Now that Ewell had met such a fire that he could not advance, Longstreet got orders to make a diversion that would take some of the pressure off Hill and Ewell. He sent Pickett forward in a vigorous demonstration. The position was too strong; if Pickett’s Virginians kept on they would be destroyed. Longstreet reasoned that if anything at all was to be done, a general assault had to be delivered. Notifying Lee, he began to arrange his forces for a direct thrust at the hillside in front of him.23
On the Confederate left the situation was no better. Jackson had arrived on D. H. Hill’s front, but knew nothing of the terrain. He arranged Hill’s line with open ground in advance so that, if the enemy were driven eastward, a clear field of fire would be offered. When he learned that Ewell’s division was already engaged, he directed the only staff officer at hand, Major Harman, to carry orders back to Whiting and Winder. These two were to move up at once en échelon on the left of Ewell, and were to fill the gap between Ewell and D. H. Hill. Harman knew all about horses and wagons and little about military terms. When he reached Whiting he gave a muddled version of his instructions to that officer, who, by ill chance, was in no humor for any orders from Jackson. Whiting had been trying all the morning to tell Jackson what to do and had taken offense because Jackson paid him no heed. When the confused colloquy was ended, Whiting was left in the belief that Jackson wished him to remain where he was and to await further instructions. Whatever Winder behind him may have learned from Harman, he could not advance; the road was blocked. For an hour and more, then, the two divisions, together with Lawton’s brigade, waited along the road while Ewell was wearing away his strength in the swamp.24
McClellan’s troops were unshaken. Nothing less than an assault by the entire army, driven home at any cost, could rout the bluecoats. The outcome of the entire action might depend on Jackson. He did not realize it. Still less did Whiting and Winder. All three of them might remain idle till the hour was too late for a strong, united blow. Fortunately, Major Dabney had heard Jackson dispatch the orders Harman carried to Whiting. Ill though he was, Dabney determined to ride back up the road to the division commanders and make certain they understood the orders. Whiting confirmed in surly tones that he had seen Harman: “That man has been here with a farrago of which I could understand nothing.” Dabney then explained that Jackson wished him to engage the enemy immediately. Whiting was disposed to argue, but he was prompt in moving.
With Hood’s brigade in front, Whiting’s division began to deploy. Lawton’s brigade, at 3,500 men the largest in the army, came up and formed behind Gregg’s thin but stubborn line. Dick Ewell, in the heaviest of the fighting, saw Lawton’s men coming forward and, waving his sword, cried, “Hurrah for Georgia!” Far to the eastward, Harvey Hill was waiting to go forward. That left only Winder to complete Jackson’s line. When he received a call to move up rapidly, Winder directed his advance to the sound of the heaviest fire, and soon found A. P. Hill, to whom he reported for orders.25
Five o’clock it now was. Only three hours of the long summer daylight remained. Would it be possible ere nightfall to put all those tangled brigades into position and throw them, as one man, against that fiery front on the long hill? Longstreet’s deployment was complete. A. P. Hill’s weary men could be expected to do little more than to follow a strong, fresh line. Ewell still was capable of hard fighting and, with Lawton’s stout brigade, might share in the final gamble. Winder, rightly placed, had good firepower. D. H. Hill, ready to sweep forward, would be compelled to cross 400 yards of open ground. Was the gamble an even one? Could Jackson decide it?
The long day in a bewildering country had wearied Jackson. He needed refreshment. Out of his haversack he pulled not a bottle but a lemon. He began to suck it and, so engaged, started down the sun-scorched road toward New Cold Harbor. Dust covered him; his old cap was pulled down to his nose to shade his eyes from the glare. Not a word, not a gesture indicated his thought. Ahead he saw Lee; straight to the commander he rode.
“Ah, General,” said Lee, “I am very glad to see you. I had hoped to be with you before.” There was a mumbled answer, a jerk of the head—no more. “That fire is very heavy. Do you think your men can stand it?” “They can stand almost anything,” came the proud answer. “They can stand that!” He listened as Lee explained how he was organizing the line. As soon as Jackson was sure he understood, he was off to the left to prepare for its execution.26
Delay seemed endless to those who waited for the command to advance. Slowly, almost imperceptibly, the final reinforcements felt their way across the fields. At last, close to 7 o’clock, the front was complete. Five hours it had taken to get all the brigades in position—five hours of hell for the men already engaged—but the task was done. The Army of Northern Virginia was ready for its first general assault on an enemy whose defense thus far had been superb. Lee ordered an advance by all the troops.
To Hood it was a challenge as stirring as a bugle call. Drop your knapsacks and blankets, he told his men; we are going to take that line. I am going to lead you. Whiting, too, rode along the front, and when the men cheered him he raised his hat. “Boys,” he cried as he pointed toward the enemy’s position, “you can take it!” The Texans and their comrades started forward across the field toward the swamp. On their right, Longstreet already was at grips with the Federal infantry. Ewell was down in the swamp in person directing his men, who were getting support from Gregg and from other of A. P. Hill’s brigades. Lawton’s men kept an unbroken front. Trimble was everywhere with the same cry, “Charge, men, charge!” Winder, on Ewell’s left, went forward. Back of the line Jackson was in the exaltation of conflict. His face was crimson; under his cap-brim his eyes were burning. To each division commander he sent the same message: “Sweep the field with the bayonet!”27
D. H. Hill, on the extreme left, moved forward swiftly to the swamp. There was confusion in the maze of underbrush. Robert Rodes, still weak from his wounds at Seven Pines, strove to untangle his brigade of Alabamians. G. B. Anderson—tall, erect, composed—found Federal infantry in the maze, but at the word of command in his magnificent voice his men drove out the enemy. Garland kept pace with Anderson. All along the left, the swamp was cleared of the enemy. Ahead was a shell-swept open field, a quarter of a mile to the crest. G. B. Anderson, Garland, and Hill gathered to study the ground, exposed but as unconcerned as if no battle were raging. Hill devised a plan to take a battery enfilading their advance. Colonel Alfred Iverson’s 20th North Carolina maneuvered around the flank of the battery. The Carolinians were in full cry; then they were upon the guns. Hill unloosed every regiment on the edge of the swamp. In a long, cheering line they mounted the ridge. Soon the Federals were wavering, were breaking.28
Far to the west, almost at that moment, rolled the triumphant yells of Whiting’s men. Hood’s and Law’s brigades, leaving a thousand dead and wounded behind them, had cracked the Unionist front and were clambering over the batteries that for five hours had defied A. P. Hill’s attack. Longstreet was on the crest of the hill within a few minutes; Lawton and Winder and Ewell swept up. For half an hour there was spasmodic fighting, then darkness and a field of victory.
In the praise of the camps, highest honors went to Hood and his fine regiments. Said Jackson, riding over the ground of Hood’s advance, “These men are soldiers indeed!” It was noticed that the Federals abandoned all resistance on that part of the field as soon as these fierce soldiers were upon them. The other brigade of Whiting, led by Colonel E. M. Law, had shared fully the advance of Hood. For his general direction of these two brigades, Whiting received the credit he deserved. Among the other general officers, Maxcy Gregg had given an unequivocal answer to the question whether he would make a soldier. Trimble and Winder had added new honors to those won in the Valley. Garland had justified everything said of him after Seven Pines. Scores of others received and deserved commendations as warm. All told, said Longstreet, “there was more individual gallantry displayed upon this field than any I have ev
er seen.”29
But the casualties! Some 8,000 Confederates had fallen. Arnold Elzey had received a horrible wound of the face and neck, and Pickett had been wounded seriously. The most gruesome loss had been among the regimental commanders—eight killed or mortally wounded. With the two killed the day before at Mechanicsville, the offensive thus far had taken ten colonels, besides those wounded.
Costly, then, the victory was … and it was only the second engagement in what might prove a long struggle to save Richmond.
4
MAGRUDER STAYS UP TOO LONG
Beneath the fog of war and beyond the impenetrable woods, much had been happening to the Federals since A. P. Hill had opened the battle at Mechanicsville. General McClellan had become convinced that his army, which numbered about 105,000 officers and men, was outnumbered almost two to one. The approach of Jackson had decided him that he could not retain any force north of the Chickahominy. Accordingly, on the night of June 26, following the action on Beaver Dam Creek, he had concluded to retreat and establish a new base on the James River, where he would have the protection of the Federal gunboats. He had accepted battle at Gaines’ Mill because he feared a general withdrawal on the twenty-seventh would have exposed the rear of the army and “enabled Jackson’s fresh troops to interrupt the movement….”
To delay the Confederate attack, McClellan had left behind at Boatswains Swamp the V Corps of Fitz John Porter, which he reinforced to about 35,000 before the close of the action. Porter’s defense, costing 6,837 casualties, confirmed McClellan’s purpose to retreat or, more euphemistically, to “change his base.” Any counterthrust on the south side of the river against Huger and Magruder he ruled out. His reasoning, rendered faulty by his gross overestimate of the forces opposing him, even led him to apprehend an attack on the south as well as the north bank of the river. On the night of June 27, after the Battle of Gaines’ Mill, he announced his plans of withdrawal. Keyes’s IV Corps was to cross White Oak Swamp on the twenty-eighth and cover the flank against attack from the direction of Richmond. Porter was to follow. As soon as the wagon trains had passed, Franklin, Sumner, and Heintzelman, commanding the other corps, were to withdraw on June 28-29 from their lines south of the Chickahominy. These troops were to hold the rear against attack and then head for the James River.30
To this retreat the little stream known as White Oak Swamp, forming almost a half circle of about ten miles in total length, presented both obstacle and cover. On its upper reaches the creek presented no material difficulty in dry weather, but after heavy rains it overflowed swiftly and transformed all approaches into a bog. Access to it was easy enough from McClellan’s position. Numbers of roads ran down to it from the north. The principal crossing was at White Oak Swamp Bridge, about five miles southeast of Savage Station. From this crossing a decent road ascended to Long Bridge Road. Once this highway was passed, there was a slow descent to the James, distant near seven miles by road. McClellan’s problem was to get quickly across the swamp without overcrowding the approaches. Then he could hope to hold the swamp against attack from the rear. As he progressed toward the James River he would have to guard his column against attack from the west only; from no other quarter did it seem likely he could be assailed.
None of this was known, on the morning of June 28, to the Confederates north of the Chickahominy or to those who faced the enemy between New Bridge and White Oak Swamp. Would the Federals remain south of the river? Might not McClellan move down southeasterly along the south bank of the Chickahominy and recross to the north bank in order to reestablish his line of supply down the Peninsula? Not until the early morning of the twenty-ninth was the answer clearly “No.” Then, but not until then, was it established that McClellan was heading for the James River. It was impracticable to concentrate against the Federal rear north of White Oak Swamp before night; the distances were too great. Thus Lee did not undertake to prevent a crossing of the swamp. He planned instead to press the Federal rear north of the morass on June 29, and to move the remainder of his troops, by the roads nearer Richmond, until they could strike the Federals the next day, June 30, on the march from White Oak Swamp toward the James. This involved a difficult convergence, but against an opponent who in this terrain could steal a day’s march, there was no alternative.
Early on the morning of the twenty-ninth the division commanders got their orders. Jackson was to bridge the Chickahominy and then sweep down between the river and the swamp with his own, Ewell’s, Whiting’s, and D. H. Hill’s divisions. Magruder was instructed to push down the Williamsburg Road and have Jackson’s support in attacking the enemy. Huger’s orders were to proceed eastward on the Charles City Road, south of the swamp, and on the thirtieth take the Federals in flank. Longstreet and A. P. Hill were to recross the Chickahominy close to Richmond and march down the Darbytown Road to a position on Huger’s right, where they, also, were to assail the flank of McClellan as he moved toward the James River. T. H. Holmes, who had crossed from the south bank of the James, was to be on the right of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, in order to head off McClellan.
Which were the more difficult tasks in this convergence? Who had the largest opportunity? How well suited for their missions were the divisional commanders? Longstreet, who ranked A. P. Hill, was given direction of their joint operations. He would have a long march, but would encounter no natural obstacle. Holmes had a clear road. Huger had to cover approximately eight and a half miles. Magruder would have rear guard action and might have to pass through some fortified positions. To Jackson, as in the opening of the campaign, the most arduous task was assigned. Troops enough he had: Was his mission too large for the time allowed him?
Magruder was to open the third act of the drama and probably was to have the largest opportunity. Thus far Magruder had taken his posting very seriously. As one of his staff put it, “we all thought that the position of holding our front lines against McClellan and thereby protecting Richmond, was the post of honor as well as of danger, because it never occurred to us that McClellan with his superior numbers could fail to attack and seek to break through….”31 The instructions to Magruder and Huger had been to demonstrate in order to ascertain what the Federals were doing. Prince John busily stirred his pickets; at frequent intervals he had his batteries challenge those of the Unionists to be sure no withdrawal was in progress. During the fighting at Mechanicsville and Gaines’ Mill he had grown restless and apprehensive. What if the Federals should attack; what if they were about to do so? By the twenty-eighth all his efforts to ascertain their movements had come to nothing. Where the earthworks were visible they appeared to be fully manned; the woods were impenetrable; every road was well guarded. Magruder still remained in the deepest concern lest he be attacked.
It was now 3:30 on the morning of June 29, and General Magruder was not physically at his best for what might prove his day of days. A bad attack of indigestion was persisting, and medicine given him by the surgeon was having an exciting effect. In none of the dramas he had played as an amateur thespian had he assumed so great a role as the one that now was his, that of pursuing a vast army. His relief was immense when finally he heard that the Federals were known to be withdrawing from his front.32
Before Magruder made his dispositions to pursue, Colonel R. H. Chilton of Lee’s staff rode up to summon him to a meeting with the commanding general. The two overtook Lee and his staff on the Nine Mile Road, and the cavalcade followed the line of the Federal retreat toward Fair Oaks. Magruder listened, perhaps abstractly, while Lee explained the plan for the reconcentration. Longstreet and A. P. Hill were to cross in rear of Magruder’s position and move to the extreme right, so they could intercept McClellan en route to the James River; Huger was to proceed down the Charles City Road; Jackson was to cross—perhaps already had crossed—the Chickahominy and operate against the enemy’s flank nearest the river. Magruder’s mission was explicit: He was to press directly on the Federal rear and was to attack.33
Magruder was now in
charge of the field and of the pursuit of the rear guard. Eastward, the track of the York River Railroad disappeared in a long, scarcely perceptible curve between woodland on either side. Less than a mile to the southeast, hidden by forest, was the Williamsburg Road. From the nature of the terrain, the Federal retreat had to be eastward and southeastward across White Oak Swamp toward the James River. D. R. Jones and Kershaw were coming forward. McLaws’s other brigade, that of Paul Semmes, had not arrived from the line of fortifications. Magruder’s own division was approaching, under Howell Cobb and Richard Griffith. Six brigades, then, approximately 11,000 infantry, could be concentrated against an enemy who, as yet, had shown no more than a skirmish line and had not halted anywhere for a stand.
As he made his dispositions, Magruder became convinced that the enemy was preparing to attack him in numbers far exceeding his own. He sent Major Joseph L. Brent, his ordnance officer, posthaste to Lee to request that Huger’s division reinforce him. According to Brent, General Lee “seemed surprised and a little incredulous. He said his information was that the enemy was in rapid retreat, and he thought that his rear guard would scarcely deliver battle at the point indicated.” Still, he said he would have Huger detach two brigades to report to Magruder; but if they were not engaged by 2 o’clock they must be returned to Huger.
Not content with assurance of help in that quarter, Magruder sent to the left to ascertain where Jackson was and what cooperation could be given on that flank. He was told that Jackson was rebuilding the Chickahominy bridge on his front and would not be ready to cross for two hours. Thereupon, still in the belief that he was about to be attacked, Magruder decided he would delay his advance until Huger came up on his right and Jackson on his left. When they arrived, he intended to envelop the entire Federal rear guard.34
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