Lee's Lieutenants

by Douglas Southall Freeman

  Although the situation was vastly better than it had been twenty-four hours previously, command remained in confusion. Pickett in Petersburg was aware of Beauregard’s sickness and increasingly apprehensive of the danger to the Weldon Railroad. Beauregard himself had the President’s directive to proceed to Petersburg, when his physical condition permitted, to direct operations. Old Bory replied that he hoped to leave on the seventh, but he remained at Weldon. There he did what he could to expedite the movement of Wise and Hoke. In obedience to orders, Hoke had abandoned the expedition against New Bern and was hurrying his troops to the railroad.24

  On the afternoon of May 7 the fight was renewed at Port Walthall Junction. The bluecoats showed neither dash nor originality, and first a frontal and then a flank attack were repulsed. The one achievement of the Federals was the severance of the telegraph wires and the tearing up of more than 300 yards of railway track during the brief time they held it. The Confederates were well pleased. Johnson and Hagood both felt that the repulse was due in large degree to the leadership of Harvey Hill. The final contingent of Hagood’s brigade now reached the battleground and raised the total strength of the Confederates to about 3,500. This encouraged the defenders of the railroad, but instructions from the rear began to hamper them. Pickett thought he saw indications of a direct assault on Petersburg, and he sent insistent demands for the troops at the Junction to fall back to the good defensible ground at Swift Creek. By midnight of May 7-8 they were on the road to the rear.

  Early on the afternoon of the seventh telegraphic communication with Beauregard had failed. A scouting locomotive sent down the Weldon Railroad reached Stony Creek, nineteen miles south of Petersburg. There the crew found that the Federal cavalry raiders from Suffolk, under Brigadier General August V. Kautz, had burned the railway bridge. It could be rebuilt quickly but, during the critical days immediately ahead, Beauregard could not move troops by rail directly to Petersburg. The enemy had won the race. Richmond’s main line of supply, up the coastal plain, was severed north and south of Petersburg. Before it could be reopened, anything might happen in the face of the adversary at Bermuda Hundred.25

  That opponent now was known to have two corps, the X and the XVIII, opposite the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, and was identified as Major General Benjamin F. Butler, “Beast” Butler to the more vehement Southerners. Some there were who doubted so important a command had been entrusted to a “political general” of limited experience. Whether Butler was competent or not, the Confederates still thought he had 40,000 men—the actual number was about 22,000, more than six times as many as stood in his front.

  Surprisingly, the next day, May 8, Butler did not take advantage of his superior numbers. He remained idle within easy striking distance of the Richmond and Petersburg, though he readily could have destroyed several additional miles of track. By this blunder on his part the Confederate commanders gained a day in the northward movement of the troops still in the Carolinas. The expedient of the authorities was to hasten the advance of the soldiers as far north as the break in the line at Stony Creek. There the regiments were to be detrained and marched to cars being assembled north of the burned bridge. Behind this arrangement and all other aspects of the concentration to save Richmond from Butler’s army, the driving power was that of Braxton Bragg. He was scouring the entire South Atlantic seaboard for reinforcements, and ceaselessly urging Whiting and Beauregard to speed traffic on the railway.

  The day of inaction by Butler was not one of relief on the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad. South of Weldon, the Confederates could make the most of poor equipment and limited rolling stock; north of Weldon, bad conditions grew worse. Early on the eighth Kautz attacked the defenders of the railroad bridge across the Nottoway River, five miles south of Stony Creek, and set the structure on fire. In twenty minutes the ruined bridge fell into the river. This was a more serious blow than the destruction at Stony Creek, because the Nottoway bridge was 210 feet in length. Troops could march around the long break, but for an indefinite period all supplies sent up the Petersburg and Weldon had to be unloaded south of the Nottoway, hauled by wagon to Stony Creek, and reloaded there—an added burden on overworked quartermasters.26

  Still another difficulty was presented now by Pickett. His military judgment began to show the effect of strain. Although he had ordered Bushrod Johnson to evacuate Port Walthall Junction and take position on Swift Creek, Pickett on the eighth directed D. H. Hill to march the troops back to the Junction. Fortunately there was good understanding between Hill and Johnson, who had become acquainted during the Chickamauga campaign. Doubtless with Hill’s approval and possibly at his suggestion, Johnson retained the main body at Swift Creek and sent only detachments to reconnoiter at the Junction. He employed his men usefully on the eighth digging rifle pits south of the creek. The next day the enemy appeared in considerable strength north of Swift Creek.

  The zone of action now widened. Because Butler at Bermuda Hundred was a continuous threat to the southern face of the Richmond defenses, General Ransom had sent from the city garrison the brigades of Archibald Gracie and Seth Barton to reinforce the garrison of Drewry’s Bluff. Reports of a Federal advance were seen by Bragg as both a danger to Drewry’s and as an opportunity for delivering a blow. About noon on May 9 he telegraphed Pickett an order to push forward all troops as fast as they arrived from the south in order that they might recover the lost position at Port Walthall Junction and reopen the line to Richmond. If Butler advanced on Drewry’s Bluff, the Confederates in the Petersburg area must assail him in the rear from the Junction. At 1:10 there came new and imperative instructions from Bragg: The enemy was moving on Drewry’s Bluff; all the troops at Pickett’s disposal must move out immediately and attack the Federals in the rear; this admitted of no delay. Pickett acknowledged this at once, and then communicated with D. H. Hill and told that officer to advance.

  Soon the troubled commander at Petersburg repented these orders. Bushrod Johnson was weak; indications were that the Federals were about to attack at Swift Creek. For the moment, in spite of Bragg’s imperative, it seemed wise to hold the creek and ascertain, if possible, whether the enemy there was making a feint or a serious thrust. Johnson was so advised. About 3 o’clock Pickett received Johnson’s acknowledgment of the earlier attack orders. In utmost haste Pickett replied that a countermand had been sent and Johnson was to hold the line of Swift Creek if it was true, as reported, that the Federals were advancing on that position.27

  Johnson, it may be assumed, was as much bewildered by these changes of orders as Pickett was by Bragg’s instructions and the enemy’s threats. Johnson’s conclusion was that Pickett wished him to make a reconnaissance in force. He undertook this with part of Hagood’s brigade and sustained 137 casualties to establish the fact, almost obvious, that the enemy was strong and in his immediate front. At the other end of the exposed section of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, the advance on Drewry’s Bluff did not materialize. Ransom was easy in his mind and of the opinion that the enemy was seeking only to destroy the railroad. His chief concern was over the difficulty of communicating with Bushrod Johnson, whom he considered under his command.

  The end of the day left Pickett the most harassed of all the commanders on the Southside. He expected to be attacked the next morning from Swift Creek, from City Point, from the south, and he could not understand why no effort seemed to be made to push northward the troops delayed by the burning of the bridges. On the night of May 8 he had sent trains to the northern end of the break in the Weldon Railroad. For eighteen hours and more they had waited, but no contingent had arrived. His appeal to Bragg was desperate: “Why do not the forces … below march up and drive off the enemy? This delay is criminal.”28

  4

  BEAUREGARD PLANS AGAIN (STYLE OF 1861)

  Before 9 o’clock on the morning of May 10—the day of the first attack on the Mule Shoe—Beauregard reached Petersburg. He brought his good luck with him. From the south, over re
paired tracks and by marches around the destroyed bridges, more of the long-delayed reinforcements came that day. Hoke’s brigade arrived. So did three regiments of Wise, and two of Matt Ransom. On the road, due that day, were Clingman’s brigade and four regiments of brigades already on the ground. By 9:00 A.M. the accession of strength was 4,900 infantry—more men than previously had been collected, with haste and anguish, for the defense of the southern end of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad.

  These newly arrived troops Beauregard, with his old self-confidence, prepared to organize. Hoke was to have one division. Pickett was relieved of command of his military district in order to be assigned to the other division. To each division Beauregard attached an extemporized battalion of artillery. He could proceed, for the moment, without concern. After demonstrating during the morning, the Federals withdrew from Swift Creek by midday. Before the day was over Beauregard was able to telegraph Bragg, “Hope to be in position for offensive tomorrow night.” For his part, Ransom at Drewry’s Bluff was distinctly stronger. To the brigades of Barton and Gracie he was adding Eppa Hunton’s brigade from the Richmond garrison. This would give Ransom almost 5,000 men, to which number a part of those arriving at Petersburg were to be added.29

  During the night of May 10-11 the telegraph brought an alarming message from Secretary of War Seddon. “This city is in hot danger,” it began. Sheridan’s powerful cavalry divisions had reached the Virginia Central, torn up the track, and headed in the direction of Richmond, which had been stripped of almost all its defending infantry in order to protect Drewry’s Bluff and the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad. Beauregard’s forces, including those at Drewry’s Bluff, were the sole hope of the city. Divided, his troops could save neither Richmond nor Petersburg. Brought together, they might be able to deal successively with Sheridan or Butler. This was the military logic that shaped the secretary’s telegram.

  It was Beauregard’s intention to form a junction with Ransom and assail Butler, and to that extent Seddon’s anxious message conformed to Old Bory’s strategic view; but he did not like to be tied to a specific plan. Although he started Hoke for Drewry’s Bluff the next morning, May 11, he did not hasten the column’s advance, and directed Hoke to make a forced reconnaissance toward the river to press Butler should he be preparing to withdraw. “Division of your forces is earnestly objected to,” Seddon telegraphed. Back and forth went the telegrams, in one of which Beauregard asked to be relieved if his course was not approved. In the end, the reconnaissance toward Bermuda Hundred showed the Federals as numerous as ever. Hoke went on to join Ransom two miles below Drewry’s Bluff.

  Pickett did not participate in this movement. He had reported sick and on the eleventh kept to his quarters. In the belief that Pickett might not recover promptly, Beauregard telegraphed to Wilmington for Chase Whiting to command the forces at Petersburg. He was anxious to use in the field an officer for whose abilities he had high admiration. Pending Whiting’s arrival, he himself would remain at Petersburg, although the harassed War Department manifestly wished him to proceed immediately to Drewry’s Bluff. He lingered in part, no doubt, because of his taste for independence, for suspense, for dramatic appearance at the climax of a scene. His arrival must mean action.30

  The day of the Bloody Angle and of Stuart’s death, May 12, was one of taut anxiety along the James. Ransom and two brigades hurried across the river to man the Richmond earthworks against Sheridan. Hoke, left in command at Drewry’s Bluff, faced a hesitant attack on his front. Hoke had gained vastly in self-confidence by his successful attack on Plymouth. He needed all his faith in himself. The enemy was across the Richmond-Petersburg turnpike; his orders were to hold the railroad as well as the defenses of Drewry’s. Beauregard, receiving the reinforcements from the south he had been waiting for, announced that he would join Hoke the next day.

  On the morning of the thirteenth the situation on all the Virginia fronts was gloomy. The defenders of the Bloody Angle had limped back to their line across its base. In the Shenandoah Valley, Sigel was moving southward in force superior to any the Confederates could hope to concentrate against him. Crook and Averell were on a raid in southwestern counties and, after a bloody little fight at Cloyd’s Mountain, were destroying bridges and trackage on the Tennessee Railroad. That railway had to be added to the four already cut—the Richmond and Petersburg, the Weldon, the Virginia Central, and the R.F. & P. Kautz’s troopers were even then seeking to cut the last two railways within Confederate lines, the Richmond and Danville, and the Southside.

  Black as was this situation, a change was discernible on May 13 in two respects: First, Sheridan had ridden down the James and gave no evidence of resuming his attack. Second, the Confederates no longer were thinking in terms of defense. An offensive plan had taken shape in Bragg’s mind. It was that Hoke should engage the Federals in his front while Beauregard moved up swiftly from Petersburg to form a junction. Beauregard was ordered to march at once. The day passed with no reply, as Kautz’s raiders had cut the telegraph line. Waiting in vain for Old Bory, Hoke fought all day against an enemy who captured part of the outer line of the Drewry’s Bluff defenses. Luckily, the Federals could not exert equal pressure at all points; fortunately, they undertook no twilight offensive.31

  The time for the appearance of the principal actor in the drama had arrived. At 3:00 A.M. on May 14, in the midst of a hard rain, General Beauregard rode up to the Drewry mansion near the bluff of that name. As always in such a setting, Old Bory was cap-a-pie the soldier, all energy, altogether for action. Precisely as in the days of glory and unchallenged primacy at Manassas in 1861, he indulged himself in the fashioning of grand strategy. The pattern of three years previously was unchanged. Nothing, apparently, had widened his sense of the militarily practical, or modified his early theories of logistics. His own account was characteristic: If Mr. Davis would send him 10,000 men that day from the Richmond defenses and from Lee’s army, “I w’d attack Butler’s 30,000 men [and] capture or destroy them by 12 h. on the 15th. I would then move to attack Grant on his left flank & rear, while Lee attacked him in front, & I felt sure of defeating Grant & probably open the way to Washington where we might dictate Peace!!”

  Unwilling to awaken the President at so early an hour to present this grand design, Bragg ordered his horse and rode at once to Drewry’s to hear what Beauregard had to say in support of his plan. He discovered that Beauregard intended the Army of Northern Virginia to fall back to the Richmond defenses while heavy detachments from that army were sent to support the attack on the Southside. “Bragg, circumstances have thrown the fate of the Confederacy in your hands and mine, let us play our parts boldly and fearlessly!” said Old Bory. “Issue those orders and I’ll carry them out to the best of my ability. I’ll guarantee success!” This did not appeal to Bragg. He merely said he would lay the facts before the President. His report must have been unsparing; in a memorandum for the record, he completely riddled Beauregard’s entire scheme. In a short time Davis himself came to the Bluff to listen to Beauregard. Like Bragg, the President could see nothing practical in the proposal. All he promised was that he would send back Ransom and all the troops that could be spared from the Richmond garrison.32

  Doubtless both Davis and his military adviser were steeled by the emergency to the unceremonious rejection of a plan that was basically and irredeemably wrong in its logistics and its psychology. The crisis could not wait on theory or theatricals. A desperate moment in the life of the Confederacy had been reached. The previous night Kautz had torn up part of the track of the Richmond and Danville. On the fourteenth some of his troopers struck the Southside line and thereby severed the last railroad that connected Richmond and Petersburg with any large section of the Confederacy. Even if Butler were held, Sheridan with his powerful cavalry still lingered at Haxall’s Landing below Malvern Hill. The alternative to Beauregard’s grandiose scheme was clear: Butler must be destroyed and a part of the troops confronting him sent back to the north side of
the James to guard against Sheridan assailing the capital.

  In contrast to the excited men in Richmond, Beauregard began the duties of the fifteenth in a composed and leisured state of mind. It would be best, as he saw it, to allow Whiting the whole of the day and the greater part of the sixteenth to bring up the troops from Petersburg to join him. May 17 would be a suitable day for the battle. This caused great alarm in Richmond. Bragg telegraphed, “It is hoped you may receive him [Whiting] in time to attack tomorrow. Time is all-important to us….” Beauregard now altered his plan. It would be better, he reasoned, to leave Whiting south of Butler. Then Whiting could attack the Federals in the rear while Beauregard moved against them near Drewry’s Bluff. He later pictured the anticipated result: “Butler, thus environed by three walls of fire, with the defeated troops, could have no resource against substantial capture or destruction, except in an attempt at partial and hazardous escape westward, away from his base, trains, or supplies.”

  For the operation Beauregard reorganized his divisions into three commands, under Ransom, Hoke, and Alfred Colquitt, which varied in strength from two to four brigades that never had fought together. Colquitt was an old acquaintance, but Hoke and Ransom had not been known to the army commander until this campaign. He might have noted that, along with some able men like Hoke and Ransom, his subordinates included an undue number of brigadiers who had been tried in the Army of Northern Virginia and found wanting. One potential liability, of which he had no forewarning, was in the brain of Chase Whiting. Having solicited field command, now that he had it Whiting seemed appalled by its responsibilities. He was apprehensive of attack, and he believed that Petersburg was the actual Federal objective. He worked ceaselessly, under immense strain, day and night, to protect the city. He was able to lean heavily on D. H. Hill, who had remained to counsel Pickett’s successor.33