Hubris

by Michael Isikoff

  For information on Wissam al-Zahawie’s visit to Niger, see Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, July 14, 2004, p. 124 (this report is better known as The Butler Report). The Zahawie quotes come from e-mails he sent the authors. The account of the U.S. intelligence community’s handling of the Niger intelligence comes from SSCI Report, pp. 36–51. For the CPD employee’s quote regarding the request from the vice president’s office, a confidential interview.

  The account of Joseph and Valerie Wilson’s involvement in the Niger trip is based on the SSCI Report, confidential interviews with CIA officials and others, interviews with Joseph Wilson and Doug Rohn, and Rohn’s memo, which was released by the State Department under the Freedom of Information Act. Wilson’s own account is in Joseph Wilson, The Politics of Truth: Inside the Lies That Led to War and Betrayed My Wife’s CIA Identity (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004), pp. 39–43. His trip to Niger and his subsequent debriefing are covered in the SSCI Report and The Politics of Truth. The INR memo, “Niger: Sale of Uranium to Iraq Is Unlikely,” was obtained by Judicial Watch under the Freedom of Information Act. The summation sent to Armitage was released under a FOIA request by the authors. The quotes from Chouet come from e-mail exchanges with the authors. For Murray’s “Eiffel Tower” cable, a confidential interview. The British white paper on Iraq’s WMDs can be found at www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk/content/dos/dos_1_0055to0107.pdf.

  CHAPTER 6: THE SECRET DIGGERS

  The account of the Feith slide show is based on copies of the slides obtained by the authors from the office of Carl Levin and SSCI Report, pp. 309–312. For the FBI report on Atta’s family, a confidential interview. The CIA and FBI investigations of the Atta-in-Prague charge are drawn from Michael Isikoff, “The Phantom Link to Iraq,” Newsweek, May 6, 2002, and 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 228–229, 522; and from confidential interviews with CIA and FBI investigators. The reference to Ahmad Hikmat Shakir can be found in the 9/11 Commission Report on page 519. The 9/11 Commission’s finding regarding the alleged bin Laden meeting at a farm in Sudan is explained in its report, p. 468.

  For Donald Rumsfeld’s meeting with influential Washingtonians, a confidential interview with a participant. For Hans Blix remark, Lawrence Freedman, “War in Iraq: Selling the Threat,” Survival, Summer 2004. For an account of what happened—or didn’t happen—with al-Midhar and al-Hazmi, two of the 9/11 hijackers, see 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 266–272. The report is also the source for Wolfowitz’s charge that the CIA lacked imagination in dealing with terrorism, pp. 335–336. The accounts of Feith at White House meetings are based on confidential interviews with White House and State Department officials. For Feith’s dealings with other government officials, confidential interviews. The account of Feith’s intelligence unit is based on interviews with F. Michael Maloof, Thomas Wilson, and a confidential INC source, and the SSCI Report, pp. 307–312, 362–364. The SSCI Report covers the “Iraq and al-Qaida” study on pp. 305–306, and it refers to the CIA ombudsman and possible politicization of intelligence on pp. 359–361. Feith’s comments on the competing theories of intelligence are from an interview with the authors.

  CHAPTER 7: A TALE OF TWO SOURCES

  The account of the assassination plot against George H. W. Bush and the subsequent fate of the plotters is based on interviews with Edward (“Skip”) Gnehm and a confidential government source. For Armey’s reaction to Bush’s comment, interview with Armey. See also Paul Quinn-Judge, “CIA Report Casts Doubt on Kuwait Assertion of Plot on Bush,” The Boston Globe, May 27, 1993, and Seymour Hersh, “A Case Not Closed,” The New Yorker, November 11, 1993. For Bush’s breakfast with congressional leaders, confidential interview. The account of the September 24, 2002, hearing is based on interviews with Joseph Biden and Chuck Hagel and confidential interviews with other participants.

  The story of Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi is based on confidential interviews with senior FBI and CIA officials. The State Department’s 2001 human rights report can be found at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/. The February 2002 DIA memo on al-Libi was released by Levin in October 2005. It can be found at levin.senate.gov/newsroom/ release.cfm?id=248339. See also Michael Hirsh, John Barry, and Daniel Klaidman, “A Tortured Debate,” Newsweek, June 21, 2004; Michael Isikoff, “Forget the Poisons and Deadly Gases,” Newsweek, July 5, 2004; and Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, “Al-Libi’s Tall Tales,” Newsweek.com, November 10, 2005.

  For Armey’s briefing with Cheney, interviews with Armey. The policy briefings for House Democrats were described by Henry Waxman in an interview. He shared his notes from these sessions with the authors. The story of the Biden-Lugar-Hagel resolution and Dick Gephardt’s role is based on interviews with Biden, Hagel, Lott, and Gephardt, and confidential interviews with congressional staffers. For Bush’s order to Lott, see Herding Cats, p. 240.

  The tale of Curveball is based on interviews with Drumheller and a confidential CIA source and on the accounts in the SSCI Report, pp. 152–154, and Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States (2005), pp. 83–85 (hereinafter Robb-Silberman Report). See also Bob Drogin and John Goetz, “How U.S. Fell Under the Spell of ‘Curveball’,” Los Angeles Times, November 20, 2005.

  CHAPTER 8: BENT WITH THE WIND

  Peter Zimmerman’s reaction to the NIE is based on interviews with him. Portions of the NIE were declassified by the White House in July 2003. They can be found at www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_cr/h072103.htm. For the quote from the unnamed Energy Department official—“DOE did not want to come out before the war”—see Robb-Silberman Report, p. 75. For the intelligence analyst’s quote on the prewar perspective of intelligence analysts, SSCI Report, p. 505. For Pillar’s observations regarding pressure on analysts, Paul Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, March–April 2006. Simon Dodge’s actions regarding the NIE and the Niger charge and Robert Walpole’s decision to include it are referenced in the SSCI Report, pp. 51–54. For the WMD Commission report quote, Robb-Silberman Report, p. 14.

  Graham’s reaction to the NIE and his and Levin’s request for a declassified white paper are based on interviews with Graham and Levin and Intelligence Matters, pp. 180–181. For Pillar’s role in drafting the CIA white paper, interviews with Pillar. The CIA white paper can be found at www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm.

  Graham’s response to the CIA white paper comes from interviews with Graham; Intelligence Matters, p. 185; and Bob Graham, “What I Knew Before the Invasion,” The Washington Post, November 20, 2005. For Levin’s reaction to the CIA letter, an interview with Levin. The CIA letter on Saddam, terrorists, and WMDs can be found at www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd.htm. It cites the October 2, 2002, exchange between Levin and John McLaughlin. For Tenet calling a New York Times reporter, Levin interview and a confidential interview with a Times reporter.

  The account of the drafting of Bush’s Cincinnati speech is based on interviews with Gibson and another White House speechwriter and on SSCI Report, pp. 55–57. For McLaughlin’s October 2 testimony, SSCI Report, p. 54. Walpole’s presence at that hearing comes from an interview with a confidential CIA official. For Levine in the Situation Room, interviews with Levine.

  The account of Elisabetta Burba’s meeting with Martino and her subsequent dealings with editors and the U.S. Embassy is based on interviews with her and Ian Kelly. For CIA station chief Jeff Castelli’s handling of the Niger documents, Drumheller interviews. (Castelli’s name was published in La Repubblica’s Niger series in October 2005.) For Brent Scowcroft’s letter to the White House regarding Joseph Wilson, an interview with Scowcroft. See also The Politics of Truth, pp. 296–97.

  CHAPTER 9: A SECRET IN THE NEVADA DESERT

  The account of the Scorpions at the Nevada training camp is based on interviews with Maguire, one of the Scorpions, Drumheller, an NSC official, Gra
ham, and a White House official. For Mohammed Abdullah al-Shahwani’s background, interviews with Maguire and one of the Scorpions. See also Marie Colvin, “Revealed: CIA’s Bungled Iraqi Coup,” The Sunday Times (London), April 2, 2000.

  For the Sufi mystic at the Marrakesh restaurant, interviews with Maguire. See also Plan of Attack, pp. 144, 210–212. For Biden’s phone call with Colin Powell, interview with Biden. For Tommy Franks’s deployment order, Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), p. 95. For Cheney’s meeting with Victor Davis Hanson, an unpublished interview with Hanson conducted by one of the authors. The account of Luis and Maguire’s conflict with other CIA officers regarding the Jordanian car operation and other Anabasis matters is based on interviews with Maguire. See also James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration (New York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 79–83.

  For Simon Dodge’s review of the Niger documents, SSCI Report, p. 58, and interview with Dodge. For Wayne White’s reaction to the documents, an interview with White. For the December 17, 2002, WINPAC paper, John Bolton’s connection to the State Department fact sheet, Dodge’s continuing efforts related to the Niger documents, the Energy Department analyst’s quote, and the WINPAC analyst’s quote about the Niger papers, SSCI Report, pp. 60–62.

  The account of the dispute within the CIA over Curveball is drawn from Robb-Silberman Report, pp. 95–101, and a confidential interview with a CIA source. The issue of the January 2003 spin tests of the aluminum tubes is covered by Robb-Silberman Report, p. 70. The IAEA meeting with Joe Turner and the quote from one participant is drawn from “How White House Embraced Suspect Iraq Arms Intelligence,” The New York Times, October 3, 2004. For Shahwani and the Scorpions in Jordan, interviews with Maguire and one of the Scorpions. For the work of the CIA’s Joint Task Force on Iraq, interviews with confidential CIA source.

  CHAPTER 10: THE FINAL PITCH

  The account of the drafting of the State of the Union address is based on interviews with Gibson and Matthew Scully and confidential interviews with other White House officials and a CIA official. SSCI Report covers the interactions between Alan Foley and Robert Joseph at pp. 64–66. See also White House press briefing by senior administration official, July 18, 2003. (This official was not identified publicly; it was Dan Bartlett, White House communications director.) For Joseph Wilson’s reaction to the State of the Union speech, The Politics of Truth, pp. 312–314.

  For the preparation of Powell’s presentation at the United Nations, interviews with Lawrence Wilkerson and confidential interviews with a State Department official and a White House official. Also SSCI Report, pp. 66–67, 366–367; “Testimony of Lawrence Wilkerson,” Senate Democratic Policy Committee hearing, June 26, 2006; Plan of Attack, pp. 288–292; and Burrough, Peretz, Rose, and Wise, “The Path to War,” Vanity Fair, May 2004. Powell’s reaction to de Villepin’s January 20 statement is based on a confidential interview with a State Department official. For the INR’s memos critiquing the draft of the Powell speech, SSCI Report, pp. 423–430.

  The account of the January 31, 2003, Bush-Blair meeting is based on a secret memo written by a Blair aide. Portions of this memo have been published; see Philippe Sands, Lawless World (London: Penguin, 2005), pp. 273–274, and Don Van Natta, Jr., “Bush Was Set on Path to War, Memo by British Adviser Says,” The New York Times, March 27, 2006. The authors have reviewed a copy of this memo.

  For Woolsey, Mohammad al-Harith, and the Pentagon intelligence officer, interviews with Woolsey; Jonathan Landay and Warren Strobel, “Former CIA Director Used Pentagon Ties to Introduce Iraqi Defector,” Knight Ridder, July 16, 2004; and SSCI Report, p. 247.

  The account of the Curveball dispute and its relation to the Powell speech is based on Robb-Silberman Report, pp. 102–105; SSCI Report, pp. 243–251; and interviews with Drumheller. For Phil Mudd’s call to Tenet and Tenet’s attempt to reach Wilkerson, interviews with Wilkerson. For Biden’s phone call with Powell, interview with Biden. For Wilkerson’s comments regarding Powell’s use of the al-Libi charge, “Testimony of Lawrence Wilkerson,” Senate Democratic Policy Committee hearing, June 26, 2006. For Powell’s comments on his UN speech, interview with the authors.

  CHAPTER 11: BEST-LAID PLANS

  The account of Wayne White’s preparation of the “No Dominoes” study is based on interviews with White and Greg Miller, “Democracy Domino Theory ‘Not Credible,’ ” Los Angeles Times, March 14, 2003. The Stiglitz and Bilmes war costs study can be found at www.2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/

  download/2006_Cost_of_War_in_Iraq_NBER.pdf. For General Tommy Franks’s use of the “lord mayor” phrase, interviews with White House official. See also Cobra II, p. 160. The account of Phase IV planning within the Third U.S. Army is based on interviews with Colonel Kevin Benson. For the preparation of the Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute study, interviews with one of the report’s coauthors and another War College source. The study can be found at www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/

  pdffiles/PUB708.pdf.

  Pillar described the post-Saddam report he prepared for the CIA in an interview and e-mail exchange. See also the transcript of a talk he gave at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C., on March 7, 2006, which can be found at www.cfr.org/publication/10097/

  intelligence_policy_and_the_war_in_iraq_rush_

  transcript_federal_news_service_inc.htm. For the description of the Future of Iraq project, interview with a State Department official; David Phillips, Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco (Westview Press, 2005), p. 128; Eric Schmitt and Joel Brinkley, “State Dept. Study Foresaw Trouble Now Plaguing Iraq,” The New York Times, October 19, 2003; and James Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” The Atlantic Monthly, January–February 2004. Murray’s continuing pursuit of Naji Sabri is based on confidential interviews with CIA officials.

  The account of Jacques Baute and the Niger documents is based on an interview with him and an e-mail exchange with Zahawie. For the DIA memo sent to Rumsfeld on the yellowcake charge, the WINPAC reports, and the CIA Sense of the Community Memorandum, see SSCI Report, pp. 69–71. For the Iraqi defector who provided fabricated intelligence about chemical weapons and for the CIA’s rejection of the UAV charge, see Robb-Silberman Report, pp. 128–129, 132–140. The account of Miller at the book party is based on an interview with a confidential source. For Gibson’s conversation with Sean McCormack, interview with Gibson. For Levine’s conversation with Tim Russert, interviews with Levine.

  CHAPTER 12: THE MISSING WEAPONS

  The story of the ROCKSTARS and the bombing raid targeting Saddam is based on interviews with Maguire and Cobra II, pp. 176–177, and Plan of Attack, pp. 383–399. The role of the Scorpions and the Anabasis sabotage program is drawn from interviews with Maguire and one of the Scorpions. For the celebratory dinner held by Cheney, Plan of Attack, pp. 409–412. A University of Chicago summation of what was looted from the Iraqi National Museum can be found at http://oi.uchicago.edu/OI/IRAQ/iraq.htm. See also Andrew Lawler, “Mayhem in Mesopotamia,” Science, August 1, 2003. Benson’s briefing of General William G. Webster is based on interviews with Benson. The account of the atmosphere in the White House regarding the unfound WMDs is based on interviews with Levine and four other White House officials. For Gerson’s remark on WMDs and Bush’s legacy, a confidential interview with a White House source. Carl Ford’s review of the incoming intelligence on Iraq’s WMDs is based on interviews with him.

  Victoria Clarke’s approval of Miller’s embed assignment is based on an interview with Clarke and an e-mail written by Eugene Pomeroy that was shared with the authors. For Miller in the desert, a confidential interview. Steven Erlanger’s reaction to the Miller story about the scientist in a baseball cap and the subsequent Times meeting is based on interviews with Erlanger and other Times employees. The Pomeroy e-mail quoting Colonel Richard McPhee was obtaine
d by the authors. For Gellman’s effort to follow up Miller’s story, interviews with Gellman. For Miller’s role in the transfer of Saddam’s son-in-law and her attempt to block the order recalling MET Alpha, Howard Kurtz, “Embedded Reporter’s Role in Army Unit’s Actions Questioned by Military,” The Washington Post, June 25, 2003. The account of Miller’s interactions with MET Alpha is also based on interviews with Pomeroy. A full copy of Miller’s note protesting the order recalling MET Alpha was obtained by the authors. Miller’s e-mail to John Burns about Chalabi was first disclosed in the Kurtz article mentioned above. A copy of Miller’s May 5, 2003, e-mail to Raines and Gerald Boyd was obtained by the authors.

  The account of Joseph Wilson’s appearance at the gathering of Democratic senators is based on interviews with Wilson and another participant at the meeting. For Wilson’s account of his pretrip meeting at the CIA, see The Politics of Truth, p. 14. For Paul Bremer’s orders on de-Baathification and dissolving the Iraqi Army, see L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), pp. 39–42. This account is also based on interviews with a senior NSC official and Maguire. See also Losing Iraq, pp. 143–153.

  The account of the dispute over the CIA paper on the purported bioweapons trailers is based on interviews with Ford, Albright, a senior DIA analyst, and a former weapons inspector specializing in biological weapons. For Walter Pincus’s pursuit of the Niger trip story, interviews with Pincus.

  CHAPTER 13: THE LEAKING BEGINS

  Karl Rove’s horsing around at Camp al-Sayliyah is based on Mike Allen, “President: ‘Truth’ on Arms Will Be Found,” The Washington Post, June 6, 2003. The account of Bush’s “just like the WMD we found” remark comes from a confidential interview with a White House oficial. For Bush’s conversation in Qatar about who was in charge of the WMD hunt, Massimo Calabresi and Timothy Burger, “Who Lost the WMD?,” Time, July 7, 2003. The account of David Kay taking over the WMD hunt is based on interviews with Kay. For Pincus’s continuing pursuit of the Niger trip story, interviews with Pincus. For Libby’s receiving oral reports from Marc Grossman on the Wilson trip, the CIA faxing classified documents to Libby, and Libby writing “Wilson” on the documents, see “Indictment of I. Lewis Libby,” U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, October 31, 2003, pp. 4–5 (hereinafter “Libby Indictment”). The indictment can be found at www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/osc/documents/libby