Lee's Lieutenants

by Douglas Southall Freeman

  At 11 o’clock, May 1, the Confederate advance began. In about fifteen minutes, from the direction of the old Turnpike, came the challenging pop-pop of picket fire and then the boom of field guns. Evidently McLaws, commanding on that road, had encountered the Federals almost as soon as he set his column in motion. In a few moments, in his own front on the Plank Road, Jackson heard the dispute of pickets. A heavy Federal force was discovered in the act of deploying. Word came from McLaws that Unionists in large numbers were advancing on him. Behind them, a mile or more in the Wilderness, many troops could be seen on higher ground. The better opportunity, McLaws went on, seemed to be offered for a flank attack from the direction of the Plank Road.

  Hooker, then, was ready for a fight on both roads and, if left alone, might attack. Jackson did not intend on this account to surrender the initiative. If McLaws could hold his ground, Jackson would try the effect of Alexander’s guns on the Federals who were deploying, then try to turn their flank and get in their rear. Rodes was directed to send forward one brigade to help Anderson. A courier brought a note in which Jeb Stuart announced that he was coming up on the left and that Fitz Lee was still farther west and in position to observe troops movements in that quarter. Jackson turned over the sheet from Stuart and said much in fourteen words: “I trust that God will grant us a great victory. Keep closed on Chancellorsville.”9

  Now Lee arrived to see how the battle was developing on the flank where he expected the heavier bolt of the Federals to be hurled. The commanding general had remained at Fredericksburg during the morning to counsel Jube Early, Barksdale, and Pendleton in the defense they might be called upon to make. Jackson reported no serious opposition yet had been encountered; the ground to the south, said he, was favorable for a turning operation. In that direction, past the cheering line of Second Corps veterans, Jackson rode some distance with his senior. Lee had no suggestions to make, and soon started for the right to see whether any Federal attack was developing between the Rappahannock and the flank of McLaws.10

  Word came from the Turnpike that Semmes’s brigade, with some help from Billy Mahone’s men, had beaten off the attack. A rumor was spreading through the advancing ranks that Hooker was withdrawing. Harry Heth, fighting his first battle with the Army of Northern Virginia, had been told by A. P. Hill to take three brigades—his own, Lane’s, and McGowan’s—and hurry over to the Turnpike. Thence Heth was to push straight for Chancellorsville. On the Plank Road Jackson urged Anderson’s men forward, and at 2:30 he sent McLaws similar instructions to press the enemy Now leading the advance on the Plank Road was the brigade sent from Rodes’s division, under its new brigadier, S. Dodson Ramseur. Rans Wright was to the south of Ramseur; northward was Carnot Posey with the Mississippi brigade formerly the charge of W. S. Featherston. Whenever the advance reached a point where the enemy might have set an ambush or formed an invisible line, Jackson had the artillery “feel” the woods. Always his word to the regimental commander was the same—“Press them, Colonel.”

  As the enemy appeared now at a stand, Anderson did not wait for Jackson to order the Federal flank turned. He directed Wright’s brigade to sideslip to the left until it reached the line of an unfinished railroad. Then the Georgians were to march westward along the right of way. This was done swiftly and successfully, the Federals giving ground rapidly. The Confederate advance was resumed on both roads. It was now about 4:00 P.M.

  Jackson decided to see how Rans Wright was progressing and what the nature of the ground was to the left front. He rode quickly to the vicinity of Catharine Furnace, about a mile and three quarters south and west of Chancellorsville. There he found Stuart with the 1st Virginia cavalry and some of the horse artillery. Wright already was deploying to sweep a woodland to the northward. Jackson asked Stuart to ride with him to some higher ground whither Beckham was moving several of Stuart’s guns to clear the way for Wright. Beckham’s opening salvo brought a furious and well-directed answer from two batteries of masked guns. Jackson and Stuart and their cavalcade had to turn about and make for safety. Major Channing Price was hit with a bit of shell but proudly refused to think the hurt serious. With fine pluck he kept his seat until the little company was out of range and then, with scarcely a sound, he fainted and dropped from his saddle. It was found that the iron had severed an artery and that the major had lost much blood.11

  Jackson went back to the Plank Road where he met A. P. Hill and Anderson. They told him regretfully that the advance had been halted in the face of a stubborn stand by the enemy. Everything indicated that Hooker was in great strength about Chancellorsville. Jackson then bade Hill ride with him to the Turnpike, whence was rolling the sound of a brisk skirmish. McLaws, it was found, was halted on the Turnpike, and half a mile in advance was Harry Heth with the three brigades Powell Hill had sent to that road. As a newcomer, Heth was determined not to be found wanting in dash. When he ascertained he was facing determined resistance, he sent to McLaws to inquire whether he would support him in attacking. McLaws had no words for such nonsense at that time of day.

  Even in the face of that implied rebuke, Heth had not abandoned his mission. McLaws or no McLaws, support or no support, he would go on to Chancellorsville. Captain Alex Haskell, quick-witted as always, said he would go forward with two regiments: “If the enemy have gone, we can sweep through as your advance guard; and if they are there, the rest of your command will be saved for the general fight.” Haskell had thrown forward two famous regiments, Orr’s Rifles and the 14th South Carolina, McGowan’s old command. A blasting fire had greeted them. When Jackson and Hill rode up, Haskell came to meet them. “Captain Haskell, what is it?” Jackson said quietly. “Ride up here, General,” said the South Carolinian, “and you will see it all.” Jackson rode up and took out his field-glasses. Ahead, plainly visible, were three lines of battle and crude but strong earthworks. McLaws had reported before noon that Hooker occupied a strong position. Here was the proof of it. Would Hooker stay there?12

  Back to Heth’s line and across to the Plank Road Jackson galloped. Near the junction of the Plank and Furnace roads Old Jack halted and there, before darkness fell, he saluted General Lee, who rode up to investigate the report that Hooker had been brought to bay. With few words, the Confederate chieftains went back into the woods in order to get out of range of a Federal sharpshooter who could not be driven from his perch.

  Among the pines Lee sat on a fallen log and asked Jackson to take a place beside him. What, Jackson was asked, had he found on the left? Briefly the corps commander told of Wright’s attack near Catharine Furnace and of the strength the Federals had displayed there. It was Lee’s belief that Hooker’s main effort was to be on that flank. What they were witnessing on the fringe of the Wilderness was no feint. Hooker had planned to give battle there and would not abandon the attempt so lightly. If the Unionists remained in position the next day, they must be attacked. Where could that be done successfully? Lee’s reconnaissance on the right had convinced him that an effective blow could not be delivered between the old Turnpike and the Rappahannock. The Wilderness was too thick. Was the situation immediately in front of the Chancellorsville line equally discouraging? Apparently it was; but before the possibility was discarded, a careful reconnaissance ought to be made. Talcott of Lee’s staff and Boswell of Jackson’s were named for that task.

  Till the two engineers returned, Lee and Jackson canvassed the alternative that was shaping itself by elimination: If an attack on the Confederate right were ruled out, and the reconnaissance on the center revealed no opening, what could be done on the left? Beyond Catharine Furnace, where Wright and Beckham had fought, what were the prospects? Where was the Federal right? How securely was it anchored?

  Jeb Stuart rode up and jubilantly announced that Fitz Lee had been reconnoitering to the west and had satisfied himself that the Federal right was “in the air.” That news gave more importance than ever to the location of a route that extended beyond Hooker’s exposed flank. It must be a concea
led route, but it should not be overlong if the infantry were to cover it in time to give battle the next day. Hooker most obligingly had given the Confederates a boon by sending virtually the whole of his cavalry on a raid to the southward. He had shown little cavalry in front of Stuart and he might have few squadrons elsewhere to watch Confederate movements. A turning operation that would roll up his right seemed entirely practicable, if any decent adjacent roads out of sight of the Federal pickets could be found.

  Talcott and Boswell came back from their reconnaissance and were of one mind: The Federal line in the Wilderness was too strong to be assailed. It was being fortified steadily; it was located where little artillery could be brought to bear on it. The whole country in front of the Confederates was a maze of mixed timber of all heights. Much of the “original growth” had been felled years before for charcoal and had been replaced with stubborn young hardwood. A Wilderness in truth that terrain was!

  The chain of thought this report suggested moved Lee to ask, “How can we get at these people?” Jackson did not assume the commanding general was asking advice. He knew that Lee often asked just such a question when he really was addressing it to himself. The answer then was as loyal as it was understanding. “You know best,” said Jackson, in effect; “show me what to do, and we will try to do it.”

  Lee’s was the responsibility, Lee’s the decision. On the map, in a few moments, he traced the approximate direction of an advance that should put the Confederates beyond the right flank and in rear of Hooker. Then Jackson had the pleasure of hearing Lee entrust the ascertainment of the exact line of march and the execution of the operation to him. “General Stuart will cover your movement with his cavalry,” he added. The assignment brought a smile to Jackson’s face. Lee doubtless never had any other idea than that of committing the operation to Jackson, but until that moment had not said so. Now the task and all the tactical arrangement were Jackson’s. He rose quickly and saluted: “My troops will move at four o’clock.”

  Quietly Jackson went back a little farther into the woods and spread out his saddle blanket on the ground. He gratefully accepted Sandie Pendleton’s proffer of a cape to protect himself from the chill of the night and stretched out. Staff officers and couriers came and went. Around nearby campfires was slow conversation and now and again a laugh, but the mournful whip-po’-wills in the thickets almost drowned the voices. Moonlight outshone the flickering fires and gave sleeping soldiers a strange look … as if they were dead already. What mattered ghastly faces? Tomorrow would bring Jackson as great an opportunity as ever Winchester had offered … or Port Republic … or Groveton, or …13

  2

  “YOU CAN GO FORWARD THEN”

  The chill of the damp earth and the scantiness of his cover caused Jackson to awaken before daylight on the second of May. He was shivering and felt the first symptoms of a cold. He went to a little fire a waiting courier had kept alive. With his rubber coat around him the general sat on a cracker box the Federals had left there and bent over the fire as if he were hungry for heat.

  Presently Tucker Lacy, the chaplain, came to the fire. He had arrived during the night, after Jackson had gone to sleep, and told General Lee what he knew of the roads in the district, in which his family had large holdings of land. Jackson greeted him, “Come, sit down; I wish to talk to you.” Was there, he asked, any road by which either flank of the enemy could be turned? On the Confederate left, Lacy answered, there was a succession of roads, good and bad, that led around to the Turnpike west of Chancellorsville. Jackson showed him a rough map of the area and said, “Mark it down for me.”

  Lacy sketched the road, but Jackson was not satisfied. “That is too near. It goes within the line of the enemy’s pickets. I wish to get around well to his rear, without being observed. Do you know of no other road?” He did not, Lacy replied, but someone who doubtless would know was the proprietor of Catharine Furnace, Charles C. Wellford. This fired Jackson. He woke up Jed Hotchkiss and explained to the topographical engineer what he wanted—a concealed route, not too long, from Catharine Furnace to the Plank Road west of the point where the Federal right was “in the air.” Hotchkiss and Lacy were to find out from Mr. Wellford whether such a route existed, if so what its length was, whether it was practicable for artillery, and if a guide could be procured.14

  Hotchkiss and the chaplain got their horses and rode down the Furnace Road to consult Mr. Wellford. Soon to Jackson’s side came the commanding general. Day was breaking; it gave promise of warmth and pleasantness. Refreshed and alert—always at his vigorous best in the early morning—Lee sat down by his lieutenant. Jackson told of dispatching Hotchkiss and Lacy to the Furnace. The conclusion already reached by the two generals was that the flank of Hooker must be turned. What now was to be decided was whether a march to the Federal right was practicable within the time that Hooker might be expected to remain on the defensive.

  Jackson had determined what he would propose to increase the prospect of success in a furious offensive that would hurl one Federal wing back on Chancellorsville and the fords of the Rappahannock. Everything was contingent on the report Hotchkiss would make on the roads. Up from the Furnace Hotchkiss soon rode, and with good news. Mr. Wellford said there was a way! Hotchkiss picked up another of the cracker boxes the Federals had left behind and placed it between Lee and Jackson. On it he spread a map across which he traced the route Mr. Wellford recommended: From Catharine Furnace you follow a newly opened road south and west to the Brock Road, which runs north. You do not turn north because you may come within sight of the enemy. Instead, you move south about 600 yards and then make a sharp right turn and go back north again past the Trigg and Stephens houses. You keep on parallel to the Brock Road to the place of a free Negro named Cook. There you get back into the Brock Road and follow it to the Orange Plank Road.

  When Hotchkiss finished there was a moment of silence. Lee looked at Jackson, whose head probably was still bent over the map. “General Jackson,” he said quietly, “what do you propose to do?” The question was superfluous in view of the previous understanding, but it was polite. Jackson put his forefinger on the map and followed the line that Hotchkiss had traced. “Go around here,” he answered.

  “What do you propose to make this movement with?” Undramatic the question was, and spoken in a conversational tone, but it presented on the instant a supreme test of both generals. If Jackson asked for little he could do little, but if he asked for much, would he be fair to Lee? The answer had to be in terms of opportunities, not of sensibilities. Hooker’s army must be overwhelmed, hurled back to United States Ford, destroyed. Sufficient force to do this must be provided. So, without hesitation or preliminary, Jackson gave the answer he probably had been fashioning for hours. With what did he propose to make the movement?—“With my whole corps.”

  “What will you leave me?” the commanding general asked. Without so much as an apologetic inflection to acknowledge that he was putting upon Lee the burden of facing perhaps 50,000 men with 14,000, Jackson replied, “The divisions of Anderson and McLaws.”

  Why not? Lee had not forgotten that Jackson had started one flank march the previous August and found his way, swiftly and surely, to the rear of Pope. In September had not Jackson left Frederick with just such a column as he now wished to put on the road, and had not the reward been 11,000 prisoners at Harper’s Ferry and more than 70 guns? Second Manassas, Harper’s Ferry, Chancellorsville—retreat, surrender, destruction—might not that be the ascending order of Jackson’s achievements? “Well,” said Lee calmly, “go on,” and he took pencil and paper to make notes for the orders he would issue.15

  Quickly Jackson left the bivouac to prepare for the advance of his corps. Already the blue of his eyes was beginning to burn, the line of his thin lips was sterner, his words were clipped. Although he made his dispositions rapidly, much time was consumed in getting even the well-disciplined men of Rodes’s division to cook and eat their breakfast and to move out to the road.
After Rodes was to march Colston, with Trimble’s division, which had been Jackson’s own. Powell Hill was to close the rear. A long, long column it would be—15 brigades, 29,000 bayonets—with artillery, ambulances, and wagons, on those narrow trails through the Wilderness.

  It was about 8 o’clock when the head of the column crossed the Plank Road on the way down the Furnace Road toward Wellford’s. Jackson was alert but not impatient. At the crossroads he saw the commanding general. Few words Jackson had, because all was in order, and those few he uttered tersely. His sole gesture, wholly characteristic, was to point ahead. Lee nodded; Jackson rode on. Under the brim of his cap his eyes were shining fiercely now.16

  Jackson sought to keep the column at his standard—a mile in 25 minutes with 10 minutes’ rest every 2 miles. Fortunately the dirt roads were “just wet enough to be easy to the feet and free from dust.” The only discomfort that developed as the sun rose higher was lack of water. Few streams or farm wells were passed.17 The first danger point was where the road crossed an open elevation close to Catharine Furnace. Not long after the van started the descent to the Furnace, a shell from the direction of the Turnpike made an inquisitive flight over the heads of the Confederates. Another followed, and another. As the fire continued, Jackson directed the troops to double-quick across the open space. Reconnaissance showed a woods road by which the corps train could detour and escape a pounding on the exposed stretch. Happily there was no increase in the volume of fire, but Jackson did not overlook the possibility that a Federal column might descend on the Furnace to ascertain the meaning of the movement. Rodes was directed to detach a regiment to guard a trail that entered the Furnace Road from the north.18