Tomb of the Panzerwaffe: The Defeat of the Sixth SS Panzer Army in Hungary 1945

by Aleksei Isaev

  Number of wounded: 10,542 (only Germans)

  A total strength of 25,667 (not counting the wounded), including 17,661 Germans; the corps’ has just 15,149 combat effectives, including 11,130 Germans.1

  Thus, the attackers were superior to the city’s defenders in numbers by approximately 1.7 to 1.

  Prior to 30 January, the units of the Budapest Group of Forces were involved in combats of only local significance in Buda, and making only insignificant advances. With the 3rd Ukrainian Front’s launching of the counteroffensive and the elimination of the German threat to the temporary bridge in Ercsi, the time arrived for a decisive assault. As in the case of the storming of Pest, the artillery was to play the key role. As of 1 February 1945, the Budapest Group of Forces had:

  114 45mm guns;

  60 76mm regimental guns;

  245 76mm divisional guns;

  30 57mm guns;

  160 122mm guns;

  116 152mm guns;

  69 203mm guns;

  307 82mm mortars;

  213 120mm mortars;

  24 Katiusha rocket launchers.

  Thus, the number of artillery barrels had even somewhat decreased since the assault on Pest. Only the quantity of 203mm howitzers had noticeably increased. This can be explained on one hand by the fact that the buildings in the city’s old quarter on the western bank of the Danube were on average more solidly built, and on the other hand, the flat topography in Pest wasn’t favorable for the concentration of artillery firing over open sights. In the hilly topography of Buda, the guns could be deployed in several belts while preserving their ability to fire upon the same target.

  In the city’s old quarter, there was a large quantity of stone and iron walls around the buildings. The walls were kept under fire from neighboring buildings. It was possible to overcome them only after the use of demolition charges or their destruction by artillery. The demolition charges would be emplaced at night under cover of darkness, or in the daytime under the cover of smoke or even the fire of neighboring units. Tanks always advanced behind the infantry, supporting them with fire from protected locations. The assault groups consisted of 1-2 tanks, a submachine gun platoon, a combat engineer squad, and 3-4 flamethrowers. The tanks of the assault groups advanced in a single file, or staggered 50-60 meters behind the infantry. The overall operational principle of the Budapest Group of Forces remained unchanged – breaking up the enemy defenders into several isolated groups with their subsequent gradual annihilation.

  One can cite the attack by the 23rd Tank Corps’ tank company on 4-5 February as an illustration of tank operations in Budapest. The road ahead for the attacking Soviet units was blocked by an anti-tank ditch. The tanks took up suitable positions on the approaches to it and placed the adjoining streets under fire from their main guns and machine guns. Meanwhile, the combat engineers and infantrymen began filling the ditch with rubble and to level its earthen parapet. Enemy firing points hindering this work were quickly suppressed by the tanks. When the passage was ready, the tanks crossed over it and the attack was resumed.

  The casualties of the units and formations that were assaulting the city can be regarded as moderate. From 1 February to 10 February 1945, the Budapest Group of Forces lost 1,044 men killed, 3,047 wounded, 52 missing in action, 276 sick, and 4 due to non-combat reasons (careless handling of a weapon, etc.), for a total of 4,783 men.2 The tank company of the 23rd Tank Corps lost 4 tanks destroyed and 1 disabled in the course of fighting for Buda, while the tank company of the 5th Guards Tank Corps lost 5 tanks and had 2 disabled.3

  The day of 11 February became the turning point, when the 18th and 37th Guards Rifle Corps isolated the southern portion of the main enemy grouping in Buda. Pfeffer-Wildenbruch decided to launch a break out. He reported his intentions by radio to the headquarters of Army Group South, and as he had been ordered, also to Führer headquarters, only at the last possible moment, at 15.50 11 February. He transmitted the following:

  1. Rations are used up, the last round is in the barrel. The choice is capitulation or the defenseless massacre of the Budapest garrison.

  As a result, I have decided to take to the offensive with the remaining combat-effective German elements, Honveds and Arrow Cross members to fight to a new combat and supply position.

  2. Breakout with the fall of darkness on 11 February.

  Request passage between Szomor – Máriahalom.

  If passage is not possible there, I will advance into the Pilis Mountains. Request passage there in the area north of Pilisszentkereszt.

  3. Recognition signals: two green flares – our own.

  4. Present strength 23,900 Germans, of which 9,600 are wounded; 20,000 Hungarians, of which 2,000 are wounded.

  Immediately after this message was transmitted by radio, the radio operators destroyed all the radios. Pfeffer-Wildenbuch was afraid that he would be overruled. He wanted nothing that could hinder his operation now.

  The encircled forces on 11 February 1945 had remaining 12 Panthers, 9 Hetzers, 6 assault guns, 10-15 tanks of unknown types, and 50-60 guns. Those that could not be pulled out of their present positions stealthily and without betraying the breakout plan in advance were blown up in place. It is possible to assume that not more than 10-12 armored vehicles were gathered together for the breakout attempt. The arrangement of forces for the breakout was as follows: In the first wave were units of the 13th Panzer Division and 8th SS Cavalry Division. They were split up into groups of 30 men, each of which had a Hungarian guide who was knowledgeable of the local area; in the second wave were the SA Division Feldherrnhalle, the 22nd SS Cavalry Division, and the Hungarian units.

  The plan was kept in deep secrecy. Division commanders were made aware of it at 14.00, regiment commanders – at 16.00, and lower-level officers – after 18.00. Hungarian commanders were informed of it at the last possible moment, since the German command was concerned about leaks of information through them. According to prisoners taken later by the Soviet troops, at 18.00 all the units received an order to prepare for a march and to destroy everything unnecessary for it. Having assembled the forces on a narrow sector in the northern part of the city center, at 20.00 11 February the remnants of the IX SS Gebirgs Corps began the breakout operation. Having broken through the front of the 180th Rifle Division, the encircled men began to spread out to the west and northwest, trying to make their way to friendly lines.

  By the morning of 12 February, the breach that had been torn in the positions of the 180th Rifle Division was sealed, and units of the Budapest Group of Forces entered Buda. By the end of the day, the city of Budapest was completely in Soviet hands, and in the process, large amounts of materiel and approximately 20,000 prisoners were taken. On 14 February, the main forces of the Budapest Group (with the exception of the 297th Rifle Division and 83rd Naval Infantry Brigade, which were left behind to mop up the city) were sent in pursuit of the enemy’s breakout forces. Several large groups of the encircled men were destroyed by forces of the 46th Army. The 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps and 5th Guards Cavalry Corps were also deployed against the enemy groups that were attempting to break out of the city. By 15 February, the vast majority of those trying to escape had either been rounded up or wiped out. Of the approximately 28,000 soldiers and officers attempting to escape the encirclement, only around 800 eventually made it to friendly lines.

  Pfeffer-Wildenbruch, who was attempting to break out together with his headquarters by a special route along the so-called Czertovaya Canal, made their way out of the city, but soon after his group was encircled and he was taken prisoner. On 17 February, the Budapest Group of Forces was dissolved, and soon its divisions were distributed to the armies that were standing along the front that was facing to the west. With this, the somewhat prolonged epopee of the storming of the Hungarian capital, which had dragged on in part due to the relief attempts, came to an end.

  7

  Results and Conclusions

  The January German offensive with the aim of free
ing the Budapest garrison through the introduction of several fresh divisions, including panzer divisions, into the fighting can be called an attempt to reach an objective with far too inadequate forces. From the point of view of tank operations, the optimal route of attack around Lake Velence from the south required significant reserves in order to cover the extending flanks. However, this was no longer 1940, 1941 or even 1942. Thus the German command no longer had army corps with powerful infantry divisions. The panzer divisions of Gille’s panzer corps simultaneously had to crack the Soviet defenses and to tend to threats to its flanks. All of this slowed the advance and allowed the Soviet command to set up a new line of defense.

  Given all the ambiguities of such an indicator as casualties, they are still the yardstick for assessing many battles. The currently available data don’t in any way permit the success of the Soviet forces in repelling the Konrad offensives to be called a pyrrhic victory. The personnel losses of the 4th Guards Army for January 1945 amounted to 3,588 killed, 11,552 wounded, 4,543 missing in action, 132 non-combat injuries, and 1,682 sick.1 In total, G.F. Zakharov’s army, which carried the main burden of repelling the German offensives, lost 21,467 men. According to the measures of 1945, these casualties are rather high, especially with respect to the missing in action. The overall losses of the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps, which was subordinate to the 3rd Ukrainian Front for January 1945, amounted to 2,165 men. The Front’s 18th Tank Corps suffered 1,740 casualties, and the 23rd Tank Corps, in the course of the counteroffensive between 26 and 31 January lost 313 killed and 659 wounded.

  The losses of Armeegruppe Balck for January 1945 (excluding those of the IX SS Gebirgs Corps in Budapest) amounted to 3,598 killed, 16,504 wounded, 1,520 missing in action and 12,751 sick.2 The causes for the high number of sick are unknown; possibly, the lightly wounded were included in this category. It also isn’t clear whether these figures include the Hungarian losses, but most likely they do not. Altogether, the losses of Armeegruppe Balck can be placed at 25-30,000 men.

  The overall balance of losses between Armeegruppe Balck on the one hand, and the opposing armies of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts on the other, gives a doubtless advantage to the Soviet side, especially when the complete destruction and imprisonment of the Budapest garrison is considered. The losses of the troops that were assaulting the Hungarian capital were substantially lower than those of its garrison. For example, the total losses of the assaulting 18th Guards Rifle Corps for January 1945 was 2,357 men, and of the 7th Guards Army – 9,120 men (including combat operations outside of Budapest).

  The 18th Tank Corps, which became the bulwark of the 3rd Ukrainian Front’s defense, over the month of January 1945, lost 161 T-34, 21 ISU-122, 21 SU-76, 13 ISU-152, and 12 SU-85. The 23rd Tank Corps according to records of the Front headquarters lost 84 T-34 and 3 ISU-122 between 26 January and 31 January 1945.

  When studying the January battles west of Budapest, the style of conducting the defensive operation by the 3rd Ukrainian Front command immediately catches the eye. Tolbukhin strove to keep the tank and mechanized corps under his immediate command. However, this wasn’t done in order to launch counterattacks. Rather, the tank and mechanized corps became the “steel girders” of the defense. With the initiation of the Konrad I and Konrad II offensives, a new defensive line began to form 15-20 kilometers behind the crumbling original line. In order to reestablish a front, mechanized and cavalry corps moved out and took on the advancing German units. Comparable in their mobility to the tank brigades, the mechanized brigades also possessed artillery. Their arrival also substantially reinforced the newly created line of defense. Behind the mechanized units were the rifle divisions following in their wake, which cemented the front line. However, as before the “steel girders” of the newly built positions remained the tanks, which deployed in static positions would take on the enemy.

  The evaluation of such an approach to the use of the tank forces was not unanimous. The Stavka criticized Tolbukhin for scattering his tanks across a broad front. In reality, the uncertain nature of the enemy’s plans compelled Tolbukhin to “gird” several directions of attack simultaneously, with no concentration of strength on any particular one of them. However, we also have examples of other Red Army defensive operations, when the mechanized formations were hastily thrown into costly counterattacks and rapidly expended their combat effectiveness, after which they were also compelled to be used as “girders”, but now with inadequate strength.

  “Tolbukhin’s system” suffered a setback only during Konrad III, when the front fell apart too quickly, before an adequately strong defensive line could be built 10-20 kilometers behind the initial line. The deploying anti-tank artillery regiments were crushed, while the tank corps was outflanked on both sides. Then the “girding” of the defenses of the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps again justified itself as a tactic, but there soon followed a second “Prokhorovka” with the head-on counterattack by Akhmanov’s tank corps against the solidly built tip of the German panzer wedge. Incidentally, in the course of Konrad III, Tolbukhin nevertheless showed that he was a military commander who had mastered the art of the counterattack. He used the 18th Tank Corps, which had been quickly replenished with armor, for a stroke against the soft underbelly of the IV SS Panzer Corps.

  On the whole, the adroitness with which the tank and mechanized corps were used is noteworthy. The brigade system of organization allowed the formation of combat groups (in the German terminology) around the kernel of the tank and mechanized brigades, strengthening them with self-propelled, rocket and tube artillery. Even when isolated from the main forces of its parent corps, the availability of a headquarters on the brigade level ensured command and control over such a combat group. With the organizational structure that the tank forces of the Red Army had back in 1941, such a tactic was practically impossible.

  The air forces of the two sides played an important role in the January battles. It is sufficient to recall the heavy airstrikes by the German fighter-bombers in the area of Bajna, which cleared a path forward for the SS troops on 3-4 January.

  The total losses for the 3rd Ukrainian Front’s 17th Air Army for January 1945 amounted to 241 aircraft (47 La-5, 140 Il-2, 14 Lend-Lease Douglas A-20 Havocs, 30 Iak-3/9, 3 Pe-2 and 4 Po-2). The survivability of the Soviet aircraft in the January fighting is characterized by the following data on the number of combat sorties and hours of flight per 1 combat loss:

  Table 4 Number of Combat Sorties and Hours of Flight per 1 Combat Loss

  If the figure for the losses of Pe-2 at just 3 aircraft (moreover reconnaissance aircraft) can be considered absurdly low, then the high losses of the Il-2 ground attack aircraft stand out among the losses of the other types. As the main strike aircraft of the 17th Air Army (the 3rd Ukrainian Front simply had no Pe-2 or Tu-2 acting as bombers), the Il-2s sustained losses from both enemy ground fire and as a result of enemy fighter attacks. Of the 140 Il-2s lost, 50 were downed by enemy anti-aircraft fire, 53 by enemy fighters, and 14 failed to return from combat missions. The remaining were non-combat losses. The Il-2s also logged more flight hours than any of the others; of the 12,000 individual combat sorties over the month of January, 6,000 were conducted by the Shturmoviki.

  In the above text, the low effectiveness of the Il-2 in the role of bridge destroyers has already been noted. However, they inflicted painful strikes against the attacking German units. For example, on 20 January the 3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf made the following request to a Luftwaffe liaison officer: “I request the hasty covering of the Seregélyes 8844 area by fighters; constant raids by enemy ground attack aircraft.”3

  One of the novelties (relative, of course) of the Konrad offensives was the wide use of night actions by the Germans. Such night attacks had a substantial effect on the course of combat operations. This was reflected in a discussion that took place between the commander of the Sixth Army Balck and the commander of the IV SS Panzer Corps Gille on 26 January 1945, when the latter directly stated, “We a
re mainly acting at night.”

  It isn’t totally clear what role that panzers equipped with night-vision optics played in this. It is reliably known that Panthers of the 130th Lehr [Training] Panzer Regiment of the Panzer Lehr Division, which were equipped with infrared optics, were operating in Hungary. The first combat use of night-vision optics belongs to Operation Konrad I. However, the number of tanks equipped with such optics for night operations was small. The rest used much more prosaic means for night fighting. For example, tankers of I/24th Panzer Regiment (Panthers) illuminated the battlefield with the help of illumination rifle grenades. They were discharged from launchers that were attached to a carbine barrel, and descending under a parachute, burned for around a minute.

  For one reason or another, the Germans opted to employ night operations widely in the course of the Konrad offensives, and this required special measures in response from the Soviet side. In particular, flammable materials began to be piled in front of the anti-tank artillery positions in order to illuminate the area. It is interesting to note that back in the summer of 1941, the Soviet troops caught in a difficult position also made broad use of night operations.

  In the defensive battles around Budapest, the Red Army’s latest self-propelled gun, the SU-100 tank destroyer, was used for the first time. Despite their less than stellar debut at the beginning of January 1945, they played an important role and were highly regarded by their crews and the command. In a summary report from the commander of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps’ artillery Guards Lieutenant Colonel Zakharov dated 15 February 1945, he noted that despite the large size of the 100mm main gun, the crew’s work conditions in comparison with those of the SU-85 were no worse. The self-propelled gun’s maneuverability and the performance of its running gear had also not deteriorated in comparison with the SU-85. The combat rate of fire, despite a shell that was twice as heavy (32.6 kilograms versus 16 kilograms), remained acceptable – 4-5 shots per minute, against the SU-85’s 7-8 shots per minute. He also noted that the ammunition storage and commander’s cupola had improved over their previous versions. Regarding the SU-100’s armor protection, Zakharov stated: “The frontal armor of the SU-100 is invulnerable to light and medium [anti-tank] artillery; against heavy tanks and 88mm guns, the frontal armor is inadequate and very frangible.”4 Among the SU-100’s other shortcomings, he mentioned the ponderous operation of the gun laying mechanisms and the fact that the optics were often damaged by the shock of shell hits, whereas in the SU-85, the optics were unaffected by the shock of shell hits. Zakharov also observed that it would be desirable for the SU-100 to have a machine gun for self-defense against infantry. On the whole, the SU-100 self-propelled guns were evaluated as “a most effective means for combating the enemy’s heavy tanks.”