Lee's Lieutenants

by Douglas Southall Freeman

  The next day Longstreet received a summons to a private conference with Mr. Davis. It lasted nearly all day. Longstreet could see from the President’s manner that a change in the army command was in contemplation, and conjectured that he was being considered as a posssible successor to Bragg. A month previously Longstreet had suggested confidently that he take Bragg’s army. Now the outlook was less hopeful. In his effort to escape an undesirable assignment, he forthrightly, perhaps tactlessly, remarked to the President that Bragg’s forces were in the military department of Joseph E. Johnston. In no other way could they be effectively used than in combined operations. Under Johnston, said Longstreet, he gladly would serve in any capacity.

  That name, according to Longstreet’s narrative, provoked Davis and led to “severe rebuke.” The temper of both men must have flared. Longstreet verbally tendered his resignation, which Davis rejected. Then there was a stubborn and fruitless conversation over naming Evander Law or Micah Jenkins to lead Hood’s division. When president and lieutenant general had disagreed thoroughly and ended their conference, Davis walked to the gate, shook hands cordially, “and dismissed me with his gracious smile; but a bitter look lurking about its margin, and the ground-swell, admonished me that clouds were gathering about head-quarters of the First Corps even faster than those that told the doom of the Southern cause.” Longstreet evidently thought that he had put himself on Davis’s black books by proclaiming his faith in Johnston. The President, in turn, perhaps concluded, with his usual sensitiveness, that Longstreet had joined the forces arrayed against the administration.

  The decision of the President, maturely reached, was to retain Bragg in command. In the controversy, Longstreet’s former commander in Virginia was careful not to interfere or, for that matter, even to admit that differences existed between Bragg and his subordinate commanders. During the second week in October Lee undertook his projected offensive against Meade’s weakened forces, and when the operation was over, he wrote Longstreet,“… I missed you dreadfully, and your brave corps. Your cheerful face and strong arms would have been invaluable. I hope you will soon return to me. I trust we may soon be together again.”18

  In that brief campaign several new general officers participated. Colonel Robert M. Johnston of the 23rd North Carolina was promoted to take Iverson’s brigade. To Pettigrew’s brigade, W. W. Kirkland, former colonel of the 21st North Carolina, was assigned. Colonel Leroy A. Stafford, a man of conspicuous courage, was given a wreath around his three stars and placed in charge of Nicholl’s brigade. In the cases of Stafford and Kirkland, promotion was from the same division but a different brigade. This was saved from being blasphemy against states’ rights because they came from the same state as the troops they were to lead. As it was now manifest that Samuel McGowan would not return at an early date to lead his brigade, Colonel Abner Perrin of the 14th South Carolina was promoted to direct that famous command—to the dire offense of Colonel D. H. Hamilton, who thought he should have been advanced.

  Seth M. Barton, a Virginian and a West Pointer of the class of 1849, formerly a brigadier in Stevenson’s division, was exchanged after the surrender of Pemberton’s army at Vicksburg and was assigned to the command of Lewis Armistead’s old brigade, Pickett’s division. Another general officer to join Lee’s army and take command of a worn brigade was John Pegram, who last was seen as the leader of a captured column at Rich Mountain in 1861. Pegram had been exchanged and, like Barton, had been given a post in the western army. There he had won his brigadier’s commission, but for reasons of the heart he had decided to come back to Virginia. He was given Extra Billy Smith’s brigade in Early’s division—a promising appointment. No man could have a better introduction to the Army of Northern Virginia than to be presented as the older brother of Major William J. Pegram.

  It probably did not escape attention that of these six new appointments, two only—Johnston and Perrin—were by promotion within the brigades. Stafford and Kirkland had belonged to the division to which their new brigades were a part, but the two had no previous connection with those brigades. Barton and Pegram, though Virginians, were strangers to their troops. New and grim confirmation there was in all this of the ill-omened truth that the material of command was close to exhaustion.

  In the next scene of the drama, in which these men made their first appearance as general officers, the central figure was A. P. Hill. He had not shone at Gettysburg, and after that defeat bore an industrious though not a conspicuous part in restoring the Third Corps to fighting competence. On the record, he proved less notable as a corps commander in June-September 1863 than he had been as head of his famous Light Division. Now Hill had a new opportunity.

  Meade early in October was encamped north of Culpeper Court House, with two of his corps extended to the Rapidan. The sole inexpensive way of attacking him was to turn his position, force him to retreat, and then assail him in motion or where the ground was less readily defensible. On the ninth of October the Confederate columns began to move. Ewell and Hill proceeded with their corps to Culpeper. On the morning of October 12, on orders of the commanding general, who was trying to intercept the enemy’s retreat, the Third Corps started on a wide circuitous advance toward the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Ewell had the shorter road via Jeffersonton and Sulphur Springs in the direction of Warrenton. Hill moved byway of Sperryville, Gaines’ Crossroads, and Waterloo Bridge. From the east, as Hill’s men swung along, they occasionally heard the sound of artillery. On the thirteenth the steady march brought the corps near Warrenton, which Ewell also had reached.

  The Third Corps resumed its march on the morning of October 14. “We all entered now fully into the spirit of the movement,” wrote a brigade historian. “We were convinced that Meade was unwilling to face us, and we, therefore, anticipated a pleasant affair, if we should succeed in catching him.” In a larger knowledge of the situation, Hill must have realized that the odds now were against the Confederates in the northward race between the armies. The Federals had started early and were following the direct roads up the Orange and Alexandria railway. Hill and Ewell had to use roads more remote. All the indications were that the Army of the Potomac was moving toward the Washington defenses.19

  Five miles north of Warrenton, Hill received word that a Federal column was moving northward almost parallel to him. At Greenwich, reached about 10:00 A.M., the Third Corps was definitely on the trail of the Federals. Fires were still burning. The road toward Bristoe Station was strewn with the articles retreating soldiers throw away, knapsacks, blankets, guns even. The eyes of the Southerners brightened. It was August 1862 again! Ahead of them, at that time, had been all the delights of plundering the great base at Manassas. Memory spurred lagging feet. Like speed to Bristoe might yield like prizes. “It was,” said one North Carolinian, “almost like boys chasing a hare.”

  Lines of advance of the Second and Third Corps from Culpeper Court House to Bristoe Station, October 12-14, 1863.

  As the column approached Bristoe Station, Hill spurred ahead to see whether the enemy had cleared Broad Run. He doubtless knew that the railroad bridge across the Run could be used by infantry and that easy fords existed on either side of the bridge. There always was a chance that a swift pursuit might surprise an adversary who thought himself safe at the crossing site. When Hill came to high ground in sight of Bristoe, he saw thousands of Union soldiers on both banks of Broad Run near the fords. They offered such a mark as the army had not seen since that May afternoon when Jackson deployed in the woods west of Chancellorsville. Instant action was imperative. Heth with the leading division must speed his advance. As soon as he was in striking distance he must form line of battle. Let Poague bring up his artillery battalion immediately! Such an opportunity might not come again!20

  Hill’s eyes were on the enemy near the fords, and on them only. In his eagerness to assail them, he sent to Heth to hurry forward with the troops already in line of battle. To Hill it may have seemed a long, long time before Heth
’s line of battle came in sight. John R. Cooke’s brigade was on the right; Kirkland, with Iverson’s old command, was on the left. Henry Walker’s Virginians had not reached the line when the order came for Heth to push forward. Now Walker was trying vainly to catch up with Kirkland and form on his left. Poague’s gunners dashed into position and, at Hill’s order, opened fire. A few shots sufficed to send to the north bank those Federals who had been resting on the near shore. Their flight sharpened Hill’s combativeness. Heth must move by the left flank, cross the Run, and attack the fugitives.

  As Heth made the shift and began his advance toward Broad Run, Hill turned to examine the ground between the fords and the advancing line of gray. He saw something he had not observed before: Federal skirmishers on the Confederate side of the stream. They were spread southward and parallel to the railroad. When Heth’s line advanced, they would get on its right flank and in its rear. Hill sent back for McIntosh’s battalion of artillery and hurried a messenger to Dick Anderson to advance two brigades immediately to cover Heth’s right flank. Another messenger was rushed to Cooke, commanding Heth’s right brigade, to watch his flank.21

  So far as Hill could see from his command post, Cooke drove back the skirmishers. Heth sent a report that showed he was alive to the situation: On his right, he said, a heavy column of the enemy had appeared. Hill had to halt the division quickly or order it immediately across the stream in pursuit of the Federals. He reflected for a moment and decided that the movement should be suspended, but soon changed his mind. Looking to his right, Hill saw the head of Anderson’s column. In a short time Anderson would be on Heth’s right and could deal with any Federal force that remained on the near side of the Run. Impetuously a courier was sent to order Heth to the fords and in pursuit.

  Soon a rider dashed up to Hill with another message: Heth sent word that Cooke was certain that as he moved forward, the Federals near the railroad would take him in flank. In this contingency, should Cooke advance? Hill was positive in his answer: Anderson was coming up; Cooke would be safe. That was enough for the subordinates. Orders were orders. In a short time Hill saw Cooke’s line come over the crest of a hill and start forward. Kirkland was on Cooke’s left.

  Thus Hill hastily planned the attack, but a furious burst of fire soon showed how mistaken he had been. Anxious messages explained what smoke quickly concealed from the eyes—Federals still on the Confederate side of the stream in great numbers. They had not been observed earlier because they were concealed behind the railroad embankment, which Hill had not thought to reconnoiter. When Cooke and Kirkland advanced toward the stream, their entire right was exposed to Union fire from the embankment. Instead of making a flank attack across the Run, the two brigades became heavily engaged in front of the embankment and, to save themselves, had to try to drive the Union force from its cover.22

  In the attempt Cooke’s brigade was slaughtered. Not less than 700 of its men were killed, wounded, or captured. The 27th North Carolina, which had earned immortality at Sharpsburg, sacrificed 33 of its officers and 290 of its 416 men. Kirkland lost 602, of whom nearly half surrendered after they reached the railroad and saw that they could not escape otherwise. Total casualties in Heth’s division were 1,361 and for the army during the entire operation, in killed, wounded, and missing, probably 1,900.

  Both Cooke and Kirkland were badly wounded, to the dire impairment of their shattered commands. Both leaders realized the danger in which their brigades were put by Hill’s instructions, but they charged boldly. Said Cooke, “Well, I will advance, and if they flank me, I will face my men about and cut my way out.” In addition, a third general officer was wounded. In a futile attempt by Dick Anderson to cover Heth’s flank, Carnot Posey was badly wounded in the left thigh. In Charlottesville on November 13 he was to succumb to his injuries.23

  For these casualties no blame was placed on Harry Heth. He had acted in precise accord with his orders from Hill, and had taken pains to see that the full measure of the danger to the flank of the attacking column was made known to the corps commander. The battle was another instance of the singular ill fortune that pursued Heth, but the responsibility was Hill’s, not his. The army realized this. Criticism of Hill was on every lip. In his report, Hill admitted that he did not know of the presence behind the railroad embankment of the Federals who, after repulsing the Confederates with light losses, calmly marched on.

  In forwarding to the War Department Hill’s confession, Lee said in his endorsement: “General Hill explains how, in his haste to attack the Third Army Corps of the enemy, he overlooked the presence of the Second, which was the cause of the disaster that ensued.” President Davis wrote realistically, “There was a want of vigilance.” More painful far to the proud, sensitive Hill must have been Lee’s rebuke. The day after the battle, Hill conducted the commanding general over the field and explained what had happened. Lee had little to say and showed plainly in his face that he was disappointed. At last he spoke: “Well, well, General, bury these poor men and let us say no more about it.”24

  4

  JEB STUART’S NEW ADVENTURES

  The cavalry’s part in the Bristoe campaign tested Jeb Stuart’s new divisional organization but not all of his new general officers. Hampton was absent still because of his wounds; Fitz Lee had a vigorous hand in the fighting. Of all the brigadiers, only Lunsford Lomax and James Gordon were at their posts. The other brigades were led by colonels. Pierce Young headed Butler’s brigade and probably did not know, until the campaign was over, that he had been promoted. Rosser, too, participated as a colonel. Grumble Jones’s brigade was under Colonel O. R. Funsten. The troopers of Wickham were in the care of Colonel Thomas H. Owen of the 3rd Virginia. Colonel John R. Chambliss, Jr., again directed Rooney Lee’s brigade, but he had done this so often that he was to be counted now as a seasoned brigade leader. Exercise of higher command by colonels involved, of course, the care of regiments by lieutenant colonels and majors. In short, since the Seven Days there scarcely had been a time when so large a part of Stuart’s force was under men who had not been tested in the posts they now filled.

  Orders from army headquarters were that one division of cavalry should be left temporarily on the Rapidan and the other should be employed on the right of the army during the attempted turning movement. Stuart of course rode with the van, in command of the three brigades of Hampton’s men. This arrangement left Fitz Lee on the Rapidan. On October 11, near Culpeper, the Union cavalry was found in manifest strength between the retiring infantry and Stuart’s regiments. The sensible thing to do, Jeb reasoned, was to turn the Federal position and get in the enemy’s rear on the old battleground of Brandy Station. This appeared to be a course as safe as profitable, and for this cheering reason: From the east there rolled the echo of artillery, which Stuart took to be that of Fitz Lee in pursuit of Federals from the line of the Rapidan. Thus Fitz would be available with his three brigades when Stuart struck the enemy.

  As Stuart approached Brandy Station his pride sank: He saw that the Federals had fathomed his plan and were moving toward Fleetwood Hill in heavy columns. Instinctively he determined to push on and charge them before they could reach the high ground he had defended on the humiliating ninth of June. He looked eastward across the Orange and Alexandria Railroad and there could see the rising smoke of Fitz Lee’s guns. Fortune seemed to favor the bold. The enemy was squarely between Fitz Lee, closing on Brandy from the east, and Stuart, pushing from the west! It was a glorious opportunity to redeem the Brandy of four months previously … but just when Jeb was about to apply the vice, shells began to fall most unpleasantly close. Fitz Lee had seen the column of Stuart and, mistaking it for arriving Federal reinforcements, was firing on it!

  The sole means of informing Fitz on his mistake was to attack the Federals, who already suspected they were in a trap. “Regiment after regiment,” as it seemed to Stuart, “broke and dispersed.” The reliable 12th Virginia was at the head of the column: Let it charge the scattering ene
my! Without a second of hesitation, the 12th, which had fought previously at Brandy, dashed at the enemy. As Stuart looked, his blue eyes aflame, the regiment swung like a scythe in a harvester’s hand and cut off many hundreds of the enemy. If only Fitz Lee would come up now and throw his column against the opposing flank, what a harvest of prisoners there would be! Fitz did not gallop forward; he still believed Stuart’s men were Federals. To corral the bluecoats, Stuart must bring quickly to the front the 5th and 6th North Carolina, whose advancing troopers were spread for hundreds of yards back on the narrow road.

  At that moment, a battalion of Federal cavalry bore down on the flank of the approaching Carolina regiments. Everyone who watched its approach observed that the force was small and without support. The Confederates in the road either did not see or did not comprehend. They stopped, wheeled, then made off in utter panic. Stuart himself dashed back to halt them. Gordon pleaded and shouted. Nothing availed. It was now too late to capture the Federals who had scattered in the first charge. Nor could Fitz Lee, after discovering his error, reach his chief in time to prevent the Unionists from executing a defiant withdrawal toward the Rappahannock.25