Forgotten, apparently, were Magruder’s orders to pursue vigorously. With six good brigades at hand, supported by artillery, he waited out of range. An hour passed, perhaps two hours. Huger rode over through the blistering heat to Magruder’s field headquarters to report his two brigades were arriving and was puzzled at the lack of any indication of a Federal advance. Magruder went off to busy himself moving his troops to better defensive positions. When the bluecoats attacked him, he would give them the best battle he could! Finally a messenger from Huger reached him: General Huger presents his compliments and begs to advise that under his orders he did not think it necessary for his two brigades to remain longer, and he was withdrawing them for other service.35
That was not the end of the troubles for the tired and excited Magruder. D. R. Jones sent a dispatch from the left that closed, “I had hoped that Jackson would have cooperated with me on my left, but he sends me word that he cannot, as he has other important duty to perform.” Huger withdrawing; Jackson unable to cooperate—what was Magruder to do? What could he do except to obey orders that had contemplated his pursuit of the enemy in the forenoon? There was no chance now of a great coup; did he reason, too, that there was small risk of defeat? “I ordered the whole to move to the front,” he subsequently reported, “and each commander to attack the enemy in whatever force or works he might be found.”36
Rhetorically the statement was fine; tactically the performance was timid. The “whole” was not sent forward. Of six brigades present, he used only two. The advance of Kershaw and Semmes, gallantly led and well handled, was resisted stoutly. When the two were halted by darkness and a terrific thunderstorm, after sustaining 354 casualties, they were close to the farthest point they had gained. The Battle of Savage Station was over, but Magruder was not satisfied that this meant an end to the attack of which he had been apprehensive all day. At last, about 3:30 A.M. on the thirtieth, to which hour Magruder remained anxiously awake, Jackson arrived at Magruder’s post and announced that the Valley troops probably would be up by daylight. Prince John breathed freely once again. “I then slept an hour,” he observed in his report, “—the first in forty-eight.” His brief rest could not have been sweetened by the last note he had received from Lee. “I regret much that you have made so little progress today in the pursuit of the enemy,” the commanding general wrote. “… We must lose no more time or he will escape us entirely.”37
The environs of Savage Station.
The past tense might have been employed. So far as Magruder was involved, the enemy had escaped already. In front of him, in the vicinity of Savage Station, had been three corps, but they had been under orders simply to hold their ground until darkness and then to continue the retreat. A sustained attack by Magruder probably would have led to a bloody repulse; when the Confederates did attack, a single brigade stopped them.38
Early on the morning of June 30, Magruder received orders that might have been construed as indicating that his performance on the twenty-ninth was not rated highly by G.H.Q. He was to leave to Jackson the pursuit of the enemy, retrace his steps, and move down the Darbytown Road. That is to say, he was to be taken from the rear of the enemy and placed in support of the Confederate right. The post of danger and of opportunity—if of responsibility—was taken from him and given that strange man Jackson.
CHAPTER 12
Richmond Relieved
1
THE DELAY IN THE RECONCENTRATION
While Magruder was hesitating on the afternoon of June 29 because he feared a Federal onslaught, the preparations of General Lee to attack McClellan the next morning were being developed unevenly. Longstreet and A. P. Hill were moving from the north to the south side of the Chickahominy and advancing at satisfactory speed to the Darbytown Road. There was every reason to believe they would be in position, early on the thirtieth, to assail the flank of the Federals en route to the James River. Full convergence of the Southern columns would depend, first, on the ability of Huger to come up promptly on Longstreet’s left; second, on the success of Jackson in crossing White Oak Swamp to strike the rear of McClellan; and third, though less importantly, on the arrival of Holmes to the right of Longstreet.
Huger’s lead brigade, on the Charles City Road, was that of William Mahone, a most unusual man. Virginia born, he physically was so short of stature and so frail that he seemed insignificant, but this Virginia Military Institute graduate had established himself as a resourceful construction engineer for railroads. When the war began he was in his thirty-fifth year, was president of the Petersburg and Norfolk Railroad, and was full of restless, driving energy. He volunteered promptly and received rapid promotion. His reputation as a swift builder had led, in the spring of 1862, to his assignment to Drewry’s Bluff, where the immediate strengthening of the river defenses had been considered essential to the safety of Richmond. This work done, Mahone returned as the senior brigadier in Huger’s division, and, in Huger’s absence, occasionally acted as its head.
That afternoon Mahone was directing the march down the Charles City Road. At the Brightwell farm the advance encountered a cavalry outpost, which quickly disappeared. Mahone halted the troops and examined the ground. To the north a road ran to Jordan’s Ford in White Oak Swamp. Might not the enemy be planning to cross at Jordan’s and take this route via Brightwell’s toward the James? A reconnoitering party was dispatched toward the swamp. Soon word came back that the enemy was at Jordan’s and was in the very act of crossing southward. Mahone immediately threw out a heavy skirmish line. A collision followed—a spat of fire and a quick, somewhat suspicious withdrawal by the bluecoats.
General Huger now reached Brightwell’s and resumed command. He was far from satisfied with the prospect. Prisoners stated that the Federals were still north of the swamp—Kearny’s division of Heintzelman’s III Corps. Huger learned also of the New Road that ran north of and parallel to the swamp. This road gave the Federals freedom of action to move from one ford to another; they could demonstrate at one crossing to cover the passage of another. Huger concluded that if he left Jordan’s Ford unguarded, Kearny might cross in his rear as readily as in his front, and he chose to bivouac at Brightwell’s. It seemed a logical or, at the least, a cautions course to follow. Actually, as often happens in war, Huger’s information was outdated almost before it reached him. Kearny had gone down to Jordan’s but decided against crossing there, proceeded eastward on the New Road, and already was negotiating the swamp between Huger’s bivouac and the objective Lee had set for him.1
White Oak Swamp, New Road, and Charles City Road, to illustrate Huger’s advance of June 29-30, 1862.
While Huger was debating his proper course of action on the evening of June 29, at the very time Magruder hesitantly was engaging the Federal rear guard at Savage Station, Stonewall Jackson was ending two exasperating and unprofitable days. When, on the twenty-ninth, Lee became convinced that the Federal army was moving for the James River, he directed Jackson immediately to repair the bridge the Federals had destroyed. Jack-son’s further orders, as Major Dabney remembered them, were “to march eastward by the Savage Station road, parallel to … the Chickahominy; to guard all the northward … thus forming a line of protection for the movement of Lee’s other columns south of him; and not to leave that eastbound road until he had passed the extreme northern flank of McClellan’s force and gotten in his rear.”
These seemed to be clear and simple orders. To obey them, Jackson, on the morning of June 29, directed Major Dabney to reconstruct Federal engineer Barton Alexanders bridge (misnamed the Grapevine Bridge by the Confederates). Dabney must have been chosen for the task because none of the engineers was at hand; and he soon demonstrated that he was not so good a builder as he was a preacher. Progress was discouragingly slow. Fortunately, Captain C. R. Mason appeared with his Negro navvies. This remarkable man was one of Jackson’s “finds.” Not an educated engineer, Mason had a knack for the rapid construction of rough, stout bridges using the skilled labor of
his work crew. He relieved Dabney’s detachment and began to give form to the structure.2
As soon as the bridge was passable at all, though still unfinished, Jackson himself went over and rode about three quarters of a mile southward to the Trent house to examine the ground there. Then there came to him from Colonel Chilton at headquarters a dispatch that redefined his role—the “important duty” that he would say prevented him from supporting Magruder as originally planned. Concerned that the enemy might yet cross the Chickahominy downstream and escape down the Peninsula, Lee assigned Jackson the additional task of guarding the crossings if that was attempted. Jackson recognized no if’in Chilton’s writing; as he had not yet crossed his divisions to the south bank, he took it as his duty to stay right where he was. “Genl. Ewell will remain near Dispatch Station,” he wrote on the dispatch, “and myself near my present position.”3
2
TWO COLUMNS ARE HALTED
General Lee correctly assumed that after McClellan crossed White Oak Swamp, the direction of his retreat would be toward the James River by the shortest route. This almost certainly would carry the Federals to a little settlement known as Glendale or Riddell’s Shop, southeast of White Oak Swamp Bridge at the junction of the Charles City and Darbytown roads. From there McClellan would head south. The plan of the Army of Northern Virginia called for a concentration all the way southward from the fringe of the swamp to the river, and parallel to the north-south roads by which McClellan was moving. This would make the direction of the Confederate attack eastward, except for Jackson who would close in on the Federal rear from the north. Simultaneous convergence of four columns was undeniably a difficult matter, but in the situation that existed it was the only practicable maneuver, and it did not seem complicated beyond attainment—at least each of the columns was to advance by a separate road; none would cross the route of any other.
These were the specific missions of the four columns:
1. Holmes was to proceed on the River Road past New Market and engage the enemy where found. The length of his march would be about nine miles, with no material obstruction.
2. Magruder was to turn from Savage Station to the rear, cross over to the Darbytown Road, and support Longstreet. The distance was approximately eleven miles to Longstreet’s bivouac.
3. Longstreet, with his own and A. P. Hill’s divisions, was to continue along the Darbytown Road until he encountered the Federals. His march probably would not be more than six miles.
4. Huger was to proceed from Brightwell’s for about three miles down the Charles City Road, through woodland, to the junction with the Dar-bytown Road and was to attack the enemy when found.
5. Jackson was to advance from the Alexander bridge and clear the enemy from the woods near the Chickahominy. Then he was to turn south when opposite McClellan’s rear, pass White Oak Swamp Bridge, and press the Unionists. He had eight and a half miles to go and had to cross a stream that might be troublesome.
If all went well, the order of battle would be: extreme right, Holmes; right center and center, Longstreet and A. P. Hill, with Magruder in support; left, Huger; rear of the enemy, Jackson. Such was the plan of convergence as seen from army headquarters. Because all the generals were well instructed, the story of the day should have been one of a driving march and a straining effort by every column to reach its assigned place at the earliest moment. Instead, the events of June 30 fall into a succession of delays, of groping marches, of separate decisions as if some of the divisional commanders had no regard for time and felt more concern for their reputations than for the outcome of the battle.
Soon after daybreak, June 30, with Mahone in front, Huger started his advance from Brightwell’s. Mahone proceeded with great caution. He reasoned that Kearny might wait in the swamp and get in rear of the Confederates after they had passed down the road—only to be told by residents that the Union troops had crossed at Fisher’s, the next ford on the left of Huger’s advance, the previous evening. Was Kearny, then, now in front, down the Charles City Road? Could the Confederate advance be pushed without further thought for the security of the left flank? Huger and Mahone concluded that this could be done. But no sooner was Fisher’s passed than fire was opened from the enveloping woods. Ahead, on the road, as far as vision carried, newly felled trees lay in grim obstruction.
What was to be done now? Again Huger left the decision to Mahone, perhaps because he had the reputation of a specialist in dealing with swamp and forest. When Mahone reported that it would be easier to make a new road through the woods for the artillery than to clear the old one, Huger sent word to Lee that his march was obstructed. Mahone put his men to work felling trees, but tools were few and progress slow. The strange spectacle was presented of a battle of rival axemen. Beyond their front, McClellan’s trains rumbled toward the river. It was a curious episode. In a metaphor of the woods, while the hunter fumbled, the quarry was escaping.4
Soon after sunrise, Lee came up and gave Magruder his orders to start for the Darbytown Road. Magruder, wrote Major Brent, “seemed to me to be under a nervous excitement that strangely affected him. He frequently interposed in minor matters, reversing previous arrangements and delaying the movement he was so anxious to hasten.” Finally Brent spoke up, saying he was sorry to see that the General was not feeling well that morning. “Well, Major, you are right,” admitted Magruder. “I am feeling horribly.” He explained that the medicine given him for his indigestion by the surgeon contained morphine, “and the smallest quantity of it acts upon me as an irritant.” He made efforts to regain his self-control, but his excitement continued.5
Ere Magruder started, Lee reviewed with Jackson the part that officer was to have in the operations of the day. Jackson seemed all energy. The Federals manifestly had evacuated the area, and booty was everywhere. The “wagon-hunter” could not fail to gather at least something from the abundance the enemy had left. This took time. So did the collection of hundreds of Federal stragglers from the woods. It was noon when Jackson reached the fringe of White Oak Swamp, close to the bridge over which the Federals had retreated.
A forbidding place the swamp was. Like the Chickahominy, the stream itself was shallow and little scarped. In dry weather the sole difficulty in crossing it was offered by the underbrush and briars along the banks. Of sound and beauty there was little. The kildee and the mockingbird shunned the confinement of boughs that shut out the sun. Voiceless the stream flowed over its soft bottom. No vistas opened on the variant greens. Shadows dulled the colors. Such was White Oak Swamp at its best. At its worst, the stream spread swiftly from its bed and set a barrier almost impassable, and to this condition it had been brought by the torrential downpour of the night of the twenty-ninth. The ring of the sharpshooter’s rifle warned that man’s weapons reinforced the swamp’s resistance.
Contact was established: What was ahead? Jackson could see across the swamp to the enemy’s position on the left of the road. White Oak Swamp Bridge itself manifestly was broken. Beyond it the road passed directly over a hill and disappeared. On the level crest the guns of about three batteries were visible, and behind them a long line of infantry, lying down. A heavy fringe of tall timber provokingly cut off all observation on the right. There was no way of telling in what strength the Federals occupied that side of the road.6
Such a situation called for the employment of Jackson’s artillery. Colonel Crutchfield advanced twenty-eight guns and had them shotted under cover, and at 1:45 P.M., with a rush, he brought out these fieldpieces onto a dominating ridge and opened on the batteries across the swamp. The effect must have warmed the heart of the general who as a young man first had caught the eyes of his superiors by his handling of a gun section under the shadow of Chapultepec. The Federal artillerists limbered up their pieces and hurried off, leaving three damaged rifles. The startled infantry dashed for the rear.
It was now 2 o’clock. Along the Darbytown Road General Lee and President Davis were waiting with Longstreet’s command and won
dering what had delayed for hours the attacks by Huger and Jackson. On the Charles City Road Huger was chopping trees and dragging the trunks aside to clear a new road for his artillery. Late as it was, Jackson’s part in the convergence did not seem beyond attainment. Let Munford’s 2nd Virginia cavalry cross the swamp, charge up the hill, and secure the guns the Federals had abandoned. Jackson himself mounted to ride with the troopers.7
The clatter of the cavalry, a splash through the ford, and then—up the hill! The column deployed as it reached the open ground. Jackson was close in the rear. Immediately a field battery roared. Jackson turned to see whence came this challenge. One glance was enough: There were blue infantrymen opposite his right, thousands of them, in full possession of a fine position, the strength of which had been hidden by the trees that cut off vision from the north side of the swamp. As Jackson looked, more Union batteries dashed up. Regiments were forming in line of battle. What could Munford’s men do? Nothing except quit the field or subject themselves to futile slaughter! Skillfully the colonel veered off to the east to escape the fire. Jackson turned back swiftly the way he had come and returned to his lines north of the swamp.8
The incident was a definite repulse. Those Federals on the high ground could prevent a crossing at the bridge. It was manifest; it was indisputable. Incredibly, almost mysteriously, and for the first time in his martial career, Jackson quit. His initiative died almost in the moment of his return from the south side of the swamp. The alert, vigorous Jackson of the early morning grew weary, taciturn, and drowsy. Marshy approaches, destruction of the bridge, and the fire from the new Federal position made a crossing impossible. This he concluded and then, exhausted, went to sleep under a tree.9
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