Tomb of the Panzerwaffe: The Defeat of the Sixth SS Panzer Army in Hungary 1945

by Aleksei Isaev

  On the whole, though, Balck’s carping and concerns regarding the loss of time were unfounded. The defense of the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps in the neck of land between Lake Velence and the Danube was steadily being reinforced. The 1st Guards Mechanized Corps, while remaining subordinate to Front command, was parceled out by brigade among the various sectors of the 4th Guards Army’s defense. As already noted above, one brigade was in Székesfehérvár, and the 3rd Mechanized Brigade had been transferred to the 46th Army. The remaining two brigades of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps were assembled on the axis of the SS IV Panzer Corps’ main attack. By 8.00 on the morning of 21 January, the 2nd Mechanized Brigade had taken up a defense in the Kápolnásnyék – Baracska area. These villages soon became the scene of fierce combat. Despite their rural locations, they consisted of stone houses, often with deep cellars, while brick enclosures provided additional benefits to the defenders.

  One of the veterans of that fighting briefly, but succinctly described the occupied positions: “Baracska was distinguished by its particular geographic location. From the village, it was just a stone’s throw to Budapest: 30 kilometers over an excellent paved road. In other words, in a strategic respect Baracska was a key point on the approaches to the Hungarian capital.”4 In a word, there was a clear motivation to hold the designated positions. In addition to the Sherman tanks of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Brigade, two batteries of SU-100 tank destroyers and anti-tank artillery moved into the streets of the Hungarian villages. The 1st Guards Mechanized Brigade together with a regiment of SU-100 tank destroyers took up a defense in the neighboring sector on the Vali River. A day later the defense of the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps received a “safety cushion” behind its positions in the form of the 252nd and 113th Rifle Divisions, which had been shifted from quieter sectors of the front. The 252nd Rifle Division moved into its positions behind the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps already by 10.00 22 January, several hours before Székesfehérvár fell. The defense cobbled together by Tolbukhin was ready to withstand the next attack.

  A bogged down and abandoned Tiger of the Totenkopf Division.

  It shouldn’t be thought that while the assault against Székesfehérvár was underway, the two SS panzer divisions of Gille’s IV SS Panzer Corps had been sitting idly by. They weren’t even discouraged by the march of the 509th Heavy Panzer Battalion of King Tigers toward Felsöbesnyö on 21 January, when as a result of the marshy terrain and engine stress 6 of the 12 heavy tanks broke down. The SS undertook an attempt to break through to the Vali River and to seize a bridgehead across it. Totenkopf struck on the left flank by Lake Velence, while Wiking attacked on the right, closer to the Danube. On 21 January, Totenkopf ’s attack cut off a regiment of the 63rd Cavalry Division from the remainder of the division’s forces and pressed it back against the lake. A much stronger attack followed on 22 January. The SS Panzer Division Wiking struck the boundary between the 11th and 12th Cavalry Divisions. The defenders estimated the strength of the enemy’s attacking force as “more than 100 tanks and self-propelled guns.” According to a report from Wiking for 21 January, however, it had just 3 Pz IV, 5 Pz V, and 4 Jagdpanzer IV still serviceable, though it also had the attached 303rd Assault Gun Brigade numbering 34 self-propelled guns (26 StuG and 8 StuH). Thus, the SS armored battering ram at that moment consisted primarily of Sturmgeschütz assault guns. The Germans managed to drive a narrow wedge into the Soviet defenses, 3 kilometers wide and 5 kilometers deep. SS Wiking’s spearhead reconnaissance battalion reached the area of Agg. Szentpéter and even forced a crossing of the Vali, where it became isolated. On 23 January, after several attacks, the Germans re-established connection with it and tenaciously clung to Agg. Szentpéter.

  The next powerful attack came at 22.00 on 23 January, when the 1st Panzer Division and the 403rd Volks Artillery Corps, having regrouped from Székesfehérvár joined the offensive. The newly arriving forces didn’t achieve great successes, but enabled Totenkopf, which had turned over part of its sector to them, to break through toward Baracska from the southwest. A report from the commander of the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps at 6.00 24 January 1945 conveys the atmosphere of what was happening: “Remnants of the combat formations are fighting piecemeal. Contact exists with the 11th and 12th Cavalry Divisions but not with the 63rd Cavalry Division. It managed to transmit “Approaching the command post – 20 [enemy] tanks.” As a result of the deep German penetrations into the Soviet defenses, the commander of the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps General Gorshkov ordered a withdrawal of the units and formations subordinate to him to the second line, which was located on average 4 kilometers behind the first.

  At last, on 24 January there came a general German offensive with the participation of the three panzer divisions of Gille’s IV SS Panzer Corps. However, the attackers were unable to achieve a decisive result in the day’s fighting. An important advantage of the second line of defense was a swampy valley with a broad and deep canal flowing down the middle of it that obstructed the approaches to Baracska from the south. The Soviet defensive positions overlooked this valley and canal. Four German tanks attempted to cross it, but became stuck and were left burning by Soviet artillery.

  It seemed at last that a firm barrier had been erected in the path of the relief offensive toward Budapest. The German command had the same impression. At the command post of the IV SS Panzer Corps, Army Group South commander Wöhler and the commander of Armeegruppe Balck held a meeting to discuss what to do next and who was to blame. Gille, whose name was on Balck’s tongue as the answer to the latter question, was absent from the meeting – he was up at one of the forward kampfgruppe. Thus, the commander of the army group and the commander of the group of armies reached a decision without him. There is an entry in the journal of combat operations of Army Group South regarding the results of the discussion: “As today’s experience showed, a frontal attack upon the firm and deeply echeloned enemy defense beyond the Vali provides no chance for a successful breakthrough.” In addition, the commander of Army Group South was troubled by the presence of the grouping of Soviet forces to the north of Lake Velence that was looming over the left flank. As a result, the decision was made to turn the spearhead of the attack to the northwest. The IV SS Panzer Corps now was to pivot 90 degrees. It was directed to attack toward Bicske and to encircle the Soviet forces to the north of Lake Velence in conjunction with Breith’s III Panzer Corps and the Hungarian VIII Corps.

  The motivations for such a decision are rather obvious. Retaining the initiative and launching an encircling attack, the attacker would thereby tear a hole out of the defender’s front and force him to rebuild anew an intact front. The defensive arrangement would thereby dissolve, and a hope for a successful breakthrough on the desired axis would appear. However, Balck’s and Wöhler’s joint decision would later be subjected to sharp criticism, in particular from the historiographer of the Sixth SS Panzer Army Georg Maier, who argues that staying on the former direction of attack better corresponded to resolving the main task – a breakthrough to Budapest. It is also doubtless that time was an important factor. It makes sense to punch through and roll back a sector of the enemy’s defensive front in those conditions when the defending grouping is static and cannot be reinforced. However, in the case with the 3rd Ukrainian Front, this wasn’t so – reserves, taken from the neighboring 2nd Ukrainian Front, were already approaching.

  Gille, who believed it necessary to attack not to the northwest, but to the northeast (toward Budapest), knew better than the others the situation facing his panzer divisions, as well as their own capabilities. The fighting on 24 January not only demonstrated the stoutness of the defenses along the Vali River. The 5th Guards Cavalry Corps’ first line of defense had extended for 18 kilometers, but the second line stretched for 24 kilometers. After the pullback to the second line, the defensive front became extended, but the troops defending it had suffered losses and their capabilities had decreased. The 252nd Rifle Division, which had been shifted in order to reinforce the caval
rymen, had been badly battered already on the first day of the German offensive. One of the primary principles of German offensives was to attack on a narrow front. In so doing, efforts are focused on a single point within the salient of a penetration in the Soviet defense. In contrast, the defenders are compelled to cover the entire perimeter of the inner salient in their lines relatively equally, with no prior knowledge of where the attack would come. In this situation, the attacker would be guaranteed to secure a large numerical superiority on the chosen direction of his main attack. The stretching of the Soviet defensive front with practically no changes in the forces available to hold it would increase the Germans’ chance for success with their next attack.

  Subsequent events quickly demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of 5th Guards Cavalry Corps’ defense. The pivoting of the attacking spearhead by 90 degrees didn’t happen right away – most of the day of 25 January was spent regrouping the forces. Once again, as in the course of Konrad II, the SS units had to assume a defensive posture 18 kilometers outside of Budapest and regroup for a new attack. Now the axis of the main attack was directed toward the Pettend farmsteads, which lay along the road running northeast to Budapest between Lake Valence and Baracska. The farmsteads had been converted into a defensive strongpoint. It was being defended by units of the 63rd Cavalry Division, as well as a submachine gun company, 5 Sherman tanks and 5 SU-100 tank destroyers from the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps. They held out for seven hours in the battle which started before sunup, and in the end almost all the defenders were killed. It must be said that the casualties of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps in these battles were rather heavy; altogether between 19 and 25 January, the corps lost 54 Sherman tanks and 17 SU-100s.

  Having broken through along the highway leading to Budapest, the Germans overran the defenses of Gorshkov’s group to its entire depth. German tanks even broke into the firing positions of the 877th Howitzer Artillery Regiment. They also managed to outflank the Soviet strong point in Baracska further along the road to Budapest. Nevertheless, the SS troops failed to take Baracska. Here, the Soviet air force played a major role in repelling the enemy attacks. The commander of the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps subsequently even wrote a message of gratitude to the Il-2 crews of the 136th Ground Attack Aviation Division:

  On the difficult day of 25.1, when a crisis set in during the battle for Baracska, the Il-2s that appeared above the battlefield turned the battle in our favor. Despite the poor meteorological conditions – snowfall and limited visibility – the bombing was exceptionally accurate and the enemy’s decisive attack was broken up. All the Cossacks, sergeants, officers and generals of the Cossack Corps [5th Guards Cavalry Corps] are in admiration of the work of your crews on 25 January 1945.5

  The ground attack aircraft of the 10th Ground Attack Aviation Corps operated rather energetically in the area of Baracska. Its 58 Il-2s conducted 164 individual combat sorties, which yields 3 sorties a day for the majority of the aviation corps’ aircraft. The losses suffered could be considered insignificant – just one Il-2 was shot down by German anti-aircraft fire.

  However, on the whole the German attack on 25 January could be assessed as a tactical success. Though it was only in a narrow sector, the IV SS Panzer Corps managed to break out of the “gap” between Lake Velence and the Danube. That night, the attackers from the march took Pázmánd, and at 4.00 on 26 January, the German panzers broke into Vereb. That dawn, German panzer reconnaissance vehicles even broke through to the town of Vál, where the headquarters of the 4th Guards Army was located. In order to contain the extent of the German breakthrough into the rear of the 4th Guards Army, the last reserve had to be thrown into the fighting – a composite brigade of the 7th Mechanized Corps.

  Despite the success of the IV SS Panzer Corps on 25 January, the hopes for closing the jaws around the 4th Guards Army were more than illusory. The attacks of the III Panzer Corps at Zámoly and of the 1st Cavalry Corps at Bicske made no headway. Gille’s panzer corps had made a penetration of 10 kilometers in the Soviet defenses on a front of approximately 5 kilometers. It would have to make a similar advance in order to reach Zámoly, and it was even a little farther to Bicske. It can’t be ruled out that an analogous success might have been achieved by the Germans had the efforts been concentrated toward the northeast, which is to say that Gille’s option to continue to direct the offensive toward Budapest was perhaps more appropriate than Balck’s idea about encircling the Soviet forces to the north of Lake Velence.

  In the middle of the day on 26 January, the following intriguing discussion took place between the commander of the Sixth Army Balck and the commander of the IV SS Panzer Corps Gille:

  Balck: “We must cope with our assignment here. This now has decisive significance. What’s the situation here [at Kajászó – Szentpéter]?”

  Gille: “This bridge, contrary to initial reports, is passable for panzers. We have a small bridgehead here.”

  Balck: “That is very good and very important. How’s your progress here?”

  Gille: “Contact was established between both kampfgruppen at 12.10. The last dispatch arrived at 13.50.”

  Balck: “We must break through here. This decides everything, or here we will die.”

  Kajászó-Szentpéter is a settlement south-southeast of Vál. Judging from the evidence, the discussion was about the crossing of the Vali River, which is to say that a small bridgehead had been seized on its eastern bank, a little north of the highway leading to Budapest. This indicates that Gille had continued to search for a route leading to Budapest, even though his orders were to attack to the west and link up with Breith’s III Panzer Corps; yet in this conversation, Balck gives his full support to Gille.

  Interestingly, Balck would later attack Gille with accusations that the bridge at Kajászó-Szentpéter had been taken against his orders and that thereby the offensive forces became “dispersed”. Balck also accused Gille of holding up the offensive for 36 hours. However, all of this remained a “paper” controversy, because the situation soon changed fundamentally.

  If the German command had set for itself the limited task of extracting the Budapest garrison out of encirclement, then it made more sense not to alter the direction of attack of Gille’s IV SS Panzer Corps to the northwest. A concentrated attack in the direction of Budapest, most likely, would have led to the same 10-kilometer penetration, but days earlier. The German and Hungarian units remaining in Buda might have been able to organize a breakout and might have linked up with units of Gille’s panzer corps. A raid by an armored group from one of the panzer divisions of the IV SS Panzer Corps, analogous to Pieper’s raid at Kharkov in February 1943, might have reinforced the grouping coming out of the encirclement. In principle, the possibility of a breakout by the Budapest garrison remained even after the pivot by the bulk of the IV SS Panzer Corps to the northwest. However, in this breakout, plainly only a small portion of the garrison would have reached the Vali River. In either of these two alternatives, the battle for Budapest might have ended as an effective “less than defeat” (or semi-victory), which could have become a source of pride and rhapsodized about in the memoirs about the “lost victories” after the war.

  However, Balck and Wöhler set for themselves far more ambitious tasks. Here, it is impossible not to rebuke Balck for having an excessive and unfounded optimism in his assessment of the situation. He knew about the assembly of forces opposite his southern flank (the 18th Tank Corps), as well as about the movement of fresh Soviet forces across the Danube at Budapest. A logical inference to draw from this information would have been to conclude that the prospects of holding the occupied positions as far as the Danube were dubious. Accordingly, a more sensible scenario would become to “hit and run”, that is to say, to free the Budapest garrison and to withdraw together with it to the offensive’s start line. However, there was no change in the German strategy prior to the start of the Soviet counteroffensive. If you will, the only justification for Balck might be to view h
is actions as attempts to improve the overall situation through the reserves that had been sent to him (the IV SS Panzer Corps) before they could be taken away from him. With the inevitable fall of Budapest, the SS Panzer Corps might have been removed from Army Group South and sent somewhere else. At the end of January 1945, when the German defensive front along the Vistula River collapsed, the Germans had an abundant number of suitable places where the elite SS divisions were needed. In this case, the destruction of the maximum number of enemy formations might ease the life of Army Group South after the gift in the form of two SS panzer divisions was removed from it.

  Be that as it may, there was now no longer time to realize either of the possible German objectives (the relief of Budapest or the encirclement of the 4th Guards Army). From 9.00 25 January, G.F. Zakharov took operational control of the 104th Rifle Corps (the 66th and 151st Rifle Divisions, and the 3rd Guards Airborne Division) and the 23rd Tank Corps. These formations had been transferred from the 2nd Ukrainian Front and had crossed the Danube to the western bank south of Budapest. With their help, it was being proposed to launch a powerful counterattack in order to liquidate the threat of breaking the ring around the Budapest garrison. By plan, the counteroffensive was to begin on 28 January, but the German breakthrough on 25 January somewhat upset the plans of the 3rd Ukrainian Front command. Two brigades of the 23rd Tank Corps were immediately thrown into the fighting in order to eliminate the German penetration. The battle shifted into its next phase.