texts are problematic, and sometimes incorrect, and by highlighting
Hunter’s assumption that Muslims cannot be loyal.
This pair of issues in Hunter’s work – first, an assumed relationship
between literalist Wahhabism and authentic “true Islam,” and second, a
textual requirement to rebellion or jihad – are not easily separated into
102 INDIAN MUSLIM MINORITIES AND THE 1857 REBELLION
freestanding, cogent entities. However, both Hunter and Khan
constructed this dyad, and in the process they produced a framework
for understanding the Muslim subject. Khan’s Review attempted to
disrupt Hunter’s findings, but ultimately it failed to dislodge the inherent
assumptions at play in such categorizations. Sir Syed’s text successfully
dismantled Hunter’s assertions, but it fell short of questioning the question
of whether Muslims could be loyal subjects.
A Legalism of His Own: Sir Syed on Hunter’s
Use of Islamic Law
Throughout the Review, Sir Syed examined – and finally roundly
refuted – Hunter’s use of Islamic laws, be they specific fatwas or
general principles like jihad or zakat (charity). He offered line-by-line
corrections of Hunter’s use of fatwas, specifically in terms of literal
meaning and intention. Sir Syed criticized Hunter for misquoting
Maulvi Ismail of Delhi’s Sira´t-ul-Mustakı´m (1818).58 He argued that
Hunter’s fixation on jihad, and his catalogs of the instances in which
jihad had been legally declared and supported by Muslims, had
nothing to do with the British at all, but instead with Sikhs,59 thereby
questioning the specific threat Muslims posed to the Crown – Hunter’s
titular concern. He offered a reading of Indian Musalmans that suggested
a fundamental, egregious misread of the issues at stake:
It appears the learned doctor has mistaken the word Ijteha´d, which
means ‘to use one’s own reason and understanding,’ for jehad, and
consequently falls into the error of supposing that it relates to
entering on religious war. 60
Sir Syed accused Hunter of mistaking the principle of engaged
interpretation (ijtiha¯d) with waging religious war ( jiha¯d), principles
represented by Arabic terms that derive from the same root but which
have rather different meanings. He effectively accused Hunter of missing
the point, and of basing his gloss on such an issue so pressing to his own
argument on an error. This is not a benign correction; to my eyes, it is a
full-fledged attack on the veracity of Hunter’s work.
Sir Syed accordingly assessed Hunter’s use of Islamic legal categories,
moving to the characterization of dar-ul-harb and dar-ul-islam, the
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103
distinction between countries of war and peace. “It is a great mistake to
suppose that a country can only either be a Dar-ul-Islam or a Dar-ul-Harb
in the primary signification of the words, and that there is no intermediate
position,” he argued. 61 He suggested (as he had elsewhere62 and as others had similarly attested63) that, in fact, India was “both at present. ”64
Hunter’s fixation on whether the entirety of India could or would be
deemed a space in which Muslims would be forced to rebel, on the basis of
its status as a region hostile toward or supportive of Islam, did not resonate
with Khan’s understanding of the legal parameters of such distinctions.
Nor did it conform to Sir Syed’s standards of historical facticity: he
accused Hunter of manipulating information to prove his point. Hunter
used a fatwa by Shah Abdul Aziz (d. 1823), to demonstrate that India was
indeed in a state of dar-ul-harb. 65 Khan accused him of missing the second
part of Shah Abdul Aziz’s ruling, however, which defined dar-ul-harb as:
when the power of the Infidels increases to such an extent that they
can abolish or retain the ordinance of Islam according to their
pleasure, such a country is politically a country of the enemy (Dar-
ul-Harb). 66
Khan implied that this qualitative nuance – foreign rule was a nonissue
until and unless it interfered with the practice of Islam – had not
happened, and thus Hunter’s concerns were unfounded. Moreover, Hunter
used this fatwa to demonstrate that India could and should be read as a
country of the enemy in light of the official shift in 1858 in British rule,
which is to say, in the aftermath of the Great Rebellion. Thus Hunter
argued for greater vigilance after the British had decisively quashed revolt.
Khan, however, did not understand this interpretation, and pointedly
stated: “He [Hunter] also forgets the important fact that Shah Abdul Aziz
gave out the futwa, declaring India Dar-ul-Harb, during his life-time,
some fifty years ago, when none of the charges owing to which Dr. Hunter
says India became Dar-ul-Harb had taken place! ”67
Sir Syed’s objections were not limited to Hunter’s legal and historical
analysis or sources. He likewise found Hunter’s logical extrapolations of
his own conclusions to be suspect. He wondered how Hunter could
assert that India was indeed dar-ul-harb. Khan restated Hunter’s
evidence: Mahomed Wajih and Fazl-ul-Rahman claimed that Muslims
had stopped the basic practice of Islam because of India’s legal status,
104 INDIAN MUSLIM MINORITIES AND THE 1857 REBELLION
specifically mentioning that Muslims had stopped praying on Fridays.68
Sir Syed rather disagreed with these assertions, stating that there were
few requirements to make jummah prayers in any state of country, and
cited the Hanafi, Shafi’i, and Wahhabi legal traditions to demonstrate
legal continuity and consensus among these madha¯hib on this very
issue. 69 Sir Syed fundamentally stressed that Hunter had misinterpreted
what dar-ul-harb meant and how prayers – the most basic observance –
functioned. It seems that this lack of logical coherence within Indian
Musalmans was jarring to Khan, whose tone in this section noticeably
turned toward derisive.
Sir Syed appeared similarly jarred by Hunter’s insistence that in
either case – whether India was dar-ul-harb or dar-ul-islam – Muslims
could at best acquiesce to British rule. In an attempt to demonstrate
Muslims’ willingness and perhaps even theological disposition toward
living under Christian rule, he cited the Qur’an. Sir Syed quoted a
passage of which George Sale’s translation was offered in the Review:
Thou shalt surely find the most violence of all men in enmity
against the true believers to be the Jews and the idolators: and
thou shalt surely find those among them to be the most inclinable
to entertain friendship for true believers who say we are Christians.
This cometh to pass because there are priests and monks among
them, and because they are not elated with pride.70
It is worth noting that by utilizing the Qur’an, Khan rhetorically
positioned his argument about the legal and religious wonts of Muslims
over and above Hunter’s: Hunter cited only jurists, not the Qur’an
specifically. There is, in other words, an authenticity claim inherent in
<
br /> Khan’s direct use of the holy text.
He then critiqued Hunter and British rule, declaring that:
Like begets likes; and if cold acquiescence is all that Mahomedans
receive at the hands of the ruling race, Dr Hunter must not be
surprised at the cold acquiescence of the Mahomedan community.
Let us both – Christians and Mahomedans – remember and act
upon the words of Jesus Christ: ‘Therefore all things whatsoever ye
would that men should do to you, do even so to them: for this is
the law and the Prophets.’ (Matthew, Chapter VII:12)71
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105
Sir Syed employed the holy books of both Islam and Christianity in order
to demonstrate first that Muslims could willingly and happily live under
Christian rule, but second that the “golden rule” applied to all – should
Muslims be treated coldly by the British, they were apt to treat their
rulers badly as well. Such a move perhaps reflects an intention to
compare Muslims and Christians on an equal footing, a comparison that
routinely turned inimical in Hunter’s text.
Khan seemed repeatedly befuddled, asking his reader rhetorical
questions about Hunter’s misunderstandings, misreads, and mis-
appropriation of textual sources, analysis, and quotations. It is
therefore perhaps counterintuitive that Khan often did not disagree
with Hunter’s factual assertions even while he eagerly countered
Hunter’s interpretations of those facts. Sir Syed did not, for example,
deny that jihad is a real legal category for warfare; he did not attempt
to prove, as some have and continue to, that jihad properly refers to a
struggle within oneself, or nearly impossible conditions for producing
war.72 He did, however, strenuously – perhaps incredulously –
demand that Hunter account for the supposed conditions in which
Muslims’ ability to practice their religion had been so limited so as to
merit warfare. He wrote:
Now we Mahomedans of India live in this country with every sort of
religious liberty; we discharge the duties of our faith with perfect
freedom; we read our Azans [calls to prayer] as loud as we wish; we
can preach our faith on the public roads and thoroughfares as freely
as Christian missionaries preach theirs; we fearlessly write and
publish our answers to the charges laid against Islam by the
Christian clergy; and last, though not least, we make converts of
Christians to Islam without fear or prohibition.73
To back his clear assertion that Muslims in India enjoyed religious
freedom, Sir Syed cited tangible and regular examples of praxis, both the
masses who so terrified Hunter as well as of the elite Muslims Hunter
discredited. Khan’s choice to conclude this line of argument with
conversion was bold and effective. It is an undeniable demonstration that
even the most controversial of religious freedoms – the freedom to add
to their numbers, to recruit new Muslims – was safeguarded under
British rule.
106 INDIAN MUSLIM MINORITIES AND THE 1857 REBELLION
This powerfully written section of Khan’s rejoinder offered an answer
to Hunter’s titular question – an answer given in a number of ways
throughout Review. Sir Syed argued that Muslims were not bound to
rebel because the legal categories of jihad had simply not been met.
He clarified further in his answer to a hypothetical question Hunter
posed in a footnote about whether, in the event of a Muslim-led invasion
of British India, Muslim subjects would be doubly bound to rebel: first,
because they were already bound, and second, because the invaders were
Muslim and thus assured to offer a proper dar-ul-islam. 74 But Khan
allayed this reasoning altogether, and declared that British Muslims
would be “sinners” should they rebel against the English and help an
imagined Muslim invader.75 He wrote: “My reply [to this question] is
therefore that in no case would it be the religious duty of any man to
renounce the Aman [religious liberty] of the English, and render help to
the invader.” 76
Khan disputed Hunter’s assertion that Muslims were inherently
disloyal, bound by religious laws that entailed the obligation to rebel.
Instead, he celebrated the religious freedoms granted by Christian,
British rule. Hunter saw a necessary conflict with British, Christian
rulers who were imposing new laws, regulations, and norms;
fundamentally, he saw the very presence of the British Empire within
India – and former Mughal India, at that – as an inherent challenge to
Islamic law, and thus call to arms for Muslims. While Khan and Hunter
agreed on the facts – the British instituted new laws, and their presence
caused their new subjects to assess what these laws meant – they did not
arrive at the same conclusion. Hunter ultimately could not see past the
fact that categories of war, peace, and justified combat exist in Islam and,
more precisely, Islamic law. Sir Syed not only demonstrated that legal
conditions for jihad had not been met, but also argued for and from the
perspective of the lived reality of British rule.
Sir Syed noted, however, that despite these freedoms and benefits,
hypothetical questions and answers were just that – hypothetical.
“I cannot predict what the actual conduct of the Musalmans would be in
the event of an invasion of India by Mahomedan or any other power,”
and, importantly, he wondered if the British were making similar
inquiries about Hindu loyalty in the face of imagined invaders. 77 Khan
acknowledged a rift – perceived or actual – between Britons’ rule over
Muslims and their rule over Hindus, pointing toward an understanding
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107
of inequality or, at the very least, incongruity in how each religious
group related with their government. Lest we assume that he thought
the British wholly unfair or unjust, he stated: “It is not to be expected
that Mahomedans, who are made of much sterner material than Hindus,
will adapt themselves so readily to the various phases of this changing
age.” 78 Like Hunter, Sir Syed saw Muslims as a distinctive group with
categorical identity traits. In Khan’s terms, Muslims were “stern” (or at
least sterner than their Hindu counterparts) and naturally less willing or
able to adapt to British rule.
Nonetheless, where Hunter continually asserted that Britons had
both unknowingly and purposefully injured the egos and persons of
Muslims, Khan acknowledged these transgressions but denied their
import. He wrote: “enlightened Mahomedans are perfectly aware that
they cannot expect the same regard for their customs and for their
system of education from a foreign government, as they enjoyed under
rulers of their own faith.” 79 Specifically, Khan mentioned that the
abolition of the “Kaźis” (Ur., qazi, Ar. qa¯dı¯, lit., Islamic jurist) was a
˙
“grave political error” that nevertheless did not interfere with the faith.
He added, “the better class of Mahomedans had but little resp
ect for
them.” 80 There are classist assumptions at work in this sentiment, and
Sir Syed’s regal ties perhaps shine brighter here than elsewhere:
modernists like Khan often viewed qazis and other members of the
traditional Muslim ulama with contempt. However, this does not
necessarily capture the general Muslim public who sought counsel
from and trusted the legal rulings of the qazis. 81 Khan’s insistence that
enlightened and better classes of Muslims existed demonstrates a sense
of authenticity and real Islam – just as much as Hunter’s observations
make clear a sense of authenticity and real Islam. In other words,
Khan’s pronouncements assumed an authentic Muslim who placed
little value in the juridical issues raised by Hunter, and they likewise
imagined an authentic Muslim community not only of Muslims under
British rule, but of Muslims writ large.
Sir Syed asserted that some Muslims did not respect the jurists, and,
more importantly, he recognized that a change in rule would have
religious, economic, and legal ramifications. Khan’s fairly prosaic claim
that Muslims might expect less regard for their customs under new, non-
Muslim rule appealed to the reason of his (largely British) audience.
In making this claim, Sir Syed subtly argued that Muslims ought to be
108 INDIAN MUSLIM MINORITIES AND THE 1857 REBELLION
imagined as having a commonsense approach to Britons and British rule,
something that Hunter left beyond their grasp.
On Muslim Loyalty
Challenges to Hunter’s historical analysis, his problematic glosses of
Islamic law, and his over-reliance on Wahhabism comprised a part of
Khan’s Review, but he reserved his most withering critique for Hunter’s
assertions that Muslims ought to be understood as seditious and disloyal.
Sir Syed highlighted a lengthy quote in which Hunter claimed that
“fanatical” Muslims had “engaged in overt sedition,” but the “whole
Mahomedan community has been openly deliberating on their obligation
to rebel. ”82 He followed the citation with an admonishment: “Now, I have
no hesitation in saying that this is one of the most unjust, illiberal, and
insulting sentences even penned against my co-religionists. ”83
From this statement onward, Khan focused his critique of Indian
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