Lee's Lieutenants

by Douglas Southall Freeman

  Lee said nothing and gave no indication that he knew Longstreet was angry. With Old Pete on one side and Hill on the other, he sat on a fallen tree, map on knee, and talked of the arrangements for the action. Now Johnston and Clarke returned from their reconnaissance and Johnston reported. There was nothing in his report or in his manner to indicate that a decisive moment of the campaign had been reached. He had not attempted to mount Cemetery Ridge, Johnston said. At Little Round Top he had gone forward and climbed to a shoulder of that eminence. He found no enemy there, and he had seen no organized force anywhere. Johnston and Clarke then had ridden southward to a point opposite the southern end of Round Top. There they had turned back.

  Lee was visibly interested in Johnston’s report. At that time, opposite Lee’s headquarters, the enemy was not seen in strength. Johnston indicated that Union forces were not on the dominating ground farther southward. The decision of Lee to attack the enemy was confirmed. If the Confederates could launch an oblique assault north of the two Round Tops, get astride Cemetery Ridge at its lowest point there, and sweep up the ridge, the Federals could be driven from it! That was Lee’s conclusion. He turned to Longstreet and said, “I think you had better move on.”20

  Soon the commanding general rode off to the left for another conference with Ewell over his employment in cooperation with the attack by the First Corps. Longstreet was expected to make his preparations during Lee’s absence, but the lieutenant general was less disposed than ever to deliver his attack. He had no reason to doubt Johnston’s report that the lower end of the ridge was unoccupied, but he felt that the attack should not be made. If he must assault, he would delay until the entire First Corps was at hand. He said to Hood, “The General is a little nervous this morning; he wishes me to attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into battle with one boot off.”

  At 11 o’clock or a little later, Lee rode back up the hill to field headquarters of the First Corps. To all who had seen him on the left, it had been apparent that he had expected Longstreet to attack and was disappointed because he had not heard the guns of the First Corps. The previous evening, in discussing the desirability of an attack on the right, Lee had confessed that he hesitated to attack on that flank because Longstreet would have to deliver the blow. “Longstreet is a very good fighter when he gets into position and gets everything ready,” Lee had said, “but he is so slow.” Now he probably could not conceal altogether from Longstreet his disappointment that nothing had been accomplished, but his first remark was that it would not do to have Ewell open the attack. If Longstreet made any reply to this, it was perfunctory.21

  The morning was almost past. Opposite Lee’s post of command, a ridge that had appeared almost unoccupied at sunrise now was bristling with men and guns. Despite the increase in Federal strength, Lee believed he had no alternative to attacking as speedily as possible and, further, that his tactical plan would obviate the necessity of a frontal assault. Quietly, then, and in violation of long practice of merely “suggesting” movements to his lieutenants, Lee gave the explicit order: With that part of his command available, Longstreet was to attack along the Emmitsburg road in the manner explained earlier that morning to McLaws.

  As a soldier, Longstreet did not think of disobeying, but he asked permission to wait until Law’s brigade arrived from New Guilford. As that fine command would come up in a short time, Lee consented. Old Pete said nothing to expose his thoughts, but his every important act for the next few hours showed that he had resolved to put on Lee the entire responsibility for what happened. In plain, ugly words, he sulked. The dissent of Longstreet’s mind was a brake on his energies.

  About noon Longstreet had word that Law had joined Hood, and he ordered the advance to begin. He left the direction of the van entirely to S. R. Johnston, the reconnaissance officer Lee had put at his disposal. Longstreet himself remained near the middle of the column. For a time the commanding general rode with him, but of what passed between them no record survives. When Lee turned back, Longstreet was in authority as complete as he cared to have it. He had the large discretion that Lee’s system of command allowed the senior lieutenants.22

  When the van came to a point where the road was visible from the Federal position, McLaws halted, told Longstreet that the column could be seen by the enemy, and suggested that the two divisions countermarch and follow a route he had reconnoitered during the forenoon. This was done, though it put Hood’s division in advance. Where the Federal left flank rested Longstreet did not know, though he had seen nothing to indicate that it extended far down the ridge toward Round Top. “How are you going in?” he asked McLaws. That would be determined when he could see what was in his front, McLaws answered. “There is nothing in your front; you will be entirely on the flank of the enemy.” Then he would continue his march, said the division commander, “and after arriving on the flank as far as is necessary, will face to the left and march on the enemy.”

  “That suits me,” replied Longstreet, and rode off.

  Lee had been told of two good artillery positions, one opposite Round Top, the other in a peach orchard about 1,600 yards northwest of Little Round Top. He had concluded that good artillery preparation would make possible the oblique attack that would clear the orchard and put the Confederate right on the lowest part of Cemetery Ridge. As the attack advanced, A. P. Hill’s right division, Dick Anderson’s, was to cooperate. The remainder of Hill’s corps was to demonstrate to hold the Federal forces that faced Hill’s left. Ewell was to feint, also, as soon as he heard the sound of Longstreet’s guns, and convert this into a real attack if opportunity offered.23

  The major assumption of this plan was that the Federal line on Cemetery Ridge was short. On no other evidence than that of Johnston’s and Clarke’s reconnaissance, the Confederates assumed that the Federal left did not extend far and that it could be turned easily when the men of the First Corps were astride the ridge. Longstreet was of this opinion, which was Lee’s also. Consequently, when Longstreet presently heard firing from the front McLaws was to occupy, he told himself McLaws must have engaged an outpost only. He reasoned that he should extend his right to be certain he outflanked the Federal left, and Hood was instructed to form on McLaws’s right. After giving this order, Longstreet waited. Nothing happened. Puzzled and provoked, he sent to inquire why McLaws had not opened the attack. McLaws’s answer was prompt: He would charge as soon as the division was formed, but the Federals were in great strength in his front. They held the Peach Orchard and they spread far to his right. Abundant artillery was with them. Longstreet thought the report exaggerated, or else he reasoned that Hood, going speedily into action, would get beyond the Federal flank. McLaws’s instructions were renewed. He must attack at once.

  McLaws replied that the Federal guns were so numerous that the Confederate batteries must be used against them; careful artillery preparation was necessary to prevent failure. He wished Longstreet would ride to the front and see for himself. Longstreet gave no heed to this. McLaws was in the position assigned by Lee for the attack Lee had ordered; McLaws must go forward. Let him understand that the order was peremptory.24

  Scarcely had these instructions gone to McLaws than a messenger arrived from Hood with the worst news yet: The Federal line extended almost to Round Top! From the Peach Orchard southward the Union front was concave. An attack across the Emmitsburg road, in the manner contemplated by Lee’s orders, was impossible. It would expose flank and rear to the enemy’s fire. However, Hood reported that some of his Texas scouts had reconnoitered the southern end of Round Top and found no troops there. They believed it would be easy to get in rear of the enemy and to reach the Union wagon trains. Hood asked that the attack order be suspended and that he be allowed to move around the Federal left. Longstreet shook his head. No, “General Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg road.” Tell Hood that.

  None of his staff suggested that in a situation that had been misunderstood from the first and
had now changed decisively, Lee should be informed. Longstreet apparently did not feel that he should delay the assault still further for a report to the commanding general. But he did conclude that McLaws must wait until Hood was deployed and ready to go forward.

  Almost before the courier could spur away with this message, another officer arrived from Hood. He repeated his request: He feared that nothing could be accomplished under his orders. Would not Longstreet permit him to undertake to turn Round Top? Again the answer from Longstreet: “General Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg road.” About this time the Confederate artillery opened in front of Hood and McLaws. As the salvoes shook the countryside, there arrived still another of Hood’s staff officers with the same plea: The enemy’s position was one of great strength; Hood thought his attack could be repelled easily, and asked permission to try the turning movement. For the third time Longstreet’s answer was, “General Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg road.”

  To reinforce this as a final, imperative order, Longstreet rode over to the high ground on the extreme right where Hood’s veterans were waiting. Earnestly Hood expressed his regret that Longstreet would not permit him to advance under the southern flank of Round Top. Longstreet varied his answer to the extent only of saying, “We must obey the orders of General Lee.” Hood argued no further. He had made his request. Longstreet had seen the ground. Orders stood. He gave the word for the advance.25

  Longstreet watched the start and then, in bitter mood, rode north to McLaws’s position. In the Peach Orchard, distant less than 600 yards, Union troops were moving as if they intended to attack. This was more than could be endured by William Barksdale, he of the battle of the pontoons at Fredericksburg. “General,” he kept pleading with McLaws, “let me go; General, let me charge!” When Longstreet appeared, Barksdale impetuously came up to him: “I wish you would let me go in, General!” “Wait a little,” answered Longstreet, “we are all going in presently.”

  Hood’s attack by this time was becoming confused, with Hood falling with a bad arm wound. Evander Law, assuming command of the division, pushed his own brigade over Round Top and grappled with the enemy on Little Round Top. With heavy losses the rest of the division fought its way as far as it could without support on its left. Law halted it on the best defensive line he could find and sought help from McLaws’s troops.

  McLaws had been awaiting word from Longstreet to launch his attack, but Old Pete was not to be hurried. When presently the signal gun fired, Joe Kershaw’s South Carolinians advanced in an effort to seize the Peach Orchard and take position on the left of Hood. By some mischance, Barksdale’s advance, which should have been timed to Kershaw’s, was so delayed that Kershaw had to change front to cover his left. When Barksdale’s Mississippians at last received their orders, they drove the enemy from the Peach Orchard but could get no farther. Semmes and then Wofford pushed forward in support. Both Longstreet’s divisions now were engaged, though thrown into action piecemeal. “Then was fairly commenced,” said Longstreet, “what I do not hesitate to pronounce the best three hours’ fighting ever done by any troops on any battle-field.”26

  The time had come for Dick Anderson’s Third Corps division to go in on Longstreet’s left. The plan was to engage by brigades right to left—Wilcox, Perry, Wright, and Posey, with Mahone in reserve. Wilcox’s advance was over rising ground to the Emmitsburg road, then down grade to a shallow ravine above which towered the ridge. Perry’s Florida troops under Colonel David Lang advanced as far as Wilcox did and for a time, together, they drove the enemy. Wright’s advance was superb. As the general himself described it, “we worked our way across that terrible field for more than a mile, under the most furious fire of artillery I had ever seen.” The Georgians outran their support on either side. “Thus we were perfectly isolated from any portion of our army a mile in advance,” said Wright, “… and abandoning our captured guns we rushed upon the flanking column of the enemy and literally cut our way out.”

  The attack of the Confederate right, south of Gettysburg, July 2, 1863.

  When Wilcox earlier had sent back to Anderson for help, Wilcox’s staff officer was dispatched to Mahone with orders to go forward. Mahone said he had instructions to hold his position and would not leave it. “But,” the aide answered, “I am just from General Anderson and he orders you to advance.” Mahone replied, “No, I have my orders from General Anderson himself to remain here.”

  The attack, in a word, had been uncoordinated. Wright fell back because Posey had not covered his left flank or Perry his right. Posey’s troops were badly placed and unable to advance as a unit. Perry’s men withdrew in the belief that Wilcox had done so; Wilcox felt he had support neither on the right nor the left. In the failure of these brigades of Anderson’s, the experience of McLaws and Hood was duplicated. Each division fought its battle almost alone and in no case with its full strength exerted. That was not like Dick Anderson and not like James Longstreet.27

  For the opening of Longstreet’s battle, Dick Ewell had been waiting all day. Lee had visited him during the morning, and several times said with manifest point, “We did not or could not pursue our advantage of yesterday, and now the enemy are in good position.” Lee impatiently waited on the left for the sound of Longstreet’s guns and then had ridden off to see why the battle was delayed. Ewell was left to guard the left and to strike if he could. As soon as Longstreet’s artillery began to roar, Ewell ordered the batteries of Latimer’s battalion to open on Cemetery Hill. The Union batteries answered wrathfully with heavier metal. While the firing was in progress, Ewell decided to turn the demonstration into an assault. What he saw in the bombardment to think it held promise of a successful infantry attack he never explained. He sent to the nearest division of the Third Corps on his right—led now by James H. Lane after Dorsey Pender was wounded in mid-afternoon—to request its cooperation when he advanced.

  Meanwhile, Latimer’s battalion was being overwhelmed by the fire directed against it. Latimer was directed to cease fire and to withdraw all his guns except four, which should be left to cover the advance of the infantry. Ewell heard the slackening of the fire and then its conclusion. He had no answer to his appeal to Lane, but determined to make the attack even though he had no assurance of help on that flank. Orders went to Johnson to begin the assault by taking Culp’s Hill. Early and Rodes were to follow on their front.28

  Attack of the Confederate left on Culp’s Hill, East Cemetery Hill, and Cemetery Hill, Gettysburg, July 2, 1863.

  The sun had been near its setting when the artillery duel ended. Whatever was done by Johnson’s men must be done within the hour. With the Stonewall Brigade engaged in skirmishing on the far left, Johnson had to start his assault slowly and with three brigades only. In their groping in the gathering darkness the right brigades soon met repulse. Maryland Steuart on the left got a footing on the hillside. Although his line could be traced only by the fact that the flash of his fire was upward, his men hung on. The enemy by 11:00 P.M. desisted from efforts to drive Steuart out that night.

  As soon as Jube Early ascertained that Johnson’s division had launched its attack, he prepared to go forward. He had three brigades to employ in the fight, and decided to keep one of these as a reserve. In his assault he would use only Hays’s Louisianians and Hoke’s North Carolina troops. These were directed to take East Cemetery Hill, which lies next to Cemetery Hill, the key position on the Federal front. One line they crashed easily. They climbed a stone wall and took prisoners. An abatis was passed, rifle pits were overrun, the climb was continued. At last the crest was reached—a bold rush, and guns were seized and flags captured. “At that moment,” said Hays, “every piece of artillery which had been fired upon us was silenced.”

  For a few minutes there was quiet, but for a few minutes only. Through the shadows now, the Confederates could see heavy masses of infantry south of them on the crest of the ridge. Hays did not know whether they were Union or Confederate. He had been ca
utioned to watch for friends on either flank and in front. A wave of fire swept along the front of the approaching troops. Hays did not reply. Perhaps these were Confederates who mistook his troops for Federals. Another volley—still Hays would not shout an order. A third volley! It was so close that the flash of the muskets lighted the uniforms of the men: They were blue.

  Hays gave them every bullet he had in the rifles of his two brigades. For a time, firing fast, he held them off. Soon he saw behind the first line a second; in the rear still another force was gathering. To these odds he could oppose only his own brigade and Hoke’s. Early had held back Gordon’s brigade, seeing nothing to indicate that Rodes was advancing on the right. Further resistance on the crest would be a waste of life. Hays must give up the prize of guns and commanding ground. Like Wright an hour previously, he had to retreat for lack of help at the decisive moment.29

  When Early started forward, Rodes did as well, but moving his troops through the streets of Gettysburg consumed slow, expensive minutes. Rodes had to advance some 1,200 yards before he could open fire. Early had scarcely more than half that distance to go. When Early attacked, Rodes was still advancing. When Hays was hoping for reinforcements, Ramseur and Doles were halting their column and debating whether to storm the frowning position ahead of them. Two lines of infantry behind stone walls and breastworks were discovered, supporting well-placed batteries. The two young brigadiers had shown on many a field they did not fear adverse odds, but this time they did not think they should attack what they considered a field fortress until they had asked Rodes.

  By the time their messenger reached Rodes, their question had answered itself. Rodes was informed that Early was withdrawing from East Cemetery Hill. It appeared a useless sacrifice of life to deliver an isolated attack. Accordingly, the division quietly withdrew to a position from which Rodes hoped he could spring forward with advantage the next morning.30