The 3rd Ukrainian Front command, considering the experience of the January fighting, paid particular attention to preparations to repel enemy tank attacks at night. For this purpose, combat security was intensified at night, and special outposts were set up, which were to give early warning to the troops during enemy tank attacks and were to illuminate the surrounding terrain with flares or fires. Special exercises focusing on night-time gunnery and direct fire were conducted with the artillery units. When selecting positions to fire over open sights at tanks at night, particular attention was paid to ensure that there were no objects near the gun’s position that could serve as orienting markers for the German tanks, or with a backdrop that would reveal the gun when it fired. Also, all easily flammable objects were removed from around the artillery positions. When training for the upcoming battle, the crews of the anti-tank guns practiced firing at targets at night that were either illuminated by flares or visible in the moonlight.
Table 7 Artillery and Mortars in the Units of the 3rd Ukrainian Front on 6 March 1945 (Excluding the Bulgarian First Army and the Yugoslav Corps)
* Including the anti-aircraft artillery of the 17th Air Army; of the 514 anti-aircraft guns, 13 were of the caliber of 20- to 25mm.
** Of this number, 8 rocket launchers belonged to the Bulgarian First Army.
*** Of which, 28 were BM-8 rocket launchers, 198 were BM-13 rocket launchers, 42 were BM-31-12 rocket launchers, and 25 were M-30 rocket launching frames.
Particular attention was also paid to the potential maneuvering of the anti-tank reserves. This foresaw moving up artillery units to various areas and lines of defense, depending on the directions of the enemy attack and the unfolding situation. In order to ensure the most rapid shifting of antitank reserves to threatened sectors, anticipated movement routes were reconnoitered in advance. The most preferable routes were not necessarily the shortest, but those that were most suitable for the movement of artillery.
In addition to the artillery, orders called upon the widespread use on the defense of mobile blocking detachments – combat engineer elements with an extra supply of anti-tank and antipersonnel mines. Altogether by 5 March, there were 68 such detachments, which were equipped with 73 motor vehicles, 164 horse-drawn wagons, 30,000 anti-tank mines, 9,000 anti-personnel mines, and 9 metric tons of explosives. Directly subordinate to the Front command were three motorized blocking detachments, which were composed of a motorized engineer battalion and two combat engineer companies, and each of which were armed with 4,500 anti-tank mines. The 4th Guards Army formed two such motorized detachments on the basis of its engineer-sapper battalion, and each had 3,200 anti-tank mines and 1,000 anti-personnel mines. In the 26th Army and 57th Army there was one such detachment (a company of combat engineers with four vehicles and 1,000 anti-tank mines). The corps blocking detachments, as a rule, consisted of companies or platoons of sappers with an extra supply of 300-500 anti-tank mines. Divisions had 10 to 25 sappers each, with one vehicle and 200-250 mines, while regiments had 5 to 7 combat engineers with 100 anti-tank mines in horse-drawn wagons.
Each blocking detachment had its own plan of movement to one or another direction, depending on the situation. Their actions were linked with the anti-tank artillery and rifle units.
On the basis of obtained intelligence information, the 3rd Ukrainian Front command came to the conclusion that the German units might launch an offensive at any moment. Thus on the evening of 5 March, Front headquarters notified the troops of a possible start of an enemy offensive the next morning. The army and corps headquarters issued an order to bring the formations and units up to full combat-readiness. For example, the artillery headquarters of the 26th Army’s issued the following combat order:
The intensified movement toward the front line of enemy motorized transport and personnel in the course of the day has been established through observation. There is evidence that the enemy will initiate active operations. For the timely forewarning of active enemy operations, the commander of the corps artillery has ordered:
1. On the night of 5-6 March 1945, all the officer staff will be at their posts; battery commanders up to the commanders of the artillery are to be at their observation posts and are to check the readiness of all the artillery to conduct massed fire according to the plan of counter preparatory fire. The artillery positioned to lay direct fire is to be at full readiness to repel enemy tank attacks.
2. Personnel are to be at their guns or the observation posts (50% on duty, 50% resting).
3. Ready the ammunition for conducting fire at enemy tanks and troops.
4. Check communications and the direction of fire, from the commander of the division’s artillery down to the battery commander of both inherent artillery and attached artillery. In case of an interruption in cable communications, immediately switch to radio sets.
5. Confirm the receipt and report on the execution of this order.
An SU-76 self-propelled gun in combat in a village. These selfpropelled guns were second in prevalence only to the T-34 tank in the Red Army.
Soviet artillery caught in a traffic jam on one of the roads at the front. Studebaker trucks acquired from the United States were used to tow the 76mm divisional cannons.
A Soviet anti-tank artillery regiment, equipped with 57mm ZiS-2 anti-tank guns, on the march.
A Soviet anti-tank regiment, equipped with captured 75mm PAK-40 guns, on the march. A Studebaker truck obtained through Lend-Lease is being used as a tow vehicle.
Soviet soldiers training to use a captured PAK-40 75mm anti-tank gun.
A disabled and burned-out King Tiger of the 509th Heavy Panzer Battalion, vicinity of Lake Balaton, March 1945.
13
The Armored Units of the 3rd Ukrainian Front
By the start of March 1945, the 3rd Ukrainian Front had the 6th Tank Army (which didn’t take part in the defensive fighting and thus won’t be examined in the present chapter), two tank corps (the 18th and 23rd) and one mechanized corps (the 1st Guards), the 32nd Separate Guards Mechanized and 208th Self-propelled Artillery Brigades, four tank and six self-propelled artillery regiments (not including the regiments of the tank and mechanized corps), two motorcycle regiments, and eight self-propelled artillery battalions. At the beginning of the defensive fighting, two more self-propelled artillery brigades – the 207th and 209th – were transferred to the control of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.
The majority of the units had suffered heavy losses in the January and February 1945 fighting, and was significantly below table strength in equipment. This especially applied to the tank and mechanized corps, although the self-propelled artillery regiments and brigades were in better shape.
At the beginning of 1945, the TO&E for a Red Army tank corps included three tank brigades and one mechanized brigade; three self-propelled artillery regiments (light, medium and heavy); mortar and anti-aircraft regiments; motorcycle, engineer and medical-sanitary battalions; a signals battalion; a battalion of Guards mortars (Katiusha rocket launchers); a chemical defense company; a fuel and lubricant train; two mobile repair depots (wheeled and tracked vehicles); equipment and artillery repair shops; and a number of other subordinate elements. Altogether, a tank corps numbered 12,010 men, 207 T-34 tanks, 63 self-propelled guns (21 SU-76, 21 SU-85 and 21 ISU-152), 80 guns (36 76mm, 16 57mm, 12 45mm and 16 37mm), 102 mortars and rocket launchers (42 120mm, 52 82mm and 8 BM-13), 149 anti-tank rifles and 1,456 trucks and cars.
The 18th “Znamenskii” Red Banner Tank Corps (the 110th, 170th and 181st Tank Brigades, the 32 Mechanized Brigade, and the 1438th and 363rd Guards Heavy Self-propelled Artillery Regiments) as of 6 March 1945 had serviceable just 42 T-34 tanks and 5 ISU-152, 16 ISU-122 and 17 SU-76 self-propelled guns; by the number of combat vehicles, it was equivalent to just a reinforced tank brigade.
The 23rd Red Banner Tank Corps (the 3rd, 39th and 135th Tank Brigades, the 56th Mechanized Brigade, and the 1443rd and 1891st Self-propelled Artillery Regiments) was in no better shape. As of 6 M
arch 1945, it had 20 T-34/85, 7 ISU-122 and 1 IS-2 operational.
At the beginning of 1945, the TO&E of a Red Army mechanized corps included three mechanized brigades and a tank brigade; three self-propelled artillery regiments (light, medium and heavy); mortar and anti-aircraft regiments; a motorcycle, anti-aircraft and medical-sanitary battalions; a signals battalion; a battalion of Guards mortars (Katiusha rocket launchers); a chemical defense company; a fuel and lubricant train; two mobile repair depots; equipment and artillery repair shops; and a number of other subordinate elements. Altogether, by its TO&E, a full-strength mechanized corps numbered 16,422 men, 133 tanks, 63 self-propelled guns (21 SU-76, 21 SU-85 and 21 ISU-152), 96 guns (36 76mm, 8 57mm, 36 45mm and 16 37mm), 162 mortars and rocket launchers (54 120mm, 100 82mm and 8 BM-13), 287 anti-tank rifles and 1,849 trucks and cars.
The Red Army mechanized corps, even at the end of the war, was often equipped with American tanks, as a rule Sherman tanks, which had been received through Lend-Lease. The 1st Guards Order of Lenin Mechanized Corps (the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Guards Mechanized Brigades, the 9th Guards Tank Brigade, and the 382nd and 1821st Self-propelled Artillery Regiments) was no exception. It was equipped with M4A2 Sherman tanks. By the beginning of March 1945, this mechanized corps had suffered heavy losses, and had only 47 M4A2 Sherman tanks, 15 SU-100 and 3 T-34 still operational on its roster.
Thus, by 6 March 1945 the tank and mechanized corps of the 3rd Ukrainian Front had a large deficit of armor. This circumstance determined their use – their brigades were positioned on the defense, and the tanks were reinforcing their motorized rifle battalions. In addition, in order to strengthen the corps, they received self-propelled artillery regiments and brigades as attachments.
The Red Army’s separate tank regiments by 1945 had converted to either the TO&E No. 010/463 (T-34/76 tanks) or the TO&E No. 010/464 (T-34/85 tanks). They consisted of a headquarters with a command platoon (1 T-34 tank); two tank companies (10 T-34 each); reconnaissance, repair and motorized transport platoons; an administrative squad and a medical aid station. Altogether by TO&E a separate tank regiment numbered a total of 225 men (234 if equipped with T-34/85 tanks) and 21 T-34 tanks. One separate tank regiment, the 249th, which was equipped with T-34/76 tanks, took part in the fighting at Lake Balaton.
In addition, each division of the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps had one tank regiment, respectively the 54th, 60th and 71st Tank Regiments. They had suffered large losses in the preceding fighting and by now numbered between 1 and 7 armor vehicles, two of them being American light M3A1 Stuart tanks. These regiments had all been reformed according to the TO&E No. 010/414, which meant they each had four tank companies, one of which was a light tank company.
A Red Army separate motorcycle regiment according to its TO&E No. 010/433 consisted of a headquarters, a motorcycle battalion, a destroyer anti-tank artillery battalion, and four companies – a tank, a mortar, a machine-gun and a vehicle and supply company, for a total of 1,188 men, 10 T-34 tanks, 18 M3A1 armored halftracks, and 3 BA-64 armored cars. Two motorcycle regiments – the 3rd Guards and the 53rd – took part in the fighting at Lake Balaton; both were subordinate to the 57th Army.
From the point of view of the use of the tank units and formations, the main burden of the fighting at Lake Balaton in March 1945 lay upon the self-propelled artillery. Its elements consisted of light, medium and heavy self-propelled artillery regiments.
The light self-propelled gun regiments, which were equipped with SU-76 self-propelled guns and were formed according to TO&E No. 010/484, included a headquarters with a command platoon (1 SU-76), four batteries of 5 SU-76 each, and rear services (combat supply, repair and transport platoons, a medical station, and an administrative squad), for a total of 225 men and 21 SU-76. The 3rd Ukrainian Front had four such regiments – the 1896th, 1891st, 1202nd and 864th. In addition to the light self-propelled artillery regiments, the separate self-propelled artillery battalions of the rifle divisions were also equipped with the SU-76. They began forming up back at the beginning of 1944. These battalions were included on the unit roster of the rifle divisions in place of the separate destroyer anti-tank artillery battalions, but kept the same numerical designations of the anti-tank artillery battalions that they replaced.
According to TO&E No. 04/568, a self-propelled battalion consisted of a headquarters with a command platoon (1 SU-76), three batteries of 5 self-propelled guns each, and a combat supply platoon, for a total of 152 men and 16 SU-76. The 3rd Ukrainian Front had eight such battalions in March 1945 – six subordinate to the 4th Guards Army (the 8th, 13th, 75th, 88th, 122nd and 44th Guards), one in the 26th Army (the 72nd) and one in the 27th Army (the 432nd).
Medium self-propelled artillery regiments according to TO&E No. 010/462 included a headquarters with a command platoon (1 self-propelled gun), four batteries of 5 self-propelled guns each, and rear services (the same as is in the case of the light self-propelled artillery regiments), but also a submachine gun company and a combat engineer platoon, for a total of 318 men and 21 self-propelled guns. Initially these regiments were equipped with SU-85 self-propelled guns, but from November 1944 they began to be re-equipped with the new SU-100 self-propelled gun. In the March battles, three such regiments took part – the 382nd and 1821st Medium Self-propelled Gun Regiments of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps, which on 6 March had a total of 15 SU-100 self-propelled guns and the 1201st Medium Self-propelled Gun Regiment subordinate to the 57th Army. In place of self-propelled guns, however, the last named regiment was equipped with 14 T-34 tanks.
The defensive operation of the 3rd Ukrainian Front marked the debut of the medium selfpropelled artillery brigades of the Supreme High Command. They began forming up in December 1945 according to TO&E No. 010/500. According to the latter, the brigade consisted of a headquarters with a command company (2 SU-100); a reconnaissance company (3 SU-76), an antiaircraft – machine-gun company and an anti-tank company; three self-propelled artillery regiments organized according to TO&E No. 010/462 (21 SU-100 in each), and a technical service company, for a total of 1,492 men, 65 SU-100 and 3 SU-76.
The SU-100 self-propelled artillery brigades formed on the basis of tank brigades, the 1st “Leningrad” Tank Brigade, the 118th “Dvinsk” Tank Brigade, and the 209th Tank Brigade, and received the numerical designations 207th, 208th and 209th respectively. At the beginning of February 1945, all of the SU-100 brigades were sent into the Acting Army – the 207th and 209th to the 2nd Ukrainian Front, and the 208th to the 3rd Ukrainian Front. After the start of the German offensive, the 207th and 209th Self-propelled Artillery Brigades passed to the control of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. The combat operations at Lake Balaton in March 1945 saw the heaviest use of the SU-100 tank destroyer – here on a relatively narrow sector, more than 200 of these selfpropelled guns operated.
The Guards heavy self-propelled artillery regiments (they had received the honorific Guards title upon forming up) according to TO&E No. 010/461 consisted of a headquarters with a command platoon (1 ISU-122 or ISU-152), four batteries of five self-propelled guns each, a submachine gun company, and combat engineer and administrative platoons, for a total of 420 men and 21 ISU. Not including the heavy self-propelled artillery regiments in the tank and mechanized corps, only one such regiment – the 366th Guards – took part in the fighting at Lake Balaton.
As of 6 March 1945, the tank formations and units of the 3rd Ukrainian Front had 398 armored vehicles – 193 tanks and 205 self-propelled guns, of which 95 (46%) were light SU-76. The latter moreover comprised more than a quarter of the Front’s total tank park. With the arrival of the two SU-100 brigades after the start of the German offensive, the number of self-propelled guns comprised more than 60% of the Front’s armor vehicles. Thus, self-propelled guns played the primary role in the defensive operation of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in March 1945.
Table 8 Available Armor in the Armored Forces of the 3rd Ukrainian Front as of 24.00 5 March 1945
Note: numbers to right of a slash are
non-serviceable vehicles
An SU-85 on the move. These self-propelled guns were used as tank destroyers, but with the widespread introduction of the T-34/85 tank they lost their significance, since they were no longer better armed than the T-34 and lacked turrets.
A T-34/85 tank, camouflaged with branches, waits in ambush.
ISU-122 self-propelled guns. Despite its slow rate of fire, the 122mm cannons of these selfpropelled guns were used with success in combat with German panzers.
14
Operation Frühlingserwachen
As was in fact expected by the Soviet command, the German offensive got underway on 6 March 1945 with virtually simultaneous attacks on three directions. The enemy’s first attack came in the sector of the Bulgarian First Army, which was defending along the Drava River. At 1.00, units of the LXXXXI Army Corps quickly forced a crossing of the river in five locations in the Osijek, Valpovo, Donji Miholjac area, drove back the defending elements of the Bulgarian and Yugoslav armies, and by the end of the day established two small bridgeheads on the opposite bank of the Drava. At 6.00, the Second Panzer Army of Army Group South went on the offensive against the 57th Army after an artillery preparation.
However, the main attack came at 8.47, when the Sixth SS Panzer Army and Armeegruppe Balck jumped off between Lakes Velence and Balaton. The attack was preceded by a powerful 30-minute opening artillery barrage. Most of this artillery fire was intended to suppress our troops, which were occupying the primary belt of defenses. As the preparatory artillery fire wound down, it was joined by German tanks and self-propelled guns, which placed rather effective direct fire on targets along the Soviet front line from a range of 800 to 1,000 meters. However, the German indirect artillery fire was less effective: the shells often exploded some distance off-target, and the majority of the Soviet artillery batteries were unaffected by the German barrage. Luftwaffe activity during the preparatory artillery phase and in support of the attack was badly hampered by the low layer of clouds, snowfall and the poor conditions of the German airfields.
Tomb of the Panzerwaffe: The Defeat of the Sixth SS Panzer Army in Hungary 1945 Page 17