Lee's Lieutenants

by Douglas Southall Freeman

  Despite the reports, it was soon apparent to the President that the situation was not desperate. On the twenty-eighth he inquired of McDowell whether the suspended advance southward from Fredericksburg should not be renewed. Quickly came McDowell’s answer: “I do not think, in the present state of affairs, it would be well to attempt to put through a part of that force….” McDowell was immobilized. That was Jackson’s reward.29

  CHAPTER 10

  Victory in the Valley

  1

  “FROM THE SNARE OF THE FOWLER”

  By the morning of May 30, Jackson’s demonstration to the line of the Potomac was developed fully. He pressed it to the utmost to give his quartermaster time to remove the supplies and equipment that had been captured. These were prizes worth some risk. In addition to the 9,300 small arms, he had taken in Winchester a rich storehouse of surgical instruments and dressings and an incredible quantity of medicines of every sort. The South needed sorely what Banks’s medical director lavishly had provided for the Union troops, and quartermaster John A. Harman was hauling it toward Staunton by every conveyance he could hire, borrow, or requisition.

  In making the long gamble of this demonstration, Jackson realized that the time in which he could maneuver on the Potomac was being reduced from days to hours. On the night of May 27-28 a citizen had brought a report that Shields, who had moved from the Valley to join McDowell, was hurrying toward Front Royal and was within a day’s march of that town. This report was relayed to Jackson on the morning of the twenty-eighth. Now, on the thirtieth, it was confirmed by Ashby’s scouts. McDowell himself was believed to be marching on Berryville. Spies from across the Potomac reported that Banks was reorganizing his defeated force at Williamsport.1

  Jackson at Charlestown said not a word to indicate either surprise or dismay on the receipt of this news. Daily his composure was more nearly flawless. That afternoon Colonel A. R. Boteler, a former congressman and trusted friend of Jackson’s, found the general stretched out asleep under a large tree. When he wakened, Boteler was busily sketching him. “Let me see what you have been doing there,”Jackson said. Boteler submitted the sketch, which Jackson examined without a word of praise or of criticism. “My hardest tasks at West Point,” he confessed, “were the drawing lessons, and I never could do anything in that line to satisfy myself, or indeed, anybody else.” He paused for a moment and changed the subject. “But, Colonel, I have some harder work than this for you to do. I want you to go to Richmond for me. I must have reinforcements. You can explain to them down there what the situation is here. Get as many men as can be spared, and I’d like you, if you please, to go as soon as you can.” Boteler expressed readiness to start at once, but said, “You must first tell me, General, what is the situation here.”

  Jackson answered with none of the reticence he usually exhibited. He told Boteler of the reports received that day of Federal forces marching toward the Valley. Frémont, he coolly said, would move against him also. “McDowell and Frémont are probably aiming to effect a junction at Strasburg, so as to head us off from the upper Valley, and are both nearer to it now than we are; consequently, no time is to be lost. You can say to them in Richmond that I’ll send on the prisoners, secure most, if not all of the captured property, and with God’s blessing will be able to baffle the enemy’s plans here with my present force, but that it will have to be increased as soon thereafter as possible.” Jackson then uncovered a plan which he must have pondered long: “You may tell them, too, that if my command can be gotten up to 40,000 men a movement may be made beyond the Potomac, which will soon raise the siege of Richmond and transfer this campaign from the banks of the James to those of the Susquehanna.”2

  A few minutes later Jackson left Winder to make a final thrust at Harper’s Ferry. By this time troops filled the roads. The wagons were on the move. All were headed south. A retreat was on. That evening, unhurriedly, the general climbed aboard a waiting train. After the train started through a rain now falling heavily, he put his arm on the seat in front of him, leaned over, and went to sleep. He was as composed as if he were returning from a pleasant vacation. Nothing indicated that he felt any concern over the task of extracting his army from the net the enemy was spreading.3

  Near Summit Point a courier signaled the train to stop and handed a dispatch to Jackson. The general read it, tore it up, and then said to the conductor, “Go on, sir, if you please.” Without a word or even the quiver of an eyelash he resumed his position and dropped to sleep again. After the train reached Winchester the news that had reached Jackson en route was for any man’s reading. The 12th Georgia had been left at Front Royal to guard the prisoners and captured stores. That morning Federals under Shields had come swiftly through the Blue Ridge and moved against the regiment, which hurriedly marched to Winchester.4

  Grim news it was! All the captured supplies and stores at Front Royal, to the value of $300,000, had been destroyed by the retreating Confederates. Shields had closed one of Jackson’s two lines of retreat up the Shenandoah, and if he pressed rapidly westward a march of eleven miles would bring him to Strasburg. In the event that Frémont from the Alleghenies joined Shields there, the two might block the Valley Pike. From Halltown, where most of Jackson’s troops had been encamped that morning, there was a long, long stretch of forty-four miles of road to Strasburg. Forty-four for the graycoats, eleven for the blue—the odds were stiff; but if Jackson had any doubt of his ability of reaching Strasburg before the enemy closed on him, he gave no indication of it.

  Late in the evening, while the long columns were tramping through Winchester in the rain, Jackson summoned Colonel Boteler to his hotel room to give him some papers to take to Richmond. Ere he went to Jackson’s room, Boteler ordered two whiskey toddies sent up. When he offered one to Jackson, the general drew back: “No, no, Colonel, you must excuse me; I never drink intoxicating liquors.” Finally, at Boteler’s urging, Jackson lifted the glass and took several sips. Then he put it down again: “Colonel, do you know why I habitually abstain from intoxicating drinks? Why, sir, because I like the taste of them, and when I discovered that to be the case I made up my mind at once to do without them altogether.” Boteler remembered the conversation as an evidence of Jackson’s temperance and process of reasoning. The colonel might as readily have instanced it to show the composure of Jackson in an hour of desperate danger to his army, a composure so absolute that the man and the soldier seemed to be separate personalities.5

  At 3 o’clock on the morning of the thirty-first Jackson roused Jed Hotchkiss with orders to bring up Winders First Brigade from Charles-town. Hotchkiss wrote in his diary that Jackson “feared that the converging columns of Frémont, Shields, McDowell and Banks might compel him to go out and fight one of them but he was in fine spirits.”6 After Hotchkiss hurried away, Jackson saw to it that the last of the wagons with captured stores started. Next the prisoners, some 2,300 in number, were put on the Valley Pike to tramp to Staunton. With his prizes and his captives ahead of him, Jackson ordered the infantry to begin the march on which the very life of the army and perhaps of the Confederacy depended. If he and his troops escaped, they might be able to go to Richmond and share the effort to drive McClellan off; but if Jackson were trapped by the converging columns and overwhelmed, what would prevent McDowell from joining McClellan and defeating Johnstons forces which, at that very hour, were deploying for the unsuccessful Battle of Seven Pines?

  At 2:30 P.M., when all the infantry except Winder’s brigade had cleared Winchester and only the cavalry remained to guard against a dash by the enemy, Jackson took horse and rode past his toiling men. The march proved uneventful. Regulations were followed strictly. The men rested ten minutes of every hour. Officers saw to it that the column was closed. Stragglers received no mercy. As Jackson neared his objective, he could not resist the impulse to ride ahead and see for himself whether Frémont or Shields or both of them had intercepted him. At last he came in sight of Strasburg. After the first careful gaze, he mus
t have felt immeasurable relief. Not a Federal was in the village. The Valley Pike still was open! If it could be held until the main body reached there that evening and Winder’s brigade arrived the next day, the army was safe.7

  Jackson issued orders. The trains were to continue up the Valley. At nightfall the infantry brigades were to go into camp near Strasburg and remain the next day. Ewell’s troops, who would be the last to reach there that night, would move again at daylight. Ewell’s infantry were to turn westward at Strasburg and move out on the road by which Frémont was advancing eastward from Wardensburg. Jackson then went to the campfire of Dick Taylor and sat for some time. Taylor subsequently wrote that Jackson “was more communicative than I remember him before or after. He said Frémont, with a large force, was three miles west of our present camp, and must be defeated in the morning. Shields was moving up Luray Valley, and might cross Massanutton to New Market, or continue south until he turned the mountain to fall on our trains near Harrisonburg. The importance of preserving the immense trains, filled with captured stores, was great, and would engage much of his personal attention; while he relied on the army, under Ewell’s direction, to deal promptly with Frémont. This he told in a low, gentle voice, and with many interruptions to afford time, as I thought and believe, for inward prayer.”8

  Reliance on Ewell was not in vain. When that officer received his orders to meet Frémont to the west, he enjoined his brigade commanders “to be in motion by the earliest dawn.” Ewell was beginning to think in the very terms of the man whom, a fortnight previously, he had styled crazy. On the morning of June 1 he established contact with Frémont’s vanguard several miles west of Strasburg. A lively exchange of artillery and musketry followed. Said Ewell: “I can’t make out what these people are about, for my skirmish line has stopped them.” The stalemate continued. About noon the fire died away, and finally Frémont put his infantry in camp. On the other flank, facing Front Royal, there was no evidence that any of Shields’s infantry were close at hand. All the intelligence reports continued to indicate that, in an effort to get in rear of the Southern forces, Shields was marching up the Luray Valley.9

  During the late afternoon of that first of June, down the road from Winchester, came the head of Winder’s gallant brigade. The men were fairly staggering from weariness. The 2nd Virginia had covered thirty-six miles in a single day, and the other regiments had marched about thirty miles; but there they were, unscathed and undemoralized. Behind them was Ashby’s rear guard only. The trap might snap; the army was beyond its jaws.10

  Jackson issued prompt orders: The moment all of Winder’s brigade was up, the other infantry commanders were to resume their march toward New Market. He was determined that he would not be caught west of the Massanuttons. These were hard orders for tired men, but they were necessary. To one commander Jackson had to address a biting question: “Colonel, why do you not get your brigade together, keep it together, and move on?”

  “It’s impossible, General. I can’t do it!”

  Jackson shot back: “Don’t say it’s impossible! Turn your command over to the next officer. If he can’t do it, I’ll find someone who can, if I have to take him from the ranks.”11

  Leaden clouds brought heavy rain the next day, June 2. The wagon train, moving in two columns along the Valley Pike, fell into such confusion that Jackson sent Jed Hotchkiss to untangle it. There was much straggling by exhausted soldiers. Numbers of disheartened men threw away their arms and accouterments. Under vigorous pressure by a large mounted force, the cavalry defense in the rear weakened. Maryland Steuart mismanaged his part in an affair near Woodstock and saw some of his men break in panic. Mistaken for the enemy, the 2nd Virginia cavalry was fired upon by the 27th Virginia. This fusillade was too much for Colonels Flournoy and Munford; they went to Ewell and besought him to have their regiments transferred to Ashby’s command. Ewell approved his colonels’ proposal and carried it at once to Jackson. Without hesitation, he assented and put Ashby in charge of all the cavalry.12

  This unpleasant incident was offset by one bit of good news: Ashby’s men had burned the White House and Columbia bridges over the South Fork near Luray, so that the Federals marching east of the Massanuttons could not cross the range to New Market to head them off. Assured of this, Jackson, with an easy mind, spent the night near Hawkinsville. There Colonel J. M. Patton came to report the final melee of the day with the Federal cavalry. He regretted, said Patton, to see the bluecoats shot down. Jackson asked quietly: “Colonel, why do you say that you saw those Federal soldiers fall with regret?” Patton answered that the Union troopers had shown so much valor that he wished their lives had been spared. “No,” said Jackson in a dry tone, “shoot them all; I do not wish them to be brave.”13

  As the destruction of the South Fork bridges made it certain that Shields, who had no pontoons, could not cross the Massanuttons, it was manifest that the Federals in the Luray Valley would continue their advance to the southern end of the range. Then, almost certainly, Shields would turn west toward Harrisonburg to get in Jackson’s front while Frémont assailed the rear. How could Shields be kept from doing this or, as an alternative, forming a junction with Frémont? Was there a chance one of the Federal armies could be beaten before the other came up, and in that event, where should Jackson give battle?

  The immediate danger, Jackson felt, already was past. He had escaped, first, because of the speed of his march, and, second, because of the continuance of heavy rains in a region where high water favored the defensive. When on the forenoon of June 3 the last of the infantry passed over the North Fork bridge at Mount Jackson—the Valley Pike’s sole crossing of that stream—Ashby’s rear guard set the structure afire. With the stream already high and still rising, the destruction of the bridge would stop Frémont. He was known to have a pontoon train, but there was slight chance he could use it. Jackson consequently gave the army a rest for the day. He nearly miscalculated. Information reached headquarters that Frémont had brought up his pontoon bridge and was throwing it across the North Fork. Immediate resumption of the retreat might be necessary, but once again the rain was Southern. The North Fork rose, as a result of a widespread downpour, twelve feet in four hours. To save his pontoons, the Federal commander had to cut them loose and swing them around to the north bank. That was a boon. At least twenty-four hours would elapse before the main body of Frémont’s force could take up the pursuit.14

  Jackson was thinking more intently now of the situation that would develop when his divisions, Frémont’s army, and Shields’s column would be beyond the dividing ridge of the Massanuttons. Whither should the Valley army move? Its aim, of course, should be to prevent a junction of Shields and Frémont. Jackson’s plan, maturing for several days, was based on terrain. The prime barrier to the junction of the two Federal forces, once they reached the southern end of the Massanuttons, was the South Fork of the Shenandoah. This was bridged at Conrad’s Store. Fifteen miles farther south, at the village of Port Republic, the South and North rivers join to form the South Fork. The South River normally could be forded there with ease, but the North River could be crossed only by a bridge, beyond which the main road ran to Harrisonburg.

  By sending a force to burn the crossing at Conrad’s Store, Jackson reasoned, Shields would be reduced to two alternatives. First, he could go back toward Luray, rebuild the bridge near there, and cross to New Market—a slow and difficult undertaking. Second, Shields could advance up the South Fork and try to get over the stream at one of the ten fords between Conrad’s Store and Port Republic, or attempt to seize the bridge at Port Republic. The river was high; which of the fords were passable, if any, Jackson did not know, but he did not gamble on the probability that none was. He directed Jed Hotchkiss to go to the Peaked Mountain at the southern end of the Massanuttons and observe Shield’s movements.15

  The van of the army Jackson sent toward Port Republic to hold the bridge there. Then he decided on dispositions in the event that Shields got across th
e South Fork at one of the fords between Conrad’s Store and Port Republic. If part of the army were north of Port Republic and close to the Massanuttons, then Shields would be compelled to pass so close to the Confederate front that he could be struck. At that point, too, Jackson would be on Frémont’s flank in the event of a Federal advance on Staunton. Still again, from Port Republic through Brown’s Gap led the shortest road to the Virginia Central, the line that would transport Jackson to Richmond.16

  Thus did Jackson’s strategic sense and his eye for terrain lead him to choose a position that (1) would interpose his forces between Shields and Frémont; (2) would give him the one bridge that Shields would cross for an early junction with Frémont; (3) would limit Shields to a narrow and observed front of advance; (4) would delay any attempted advance on Staunton; (5) would afford access to the railroad which would carry the Confederate force to Richmond; (6) would at the same time leave open a safe avenue of retreat were unexpected disaster to come; and (7) would make it possible for him to parallel Shields should he pass to the eastern side of the Blue Ridge.

  Southern end of the Massanuttons, Shenandoah Valley, to illustrate Jackson’s choice of positions on his retreat before Frémont and Shields.

  By nightfall on June 5 some of the trains and all of the prisoners were close to Port Republic, and the advance units were near Cross Keys, but the rear brigades had been held up so long that Jackson went into camp one mile from Harrisonburg. The rain, though still falling, had slackened noticeably. There was cheering news that the force sent to burn the bridge near Conrad’s Store had succeeded, somewhat narrowly, in doing so.