75
Some time ago a letter appeared in the English Newspapers signed
by a Mahomedan Officer of Government employed at Bhagulpore,
in which he congratulated himself and the public in having made
the discovery that the followers of Islam are not bound by their
Religion to rebel against the British Government. It was indeed as
if the Mahomedan world were ignorant of that fact before; and that
Mahomedans, who had in blindness been hatching treason and
rebellion against their beneficent rulers, were to refrain hereafter
on behind blessed with this new flood of light. 99
The Society mentioned not Anglo-Christian Britons who had accused
Muslims of being disloyal, but rather, a Muslim officer; the Society’s
minutes sarcastically declared that, now that Muslims know they need
not be disloyal, they could go on living “blessed with this new flood of
light.”
But while the Society chaffed at the very notion that such a
conversation would be necessary at all, scoffing at the Muslim officer’s
so-called findings, they proceeded to entertain this debate, seemingly
so that they could immediately refute it. The author of the meeting
minutes commented that the Society felt it “imperative” to hold a
“public exposition of Mahomedan Law” in “which it should be
proclaimed, that such a question as that which elicited the fatwah was
not one which a good Mahomedan in British India should for a
moment entertain.” 100 The Mahomedan Literary Society moved
toward rectifying how Muslims were misconstrued by requesting a
formal legal ruling (a fatwa), opting to weigh in on an issue they clearly
thought was flimsy and iniquitous.
The November 1870 meeting included maulvi Karamat Ali, a Hanafi
jurist, and his findings on the issue at hand, namely whether British
India was dar-ul-harb (country of war) or dar-ul-islam (country of peace or
Islam101), which in turn would indicate whether or not Muslims would
be compelled to rebel. He began with the ruling, stating “that,
according to Mahomedan law, British India is Darul Islam, and that it is
not lawful for the Mahomedans of British India to make Jihad.” 102
Karamat Ali added that “ignorant Mahomedans” had posed the question
and that he only answered it at the Mahomedan Literary Society’s
insistence. Even before beginning his ruling, the jurist indicated his low
opinion of the question itself, and upon ruling, dismissed its legal
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INDIAN MUSLIM MINORITIES AND THE 1857 REBELLION
premise. The mufti unmistakably ruled that Muslim subjects of the
Crown were not permitted to wage religious war upon their sovereigns.
Despite this clarity of law and dismissal of the premise, he continued and
observed that the conditions for jihad had not been met, citing three
primary texts: “Fatawa Alamgeeree” ( fata¯wa¯ alamgı¯rı¯, a seventeenth-
century text); “Darrul Mukhtar” (dar al-mukhar, a sixteenth-century text
by Moulana Mahomed Alaudeen Haskafee Bin Shaikh Ali, mufti of
Damascus); and “Fusool Imadee” ( fusu¯l imadı¯, c. 1254, by Abul Fatah
˙
Abdoor Raheem Bin Ali Bakir Bin Abdool Jaleel Murghinanee of
Samarcand). 103
Mere months later, in its original printing in 1871 and in the more
widely circulated 1872 edition, W. W. Hunter described this fatwa as
deeply inadequate, and not as a dismissal of the necessity of jihad.
Moreover, Hunter imagined not only that the ruling of Karamat Ali
would be insufficient to sway the “numerous and dangerous class,”104
but also that it was incorrect.
Its [the Mahomedan Literary Society’s pamphlet] object is to prove
that India is a Country of Islam and that THEREFORE Religious
Rebellion is unlawful for Muhammadan subjects. Significantly
enough, the word THEREFORE is omitted [. . .] still more
significantly, the two most important Decisions, that of the Mecca
Doctors and of Maulvi Abu-ul-Hakk, confine themselves to
affirming that India is a Country of Islam, and most carefully avoid
drawing the inference that rebellion is therefore unlawful.105
At first blush, Hunter simply stated that two others, the Meccan and an
additional maulvi Abu-ul-Hakk supported the Calcutta decision. But, he
immediately countered this by adding:
The truth is, according to Muhammadan law, the opposite
conclusion would be correct, and the Mecca Doctors well knew
this when they gave their decision. They affirm that India is a
Country of Islam, and leave it to the Faithful to conclude that for
this very reason they ought to strive, by war or otherwise, to drive
out the Infidels who have usurped the Government, and who in a
hundred ways have interfered with the practices and procedure,
both legal and religious, of the former Muhammadan Rules.106
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77
Thus Hunter – a Christian, a Briton – asserted his own preeminence as
an interpreter of Islamic law over and above the trained, Muslim expert,
maulvi Karamat Ali.
He claimed that a ruling in which British India is, in fact, a country
of Islam (dar-ul-islam) begged action: because the country is dar-ul-islam
one must fight (presumably, to maintain this status). He directly took
issue with Karamat Ali’s fatwa, arguing:
The Pamphlet argues that India is still a Country of Islam because
it was so under the Muhammadan Rule, and that, although now
conquered by an infidel race, yet the three conditions under which
it would have become a Country of the Enemy (Daŕ al-Harb,
literally House of Strife) do not apply to it. These three conditions
were laid down by the greatest authority of the Muhammadan
Law, Abu Hanifa. The Tract quotes them, however, not from one of
the older and universally received works, but from the Fata´wi-i-
Alamgıŕıóf the reign of Aurangzeb. This latter text materially
differs from the earlier works; and it is an unquestionable fact that
the conditions, as laid down by Abu Hanifa and by the old
authoritative law-books, do apply to India, and that, according to
the orthodox doctrine, India is a Country of the Enemy. 107
These are attitudes that formed a majority mentality of Orientalist
scholarship: the quest for origins and a prioritization of the original are
hallmarks of scholarship about religion in the nineteenth century. 108
But the fact remains: Hunter asserted that his gloss of Muslim legal
and religious texts was more accurate than that of a maulvi, a
religiously trained expert who had, in fact, been called upon by Indian
Muslims precisely because of his proficiency. Inherent in this conceit is,
no doubt, the quest for origins and authenticity; perfectly authentic
iterations of Islam from within a South Asian milieu simply do not rate
in comparison to other “universally received” (i.e., central to Islam,
perhaps Arabic or Middle Eastern) works. While other observers have
noted the tension between Islam’s vernacular traditions and a scholarly
and imperial insistence on Arabia as central,109 Hunter’s w
ork is
perplexing insofar as it takes Indian Muslims as uniquely concerning as
well as distinctive, but still renders Indic texts as inferior, unorthodox,
and untrustworthy.
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INDIAN MUSLIM MINORITIES AND THE 1857 REBELLION
Despite holding Muslims suspect, Hunter deployed Abu Hanifa, “the
greatest authority,” by his estimation. 110 Abu Hanifa (d. 767) is the
namesake of the Sunni Hanafi madhhab or legal school, and the Hanafi
madhhab he inspired still maintains primary influence in Turkey,
Central, and South Asia. Maulvi Karamat Ali is named as a “Hanafee”
jurist in the original publication of the Mahomedan Literary Society.111
Hunter thus cited Abu Hanifa against the Hanafi maulvi. Hunter did not
merely offer the comment above, but also demonstrated how he came to
such a reading by laying out a side-by-side comparison, of the original
text and the text cited by Karamat Ali. Hunter, taking both space and
careful explication, laid out key passages from the pamphlet of the
Mahomedan Literary Society (Karamat Ali’s fatwa), which cited the
Fata´wi-i-Alamgıŕıánd those found in “Sirajiyah Imadiyah and all texts
older than the Fata´wi-i-Alamgıŕı´.” 112 Hunter used the pamphlet’s
citation of the text from Aurangzeb’s era against those texts that were
older, highlighting his emphasis on the original as the authentic.
Hunter also offered his own translations and religious commentary as
it suited his argument and interrogation of text; we could say that
Hunter provided a scholarly and comparative close reading of these texts.
He took as an especially meaningful matter the compared lines about
when holy war (jihad) is called for based upon whether or not Muslims
and recognized minorities (i.e., zimmi or dhimmı¯) enjoyed religious
freedoms. He noted that the pamphlet cited the “Fata´wi-i-Alamgıŕı´,”
which ordains jihad when “no Musalman is found in the enjoyment of
religious liberty, nor a Zimmi (an infidel who has accepted the terms of
permanent subjection to Musalman Rule) under the same terms as he
enjoyed under the Government of Islam.” 113 He then compared that
phrase to one in “an older text” which stated that jihad was ordained
“when neither Musalmans nor Zimmis enjoy the Amań-i-a´wwal.”114
Hunter then defined amań-i-a´wwal as “religious liberty,” following
noted Orientalist scholar Henry Ferdinand Blochmann (d. 1878 CE).115
But, religious liberty, he opined, did not adequately define the term.
‘Amań’ literally signifies security, and the meaning of Amań-i-
a´wwal is distinctly laid down in the Ja´mi’-ur-rumuź as implying
the whole religious security and full status which the
Muhammadans formerly enjoyed under their own Rule [. . .] The
Amań, or religious status, which the Muhammadans now enjoy, is
SUSPECT SUBJECTS
79
entirely dependent on the will of their Christian rulers, and they
enjoy it only in such a degree as we choose to grant. This degree falls
far short of the full religious status which they formerly
possessed.” 116
Hunter focused on the conditionality of religious freedom in defining
amań-i-a´wwal. He argued that under their own rule – that is, during the
Mughal Empire – religious liberty would have been a given; however,
under British rule, Muslims find themselves at the will of Christians.
Therefore, religious liberty is not absolute but qualified. The conditional
nature of religious liberty compels jihad.
Hunter then forcefully argued that whether British India was dar-ul-
islam or dar-ul-harb would have little effect on the obligation of Muslims
to rebel.
If India were still de jure a Country of Islam, this portion of our
Musalman subjects would feel compelled to rise against us, and to
make it a Country of Islam de facto. It is written in all the law
books: ‘If Infidels press hard or occupy a town in Country of
Islam, 117 it is holy incumbent118 on every Muhammadan man,
woman, and child to hurt and drive away the Infidel Ruler.’ This is
so established a rule that the King of Bokhaŕa was compelled by
his subjects to declare Holy War against the Russians as soon as
they entered the Country of Islam. Indeed, if India were still a
Country of the Faithful, every day some ground of rebellion would
arise. Our religious toleration would itself constitute a capital
crime. 119
Interestingly, Hunter cited the annexation and colonization of Russia in
Central Asia as a comparative, using the actions of Bukhari Muslims
(in contemporary Uzbekistan) to demonstrate plausible actions for
Indian Muslims. In this case the king, analogous to the titular Mughal
emperor and lesser officials, was “compelled by his subjects” to revolt.
This seems to suggest that the king himself was both powerless against
the will of the religious mass and inclined to agree that it was religiously
responsible to revolt. Similarly, it is notable that Hunter included
evidence that implicated women and children, given typical British and
Orientalist depictions of women, in particular, as in need of help – these
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INDIAN MUSLIM MINORITIES AND THE 1857 REBELLION
women are not in need of help, but capable and compelled to revolt. 120 It
is the final line that demands real attention, however. Hunter asserted
that tolerance – the gold standard for British rule, civilizational maturity,
and even kindness – would itself cause grave dangers. Hunter argued
essentially that whether India were a “Country of the Faithful” or a
“Country of the Enemy,” 121 Indian Muslims would find legal recourse to
rebel, and therefore, even more worrisome, would be under religious
obligation to do so.
Hunter continued by stating flatly his concerns with the rulings of
both the Meccan jurists and of Karamat Ali, represented in the
Mohamedan Literary Society’s pamphlet.
I therefore view with extreme suspicion the decision of the Doctors
at Mecca, that stronghold of fanaticism and intolerant zeal, when
they declare that India is a Country of Islam, but who, instead
of deducing therefrom, as the Calcutta Muhammadan Literary
Society infer, that rebellion is therefore unlawful, leave it to their
Indian co-religionists to draw the opposite conclusion, – namely,
that rebellion is therefore incumbent. 122
Hunter cast aspersion on the Meccan jurists and suggested that their
ruling only superficially appeared safe and encouraging for Britons, but
in reality encouraged rebellion. He based his arguments on claims that
the region was filled with zealotry and fanaticism; in such a context,
what appeared reasonable – even favorable – must be an illusion, which
must, as he suggested, be viewed with “extreme suspicion.” Hunter’s
comments dismiss the Calcutta decision, even as he admitted that
some “easy going Muhammadans” would find the “erroneous” decision
“acceptable.” 123 The easy going Muslims ceased to bear weight in such
weighty matters, and i
n any case, what they found acceptable was
roundly declared incorrect. Hunter dismissed not only the Calcuttan
decision, but also the opinions of those Muslims who supported it; he
made minor their status, influence, religious interpretations, and self-
articulation, and he prioritized literal, “fanatic” glosses as authentic and
accurate Islam in South Asia.
Of note, as well, is the absent option: flight (hijra). Earlier in Indian
Musalmans, Hunter discussed the possibility of flight as a legal response
to inappropriate governance. He wrote: “The first duty of a Musalmań is
SUSPECT SUBJECTS
81
religious rebellion; and to those who reply that such rebellion is
impracticable under the British Power, they answer that the only
alternative is Flight.”124 In the same early section, he quoted the Jama
Tafasıŕ (1867) as having proclaimed that “Flight was a stern duty.” 125 As
Indian Musalmans focuses more directly on persuading readers of
Muslims’ clear obligation to rebel, flight drops out as an alternative
negative consequence of unwanted rule. I cannot pretend to know why
this is the case, but I suggest that the conspicuous absence of flight
(hijra) supports interpreting Hunter’s work as uniformly, problemati-
cally focused on jihad. I will return to this fixation – and its
implications – in Chapter 4.
Yet, despite appearing to declare India destined for war and rebellion,
Hunter hastened to add that because the East India Company had slowly,
methodically, and incrementally established power in India, British
Rule might be secure, after all. “The truth is,” Hunter argued, “that had
we hastened by a single decade our Formal assumption of the
sovereignty, we should have been landed in a Muhammadan rising
infinitely more serious than the mutinies of 1857.” 126 Hunter claimed
that the incremental process distracted Muslims, it caught them
unaware, effectually rendering the change invisible. He wrote: “Before
India had passed into a Country of the Enemy, the duties incumbent
upon the Muhammadans in a Country of Islam had faded away.”127 The
gradual transformation from the Mughal (“Country of Islam”) to the
British (“Country of the Enemy”) rendered British Rule a “status quo”
that “the present generation of Musalmans are bound, according to their
own texts, to accept.” 128 Interestingly, however, Hunter added that
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