Carrier (1999)

by Clancy, Tom - Nf

  • Communications Systems—Ever since Desert Storm pointed out its relative isolation, the USN has been trying to catch up with the other services in communications technology. Although the Challenge Athena system is a good start, it lacks both the reliability and bandwidth (i.e., data-flow capacity) to handle the volume of data required in a major war. Further, the need for additional bandwidth, especially in the satellite frequencies, has been growing almost as fast as the speed and power of computer/ LAN technology. Therefore, CVN-77 will have a communications capacity far beyond that of current ships. In particular, the new high-speed satellite systems preferred by the regional CinCs will be emphasized, as well as secure data-link systems for distribution to other ships in the battle group.

  One of several proposed Newport News Shipbuilding designs for CVN-77. Based on a Nimitz-class (CVN-68) hull and power plant, the new carrier would incorporate stealth technology, as well as a number of improved operating features.

  NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING

  All of these features will make CVN-77 the most powerful and capable aircraft carrier ever built. Though it will be a Nimitz in the hull and propulsion systems, it will be totally new in almost every other way. Though the schedule for CVN-77 is based upon funding dates that will be controlled by a President and Congress that have not yet been elected, current plans have the ship funded in FY-2001, with delivery in Fiscal Year 2008 (it is planned to replace USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63)).

  The second element in the Navy’s carrier production plan is currently known as CVX (Aircraft Carrier—Experimental), which will be the lead ship of a new class of carriers, the first in almost a half century. The program, which will hopefully deliver its first ship in FY-2013, is designed to incorporate all of the “bridge” technologies from CVN-77, as well as some other improvements that will be possible because of the new hull and power plant that will be part of the design. Some of these new features will include:• Hull Design—The hull form of the CVX is still under study, though it will probably be a traditional monohull design. It is likely that the CVX will displace something more than the 95,000 tons of the Nimitz-class carriers. What the ship will actually look like, however, is anyone’s guess.

  • Propulsion/Power Plant—If there is any sticking point in the design of the CVX-class carriers, it will be over the question of the power plant. Though powerful arguments against nuclear-powered warships remain, for all its vices (such as cost and environmental concerns), nuclear power provides real benefits for the captains and crews of aircraft carriers, and this means that any change had better offer significantly greater benefits. In order to resolve this question, NNS has been conducting a power plant study for CVX at their Carrier Innovation Center. There they are looking at gas turbines, turbine-electric motors, marine diesels, fossil-fueled boilers, and nuclear power as candidate CVX power plants. While the study is still in the early stages, don’t be surprised if nuclear power winds up the winner. Steam turbines are a highly compact and efficient means of powering large warships, and nuclear reactors are more compact and efficient than boilers for producing that steam.

  • Weapons-CVX will probably have a mix of Mk. 41 and 49 launchers very like CVN-77’s. However, laser weaponry is advancing so fast that the first CVX or some of its sister ships may well be equipped with a first-generation laser CIWS. The Air Force will deploy a similar system aboard a modified Boeing 747-400 in a few years, and a shipboard system would probably be a highly effective counter to the new generation of supersonic antiship weapons now being deployed around the world.

  • Catapults—Though for over a half century steam catapults have been successfully shooting aircraft off carriers, they nevertheless have significant drawbacks. For one thing, the high-pressure steam lines that power the catapults are complex and take up a lot of internal volume. For another, the saturated steam they carry is vicious stuff if a line cracks or breaks or is damaged. Finally, if a leak develops or the pressure is incorrectly set, steam catapults will occasionally “cold shoot” aircraft into the water. All of these problems have led to a major CVX initiative to replace the old steam units with a catapult using another technology. For instance, the electromagnetic technology that was to be used on the rail guns being designed for the Strategic Defense Initiative back in the 1980s might well work on carriers. However, an internal-combustion technology looks like a better prospect. Here jet fuel would power a contained fuel-air detonation in a piston to fire the aircraft on its way. Internal-combustion catapults are simple and reliable in concept, and could use the existing jet fuel system on the flight deck.

  • Automated Weapons Handling—Since weapons stowage, movement, buildup, loading, and arming eat up an enormous portion of a carrier’s personnel, a high priority in the CVX design is to automate the weapons handling and loading on future aircraft carriers. One idea already under consideration involves using an unpowered, but human-controlled, bomb cart and loader that makes clever use of counterweights and levers to upload even the largest pieces of Navy ordnance. Other ideas include robotic inventory/handling control of weapons in the magazines.

  • Advanced Flight/Hangar Deck Management—One of the Navy’s biggest challenges is to improve the efficiency of operations on the flight and hangar decks. Specifically, they want to reduce the number of personnel involved in operations on the flight/hangar decks, to improve the quality of the work environment, and to increase the rate of sortie generation for the embarked air wing. Along with the “pit stop” systems planned for use on CVN-77, robotic servicing equipment will probably be used for fueling, arming, aircraft handling/positioning, and for monitoring systems.

  If the CVX-78 program manages to stay on track, the first ship of the class will be commissioned sometime in 2013, and a second unit will probably be added to the fleet about four or five years later. Beyond that, it’s anybody’s guess. We’re talking about aircraft carriers that will be operating in a world fifty years from now. What will the world and the military balance of 2050 look like? I wish I knew. But if the people at NNS and NAVSEA have done their homework, the carriers being built and planned today will provide useful platforms to base the combat aircraft of tomorrow well past the halfway mark of the 21st century.

  Tools of the Trade: Birds and Bombs

  One day when I was a young man just beginning to design

  airplanes, the great person who founded the company that

  bore his name, Donald Douglas, took me by the shoulder

  and taught me a lesson that was simple, though vital to

  success. At the time, we were trying to generate business

  from the U.S. Navy. “Navy planes take a beating,” he said.

  “They slam down on the carriers when they land and get

  roughed up by the unforgiving elements of the high seas.

  If we want the Navy to buy our airplanes, we must build

  them rugged. They have to take punishment and still work. ”

  Aircraft Design (Ed Heinemann, 1985)

  It is a matter of historical record that some things on carrier aircraft are terribly simple, and can’t be easily replaced. The Curtis biplane that Eugene Ely first landed on the Pennsylvania in 1911 was equipped with many of the same items used by modern carrier aircraft. In particular, it had a small tailhook and a beefed-up tail structure so that the sudden shock of deceleration from the primitive arresting system would not tear the aircraft apart. However, good as these “shade tree” solutions to getting on and off carriers were, they were just a start. Future naval aircraft would have even more systems to adapt them to the unique problems and challenges of the ocean environment. Hard as it is on sailors and ships, the ocean is a terror for pilots and aircraft, and the challenges it offers to airplane designers are unlike anything found on land.

  First and most obvious are the problems of moisture and corrosion, which can literally eat a plane or helicopter from the inside out. Then there are the limitations of the ship’s confined spaces for operating and stor
ing aircraft, and the need to reduce the aircraft’s “footprint” while on the flight deck. These aircraft must also be able to operate in what has to be an “expeditionary” environment, where crews may lack the maintenance and repair facilities of a land base. Then there is the matter of assisting the aircraft into and out of the air without destroying them. And like all military aircraft, these flying machines must be capable of carrying useful payloads an adequate distance with acceptable performance and a good survival rate.

  With this in mind, it’s not hard to understand why only a handful of companies worldwide have successfully built aircraft for naval service. Carrier aircraft are odd hybrids, combining the qualities of conventional planes that fly off concrete runways with the unique ability to operate off the confined spaces of warships. While naval aircraft perform virtually all the missions that land-based aircraft do, they are also tasked with a number of missions unique to the sea services. For example, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) takes a well-deserved pride in dropping laser-guided bombs (LGBs) down the center of buildings, but the U.S. Navy has aircraft that can do that too. In addition, these same Navy craft can hunt submarines, defend ships against missile attacks, and transfer supplies between vessels. These are just some of the many jobs unique to naval aviation, and Navy aircraft have to be equipped to handle the fullest possible range of roles and missions. This has generally made naval aircraft among the most capable and flexible designs of their design generations. Perhaps the best example of this was the classic F-4 Phantom II, which served not only with the Navy and Marine Corps, but also the USAF and over a dozen foreign countries. Such diversity and capability is not easy, and it comes at a high price.

  In general, naval aircraft are both heavier and more complex than equivalent land-based craft. In an era where the cost of new aircraft is directly tied to their weight, USN aircraft generally are more expensive—which usually means smaller production runs and higher financial and technical risks for the manufacturers. Very few companies have been able to meet all of these challenges and turn a profit. For decades, just a few manufacturers have dominated the American naval aviation scene. Airframes made by Grumman, McDonnell Douglas, and Sikorsky were for many years all that you could find on the decks of U.S. carriers. In fact, the rare bird from a company like Lockheed or General Dynamics (traditional USAF contractors) was considered an aberration, a sign that the favored incumbent had made an error during the design competition. As a result, naval aircraft design grew inbred and lacked some of the innovation seen in land-based designs. Back in the 1970’s, the Navy was fully briefed on the results of the USAF’s Have Blue program. This was the flying prototype of the 1970’s that led to the development of the Lockheed F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter. But the USN chose to ignore the new technology in favor of more conventional aircraft—only one example of such lost opportunities. Another lost chance came when Texas Instruments began to develop its third-generation Paveway III LGB and the Navy stuck with the older-generation Paveway II-series bombs. With just these two decisions, the USN denied itself the two most effective weapons of the Gulf War.

  By making a string of similar decisions, naval aviation leadership fostered a two-decade-long Dark Age that denied them some of the best that modern aerospace technology had to offer. The result was the near-mortal wounding of naval aviation as a community in the early 1990’s, just at the time that they were being forced to find new roles, new missions, and even new enemies in the post-Cold War world. In an era when military power was becoming more “precision” oriented, naval aviation still valued how well a pilot could deliver a “stick” of unguided iron bombs. As of this writing, it has been over fifteen years since the Navy has taken delivery of a completely new tactical aircraft for fleet use. During that same period, over a half-dozen other major aircraft programs have been canceled or terminated. Desert Storm found the fleet ill-equipped for the first major post-Cold War conflict, and the part it did play was poorly publicized to a world hungry for the high-tech images of LGBs hitting their targets with eye-splitting precision.43

  Even worse, following the Persian Gulf war, it began to appear that the top leadership of U.S. naval aviation could not even buy the aircraft and weapons they would need to fit into the new “littoral warfare” strategy planned for the 21st century. There was even an attempt by the top leaders of the USAF to replace carrier aviation with a concept called “Virtual Presence.” This was the notion that long-range bombers based in the continental U.S. and armed with precision weapons could threaten potential enemies enough that forward-based forces like carrier battle groups would not be necessary.44 “Virtual presence” was a nice idea, especially if you wanted to justify the purchase of additional B-2A Spirit stealth bombers. Unfortunately, it was completely unrealistic in a world where “presence” really is the sight of a gray-painted USN ship near where a crisis is breaking. Clearly, naval aviation had to “get well” so that it could fulfill its essential task in the national security of the U.S.

  All Fall Down: Naval Aviation in the 1980s

  Earlier (see the third chapter), we saw how the culture of naval aviators has been forced to deal with changes in the society of the nation they serve. Unfortunately, there was more than just a morale problem to be dealt with. Material problems were also at the heart of the questioning of the credibility of naval aviation by the national leadership. Not that these were new problems—they first started over two decades ago. Naval aviation’s downward slide really began back in the 1970s, when the administration of President Jimmy Carter cut off the funds for services to upgrade their equipment, an action that was coupled with an almost complete moratorium on the buying of replacement weapons and spare parts for aircraft. Carriers frequently went on cruises short of airplanes with only partially filled magazines, requiring the “cross-decking” of planes, munitions, and equipment from ships headed home. Naval aviation was being forced to eat its “seed corn” to fulfill the missions it had been assigned. Though the Carter Administration did eventually reverse policy and spend some badly needed funds on procurement for the sea services, by then it was too late. The damage had been done.

  The next Administration—that of President Ronald Reagan and his Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman—attempted to rebuild naval aviation in the 1980’s. Lehman was a smart, energetic man, with a strong sense of purpose. But he could not instantly do everything that needed to be done, so priorities had to be set. His vision of a “600 Ship Navy,” for example, meant that since naval vessels had the longest procurement time, the largest portion of early funds from the huge Reagan-era defense expenditures would have to go into shipbuilding. He did find funds to replenish the weapons and spare parts inventories, however, and within a few years, the existing aircraft fleet was flying and healthy. But the question of how to build the right mix of aircraft in adequate numbers was a problem that would defy even Secretary Lehman’s formidable powers of organization, persuasion, and influence. Under his “600 Ship” plan, the numbers of carriers and air wings (CVWs) were to be expanded and updated. An active force of fifteen carriers would be built up, with fourteen active and two reserve CVWs to fill their decks. To provide some “depth” to the force, the reserve CVWs would be given new aircraft, so they would have the same makeup and equipment as the active units.

  Unfortunately this plan contained the seeds of a disaster. The basic problem was airframes—or more specifically, the shortage of them. Because of financial constraints, the Navy had not bought enough aircraft in the 1970’s to flesh out sixteen CVWs. Furthermore, the sea services were already heavily committed to the replacement of their force of F-4 Phantom fighters and A-7 Corsair II attack jets with the new F/A-18 Hornet. Normally, the Navy tries to stagger such buys, so that only one or two aircraft types are being modernized at any given time. Now, however, Secretary Lehman was faced with buying or updating every aircraft type in the fleet virtually simultaneously. Either way, the cost would be astronomical.

  During this same time, the
Soviet Union, under the new leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, was not quite the “evil empire” it had been under Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Andropov. Meanwhile, the growing federal budget deficits began to take their toll on the defense budget. At a time when the Navy’s budget needed to be increasing, the decline of the Soviet Empire and growing domestic problems at home made a continued arms buildup seem unnecessary, and so the Navy was not able to obtain the funding it needed.

  When John Lehman left the Administration in 1986 for a career in the private sector, the budget for procuring new aircraft was already being slashed. Far from building sixteen fully stocked CVWs, the Navy’s focus now became building just one new type of aircraft for the 1990s. That one airplane, the A-12 Avenger II, came close to destroying naval aviation. Few people outside the military are aware of the A-12 program. Though not actually a “black” program, the shadow of secrecy that shrouded it was at least charcoal gray.45 The A-12 was designed to replace the aging fleet of A-6 Intruder all-weather attack bombers, but the exact roots of the aircraft are still something of a mystery, though some details have come to light.

  Back in the 1980s, the first major arms reduction accord signed between the Reagan and Gorbachev governments was a controversial agreement known as the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. The INF treaty completely eliminated several whole classes of land-based nuclear weapons, and severely restricted others. Under this agreement, both sides would remove land-based nuclear missiles based in Europe, and aircraft capable of nuclear weapons delivery would be limited and monitored. This was a significant reduction in theater nuclear stockpiles, and at least gave the appearance of a reduced threat of regional conflict. The appearance was not quite the reality, however, because both sides wanted to maintain as large a regional nuclear stockpile as possible. As might be imagined, both sides began looking for loopholes.