Lee's Lieutenants

by Douglas Southall Freeman

  With one of the division commanders in Lee’s army Jackson again became associated before the end of July, in circumstances as curious as its results were to prove. Impetuous A. P. Hill had been, on June 26, in crossing the Chickahominy and opening the Battle of Mechanicsville. Impetuous Hill had been in assailing the Federals behind Boatswain’s Swamp—but stubbornly determined he showed himself to be, and capable of directing men on a long, confused front. At Glendale Hill had handled his troops easily and with indisputable effectiveness. All his marches had been prompt and orderly; he had shown clear competence.

  That and more could be said of Longstreet. Among the division commanders of Lee’s army, Old Pete—as his men had begun to call him—now stood pre-eminent. His attack on the right at Gaines’ Mill had been shrewd and not unduly expensive of life. In the woods west of Glendale Longstreet had directed his own and A. P. Hill’s division with confidence and entire calm. There can be little doubt that, when the campaign ended, Lee was leaning more heavily on Longstreet than on any other of his subordinates. All Longstreet’s actions had been well-reasoned and apparently free of any grasping after authority. Not a suggestion was there of the spirit he had shown at Seven Pines. Had he been conscious that he should redeem a less than credible record in the action of May 31? His new record—had it been aroused by a new commander? Was he, like Lee, learning the art of war? Or had he determined that in a campaign where divisional leadership was shared by the hero of the Valley, he would not be outdone? History cannot answer.

  The fine record of cooperation between A. P. Hill and Longstreet was marred almost as soon as it was made. Among Hill’s volunteer aides during the campaign had been John M. Daniel, editor of the Richmond Examiner. His slashing, dogmatic editorial style and sense of news made his journal much the most interesting of Richmond’s wartime papers. After receiving a trifling wound at Gaines’ Mill, Daniel retired forthwith to Richmond and, through the columns of the Examiner, glorified the general under whom he had served. A. P. Hill was credited with the “investment of Mechanicsville” against four times his numbers. Glendale, the paper proclaimed, was fought under “the immediate and sole command” of Hill. Daniel affirmed that Hill’s command, consisting of his own and “one of Longstreet’s two divisions,” had achieved on June 30 a “success which broke the spirit of the enemy and completed the circuit of our victories.”37

  As the Examiner was read in all the camps, the laudation of A. P. Hill, with implied disparagement of others, stirred many jealousies and aroused no little wrath. Longstreet, in particular, was incensed. He wrote editor Daniel a stiff note stating that the articles in the Examiner were calculated to alarm the public, and pointed out their various deficiencies. Exaggerated statements, he concluded, might do great injury to the army both at home and abroad. Since Hill was not associated directly with the adulation voiced by the Examiner, Old Pete did not propose to publish this answer over his own signature. One of Longstreet’s military family should sponsor the reply. Major Moxley Sorrel, assistant adjutant general of the division, was entirely agreeable to doing so.

  On July 11, in the rival Richmond Whig, the “card” appeared. It created satisfaction among those who had resented the manner in which one division had been credited with winning the campaign, but its publication aroused wrath at Hill’s headquarters. Hill wrote Lee: “I have the honor to request that I may be relieved from the command of Major-General Longstreet.” The paper, transmitted through channels, was endorsed by Old Pete with deliberate unconcern. He saw “no particular reason why Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill should not be gratified.” Of this, at the moment, Lee took no notice.

  The dispute widened when Hill refused to obey an order of Longstreet’s as delivered through Major Sorrel, and Longstreet had him placed “in arrest with orders to confine himself to limits of his camp and vicinity.” A furious correspondence between the two generals followed, with one of its points of contention their relative command roles at Glendale. No adjustment could be reached. Friends were called in, and all the indications pointed to a duel.38

  Could the perplexities of the reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia after the Seven Days have been illustrated more dramatically than by the threat of this duel? Huger had proved “too slow”; Maguder was to leave Virginia with the assurance that he would deal with his critics; Jackson, in the eyes of many, had not fulfilled expectations; Whiting’s conduct had raised a question; D. H. Hill was overcritical, though competent, and had been sent a challenge by Toombs. Of the division commanders only Ewell, A. P. Hill, and Longstreet had come through the campaign with a record for meeting creditably the opportunities that had come to them; and two of these three might seek to kill each other!

  Forced now to intervene, General Lee, as Sorrel phrased it, “brought matters, through other friends, to an adjustment honorable to both.” That “adjustment” grew out of urgent military necessity. Jackson, at Gordonsville, had found himself too weak to attack Pope, who was closing to within striking distance of the Virginia Central. Another division had to be sent Jackson from the Richmond front, and it must be under a competent leader. Lee reasoned that if A. P. Hill were selected for the mission, he would be satisfied to drop his demand for a duel, and Longstreet would release Hill from arrest. So it happened: Hill was returned to duty July 26, and the next day was ordered to move his division by rail to reinforce Jackson.39

  With Hill went the Louisiana brigade, but Dick Taylor was not with it. His illness had proved serious and had produced temporary paralysis of his lower limbs. He was sent home to rest and to recruit his old regiments, and was given the well-won rank of major general. Taylor always thought this was on Jackson’s recommendation for service in the Valley. The army was the poorer for Taylor’s departure.40

  6

  A NEW ORGANIZATION FOR NEW BATTLES

  By the date of Powell Hill’s departure, the first major reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia had been completed. It had been necessitated by the failure of some leaders and, no less, by the defects of the old organization. Among a multitude of lessons in command taught by the Seven Days, the most impressive was this: Under a system that placed the direction of operations largely in the hands of division commanders too numerous to be controlled directly by the general in chief, the divisions were, in effect, distinct little armies. In a wooded country of confusing roads, the major general of a column operating even a few miles from army headquarters virtually was independent. If reckless, he could not be restrained; if determined to take no risks, he could not be brought into action. Every battle had demonstrated this. In all the Seven Days there had been one instance where two divisions had cooperated for the whole of a battle—Longstreet and Powell Hill on June 30. Elsewhere how tragic had been the record, how complete the indictment of the organization! At Mechanicsville Powell Hill had acted as if he were afraid the other divisions might snatch glory from his hands; the next day at Gaines’ Mill he had plunged in eagerly before any help was at hand. Harvey Hill had outmarched Jackson that day as if determined to seize the honors of battle from his senior. Savage Station, the futile marches and long halts of June 30, the failure of Lee to get the full force of any division employed together with its neighbors against Malvern Hill—had war ever offered worse examples of dissipated strength, of might ill-used?

  Along with the leaders, the law was to blame. The Confederate military acts provided no formal organization larger than a division. Legally, there was no such military body as a corps, no grade between major general and general. Now, after the disappointments and lapses of the Seven Days, a means had to be found of coordinating the independent divisions. The Confederacy could not hope to win if it had six armies, six independent commanders on one field. Scarcely a reference appears in extant correspondence to any decision to establish corps, but by the time A. P. Hill reinforced Jackson at Gordonsville, the remainder of the infantry had been placed under Longstreet. No new titles were conferred; neither “corps” nor “wing” was men
tioned. The infantry around Richmond simply became “Longstreet’s Command,” and the troops near the Rapidan “Jackson’s Command.” Necessity forced Lee to anticipate the amendment of the law.

  The organization now was as follows:

  Jackson’s Command

  Jackson’s Division was under the command of Charles S. Winder, of the First Brigade, who, next to Jackson, was the senior general officer. John R. Jones had the Second Brigade, William B. Taliaferro the Third, and A. R. Lawton the Fourth.

  Ewell’s Division had substantially the same organization as in the Valley campaign, but Jubal Early had Elzey’s brigade and Harry Hays the Louisiana brigade. Trimble continued at the head of his troops.

  A. P. Hill’s Division was unchanged except that Joseph R. Anderson had resigned to resume direction of the important Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond; E. L. Thomas headed the brigade.

  Longstreet’s Command

  Longstreet’s Division remained intact otherwise than for the transfer of R. H. Anderson’s brigade to Micah Jenkins, promoted brigadier general on Lee’s strong recommendation.

  D. R. Jones’s Division of two brigades, under G. T. Anderson and the tempestuous Toombs, retained its organization but passed from the disbanded command of Magruder to Longstreet.

  McLaws’s Division of Semmes’s and Kershaw’s brigades was enlarged to regulation size by the inclusion of Cobb’s and Barksdale’s commands, which previously had been Magruder’s own division.

  D. H. Hill’s Division was increased by the addition of a brigade under Henry A. Wise. No commander had yet been appointed in succession to Harvey Hill.

  R. H. Anderson’s Division was Huger’s old command—Mahone’s, Armistead’s, and Wright’s brigades. So manifestly was Anderson’s promotion deserved that it created little comment.

  A special case was Whiting’s Division, kept under the direct control of Lee and not part of Longstreet’s command.

  The Cavalry

  The cavalry now constituted a division of two brigades under Major General Stuart. One brigade was under Wade Hampton, the other was commanded by Fitz Lee.

  The Artillery

  Artillery organization was not improved. Each brigade had a battery assigned as substantially its own. This battery might assist another of the same division, or in theory, another division commanded by the same general. During the Seven Days Jackson alone had been able to mass the guns of more than one division.

  To summarize the reorganization, it involved two promotions only to the grade of major general, those of Jeb Stuart and Dick Anderson. As brigadiers, Fitz Lee, Micah Jenkins, and Harry Hays were commissioned. To the infantry returned Jubal Early, to the cavalry went Hampton—historic assignments both. So tactfully were the changes made—especially the selection of Longstreet and of Jackson to direct all the infantry—and with such manifest regard for merit that few realized how far the army had been revolutionized.

  A long list it was of the “Manassas men” who had disappeared from the army in the year past. Dead were Bartow, Bee, and Cocke; wounded, transferred, or resigned were Johnston, Beauregard, Kirby Smith, Bonham, and Shanks Evans. Robert Garnett had fallen in western Virginia; Allegheny Johnson had been wounded at McDowell. To the list of dead Richard Griffith and Turner Ashby had to be added. Arnold Elzey had been wounded again and grievously, and Maryland Steuart had a broken bone that would not knit. Johnston had begun to recover, but he certainly would not replace Lee. That was assured. Besides Johnston, the army had lost the long-esteemed Gustavus Smith, whose nervous condition still was puzzling. Magruder, Huger, and D. H. Hill had been transferred. These five, with Longstreet and Whiting, ere the arrival of Jackson, had been the most conspicuous figures in the army that faced McClellan between White Oak Swamp and the Chickahominy. Now, of the seven, only three remained!

  The explanation for all this was the one grim word, combat. Those forty days of bloody action from Front Royal to Malvern Hill had shattered the command. Many had fallen, but more had failed. The battle deaths the South had expected, the failures it had not. In 1861 appearance had shaped appraisal. A confident people had accepted promise before performance. Then, under test of fire, high reputations quickly had been destroyed, pretense shattered, nerves that seemed strong had been as wax, excitement cost some men their self-mastery and others it had bewildered. That same fire of battle, burning to the soul of man, had shown valor beneath a cover of uncouthness, heroic composure under a commonplace mien, steel where the surface seemed soft, ability as dazzling as unsuspected.

  All the capacities of the new army would be required now. Fire-eating politicians and editors were beginning to doubt the recognition of the Confederacy by England and France and the intervention of those powers against the North. The bloody way of battle, whether it led across the Potomac or back again to the James, was lengthening, though it was promising; past belief was the transformation in the Southern cause since the dreadful days of February. Still … John Pope was threatening an advance down the Orange and Alexandria Railroad against Jackson. At Harrison’s Landing, McClellan’s army still outnumbered Lee’s. A force of unknown destination was being mustered at Fort Monroe.

  Could the reorganized Army of Northern Virginia cope with all these troops? Was it well led now, or had it merely been fortunate in the operations against McClellan? After a year, how much more capable, if any, would Lee show himself than Johnston? That strange man Jackson, was he a mad genius, unable, unwilling to cooperate, or would he prove himself the right arm, perhaps the successor to the commanding general? Longstreet the impassive, was he qualified, or was he another Huger, imperturbable, to be sure, but well-nigh immovable? Would the new leaders, like the old, find battle a traitor to reputation, a betrayer of the fame it brought?

  CHAPTER 14

  Facing a New Threat

  1

  NEW TROUBLES FOR OLD JACK

  Was it a major change in Federal strategy with which Stonewall Jackson had to deal in mid-July 1862? Was Pope’s Army of Virginia opening a “second front” in advancing on the Virginia Central? Another Federal force of unknown strength was at Fredericksburg. This column, uniting with Pope, might overwhelm Jackson. Either one might push forward, cut the railway, and sever communications between Richmond and the Shenandoah. Against this possibility, Jackson had, first of all, to protect the long stretch of rail from Hanover Junction to Charlottesville. He had also to watch for an opening and, if he found one, strike at once. In this spirit, when he was satisfied Pope was north and west of Culpeper, Jackson advanced the Army of the Valley on July 19 to Gordonsville.1

  Jackson was conscious that his men needed a renewal of stiff discipline. Before he left Richmond, he had prescribed the tonic of three drills a day. Now, as he awaited developments, he sought to restore whatever might have been lost in soldierly qualities. It was an exacting and burdening task. If he had time for Holy Writ, that was all. Newspapers he still declined to peruse lest they destroy his Christian humility. They spoke too well of him. “Everything here seems so quiet,” his aide Frank Paxton wrote cheerfully home. “The troops are drilling and … it is very much needed. Everything has a happy, quiet appearance, such as I have not seen in the army since we were in camp this time last year after the battle of Manassas.”2

  The arrival of A. P. Hill’s division did not disturb this calm. The Light Division reached Jackson on July 29 and the days immediately following. In dispatching Hill from Richmond, Lee had written the commander of the Army of the Valley, “A. P. Hill you will, I think, find a good officer, with whom you can consult, and by advising with your division commanders as to your movements much trouble will be saved you in arranging details, as they can act more intelligently. I wish to save you trouble from my increasing your command.”3 This was as pointed as it was tactful. The event was to show that Lee’s counsel was lost on Jackson. If Stonewall was willing, as he told Boteler, to follow Lee blindfolded, he required no less of his subordinates. Hill said nothing and asked nothing. Doubtle
ss he was glad enough to be away from Longstreet.

  If Hill kept the peace, others did not. Some privates of the Stonewall Brigade had straggled badly on the march and wandered far in search of food at private homes. Winder decided that the one way of stopping this was to punish it severely. Thirty offenders were “bucked” for a day. Their resentment was worse than their straggling. About half of them deserted that night. Jackson thought it politic to direct that men not be bucked again, thus ending that humiliating form of punishment, but it did not cool the wrath of the sufferers. John Casler wrote that Winder “was very severe, and very tyrannical, so much so that he was ‘spotted’ by some of the brigade; and we could hear it remarked by some one near every day that the next fight we got into would be the last for Winder.”4 That in the Southern Cromwell’s own brigade of the Model Army!

  Simultaneously with this unhappy affair in the Stonewall Brigade, Jackson’s cavalry was in the turmoil of reorganization. Following the death of Ashby, Richmond had not consulted Jackson in the search for a successor. The President chose Colonel Beverly H. Robertson and promoted him brigadier general. Robertson was a midland Virginian, thirty-six, a graduate of West Point in the class of 1849, a veteran of much Indian service and in person the embodiment of the fashionable French cavalry officer of the time. Somewhat bald, with unsmiling eyes, Robertson wore long, flowing mustaches and whiskers in the mode of Louis Napoleon. He had entered Confederate service as colonel of the 4th Virginia cavalry.

  Because Robertson adhered sternly to the rigorous discipline of the regular army, he was defeated in the election for colonel in the reorganization of his command. That canceled his commission but made him available for other service. Davis’s hope was that Robertson’s admitted abilities as a drillmaster could be well employed in the training of Ashby’s men. The loose, cumbersome organization of the cavalry in the Shenandoah was conformed to army regulations. Ashby’s troopers were regimented as the 7th and 12th Virginia, and the 17th Virginia battalion. With Munford’s 2nd and Flournoy’s 6th, they constituted Robertson’s “Laurel Brigade.” The organization was thus completed but it was not popular. Boys who had been accustomed to the easy-going if adventuresome life under Ashby could not be reconciled overnight to “old army” colonels and methods.5