Musalmans on the events of the Rebellion, as well as the legal issues
that followed from it. His analysis of Hunter’s inferences about the
Rebellion centered on Hunter’s misread of plurality, nuance, and what
today we might call diversity, in belief, population, and law. Khan
ably punctured Hunter’s arguments of totality, which typifies the
conclusions of Indian Musalmans: the Muslims Hunter envisioned and
produced in that work were categorically and definitionally violent,
seditious, and suspect.
Khan’s language deviated from fashionable ideals of dispassionate
objectivity, and demonstrated anger, frustration, and occasionally
exhaustion. In one passage, he described, with increasingly bold
language, the ways in which Hunter was ill equipped to speak about
Muslims, as well as specific instances in which Hunter had done a
disservice to his subject. He wrote about Hunter’s inability to take
seriously the fatwas issued in light of the Rebellion that deemed jihad
inappropriate and undesirable. 84 He argued that Hunter was using his
“imagination” to describe history and was “utterly wrong” in his
interpretation of fatwas and jihad.85 Khan added sharply: “the learned
doctor [Hunter] has shown little discretion in not sifting more
carefully the chaff from the wheat.”86
Sir Syed addressed Hunter’s characterization of the Rebellion as
predominately Muslim by addressing the demographic data. After
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109
1857 – 8, many Indians fled areas in which there had been violence and
sought shelter in the safety of the surrounding mountainous regions;
Khan and Hunter both pointed to this fact, which others later
corroborated. 87 Hunter came to define these people as either part of the
“border tribes,” original inhabitants of the mountains, or as willing
participants in the Rebellion and jihad, especially the followers of Syed
Ahmed Barelvi (i.e., Wahhabis). Unlike Hunter, Khan identified them
as Muslims and Hindus of varying caste identities, and while neither of
our authors suggested as much, we know that those who fled also
included non-casted people (those outside the pale of Hindu orthodox
categorization) as well as Sikhs. 88
Khan not only added diversity to Hunter’s depiction, he took issue
with Hunter’s elision of such a plurality of identities. Khan argued that
the existence of such a collective, motley band speaks to the problems in
conceptualizing the Great Rebellion as jihad: “To assert, as Dr Hunter
does, that they were there [in the mountains] for the purpose of making a
religious war against the Government – composed, as their band was, of
Hindus and Mahomedans of all castes and denominations – is too absurd
for belief.”89
Hunter insisted that Hindus, non-casted Indians, and Sikhs
participated in an inimitably Muslim religious war. Sir Syed, in reply,
suggested that Hunter’s gloss on both Wahhabis and the Rebellion
failed to fully account for historical fact. He held instead that the East
India Company’s “mutinous sepoys” had caused the initial rebellion and
instigated further unrest, highlighting the British’s involvement and
participation in the events. 90 Moreover, he took great issue with the
broad strokes Hunter used to portray Wahhabi Muslims, and in turn,
Indian Muslims on the whole:
The border tribes had also a great deal to do with the many raids
and cases of kidnapping, burning and plundering of British
villages; but to lay all these atrocities at the door of Syed Ahmed’s
followers, and through them to implicate the whole of Indian
Musalmans, is monstrous in the extreme. 91
As Sir Syed established, the “border tribes” were both a motley
conglomeration of refugee Hindus and Muslims of varying castes and
denominations, as well as the autochthonous groups who had made their
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home in the mountains and foothills of the North-West Provinces for
generations.
The people of these “border tribes” or “mountain tribes” had a
reputation for violence. 92 Sir Syed readily ascribed to that perception.
At one point, he even played on English racisms to make a point about
these tribes and discredit Hunter’s assertions about Muslims:
Our author forgets the very important fact that these mountain
tribes have been turbulent from time immemorial, that they have
never allowed any peace to any nation living on their frontiers,
whether so-called infidels or Musalmans; that they fought
indiscriminately with the Mahomedan Emperors of Delhi, and
with the Sikhs in Punjab. Like the Irishman at a fair, it mattered
little to them who it was as long as it was someone to fight. 93
Like the Irish, the mountain tribes were thirsty for fights; like the
British with respect to the Irish, Khan and his Muslim compatriots were
fundamentally unlike those from mountain tribes. Syed Ahmad Khan
thus traded on extant imperial racisms in order to prove his point and,
perhaps, to demonstrate his ability to be British – or at least in terms of
status, minoritization, and racialization (issues to which we will return
below).
Not only did Sir Syed work to establish common ground with Britons
by adopting a shared racism, he also highlighted Islamic legal sources,
notably absent in Hunter’s work, that spoke directly to Christian-
Muslim relationships. “Mahomed himself ordered his staunchest
followers to take refuge in the Christian kingdom of Abyssinia,” Khan
wrote, asserting that Hunter’s claims were “therefore as untrue as it is
uncalled for” to say that “zealous Mahomedans could not remain quietly
in British territory.” 94
Hunter thus missed key texts and misused others: Khan specifically
argued against Hunter’s use of Islamic texts, especially fatwas, in Indian
Musalmans. He lamented:
Now, I frankly confess that I am at a loss what to think of
Dr Hunter. I can scarcely believe that he intended to deceive or
mislead his readers; but at the same time, I can hardly credit him
with such gross ignorance as is here evinced.95
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Roughly halfway into his Review, Sir Syed admitted to his readers that he
did not know exactly what to make of Hunter’s piece. He insisted that
Hunter was too erudite to have made such glaring errors in haste or in
ignorance, but perhaps too respected and well-known to intentionally
deceive his reader. It is equally possible, of course, that Sir Syed here
respectfully calls these very appellatives into question: if Hunter was so
learned and commanded such cachet, how else might a reader make sense
of his glaring errors except to insinuate purposefully false or exaggerated
pretenses? Perhaps his confusion was not confusion, but a rhetorical
strategy that allowed Khan to question whether Hunter’s work should be
trusted at all. His fundamental suspicion lingers across the Review, as Khan
challenged Hunter’s attempts at reading law, his stress on Islamic legalism
and Wahhabism, and his reading of jihad as necessary and inevitable.
On Literalism, Wahhabism, and Jihad
Sir Syed was deeply concerned with Hunter’s conflations of “Wahhabi”
with “Muslim,” and of “Muslim” with “traitor.” Hunter presented a
history of Wahhabis in India, notably using language that reflects a
Protestant gloss on historicization: he called Wahhabis “reformers,” and he
referred to their revolutionary writings and actions as “reformations,”
“noble,” and “a practical amendment of morals.”96 He went on to use
the term “Crescentade” – an obvious play on “Crusade” – to refer to
the spread of Wahhabi ideas and ideals in India, especially under the
leadership of Syed Ahmed Barelvi (d. 1831). Hunter read Syed Ahmed
Barelvi as a divinely sent leader, and he argued that “Indian Waha´bis had
claimed for Sayyid Ahmad the title of the great Imam, who should thus
precede the final coming of Christ.” 97 Hunter imagined the Wahhabi
movement as a crusade (“Crescentade”) to recapture India and its first
leader, Syed Ahmed Barelvi, as a messianic figure. These conclusions –
rooted in Christian theology and uniquely dangerous to the political
leaders of India – dictated Hunter’s read on Islam. Hunter was convinced
– or at least argued convincingly – that Wahhabis were reformers bent on
(re-)establishing Islam within the borders of India, and that they would do
so using jihad, which he rendered “Religious War. ”98
Hunter first appealed to his readers to see Wahhabis as distinct from
traitors,99 then implied and finally stated outright that Wahhabis
spoke for and to the Muslim masses, which were, undoubtedly and
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by definition, religiously bound to rebel. 100 Khan dismantled these
claims, focusing on the shift in tone and terminology, and pointed
out Hunter’s sloppiness in determining who and what constituted
“legitimate” Islam. Khan wrote:
Our author cannot be consistent for even five pages. More than
this, however, he brings a charge against the religion of Islam,
which, from all that I have proved, is totally unfounded. 101
Khan, as he did elsewhere in his Review, expressed exasperation with
Hunter’s variations in tone, blatant errors, and incongruous assertions.
In order to demonstrate its pervasiveness and historical reach, Hunter
divided Wahhabi history in South Asia into five distinct periods, and
Khan addressed each period systematically in his Review.102 Sir Syed
questioned Hunter’s sources, his historical periodization, and the events
and people he prioritized within his schema. He was most critical of
Hunter’s overemphasis on Wahhabism, as Hunter repeatedly stated that
Wahhabi orthodoxy was rampant, a growing problem, and a prime
oppositional force in British India. For example, Hunter stated that
“Wahabi’s [. . .] orthodox position” spoke to the “great body of earnest
Muhammedans” in ways that moderates could not.103 Khan restated
Hunter’s sentiments as such: that Wahhabi doctrine and speeches
yielded “[their] constant recognition, both in theory and practice, of the
obligation to wage war upon all infidels.” 104
Sir Syed simultaneously dismantled Hunter’s overreliance on
Wahhabism and pointed out his misinterpretations of Wahhabis in
northern India. He insisted that Wahhabis encountered marked resistance
as well as physical endangerment under Mughal authorities, and that in
fact they had only gained extensive access to the public sphere under
British rule.
On the establishment of British rule, however, owing to the English
principle of strict religious toleration, the followers of Ahal-i-Hadis
again came to the front and preached openly and fiercely. 105
The principle of “strict religious toleration” to which Sir Syed referred is
a set of Enlightenment liberal values and formalized practices, and these
took a number of forms in the context of imperialized India. 106
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113
Queen Victoria’s Proclamation of 1858 is a pertinent illustration. 107
The Proclamation states: “none be in any wise favoured, none molested
or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that
all shall enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law.” 108
As historian of religion and South Asia C. S. Adcock suggests, the
Queen’s Proclamation encompassed the key components of religious
toleration: “freedom from persecution on religious grounds, civil
equality with respect to religious affiliation, and freedom of religious
practice.” 109 British legal and institutional policies of religious tolerance
created the space in which all members of minority religions –
including Wahhabis – who had been previously restricted found voice
and footing within India.
Khan implicated the British in fostering the development of
Wahhabi presence and influence: before their policies and principles, the
Wahhabi movement had been limited by Muslim ruling elites, the
unstated actors in this sentiment, the group to which Khan himself
belonged and which Hunter dismissed as ineffectual and unimportant
vis-à-vis the fanatic masses. Sir Syed challenged Hunter’s sense of
Wahhabi history in South Asia, arguing that the blanket acceptance of
Wahhabi interpretation by other Muslims, on which Hunter based many
of his points, was at least fraught and certainly incomplete.
Similarly, much of Hunter’s focus on Wahhabi influence in South
Asia relied on his gloss of Syed Ahmed Barelvi’s role in history and
Indian Muslim networks. Khan disputed Syed Ahmed Barelvi’s
religious role, stating that he was a “leader of jihads but [. . .] no
preacher.” 110 Khan’s pointed remark questioned whether Syed Ahmed
was a religious figure at all, let alone a proper authority. Yet still Khan
did not completely dismiss Hunter’s argument. He continued to
debate Hunter on his terms, critiquing Hunter’s gloss of Syed Ahmed
as religious leader and Wahhabi jihadi. Specifically, Khan wondered
why Hunter ignored the fact that Syed Ahmed did not pursue jihad
against the British at the same time as Syed Ahmed and his followers
declared jihad against Sikhs. 111
Khan asked how one might read Syed Ahmed as a threat to the
British if he had not taken up arms against them. Then, to demonstrate,
he discussed how Mahbub-Ali did not sign a “proclamation for religious
war” but told Bukht Khan “that the Mahomedan subjects of the British
Government could not, according to the precepts of their religion, rise
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up in arms against their rulers.” 112 Khan therefore expanded the
conversation beyond Syed Ahmed, in whom Hunter had placed such
authority. In so doing, he proved two key points. First, that Hunter’s
reliance on Wahhabism distorted his assessment of Indian Muslims
.
Second, that Indian Muslim uses of jihad were limited and had not
historically been directed at the British – even in instances that might
have lent themselves to such declarations.
The literalism of Wahhabi thought that so intrigued and frightened
Hunter was related to Hunter’s writing goals, that is, to determine
whether Muslims were bound to rebel. In Wahhabism, Hunter found
what he thought to be ironclad evidence of textual, legal, and historical
support for rebellion – simply put, jihad, religiously sanctioned holy
war. Sir Syed took these claims seriously and to task, arguing that
Hunter willfully misread the very texts he cited. Khan’s argumentative
thrust was in proving Muslims’ loyalty, in unlinking rebellion – both
broadly and the specific Great Rebellion of 1857 – from jihad, and in
ultimately suggesting that the legal requirements for declaring jihad
were nearly impossible to satisfy under British rule.
A major issue for Hunter was the relationship between declaring
jihad and the state of British India as part of the world (dar), as we saw
above. Hunter simplified the problem of obtaining permission for
jihad by suggesting that it was only about Muslims being subjected
to the rule of infidels; he cited Abu Hanifa, the famed legal scholar
around whom the Hanafi legal school emerged, and suggested
that other Muslims like Maulvi Karamat Ali had missed the point of
these legal texts entirely when they insisted that jihad was not
warranted in India. 113 According to Khan, Hunter had, for the sake of
clarity of argument, omitted the parts of the fatwa that addressed
whether jihad in India was sanctioned due to India’s status as either
dar-ul-harb (a country of war) or dar-ul-islam (a country of peace).
Discussing whether holy war was permissible and how one might
obtain permission, Khan wrote:
Had he [Hunter] added the words – ‘provided that the Musalmans
leading the jihad be not the subjects of those Infidels, living under
them in peace, and without any oppression being exercised toward
them – provided that they have no left their property and families
under the protection of such Infidels – provided that their [sic ]
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115
exists no treaty between them and the Infidels – and provided that
the Musalmans be powerful enough to be certain of success’ – had,
Indian Muslim Minorities and the 1857 Rebellion Page 18