Lee's Lieutenants

by Douglas Southall Freeman

  Trimble was the man. As soon as he heard that troops were wanted for the extra march, he offered his. Had he not been urging, ever since he joined Jackson, that all advantage be pushed to the ultimate? Now he was to have his opportunity. Jackson gratefully accepted the offer to march on Manassas.

  With the 21st North Carolina and the 21st Georgia, less than 800 muskets, Trimble set out about 9 o’clock. In an afterthought, Jackson sent Stuart’s cavalry. On arrival they came under fire, and Trimble disposed a regiment on either side of the railroad and advanced. In the darkness Union gunners fired wildly, and the Confederates rushed forward and took the guns before they could be reloaded. Wrote General Trimble, “… each of the two batteries contained four fieldpieces, horses, equipments, and ammunition, complete.”15

  These were no more than the first fruits. The base itself was incredibly rich. What loot there would be when daylight came—provided Old Jack would allow the soldiers a free hand. Would he do that? At Winchester he sternly had admonished his men that all captured supplies were the property of the Confederate government. Was he to be more moderate now? Of course he would take into account that the soldiers had received no rations since the evening of the twenty-fourth, but beyond the formal issue of bread and bacon, would he throw open the stores? After the manner of man when hungry, that question bulked larger in the dawn of August 27 than did the fact that one of the great marches of history had been made.

  3

  JACKSON DEFIES POPE AND THANKS GOD

  Before even his usual “early dawn,” Jackson advanced in support of Trimble—Hill’s division, the remainder of Taliaferro’s. At Bristoe, Ewell was left with three brigades, with orders to resist any Federal advance and, if hard pressed, to fall back on the main force. Jackson found the Federal property at the Junction fully as much as predicted. Two tracks for a distance of half a mile each were covered with freight cars loaded with supplies of a variety that outscaled imagination. Flour and like staples crowded warehouses. “The display of luxuries among the sutlers’ stores,” wrote Colonel W. W. Blackford, “was even more extensive than at the White House….”

  To the loot the cavalrymen helped themselves liberally, but stern Trimble had ordered his two regiments to guard the captured stores. The Stonewall Brigade, which reached Manassas soon after daylight, likewise was restrained, but imperfectly. Comrade Casler reported breaking into a commissary depot: “When we had appropriated all we could carry we found a barrel of whiskey … but as we had our canteens full of molasses, and our tin cups full of sugar, we had nothing to drink out of. We soon found an old funnel, however, and while one would hold his hand over the bottom of it another would draw it full. In this way it was passed around. But the officers soon found us out and broke up that game.” Hill’s men, following the Stonewall Brigade, proved of irrepressible appetite.16

  Meantime, north of the Bull Run railroad bridge, a New Jersey brigade was detrained by its general, George W. Taylor, under orders to hold the bridge. In his ardor General Taylor decided to press on to Manassas and drive off a Confederate force he evidently though small. As the inexperienced Jerseymen came on, Poague’s and Carpenter’s batteries opened on them. Jackson watched with admiration and felt that he should save them, if he could, from the slaughter that was beginning. He halted the firing, rode out in front, waved his handkerchief, and shouted to the enemy to surrender. In response a Federal infantryman took careful aim and fired at Jackson. The missile came close enough for a cannoneer near the general to hear the spiteful whistle. With that Confederate fire was reopened. The Federals stumbled on for a few minutes, then broke and fled, leaving 300 prisoners and 135 dead and wounded. The unequal fight was over by 11 o’clock.17

  Back at the Junction, the stores the Southern army most lacked were being loaded into the ambulances and ordnance wagons. The remainder was offered to the men in haphazard if liberal fashion. Boylike, the members of numerous messes would stop the preparation of plain, familiar food when a new delicacy was triumphantly brought in. For better or worse they would try their hand at cooking the rare viand. After Jackson had seen to it that all discoverable liquor was dumped from barrels and every bottle not requisitioned by the surgeons was remorselessly smashed, he agreed that the men might as well enjoy what their government could not salvage. Truth was, all who could do so had been plundering on the sly ever since their arrival.

  The hours that followed never were to be rivalled in the Army of Northern Virginia and never forgotten. Said John H. Worsham: “It was hard to decide what to take. Some filled their haversacks with cakes, some with candy, and others with oranges, lemons, canned goods, etc. I know one who took nothing but French mustard….”The lament was that certain of the troops did not get their share. Worse still, in the view of infantrymen, was the advantage enjoyed by the mounted men. The boy on foot had his haversack and his pockets—no more; the trooper had an animal that could bear much loot. The advantage enjoyed by an officer who had two horses was scandalous. “For my part,” wrote an artillery lieutenant, “I got a tooth brush, a box of candles, a quantity of lobster salad, a barrel of coffee, & other things which I forget.”18

  Delightful plundering, like affrighting battles, had to end. Long Federal columns by midafternoon were threatening Ewell at Bristoe. It was manifest that Pope’s army was coming up. Ewell decided to retire, as Jackson had authorized, to Manassas. Admirably was this done, and when Ewell’s veterans arrived at the Junction and drew rations, they had earned a full share of the luxuries. What they got was prosaic meat and bread and perhaps some coffee. The delicacies were gone. Already Jackson was preparing to evacuate the place and give to the flames what he could not consume or transport and would not leave to the enemy.19

  The first part of Jackson’s mission now was performed: He had cut off the supplies of the Federal army and thereby assured its speedy withdrawal from the Rappahannock. Ahead of him was the second part of his mission, the task of preserving his force until the two wings of the army were reunited. Realistically Jackson determined to stay close to the line of Lee’s advance from Thoroughfare Gap, ready to cooperate on Lee’s arrival, to retreat if Lee were delayed, and, meantime, to strike a blow should the Federals give him an opening.

  For this bold maintenance of his advanced position, Jackson would need strong, readily defensible ground. Reconnaissance and his own knowledge of the terrain acquired the previous year led him to select a low ridge north of the road from Warrenton to Alexandria. The ridge was styled Groveton after a nearby settlement, and as if in good augury, was just a mile west of Henry House Hill where Jackson had fought in the first battle at Manassas. Groveton was not a perfect position, but it was probably the best the nearby countryside offered for the mission Jackson had assigned himself.

  That advantage of position Jackson might never have realized, had his adversaries been alert, because he got into a tangle on August 27-28 as a result of an excess of reticence. By telling his lieutenants only that a guide would direct them to their objective, the day ended with just Taliaferro’s division at Groveton. Hill was misdirected to Centreville; Ewell was south of Blackburn’s Ford. As one of Ewell’s staff explained in disgust, their guide “had not been told where to take us, or if told, it had been in some very general terms.” There was worse confusion than had prevailed on any of Jackson’s marches save that of August 8 en route to Cedar Mountain.20

  Before the scattered divisions could be concentrated on the morning of the twenty-eighth, intelligence began reaching Jackson of Federal forces concentrating on Manassas. This evidence of gathering opposition did not lead him to modify his plan of remaining where he was until Lee arrived. At first he was not convinced, even, that the enemy intended a stand; perhaps Pope was reorganizing for a retreat to unite with McClellan and then resume the offensive. As soon, therefore, as he was assured that his three scattered divisions would be reunited in the course of a few hours, he began to seek an opportunity of striking a blow. Now evidence accumulated that instead
of running away from Jackson, the enemy might be preparing to give him battle. For a time he could do nothing except to watch the Federals.21

  He waited—and not in vain. Toward sunset a blue column came up the Warrenton Turnpike, but did not follow the route of those that had turned southeastward toward Manassas. It was marching straight for the Stone Bridge. The flankers were out heavily; the column itself was compact and well closed.

  What followed was witnessed by Stuart’s engineer, W. W. Blackford: “Jackson rode out to examine the approaching foe, trotting backwards and forwards along the line of the handsome parade marching by, and in easy range of their skirmish line, but they did not seem to think that a single horseman was worthy of their attention—how little they thought that this single, plainly dressed horseman was the great Stonewall himself…. All felt sure Jackson could never resist the temptation, and that the order to attack would come soon, even if Longstreet was beyond the mountain. Presently General Jackson pulled up suddenly, wheeled and galloped towards us. ‘Here he comes, by God,’ said several, and Jackson rode up to the assembled group as calm as a May morning and, touching his hat in military salute, said in as soft a voice as if he had been talking to a friend in ordinary conversation, ‘Bring out your men, gentlemen!’”

  From the woods, said Blackford, “arose a hoarse roar like that from cages of wild beasts at the scent of blood.” Taliaferro sent his cheering men forward. Ewell followed with two of his brigades. Three batteries opened. Into the open the infantry plunged, and then the advance abruptly halted; there at close quarters was begun a bitter stand-up fight. The Federals, it was later discovered, belonged to King’s division of Burnside’s corps. Gibbon’s brigade, of one Indiana and three Wisconsin regiments, was the tough bone Jackson attempted to crack; quickly to its support came part of Doubleday’s brigade. These six regiments stood off Jackson’s division and half of Ewell’s. For two hours and a half, until 9 o’clock, artillery and infantry banged furiously away. Then the Federals, withdrawing slowly, broke off the fight.22

  Tactically the action taught nothing, and demonstrated nothing save the stubbornness of both forces. In casualties, for the numbers engaged, it was one of the costliest battles Jackson ever had fought. The Stonewall Brigade lost two promising officers, John F. Neff and Lawson Botts, and was left with about the personnel of a regiment of moderate strength. In the high command serious losses there were. General Taliaferro was wounded painfully, in the foot, the neck, and in the arm. Worse, far, was the case of Dick Ewell. That incorrigible had yielded once too often to his love of being in the middle of a fight. Not until the battle was over and the litter bearers searched the field did they find Ewell on the ground with a bad leg wound. When the surgeons examined him they could say one thing only—amputate. That would mean the absence for long months of the most generous, best disciplined, and, in many soldierly qualities, the ablest of Jackson’s subordinates.23

  To lose, within less than three weeks, Winder, Taliaferro, and the irreplaceable Ewell must have seemed, even to the believing heart of Jackson, a stern “dispensation of Providence.” When Taliaferro fell, the new brigadier, William E. Starke, who had received his appointment August 6 and never had handled a brigade in action until Groveton, suddenly found himself in command of the most famous division of the army. Ewell’s troops passed, by seniority, not to Early but to the devoted Alexander R. Lawton.

  The enemy, said Jackson, “did not permit us to remain inactive or in doubt as to his intention to renew the conflict.” Daylight of the twenty-ninth showed the Federals in major force. Pope was striving to concentrate 25,000 men east of Jackson and a like number west of him in order, he wrote, “to crush Jackson before Longstreet could by any possibility reach the scene of action.” Carefully Jackson drew back his men to take full advantage of the higher ground and of the right of way of an unfinished railroad cut north of the Warrenton Turnpike. A compact front it was of not more than 3,000 yards, on which could be put as many of his forty guns as could be brought to bear. Casualties had reduced the infantry to not more than 18,000.24

  As the morning wore on, and Union batteries shelled the woods, there were demonstrations on the right, easily repulsed. The eyes of the Confederates were less on the Federals than on the Warrenton Turnpike beyond and the distant blue silhouette of Bull Run Mountain. Thence Lee was to come. From that direction there rose a long cloud of dust. Was it raised by the hurrying feet of Longstreet’s regiments? About 10:30 officers and men on the right saw a brigade boldly filing into position almost at right angles to their line. Were these confident newcomers Federals who disdained the proximity of Jackson’s guns; or were they Confederates extending Jackson’s flank along the high ground to the south of the Warrenton Turnpike? Quickly General Starke sent off a courier to ascertain. Soon he came flying back. “It is Longstreet!” he cried even before he reached his general. A great cry that Longstreet had come was taken up by the men all down the line.

  The news was true. After a march that rivalled Jackson’s, some of Longstreet’s men on the night of August 28-29 had bivouacked triumphantly east of Thoroughfare Gap. Hood’s division, in the van during the early morning of the twenty-ninth, had raised the dust that Jackson’s division had seen. Hood greeted Stuart, who had gone out to welcome and to guide Lee, and then made contact with Early’s outposts and formed the line of battle that Jackson’s men admiringly had observed. Under Lee’s eyes, other brigades now were spreading a long front that hinged on the right of Jackson.25

  For the time, Pope gave no evidence that he intended to attack on that flank, or even that he was aware of Longstreet’s arrival. A brief foray was undertaken against Jackson’s wagon train and was repelled. Next came on Ewell’s front two attacks of no great vigor. Then the heavy pressure of the enemy seemed to be shifting to the left, to A. P. Hill’s part of the line. To strengthen Hill the two brigades under Early, no longer needed as a flank guard on the right, were moved eastward and placed in the rear of the Light Division.

  Jackson ordered this, but he did not himself visit that flank early in the day. Had he done so, he would have condemned the position of Hill’s force. Nothing had been done to clear the ground where the front passed through the woods; part of the line remained in a tangle of trees and bushes; much of it was drawn where undergrowth concealed all movement. Almost no artillery could be used. Between the brigades of Gregg and Thomas there was an interval of 125 to 175 yards. Nobody ever explained why this gap was left, or how Hill failed to observe that immediately in front of it the railroad cut was deep enough to shelter a considerable force.26

  Here the Federals soon became the aggressors. As fast as successive lines could be formed, they were directed against Hill’s left. As morning passed meridian, the Federal attacks grew heavier and centered on Thomas and Gregg, who met them with volleys as furious as their own. Ere long, from the railroad cut in front of the interval in the line, a cloud of bluecoats swept forward. A thunderous counterattack by Gregg’s 14th South Carolina and Thomas’s 49th Georgia restored the line, but they won only the briefest of respites. Back came the Federals to the assault. Could Gregg hold out? Anxiously Hill sent to inquire; Gregg answered that his ammunition was about expended, but he still had the bayonet.

  Hill sent to Jackson that he would do his best but scarcely could hope for success. Stonewall decided to go in person to the threatened left, and on the way met Hill, who repeated the message he had sent. “General, your men have done nobly,” said Jackson; “if you are attacked again you will beat the enemy back.” At that moment a rattle of musketry swept the left. “Here it comes,” Hill said, and without another word he galloped back toward his command. “I’ll expect you to beat them,” Jackson called after him.27

  In the face of this assault, Gregg’s South Carolinians gave ground slowly to the top of a knoll, whence if they were driven they would be routed. From one end of the line to the other strode Gregg. His old Revolutionary War scimitar was bare; his words were inflexible: �
��Let us die here, my men, let us die here!”

  Hill drew on his reserves. Forno’s Louisiana brigade was sent to relieve the pressure on the left. Early was thrown in, moving confidently against an enemy that had spent his strength. All the ground lost in Gregg’s defensive was regained. The Federals were driven from the railroad cut. Proudly, with a relief that words could not convey, Hill sent this message to Jackson: “General Hill presents his compliments and says the attack of the enemy was repulsed.” Jackson’s face broke into one of his rare smiles as he answered, “Tell him I knew he would do it.”

  Early and Gregg and Thomas and the others waited uncertainly. A long hour of suspense passed without a further move by the Federals. Tension imperceptibly diminished. The gallant Union troops had enough! “When the sun went down,” wrote a southern gunner, “their dead were heaped in front of that incomplete railway, and we sighed with relief….”28

  When darkness fell at last, Jackson’s tired staff prepared to bivouac on the scene of the army’s hard battle. Dr. Hunter McGuire had a long list of casualties to report. Gregg had lost more than 600 men. In his whole brigade two field officers only were unscathed. Among officers of rank the casualties had been almost as severe as on the previous day. Lamentably at the head of the list was General Trimble, badly wounded. General Field and Colonel Forno had been shot. “General,” Dr. McGuire concluded his report to Jackson, “we have won this battle by the hardest kind of fighting.”