and with two possible courses of action: Muslims were unable to be loyal
to British rule without betraying their faith. To save their souls, as it
were, Muslims were to engage in jihad or hijra – that is, they were to
fight or take flight.
For W. W. Hunter, this pronouncement – and those like it – did
not represent a limited, sectarian gloss on the religious ramifications of
foreign or imposed rule. It did not represent an educated, learned
pronouncement, perhaps limited to elite circles, nor did it represent
one voice (or even a few voices) making an interpretation within a long,
complex, historical tradition of such legal interpretations. For Hunter,
it reflected a clear and present danger within the then-expanding
Indian Empire. This statement (and those like it) was, in Hunter’s
eyes, not limited to sectarian, elite, or legal interpretations, and
instead, reflected a true crisis. He explained that Wahhabis influence
“seditious masses” in four key ways, through: (i) literature of treason;
(ii) central propaganda at Patna; (iii) missionizing/missionaries; and
(iv) permanent settlements in Bengal. 79 We have returned, then, to
the concerns raised by Hunter and the Magistrate of Patna, above:
Wahhabis were, they thought, openly preaching sedition and treason
to the masses, and because the law is so clear – and Muslims so clearly
of one mind – the spread of the requirement to rebel was not to be
taken lightly. In this understanding, how could Muslims be anything
but disloyal?
SUSPECT SUBJECTS
69
Hunter did not limit his concern with Muslim sedition, treason, and
rebellion to the interpretations of others, or of Muslims themselves.
He offered a lengthy interpretation of his own on the nature of the
Qur’an, stating:
The plain meaning of the Kurań is, that the followers of Isla´m
shall reduce the whole earth to obedience, giving to the conquered
the choice of conversion, of a submission almost amounting to
slavery, or of death. The Kurań was written, however, to suit, not
the exigencies of a modern nation, but the local necessities of a
warring Arabian tribe in its successive vicissitudes as a persecuted,
an aggressive, and a triumphant sect. The rugged hostility and
fanaticism of the Kurań have been smoothed down by many
generations of scholiasts and interpreters; and from its one-sided,
passionate bigotry, a not unsymmetrical system of civil polity has
evolved. Many of the Prophet’s precepts on Holy War have,
however, found their way unaltered into the formulated
Muhammadan Law. 80
Hunter conceived a “rugged hostility and fanaticism” as endemically
Qur’anic, but which had, over time, been domesticated by the
generations of Muslim scholars that succeeded its appearance and
promulgation. This domestication did not apply, however, to the arena
of jihad: the original harshness of the text remains unchanged, to
Hunter’s conceptualization and interpretation, when it comes to this
particular concept. Despite his almost crass description of the text as
hostile and bent toward the fanatical, Hunter held that it was open to
interpretation, and he clearly insinuated that Muslims adapted it to
modern eras, thereby creating, in his terms, a “civil polity.” Put
differently, Hunter explained the historical context of the Qur’an,
imagined that Muslims had worked to interpret it so as to make it fit an
evolving modern era, and yet maintained that Muhammad’s
conceptualizations of Holy War persisted, without alteration, in
contemporary Muslim law.81
In light of his various roles as a British subject, “demi-official,”82 and
later official Hunter would be concerned in numerous publications with
the potential for rebellions, revolts, uprisings, dissatisfaction, and
dissent in the colony and Empire. In the case of Indian Musalmans, his
70
INDIAN MUSLIM MINORITIES AND THE 1857 REBELLION
roles as historian and statistician of regions undergoing shifts in British
control would narrow his vision, and structure his writing, to focus on
efficiencies of empire. Similarly, war is a common enemy of rulers, and
avoiding it was a preoccupation of British colonial and imperial powers;
thus, we may find Hunter’s focus on jihad unremarkable as well.
However, holy war as a divinely inspired or divinely mandated act of
devotion poses a distinct challenge to an author looking, as his
dedication, preface, and introduction suggested, to:
bring out in clear relief the past history and present requirements
of a persistently belligerent class – of a class whom successive
Governments have declared to be a source of permanent danger to
the Indian Empire.83
Muslims were a permanent danger, and his work was set up to illuminate
courses of actions, what he termed “present requirements.” Part of
illuminating the problem was to focus, with a clear eye, on holy war –
the unaltered words of the Prophet, evidence of Islam’s requirement of
submission to the point of slavery, and the permanent danger to the
Empire.
In his conclusions, Hunter asserted that Indian Muslims held, at their
core, religious beliefs that demanded fight or flight responses to foreign
rule. And the idea of holy war had a special purveyor: Wahhabis. Hunter
commented, “Indian Wahhabis are extreme Dissenters,” comparing them
to “Anabaptists, 5th monarchy men [. . .] Communists and Red
Republicans in politics. ”84 He added that Wahhabis “appeal broadly to
the masses, and their system, whether of religious or of politics, is
eminently adapted to the hopes and fears of a restless populace. ”85 Jihad
and Wahhabis – the archetype of a fanatical sect for Hunter – form a
gathering perfect storm: religious obligation, religious interpretation, and
religious resistance all neatly packaged within an exhortation to revolt.
Hunter again called attention to specific legal reasoning and
pronouncements, fatwas. He reckoned that the majority of Muslims
would follow the abovementioned legal interpretation – that is, being
ruled by infidels demanded that Muslims fight or emigrate. This
conviction did not deter Hunter from examining dissenting voices,
however. He cited two “distinct sets” of legal decisions that he claimed
“have been of late the most conspicuous in proclaiming that they are under
SUSPECT SUBJECTS
71
no religious obligation to wage war against the Queen.” 86 One of these
juridical proclamations came from Calcutta, the largest city in Bengal,
where Hunter was stationed for most of his career. This important
imperial city and trade capital had a thriving Muslim community, and
Hunter was keen to examine its interpretation. He wrote:
The Calcutta Doctors declare India to be a country of Islam [dar-
ul-islam ], and conclude that religious rebellion is therefore
unlawful. This result must be accepted as alike satisfactory to the
well-to-do Muhammadans, whom it saves from the peril of
> contributing to the Fanatical Camp on our Frontier, and gratifying
to ourselves, as proving that the Law and the Prophets can be
utilised on the side of loyalty as well as on the side of sedition. 87
The Calcutta legal decision cuts against that stated above; rather
than finding British rule to indicate a state of infidels and war, dar-ul-
harb, these legal scholars declared that India was in fact the opposite,
dar-ul-islam, a country of Islam, of peace. At a glance, the Calcutta
ruling would seem to have pleased Britons, as it offered an Islamic
pronouncement that supported their (peaceable) rule. Additionally,
one might think Britons would be pleased because Muslim elites and
leaders sought to stem those Muslims who thought otherwise – the
Calcutta ruling ought to have marked these Muslims as loyal
supporters, if not outright allies. For Hunter, while the fatwa was a
positive sign for the British, its origin demanded a strenuous
qualification to its legitimacy: it reflected the opinion of “well-to-do”
Muslims, and not, as he continued on to state, “the Fanatical masses,”
the majority of Indian Muslims. 88
Hunter chose which Muslim authorities and authoritative texts
carried weight and dismissed the very evidence he seemed to seek – and,
as a result, he failed to identify the possibility of loyal Muslims. Despite
commending this ruling and suggesting it was to be regarded well by his
fellow Britons, he forcefully doubted its efficacy and reach. He argued,
“It would be a political blunder for us to accept without inquiry the
views of the Muhammadan Literary Society of Calcutta as those of the
Indian Musalmans.” 89 The Muslims who sought out a fatwa seeking to
clarify the status of British India in the eyes of traditional Islamic law
were precisely the Muslims whose statements and findings were to be
72
INDIAN MUSLIM MINORITIES AND THE 1857 REBELLION
interrogated. These elite, learned Muslims could not represent most
Muslims, let alone all Muslims in Hunter’s view.
As Hunter suggested the Mohamedan Literary Society maintained
only limited appeal and cache, he simultaneously proposed that this
fatwa would fall upon deaf ears precisely because it was logical and
reasoned. Hunter reasoned, “Extreme zealots of the Wahabi Sect cannot
be expected to listen to reason of any sort, yet there is a vast body of
Muhammadans, who would be guided by a really authoritative
exposition of their Sacred Law.” 90 The Wahhabis Hunter both feared
and respected represent the power of literalism: in their extremism,
they were unreasonable, but in their authoritativeness, they possessed a
clarity that appealed to the vast majority of Muslims. The Calcutta
decision might be correct, or at least satisfactory, but it demonstrated
neither a legal truth nor a solid anti-rebellion strategy, instead
providing evidence that elite Muslims might be different from the
masses and that the varied religious tradition could be used to either
support or refute holy war.
Hunter’s work in the remainder of this chapter – and the book itself,
for that matter – looked to investigate the effects of zealotry on the
masses.
I propose, therefore, to scrutinize the Sunni Decisions with a view
to ascertaining the effect which they will have on the more zealous
Muhammadans; men with whom the sense of religious duty is the
rule of life, and whose minds are uninfluenced either by fear or
danger or by habits of prosperous ease [. . .] For it is no use shutting
our eyes to the fact that a larger proportion of our Muhammadan subjects
belong to this class. 91
The majority of Muslims were fanatics: their religious duties, Hunter
argued, ruled their lives, which were therefore unencumbered by fear,
danger, or even prosperity. This is how Hunter questioned the motives
and authenticity of the elite Muslims who procured a ruling that
appeared to favor British rule. Favorable ruling aside, their elite status –
their “prosperous ease” – did not guard against the inherent zealotry of
their co-religionists.
Hunter’s assertions, once again, do not merely represent one Briton’s
opinion; as Gottschalk and Greenberg point out, he, “like many other
SUSPECT SUBJECTS
73
Britons, collapsed diverse Muslim movements seeking divergent goals
in disparate parts of India into the category ‘Wahhabi.’”92 Zealotry, in
Hunter’s writing, became identified with either Wahhabi movements
or Wahhabi influence, which in turn were enmeshed with the Great
Rebellion – and the lingering threat of insurrection posed by Muslims
even after the Rebellion was put down. The proportion of the population
with which Hunter was concerned, he insisted, was zealous, “uninfluenced
by fear or danger or prosperous ease;” their zealotry relied upon the undue
influence and patent appeal of Wahhabi ideology, even if Hunter could not
demonstrate what Wahhabis were.
The fascination with the potential rebels, the inherent disloyalty, and
a religious propensity and obligation toward revolt became the central
concern for Hunter as the Indian Musalmans continues. Where he had
easily pinned Muslims as acting on the basis of religion earlier in the
text, he portrayed the British forces as British or English, with more
particular references directed toward official positions (e.g., magistrate,
registrar). However, as Hunter approached the climax of his narrative,
he began to reference Indian Muslims as threats because they were
opposed to British, Christian rule; he posited, in other words, a clash of
civilizations in the same sections in which he interrogated Muslim legal
decisions. Despite having just cited a favorable fatwa, issued by the
Calcutta law doctors, he lamented, “Yet the whole country continues to
furnish money and men to the forlorn Hope of Isla´m on our Frontier, and
persists in its bloodstained protest against Christian Rule.”93
He added, “I am sorry to say that the effect of the Decision of the
Calcutta Society on this numerous and dangerous class will be nil.” 94
The favorable fatwa is meaningless in this conceptualization: it cannot
influence Muslims, both because they are dangerous and because the
ruling, he later declared, was “erroneous.”95
Favorable Ruling, Unfavorable Interpretation
The Calcutta fatwa became a fulcrum in Hunter’s analysis. He quoted it
at length, and then systematically refuted it, often relying upon and
preferring his own glosses of texts. The original fatwa was issued because
the Mahomedan Literary Society of Calcutta commissioned the decision.
While legal rulings are often offered by legal scholars (here, muftis) on
critical issues without much prodding, asking a question of a legal
74
INDIAN MUSLIM MINORITIES AND THE 1857 REBELLION
scholar is a standard Muslim approach; the vast tableau of Islamic law
(shari’a and fiqh) has been woven, over time, precisely because Muslims
of various standing have sought out rulings as new situation
s, locations,
or innovations arose. This is to say that the Mahomedan Literary Society
was not acting strangely, uniquely, or even distinctively in seeking a
ruling on an issue facing them in their time. However, it should also be
noted that the ability to do so on such a hefty matter indicates elite
status, and the publication of these results similarly underscores the
relative power and prestige of this organization.
Moulvie (maulvi) Abdool Luteef Khan Bahadoor (d. 1893)96
founded the Mahomedan Literary Society of Calcutta, and he hosted
monthly meetings of the group at his home; the purpose of this learned
society was to “impart useful information to the higher and educated
classes of the Mahomedan community” in “Oordoo, Persian, Arabic,
and English.” 97 The maulvi, like many other elite Bengalis, held
various positions within British organizations, including the Bengal
Management Council and the University of Calcutta’s examination
board. The British awarded him two titles for his service and
achievements. The first was the title Khan Bahadoor, an adopted and
adapted titular role customary in pre-imperial South Asia, especially
Hyderabad; the second was Nawab, similarly a vestige of Mughal reign,
later appropriated by British imperial forces and awarded to
indigenous subjects of the Crown, much akin to the peerage system
in the United Kingdom. 98 The titles themselves are notable,
exemplifying how the British maintained and used, for their own
purposes, extant titular and honorific systems in order to mark locals as
exemplary subjects in vernacular systems that communicated imperial
prestige as well as demarcate indigeneity. Abdool Luteef was an elite
Muslim, no doubt, but also one whose loyalty to the Crown was noted.
Yet, despite Luteef’s formal – and positive – relationship with British
imperialism, Sir W. W. Hunter dismissed, as we will see, the findings
of his society’s inquiry.
In November 1870, Abdool Luteef hosted the regular meeting of the
Mahomedan Literary Society. The purpose of this meeting was to ask a
most pressing question – namely, whether Muslims in India were
required by religious law to rebel against the British. In the preface to
published meeting proceedings, the anonymous author and meeting
secretary noted that such a meeting was held because,
SUSPECT SUBJECTS
Indian Muslim Minorities and the 1857 Rebellion Page 12