Lee's Lieutenants

by Douglas Southall Freeman

  In fairness, that blame scarcely could be put on Johnston. His orders had been drawn carelessly and had not been circulated promptly, but his general plan had been sound and his assumptions valid, except that the Federals had been able to send reinforcements from the north bank of the Chickahominy, which he had hoped high water would prevent. This error would not have deprived him of the advantage of surprise had the Confederate attack been delivered as early as Johnston’s conservative logistics had led him to anticipate. The delay of two divisions at Gillies Creek and the wait on the Williamsburg Road had not been Johnston’s fault. Even with that delay he still might have won a victory had he been informed when Longstreet went into action. Prompt reports would have offset failure to hear the sound of battle. The “acoustic shadow” which disguised the rattle of Hill’s muskets was the chief reason for the late launching of the attack by the Confederate left.

  If Johnston was not to blame for failure, who was? As early as the evening of June 1 it was alleged on the streets of Richmond that “the failure of General Huger to lead his division into action at the time appointed [was] the only reason … the left wing of the enemy was not completely destroyed.” By his report Longstreet confirmed rumor: “I have reason to believe that the affair would have been a complete success had the troops upon the right been put in position within eight hours of the proper time.” General Johnston merely rephrased Longstreet’s accusation. Huger, in answer, exposed the unreason of the charge that he was eight hours late: Longstreet himself, Huger pointed out, was not in position to commence operations at that hour. The other criticisms in the reports Huger disputed, and made efforts to have a court-martial or a court of inquiry investigate the circumstances, but in this he did not succeed.31

  Again, then, the question, whose was the fault? Huger’s record was as follows:

  1. Johnston’s orders to him on the day of battle read, “As our main force will be on your left, it will be necessary for your progress to the front to conform at first to that of General Hill. If you find no strong body in your front, it will be well to aid General Hill; but then a strong reserve should be retained to cover our right.”32 These were orders for a cautious action. Aid of Hill was not made mandatory.

  2. Huger received no information concerning the general plan of action prior to the time he started from his bivouac, and he had no notice that Longstreet was in general command on the right.

  3. At 3:00 A.M., May 31, Huger notified D. H. Hill that he would start a brigade for the Charles City Road “as soon as possible,” its commander to report to Rodes, whom he was to relieve.33

  4. When Huger’s troops reached Gillies Creek they found Longstreet’s division there. Huger’s leading brigade, intended to relieve Rodes, was not allowed priority over Longstreet in crossing the creek. Thereafter Longstreet, who asserted seniority, instructed Huger to march past and to go down the Charles City Road.

  5. As to objective, Huger stated that “[Longstreet] directed me to proceed down the Charles City Road to a designated position, and sent three brigades of his division … with the three of my division, and there await orders.” The time of his arrival at the “designated position” was stated by Huger to have been “before 4 o’clock.”34

  6. “Soon after getting into position,” Huger wrote, “General Longstreet sent for the three brigades of his division, and in a short time afterwards sent for General Armistead’s Brigade of my division…. If these troops could be engaged the rest of my division could have been engaged also, had I received orders.” In official protest Huger said if his division “did not go into action by 4 o’clock it was because General Longstreet did not require it, as it was in position and awaiting his orders.”35

  What, in contrast, was Longstreet’s record that day?

  1. Whether the fault was his or his commander’s, there was a misunderstanding of orders concerning his line of march. The plan undoubtedly was for Longstreet to advance down the Nine Mile Road, but this was not stated in the official reports of Johnston or of Longstreet. Smith’s report gave the details of the search for Longstreet, and Longstreet’s message, about 4:00 P.M., stating his disappointment in not receiving assistance from the left. Johnston sent back the report with a request that Smith eliminate all references to these incidents; he considered them as essentially matters between Longstreet and himself. Smith acquiesced, and only made the full text public twenty-two years later.36

  2. Having started for the Williamsburg Road, Longstreet chose the route that put Gillies Creek in his way. Had he moved by his left instead of by his right, he could have come out near the entrance to the Charles City Road, and would have had to cross only one small branch of Gillies Creek.

  3. At Gillies Creek Longstreet’s troops insisted on crossing before Huger. There is no evidence one way or the other that Longstreet sent anyone to expedite the march of Huger’s brigade intended for the relief of Rodes.

  4. After his troops reached the turn-out into the Charles City Road, Longstreet delayed them at that point for the passage down that road of the division that his own men had insisted on preceding at Gillies Creek.

  5. Thereafter, for reasons that were not explained officially, Longstreet dispatched three of his brigades down the Charles City Road and left only three brigades to reinforce D. H. Hill on the Williamsburg Road and to maintain liaison with Smith on the left.

  6. Longstreet’s subsequent orders to Wilcox, who commanded the three brigades sent down the Charles City Road, called on him to advance, then to countermarch, then to face about again, and finally, Wilcox reported, “to move across to the Williamsburg road….” When Longstreet complained of the delay, Wilcox added, “I reported the order and counter-orders, marches and counter-marches he had given, and that I had made in obedience to his orders.”37

  The record speaks for itself, but as neither Huger nor any of his brigadiers filed any official reports, the facts were not known for many years after the battle. Johnston prepared his report on the basis of what Longstreet narrated and, as a result, he accepted the charges against Huger without knowledge of all the circumstances. At the same time, Johnston’s sense of honor and his affection for Longstreet led him to assume responsibility for a possible misunderstanding over Longstreet’s line of advance. It is possible also that Johnston and the division commanders from the Manassas line had a camaraderie that made them defend one another and assume a certain sense of superiority to the Army of the Peninsula and to Huger’s command from Norfolk.

  Be that as it may, the Battle of Seven Pines left in widespread distrust the abilities of Huger. On the other hand, Longstreet, whose conduct at Seven Pines was most subject to question, emerged not only without blame but also with prestige increased. Now that after-discovered evidence suggests a reversal, there is danger that judgment of Longstreet, in all save one respect, may be too severe. It scarcely is reasonable to say that he marched over to the Williamsburg Road to get rid of Johnston and Smith, and to fight his own battle in his own way. The probability is that he moved southward through honest mistake in the issuance or interpretation of orders. Staff work at general headquarters on May 30-31 was about as bad is it could have been. If Longstreet’s orders were equivocal, his subsequent confusion was the result of inexperience in the logistics of a far larger command than ever he had handled in the field. The inexcusable part of Longstreet’s conduct was his successful effort to make Huger the scapegoat.

  The main battle of Seven Pines was fought on the anniversary of Beauregard’s official assignment to the command at Manassas. One year of the army’s history was written. It was a story of preparation rather than of action, a prologue to the red drama that was to begin in another month. From June 1861 to the end of May 1862 the army had grown vastly in numbers but unequally in experience. The cavalry was as yet an arm undeveloped. In the artillery service not one officer had risen to eminence. The infantry, on the other hand, had earned in marches, in charges, and in casualties the confidence of every commander. So vali
ant, so willing was it that the tactics of the army were based on infantry assaults. Some of the general officers were too readily disposed to employ the infantry in the discharge of tasks that should have devolved on the artillery.

  Although there had been but two major battles, in neither of which the entire army had been engaged, attrition and transfer had removed in twelve months many of the leaders to whom the South, at the time of secession, had looked with confidence. Brilliant Robert Selden Garnett, aggressive Bernard Bee, chivalrous Francis Bartow, and courtly Philip St. George Cocke were dead. Bonham had resigned. Beauregard, Van Dorn, and Kirby Smith had been sent to other scenes of action. Huger had lost much of his reputation. Shanks Evans was in South Carolina. Jackson and Ewell were detached and were fighting a dramatic campaign in the Shenandoah Valley. Jubal Early, Wade Hampton, and Robert Rodes were suffering from wounds. Johnston Pettigrew was a prisoner of war. Hatton was newly fallen. Seven colonels of the line had been killed in action. Of the twelve brigade commanders of the troops that Johnston and Beauregard had sought to concentrate at Manassas on July 21, 1861, only two were now with the army in front of Richmond—Longstreet and D. R.Jones. If Jackson and Ewell were included, four of the twelve—and no more than four—remained in command of troops in Virginia on the anniversary of the first step in the organization of Beauregard’s “Army of the Potomac.”

  Still more convulsionary changes had come. In the twilight of the battle of May 31 around Fair Oaks Station, Joseph E. Johnston had been twice wounded—once in the right shoulder by a musket ball and, a few moments later, in the chest by a heavy fragment of shell. The next day, G. W. Smith had made fumbling and overcautious efforts to continue the battle and, on June 2, had suffered an illness which he described as paralysis. In action he was one of the most unconcerned of soldiers and while under fire did not even change the pitch of his voice. Consequently no question of his personal courage could be raised by anyone who had seen him battle. Responsibility it was that shattered his nerves, responsibility and, perhaps, the fear that if he failed his reputation was gone.38

  The commanding general indefinitely on the list of the wounded, if indeed he survived; the commander of the left wing, second in command, broken by excitement and responsibility. It was a grim price to add to the toll of the mismanaged battle. A birthday present of ill omen to the army, men might say it was, but there was another gift: To the command that Johnston laid down, to resume no more, the President on June i named General Robert E. Lee.

  CHAPTER 7

  To Defend Richmond

  1

  OLD SNARLS ARE UNTANGLED

  The loss to the army of Johnston and Gustavus Smith had results far less disconcerting than might have been anticipated. Johnston’s admirers among the officers of the “Manassas troops” believed the South had none like him in strategic ability, but the commanders of the Army of the Peninsula and the Department of Norfolk had been with him for so brief a time that he was to them little more than a distinguished name. Smith was scarcely that. After his wounding, moreover, Johnston played a manful and honorable part in maintaining the morale of the corps of officers. When a friend lamented his wounds as a calamity to the South, Johnston instantly objected. Said he: “No, Sir! The shot that struck me down was the best ever fired for the Southern Confederacy, for I possessed in no degree the confidence of this Government, and now a man who does enjoy it will succeed me.”1

  Although a few senior officers somewhat distrusted an “outsider” whose reputation primarily was that of an engineer, they soon began to drop their misgivings. They saw ere long that Lee had a sound knowledge of the army. To one large and useful advantage that Lee enjoyed observant colonels and generals learned in time to give proper valuation: Lee understood the President thoroughly, and he employed his knowledge to remove misunderstandings and to assure cooperation. In one of the first letters he wrote from the field, he told Davis of troubles in D. H. Hill’s division and added: “I thought you ought to know it. Our position requires you should know everything & you must excuse my troubling you.”2

  One complaint the army made against Lee: He made white men do Negroes’ work—wield picks, throw up parapets, build fortifications. The grumbling army did not understand that the construction of earthworks was part of Lee’s preparations for an offensive. He reasoned that if he permitted McClellan to remain in front of Richmond, the superior Federal artillery soon would blast its way into the city. A defensive behind temporary fortifications was necessary until the Confederate army could be disposed and, if possible, reinforced. Then it must assume the offensive.

  Vacancies were the first of several immediate problems of command. A. P. Hill’s brigade of Longstreet’s division had gone into action at Seven Pines under its senior colonel, James L. Kemper. Because of Albert G. Blanchard’s resignation, his brigade of Huger’s division had been led by Colonel A. R. Wright. If the brigade of Robert Hatton was to remain efficient, a successor to that fallen general must be selected. Until the fate of Johnston Pettigrew was known, temporary provision, at the least, had to be made for the command of his fine North Carolina regiments. On June 2, Lee wrote President Davis of this situation and asked for immediate appointments. In contrast to the delay that so often had attended similar requests from Johnston, came instant action by the President. Kemper and Wright were made brigadiers; Colonel J. J. Archer, a Marylander who had commanded the 5th Texas in Hood’s brigade, received promotion and Hatton’s brigade. Davis authorized the assignment of Colonel W. Dorsey Pender to the command of Pettigrew’s troops with temporary rank as brigadier general. In the cases of Kemper and Pender, their quick advancement was almost equivalent to promotion on the field for valor.

  General Huger presented a second problem. Lee doubtless had heard the charges against Huger for failure on May 31 and had not seen any of the evidence that absolved that officer of blame. Not unnaturally, a doubt concerning Huger’s diligence was raised in Lee’s mind. Twice during the three weeks that followed the commanding general suggested the possibility of transferring Huger to other stations. Soon the impression became general that he was an “old army type” who could not adjust to new conditions—that he was living in the atmosphere of the Pikesville Arsenal, not of the Battle for Richmond.

  A third immediate problem of command was presented in the division of D. H. Hill. That officer promptly reported to General Lee his dissatisfaction with two of his brigade commanders—G.J. Rains and W. S. Featherston. This was the most marked display Hill yet had given of his peculiar tendency to run to extremes of opinion. If he admired conduct on the field no compliment was too extravagant; where he distrusted or disapproved, condemnation was complete. Hill’s complaint against Rains apparently was his failure to deliver a second flank attack after the assault on Casey’s Redout.3

  The object of Hill’s wrath was a North Carolinian, fifty-nine years of age, a graduate of West Point in the class of 1827, and former lieutenant colonel of the 4th Infantry. A man of fine appearance and pronounced patriotism, Gabriel Rains was at heart a scientist, more interested in explosives than in field command. In 1840, while campaigning against the Seminole Indians, he first had experimented with booby-traps. On the retreat from Yorktown he had planted several of these in the way of the Federals. Some of his superiors were convinced that these “land torpedoes” were not “a proper or effective method of war.” Rains consequently was forbidden to use more of them, and a suggestion previously made by Secretary of War Randolph was adopted. Under orders of June 18, Rains was assigned to the river defenses, where the use of torpedoes was “clearly admissible.” A time was to come when his “subterra shells” were a welcome adjunct of the Richmond defenses.4

  The ground of Hill’s grievance against W. S. Featherston does not appear from the records. Presumably the reason was the frequent absence from his post of this officer, whose health was not of the best. Featherston was tall, clean-shaven, and eagle-faced, blunt of manner and careless of dress but with a reputation fo
r hard drill. In his forty-first year, he was without formal military education beyond that which he had acquired as a young volunteer in the Creek War. The course of justice to Featherston and of deference to D. H. Hill seemed to be to transfer Featherston to Longstreet’s division and to give him troops from his own state of Mississippi.

  In providing these troops, the old vexing question arose again of brigading units according to the states from which they came. General Lee’s view of the question was not materially different from that of General Johnston, but his approach was more conciliatory. Within a few days after he took command, he wrote the chief executive: “I have … sent a circular to Division Commanders to see what can be done about reorganizing brigades by states…. As it is your wish & may be in conformity to the spirit of the land, I will attempt what can be done. It must necessarily be slow & will require much time. All new brigades I will endeavor so to arrange.” As this was acceptable to the President, a controversy that had much vexed Johnston came to an end.5

  There was too the issue presented by Gustavus W. Smith’s division. What should be done about it? Smith’s physical condition showed no improvement. Months might pass before he could return to the field, if ever he could. Of his five brigades, only Hood’s had at its head a man experienced in all his duties. Hampton was absent, wounded; Pettigrew was a prisoner of war; Archer had just succeeded Hatton; Whiting had to leave his brigade in charge of its senior colonel while he acted as divisional commander. Logically the restoration of the morale of these fine troops during Smith’s invalidism seemed a proper assignment for Whiting. The one weakness thus far disclosed in the brilliant Whiting was his extreme pessimism. This was irritating, if not demoralizing. Whiting did not believe that Richmond could be held or that the army could maintain itself north of the James, and on this he expatiated. The new commanding general left to time the final decision in Whiting’s case. No attempt was made to get Whiting promoted forthwith or to overcome Davis’s antagonism to that officer.6