Tomb of the Panzerwaffe: The Defeat of the Sixth SS Panzer Army in Hungary 1945

by Aleksei Isaev

  A collecting station for disabled equipment which has been seized by attacking Soviet troops. In the foreground is a Panther Ausf.G; in the background a Tiger Ausf.E heavy tank and several more machines are visible.

  11

  Defensive Preparations

  In accordance with the obtained intelligence information on the looming German offensive, by Order No. 0012 of 20 February from the headquarters of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, the troops were directed to be ready to repel an enemy attack, while continuing preparations for their own offensive toward Vienna. On 24 February, however, the Front commander warned the troops that they should expect a massed enemy armored attack, and demanded them to be ready to repulse it both in daytime and nighttime. On the following day, the document “Directions for organizing an anti-tank defense” was distributed, which stated:

  1. The defense should be deep and anti-tank, calculated to repel a concentrated attack by enemy tanks and infantry supported by artillery and combat aircraft.

  2. The all-arms commander, who is organizing the defense in the sector of his formation, is responsible for organizing the anti-tank defense, and is obliged to ensure the cooperation of all types of forces and the knitting together of anti-tank fire with engineered obstacles.

  3. Battalion strongpoints and company areas of defense, situated on tank-vulnerable directions, must be set up as anti-tank. The company anti-tank area will consist of a rifle company, 3-5 guns, and a group of anti-tank rifles, mortars and machine guns. Do not permit any further parceling out of anti-tank means. Company anti-tank areas and battalion anti-tank strongpoints are to be equipped with anti-tank obstacles, the approaches to which must be securely covered by the area’s system of fire.

  4. Ensure the depth of the anti-tank defenses by means of creating strong anti-tank regions on the most important directions vulnerable to tanks. These anti-tank regions must include significant anti-tank artillery means (up to an artillery regiment or brigade), deployed in compact combat formations and having the assignment to destroy a large amount of enemy tanks that having broken through into the depth.

  Set up the anti-tank regions with the assistance of engineers and have mobile anti-tank means [mines]. The anti-tank regions must have reserves: of ammunition – not less than 1.5 combat loads; of fuel and lubricants – two to three refuelings.

  The anti-tank regions will include mortar, machine-gun and combat engineer elements with an extra supply of mines.

  Appoint the senior artillery chief (the commander of the artillery regiment or brigade) as commandant of the anti-tank region in the depth [of the defenses].

  This document also called for lines with readied direct fire positions for all the howitzer and heavy cannon artillery on those directions where massed tank attacks were anticipated. Given the enemy’s possession of heavy tanks, it was proposed to move up separate howitzers and heavy guns into the second echelon of the rifle troops’ anti-tank defenses.

  The maneuver scheme for the artillery planned to employ division, corps and army anti-tank reserves, as well as artillery shifted from less important directions. Despite the extremely limited amount of time – seven or eight days from the moment of this document’s distribution until the start of fighting – the majority of the directives were carried out.

  In the course of two weeks (starting from 20 February), the armies of the first echelon were able to create a deeply echeloned defense consisting of many belts, while paying particular attention to the organization of anti-tank defenses. In order to secure the necessary resilience of the defense, it was ordered to plan and thoroughly organize the broad maneuver of all types of reserves both along the front and from the depth, so that at the moment of any enemy attack, the next line in the depth of the defenses would already be manned and ready.

  Despite its large size, the staging area occupied by the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front on the right bank of the Danube nevertheless restricted the maneuver of forces and complicated the work of the rear echelons to keep the troops supplied with everything necessary. Nevertheless, the terrain, cut as it was by a large number of canals and rivers, contributed to the creation of a strong defense with a number of defensive belts and lines. There was a large number of paved and dirt roads in the bridgehead, although the latter were almost impassable to wheeled vehicles due to the spring thaws. The first half of March 1945 featured dreary weather; there were frequent rains mixed with snow, and thick fogs in the mornings; the air temperature fluctuated between 4°C. and -7°C.

  On many sectors of the front, there were areas suitable for the concealed deployment of troops. However, in the sector between Lakes Velence and Balaton, where the main German attack was expected, the local terrain in the area of the front lines of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was flat, which complicated the deployment and camouflaging of the guns that had been moved up in order to fire over open sights. In addition, the presence of a large number of rivers and streams, the swampy terrain, and the high water table hindered the digging of rifle pits for the infantry, gun pits for the guns or regulation observation posts. It was thus necessary to strengthen the bottom of trenches with planking, especially beneath the wheels of the guns, and to build dikes, earthworks, palisades and so forth in order to increase the depth of shelters.

  The armies of the first echelon constructed three belts of defense. The first, main defensive belt, with a depth of 5 to 7 kilometers, consisted of three lines echeloned in depth with one to three trench lines in each, linked by communication trenches. The latter served simultaneously as switch lines or intermediate positions. The second belt of defenses consisted of two trench lines. Behind it was the rear, army belt. The distance between the first and second belts was 8 to 12 kilometers, and between the second belt and the rear belt was 6 to 10 kilometers. Defensive positions were also constructed in the interval between the belts. All major settlements within the defensive belts or between them were converted into defensive strongpoints.

  Fortified lines, including intermediate and switch lines, were being prepared behind the armies’ own defensive belts. On the whole, the depth of the Soviet defenses between Lakes Velence and Balaton stretched for 30 to 50 kilometers behind the front line.

  Minefields were laid along the entire front, with an average density of mines in the sector of the 4th Guards, 26th and 57th Armies amounting to 730 anti-tank mines and 670 anti-infantry mines per kilometer of front; on the directions more vulnerable to tanks, the density of mines grew to 2,700 and 2,500 mines respectively.

  It should be said that despite the rather extensive depth of the 3rd Ukrainian Front’s defense, it was weaker than the one that had been created in the Kursk bulge (some authors try to make these operations comparable). The main defensive fortifications in the area of Lake Balaton consisted of entrenchments for the infantry, guns and tanks, as well as mine fields. There were practically no barbed wire barriers, anti-tank obstacles, pillboxes or other such fortifications. For example, on 27 February the 4th Guards Army’s chief of staff confirmed a plan to use “knocked-out enemy tanks as immobile firing points”. It was proposed set up 38 tanks in this fashion in the period between 28 February and 10 March, but it is unknown whether the idea was ever implemented.

  By the beginning of March 1945, the 3rd Ukrainian Front had five all-arms armies (the 4th Guards, 26th, 27th, 57th, and Bulgarian First Army) as well as the Yugoslav Third Army’s 12th Army Corps, one air army (the 17th), and two tank, one mechanized and one cavalry corps, for a total of 407,357 men, 6,163 guns and mortars (not including rocket artillery), 407 tanks and selfpropelled guns, and 965 aircraft.

  The 4th Guards Army (commanded by Lieutenant General N. Zakhvataev), consisting of three rifle corps (the 20th, 21st and 31st Guards) and one fortified district, was occupying a defense along the line Gánt, Zámoly, eastern suburbs of Székesfehérvár, Seregélyes, which extended for 39 kilometers. By 1 March the numerical strength of its rifle divisions was as follows: up to 4,500 men – 1 division; up to 5,000 men – 1 divi
sion; up to 5,500 men – 5 divisions; and up to 6,000 men – 1 division.

  The 4th Guards Army had the assignment to prevent a breakthrough of enemy tanks and infantry north and south of Székesfehérvár in the direction toward Budapest. It was also to cover the right flank of the 26th and 27th Armies from the north.

  In its first echelon, the army had the 20th and 21st Guards Rifle Corps and the 1st Guards Fortified District, which were occupying the first and second defensive belts. The 31st Guards Rifle Corps was in reserve. On average, each division in the sector between Gánt and Lake Velence was occupying 3.3 kilometers.

  The army’s left flank, south of Lake Velence, was significantly weaker. Here the 1st Guards Fortified District (five separate machine-gun – artillery battalions with approximately 650 men in each) was defending a 10-kilometer front between Dinnyési and Seregélyes. The fortified district had three battalions in the first echelon, with two battalions in reserve. The total depth of the defenses here did not exceed 5 kilometers; the second belt of defenses was unoccupied. On its own (with no artillery attachments), the fortified district’s density of strength was equivalent to half of a battalion, 19 machine guns, and 7 guns and mortars per kilometer of front.

  Of the army’s 32 reserve artillery regiments, nine were attached to divisions of the rifle corps of the first echelon, and five (of which three were destroyer anti-tank artillery regiments) were attached to the 1st Guards Fortified District. In addition, there was a powerful army-level artillery group, which numbered 113 guns of between 152mm and 203mm, as well as an army-level antitank artillery reserve of four regiments.

  The 26th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General N. Gagen), consisting of three rifle corps (the 30th, 135th and 104th), was defending a 44-kilometer sector that stretched from Seregélyes to Lake Balaton. The strength of its rifle division on 1 March was as follows: up to 3,500 men – 1 division; up to 4,500 men – four divisions; up to 5,000 men – four divisions; and up to 5,500 men – one division.

  At the start of the German offensive, the 26th Army had all three rifle corps in the first echelon. The army reserve consisted of only the 21st Rifle Division.

  Its right-flank 30th Rifle Corps was defending on a sector of 20 kilometers, with all three of its divisions (the 155th Rifle, 36th Guards Rifle and 68th Guards Rifle) in the front line. The divisions defending on the main axis of the German attack held narrower sectors of defense (the 155th Rifle’s sector was 6 kilometers, and the 36th Guard Rifle’s sector ran for 4 kilometers). The 30th Rifle Corps’ absence of a second echelon to a certain extent was compensated by the fact that the army reserve – the 21st Rifle Division – was positioned behind it.

  In the 135th Rifle Corps, two divisions (the 74th and 233rd Rifle) were positioned in the first echelon and one, the 236th Rifle, in the second, while in the 104th Rifle Corps, the arrangement was the opposite – one division (the 93rd Rifle) was in the first echelon and two (the 66th Guards Rifle and the 151st Rifle) were in the second.

  Thus, the main belt of the defenses of the 26th Army was defended by six divisions, while the second defensive belt was being held by four divisions. On average, each division was holding 4.4 kilometers of frontage.

  A divisional M-30 Model 1938 122mm howitzer in action. By 1945, these guns made up the bulk of the artillery in the Red Army’s rifle divisions.

  Cavalrymen occupying a defensive position. The crew of a 45mm anti-tank gun is manhandling the gun into a firing position. Note the characteristic fur caps worn by Soviet cavalrymen.

  Lieutenant G. Kuzmin’s company attacks with the support of a 45mm anti-tank gun. By 1945, these guns were already virtually useless against the latest German tanks, but nevertheless were still in use in the Red Army.

  The on-board ammunition within this Panther Ausf.G has clearly exploded. The tactical marking “AJ9” is visible on the turret. Presumably, this tank belonged to the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich.

  The army command was most of all concerned about covering its flanks, especially the right flank, where the 30th Rifle Corps was holding the line (incidentally, the subsequent fighting proved that these concerns were well-grounded). Thus of the army’s 34 reserve artillery regiments, 15 were attached to this rifle corps, which provided for a density in its sector of 25.7 guns and mortars per kilometer of front(including the artillery of the rifle divisions).

  In addition, in the sector of the defense being held by the 30th Rifle Corps, the army corps deployed more than half of the artillery belonging to the army – the army-level artillery group, the army-level anti-tank artillery reserve, and the majority of the anti-aircraft guns and rocket launchers. As a result, in the 30th Rifle Corps’ sector, there were 34 guns and mortars per kilometer of front.

  It should be said that in the distribution of the artillery within the 30th Rifle Corps, most of the guns were concentrated on its right flank. The 155th Rifle Division defending here received eight artillery regiments and one artillery battalion as reinforcements, while the other two divisions received a combined five artillery regiments and two artillery battalions. Such an arrangement of artillery means allowed the creation of a density of 67 guns and mortars per kilometer of front in the Seregélyes – Sárviz Canal sector on the anticipated axis of the main German attack. These measures enabled the creation of a powerful anti-tank defense, and in the course of the subsequent fighting, the Germans made almost no headway in this sector.

  On the left flank of the 26th Army, in the sector of the 104th Rifle Corps, the density of artillery amounted to 35.4 guns and mortars per kilometer of front, but this was achieved not by the attachment of a great number of artillery units, but by narrowing the 104th Rifle Corps’ sector of defense to 8 kilometers.

  Naturally, this strengthening of the army’s flanks didn’t come without costs – the 135th Rifle Corps, which was defending in the center on a front of 16 kilometers, had just 306 guns and mortars, and 16 BM-13 rocket launchers. Thus, the density of artillery in its sector was one and a half to two times lower than in the other rifle corps.

  Thus, if in the 26th Army’s disposition of its divisions practically no attention was given to the concentration of the main forces on the anticipated axis of the enemy’s main attack, with respect to the artillery this found a more concrete expression in the 30th Rifle Corps, which received the largest number of reinforcing artillery units.

  The 57th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General M. Sharokhin), which was defending on a sector of 133 kilometers (including the bank of Lake Balaton), from the beginning to the end of the operation had in fact only two corps (the 6th Guards Rifle and 64th Rifle) with six subordinate divisions. The numerical strength of its rifle divisions was somewhat greater than in the other armies. On 1 March, it had five rifle divisions numbering up to 5,500 men each and one division numbering up to 6,000 men. The 133rd Rifle Corps, of which the 57th Army took operational control on 5 March, was sent on the following day to eliminate an enemy breakthrough in the sector of the Bulgarian First Army, where it remained until 21 March, while the 104th Rifle Division of this corps was pulled back into army reserve. The 6th Guards Rifle Corps was assigned a sector of defense that stretched for 34 kilometers, while the 64th Rifle Corps’ sector ran for 26 kilometers. The sector of the defense that ran along the shore of Lake Balaton was covered by two motorcycle regiments and a battalion of amphibious vehicles.

  The axis along the Nagybajom – Kaposvár highway south of Lake Balaton in the sector of the 64th Rifle Corps was considered the most critical. The 64th Rifle Corps was arranged in two echelons. In the first echelon were the 73rd Guards Rifle Division, which was defending an 11-kilometer sector, and the 299th Rifle Division, which was occupying a 15-kilometer sector. Behind the 73rd Guards Rifle Division, in the second belt of fortifications, was the corps’ second echelon – the 113th Rifle Division.

  The 57th Army, which was defending an axis considered secondary by the Front command, received just two artillery regiments and two mortar regiments as re
inforcements. Together with the artillery directly under the command of the 57th Army headquarters, they were transferred to the operational control of the subordinate rifle corps.

  To the left of the 57th Army, defending a front of 150 kilometers along the northern bank of the Drava River was the Bulgarian First Army, commanded by General Vladimir Stoychev. It consisted of the 3rd, 8th, 11th, 12th and 16th Infantry Divisions, two anti-tank battalions, and an engineering regiment and anti-aircraft artillery battalion that were directly subordinate to the First Army’s headquarters. Despite the fact that the Bulgarian divisions numbered up to 12,000 to 13,000 men each, their combat experience and combat capabilities were regarded by the Soviet command as significantly lower than those of their Red Army counterparts, and this opinion was subsequently confirmed by events. True, an enemy offensive on this axis was considered relatively improbable, in part because the Bulgarian positions had the Drava River in front of them. To the left of the Bulgarians, on a 40-kilometer sector to the confluence of the Drava and Danube Rivers, units of the 12th Army Corps of General Naᵭ’s Yugoslav Third Army were defending.

  Units of the 27th Army (three rifle corps) were in the 3rd Ukrainian Front’s second echelon. The divisions of this army, which had just joined the Front on 20 February 1945, were weaker with respect to men and equipment in comparison with the other Soviet divisions; as of 1 March, it had one division with 3,300 men, two divisions with up to 4,000 men, four divisions with up to 4,500 men, and two with up to 5,000 men.

  Its 35th Guards Rifle Corps (the 3rd Guards Airborne Division and the 78th and 163rd Rifle Divisions) and 37th Guards Rifle Corps (the 108th, 316th and 320th Rifle Divisions) were positioned in the rear army-level defensive lines stretching from Lake Velence to the Danube River. The 27th Army’s third corps, the 33rd Rifle Corps (the 202nd, 206th and 337th Rifle Divisions) was in reserve on the left bank of the Danube River. A substantial flaw that complicated the defense of the sector between Lake Velence and the Sárviz Canal was its shallow depth. For example, from the forward line of the rear defensive belt, which was occupied by units of the 27th Army, to the Danube River was just 8 to 15 kilometers. Thus, in the event that the enemy reached this line, the army’s rear areas could be placed under artillery fire, which would complicate any regrouping of forces.