Tomb of the Panzerwaffe: The Defeat of the Sixth SS Panzer Army in Hungary 1945

by Aleksei Isaev

  On the night of 8-9 March, the 3rd Ukrainian Front command continued to bring up reserves to the sector between Lake Velence and the Sárviz Canal. By the morning of 9 March, additional artillery, howitzer and mortar brigades, four artillery and mortar regiments, a Katiusha battalion and the 1438th, 1453rd, 1821st and 382nd Guards Self-propelled Artillery Regiments had been deployed to the north, east and south of the sector that had been breached by the enemy. As a result of this, the density of the Soviet artillery surrounding the German breakthrough amounted to 65 guns and mortars per kilometer.

  A column of T-34/85 tanks. This scene was typical for the Red Army – infantry riding on the tank’s hull, with cases of ammunition mounted on the sides.

  An abandoned StuG 40 self-propelled gun in the area of Lake Balaton, February 1945.

  A Jagdpanzer IV/70(A) tank destroyer, knocked out in the area of Lake Balaton. The machine has Drahtgeflecht [wire mesh] Schürzen side skirts and is wearing the remnants of winter camouflage.

  A Wespe self-propelled howitzer destroyed by artillery fire; Lake Balaton area, February 1945.

  Yet another knocked-out Wespe self-propelled howitzer. These self-propelled guns, possessing armor protection against shell fragments and firing from covered positions, were a hard nut to crack, and only a direct hit could knock them out.

  A PzKpfw. VI Ausf.B King Tiger of the 509th Heavy Panzer Battalion. Its tactical designation “213” is visible on the turret.

  A completely burned-out Pz.IV Ausf.J in the area of Lake Balaton, March 1945.

  A Jagdpanther tank destroyer left burned-out on a street of a Hungarian village in the area of Lake Balaton, March 1945.

  A Marder III self-propelled gun, abandoned by its crew. The abandoned tank destroyer is being used as a road sign; it bears a marker indicating the direction of Glatz.

  An abandoned Jagdpanther on a road. The machine has no visible damage, so it may have broken down or run out of fuel. Vicinity of Lake Balaton, March 1945.

  A broken-down Panther Ausf.G, abandoned by its crew. Lake Balaton area, March 1945.

  German units continued persistent attacks the entire day of 9 March on the 26th Army’s entire sector of defense and in the sector between Lake Velence and Seregélyes. In the sector held by the 1st Guards Fortified District, Armeegruppe Balck succeeded in advancing along the southern shore of Lake Velence as far as Gárdony before it was finally halted. In the fighting on this axis, Colonel Vlasenko’s 24th Destroyer Anti-tank Artillery Brigade, which was occupying a number of anti-tank areas in the sector of the 1st Guards Fortified District on a front of approximately 10 kilometers, played the largest role. In the course of fighting between 6 and 9 March, Vlasenko’s brigade knocked out or destroyed 39 tanks, self-propelled guns and halftracks, while losing 16 of its guns in return.

  The II SS Panzer Corps continued its attack toward the southeast. Units of the 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen launched a concentrated attack in a sector 1.5-kilometers-wide against elements of the 36th Guards Rifle Division, striving to make a breakthrough in the direction of Aba and Sárkeresztúr. However, with the support of massed artillery fire, the Guards division repulsed all the German attacks on this direction. The SS troops also failed to achieve any substantial results in the sector of the 155th Rifle Division, which in the course of the day repelled nine German tank attacks.

  In the sector of the 26th Army’s 135th Rifle Corps, units of the I SS Panzer Corps launched an attack on the night of 8-9 March. The main blow struck the positions of the 233rd Rifle Division in the vicinity of Aranyos. The division’s limited amount of artillery was unable to render the needed support to the infantry. The 135th Rifle Corps’ artillery was also not in the condition to conduct effective massed fire on the breakthrough sector at night. As a result, under the cover of the nighttime darkness, the German tanks managed to penetrate the second defensive belt. True, the situation was somewhat eased by the circumstance that the Germans also acted with uncertainty in the nighttime conditions and thus couldn’t take full advantage of the success of their initial attack. Exploiting this, the units of the 233rd and 236th Rifle Divisions began an organized withdrawal to the south.

  The command of the 26th Army back on 8 March had decided to reinforce the 135th Rifle Corps, and gave it the 208th Self-propelled Artillery Brigade out of the Front reserve. Such a powerful and mobile formation (63 SU-100 tank destroyers) was able to make a significant impact on the course of combat operations. However, the Soviet command was plainly late with introducing it into the fighting. The brigade received the order to move two of its regiments into ambush positions on the line Nagyherceg – Dég, and in cooperation with the units of the 233rd and 236th Rifle Divisions supported by the 1008th and 1245th Destroyer Anti-tank Artillery Regiments to prevent a breakthrough by enemy tanks and infantry along the western bank of the Sárviz Canal. Meanwhile, the third tank destroyer regiment of the 208th Self-propelled Artillery Brigade remained in the 26th Army reserve in the Szár area.

  The brigade’s regiments were slow to move out; the brigade’s commander had no communications with the rifle divisions operating in front of him, and the reconnoitering of the approach route was poor. As a result, the 1068th Self-propelled Artillery Regiment, moving in column along the Cece – Székesfehérvár highway was unexpectedly attacked by the German tanks that had broken through; having rapidly lost 14 of its 21 SU-100 tank destroyers, the regiment hastily fell back to the Sáregres area.

  The enemy’s 23rd Panzer Division that was advancing along the highway was stopped north of Sáregres by units of the 11th Guards Cavalry Division. The attempt by hostile tanks to break though the army-level defensive belt and to seize crossings over the Kapos Canal from the march failed.

  A powerful anti-tank region, which had been set up in the Cece – Simontornya area on the morning of 9 March played a major role in repulsing the enemy’s attack in the direction of Cece with the aim of seizing crossings over the Sárviz Canal. Colonel Shpek, the commander of the 49th Destroyer Anti-tank Artillery Brigade, was appointed as the anti-tank region’s commandant. In addition to two of his brigade’s regiments, the 1008th and 1249th, the region included a battalion of the 407th Light Artillery Regiment, the 1089th Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment, the 227th Separate Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion, the 117th Destroyer Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, the 1953rd Self-propelled Artillery Regiment of the 209th Self-propelled Artillery Brigade, the “Avenger” Battalion (which had been formed between 6 and 10 January 1945 as part of the 4th Anti-aircraft Division at the order of the artillery commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in order to combat enemy tanks, and was armed with captured German 88mm anti-aircraft guns), and the 268th Guards Anti-aircraft Regiment. Altogether, this anti-tank region possessed more than 100 guns and self-propelled guns. With the assistance of units of the 11th Guards Cavalry Division, which had been hastily shifted to this sector, this anti-tank region in the course of 9 and 10 March repulsed all of the German attempts to seize crossings over the Sárviz and Kapos Canals in the Cece and Simontornya area.

  However, in spite of this, by the evening of 9 March the situation of the 3rd Ukrainian Front had become precarious. East of the Sárviz Canal, units of the I SS Panzer Corps and the I Cavalry Corps had fully breached the primary defensive belt. Units of the 26th Army’s 35th Guards Rifle Corps were with great difficulty holding back the enemy in an intermediate position. In the sector of defense of the 135th Rifle Corps, the Germans had penetrated to the army-level belt of defenses, thereby creating a real threat to break through it. The troops of the 26th Army by this time had suffered significant losses and were exhausted by the heavy fighting, while the defensive front they were trying to hold had stretched to 90 kilometers.

  By this time, too, the Front’s main reserves had already been committed. In particular, by the evening of 9 March 1945, the entire 18th Tank, 1st Guards Mechanized, and 5th Guards Cavalry Corps had already entered the fighting, as well as all the units and formations of the F
ront’s artillery reserve, including its anti-tank artillery reserve.

  The Front commander Marshal of the Soviet Union Tolbukhin appealed to the Stavka of the Supreme High Command with a request to authorize the use of the 9th Guards Army, which was located in the Front’s reserve, in the defensive fighting. However, the Stavka reaffirmed its prior decision – the 9th Guards Army would not be drawn into the defensive fighting, and the Front no later than 15-16 March would go over to the offensive. As a result, the 3rd Ukrainian Front command had to seek out so-called “internal resources” in order to liquidate the threat of the enemy breakthrough to the Danube, and initiated a force reshuffling.

  To take the pressure off of the 26th Army, Tolbukhin decided to insert the 4th Guards Army’s second-echelon 31st Guards Rifle Corps into the sector between Lake Velence and the Danube along a previously prepared line. He then assigned responsibility for the defense of the Front’s sector between Lake Velence and the Sárviz Canal, and further along the eastern bank of that canal to Cece, to the 27th Army. The 1st Guards Fortified District and the 30th Rifle Corps with all their attached assets, as well as the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps and the 18th Tank Corps, which had been committed into the fighting from the Front’s reserve, thereby passed to the control of the 27th Army.

  Meanwhile, the 26th Army assumed responsibility for a shorter sector between Cece and Lake Balaton and took command of the 33rd Rifle Corps and the 208th and 209th Selfpropelled Artillery Brigade. The 23rd Tank Corps together with the 207th Self-propelled Artillery Brigade and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps were pulled back into Front reserve. In the process, the 33rd Rifle Corps, reinforced with the two self-propelled artillery brigades, replaced the units of the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps and moved into the defenses on the line Sáregres, Simontornya, Ozora.

  In order to reinforce the 27th Army, which was now defending the critical sector, the 4th Guards Army transferred to it a destroyer anti-tank artillery brigade, a mortar brigade and an artillery brigade, as well as four artillery regiments. In addition, the 26th Army turned over to the 27th Army a breakthrough artillery division, an anti-aircraft artillery division, a destroyer anti-tank artillery brigade, five artillery and mortar regiments, as well as a breakthrough artillery division out of the Front’s reserve.

  On 10 March, fighting flared up with new intensity along the entire front. The Germans committed the 3rd Panzer Division into the area north of Seregélyes. Taking advantage of the heavy snow, the enemy tanks and infantry, attacking to the northeast out of the area north of Seregélyes, at dawn on 10 March managed to close on the Soviet positions unnoticed, and with a sudden attack began to drive back the elements of the 1st Guards Fortified District and the 3rd Guards Airborne Division. On other sectors, the Germans also stubbornly attempted to breach the defenses, and made advances in spite of their losses.

  The 3rd Ukrainian Front command was compelled to throw its last reserve into the fighting in this sector – units of the 23rd Tank Corps and the 207th Self-propelled Artillery Brigade. The artillery and tanks of these formations, which deployed on the line Agárd – Csirib, substantially strengthened the 27th Army’s defense.

  Despite this, by the evening of 10 March, German tanks reached the second defensive belt, which was occupied by a division of the second-echelon 35th Guards Rifle Corps. The 3rd Guards Airborne Division of this rifle corps took up a cutoff position with its front facing to the north.

  In the fighting for the intermediate position on 10 March, once again the main burden of the struggle against the enemy tanks lay upon the units of the destroyer anti-tank artillery, the selfpropelled artillery and the anti-aircraft artillery. For example, the artillery regiments and battalions that were operating in the sector of the 30th Rifle Corps threw back 16-18 German attacks each day.

  Combat operations didn’t cease once the sun set. Thus, in the sector of the 155th Rifle Division, savage fighting for possession of the commanding height Hill 159.0, where the command posts of the corps and the division were located, went on without pause in the course of 9-10 March. On 9 March, the enemy attacked the hill five times, but all of these attacks were successfully repulsed by defending units of the Red Army, which were supported by massed artillery fire.

  Having no success with frontal assaults, the Germans attempted to outflank the hill. A group of German tanks managed to penetrate into our defenses in the Aba area, but it was ambushed and destroyed by tanks of the 110th Tank Brigade.

  With the onset of darkness, the attacks on the hill didn’t cease. Slowly advancing, enemy tanks enveloped the hill in a semi-circle, and then opened machine-gun fire with incendiary-tracer bullets at the group of homes and outbuildings on top of the hill. The buildings began to burn, and some of the Soviet guns and tanks that were positioned near them were caught in a difficult situation: their crews were blinded by the flames, but they themselves became clearly visible to the Germans. The German tanks opened a heavy fire and began to approach. In their turn, the guns of the 155th Rifle Division fired at the muzzle flashes of the German tanks, but the fire of the enemy tanks (which had among them vehicles with infrared optics) proved to be more accurate.

  At a critical moment of the battle, the commander of the 1964th Destroyer Anti-tank Artillery Regiment ordered one battery to move out onto the flank of the attacking tanks. Having quickly deployed, the guns opened fire at the moment when the lead enemy tank had approached to within 50 meters of the position. Aiming down the barrel alone, the artillerymen managed to knock out three tanks, which slowed the attack somewhat and gave the defending Soviet elements the opportunity to make an organized retreat from the hill to new positions.

  Meanwhile, the 27th Army command committed its reserve 363rd Heavy Self-propelled Artillery Regiment (6 ISU-152 and 11 ISU-122) into the fighting. It moved into a line 1 to 1.5 kilometers east and southeast of Hill 159.0 and by its fire halted the advance of the German tanks. Taking advantage of this, the commander of the 1964th Destroyer Anti-tank Artillery Regiment withdrew his batteries from the hill. In this night action, batteries of the regiment knocked out up to 10 tanks and halftracks, while losing 8 guns in the process.

  Simultaneously with the night attack on Hill 159.0, up to two battalions of German infantry with tanks launched an attack in the direction of Sárosd and seized the Csillag strongpoint between Sárosd and Aba. The 27th Army command committed the 68th Guards Rifle Division on this axis. At 4.00, this division’s 200th Rifle Regiment (which had a two-battalion table of organization) drove the Germans out of Csillag with a surprise counterattack. All of the division’s artillery was used to support this counterattack. Curiously, the 2nd Battalion of the 320th Howitzer Artillery Regiment throughout the battle fired illumination rounds, which constantly lit up a sector of 5 kilometers of the front and up to 3 kilometers into its depth. Over two hours, this battalion expended approximately 1,000 illumination rounds.

  On the morning of 11 March, units of Armeegruppe Balck and of the II SS Panzer Corps again went on the attack, this time with broad Luftwaffe support for the ground units. As a result of repeated attacks, the Germans managed to shove back units of the 27th Army by 2 to 4 kilometers, and reached the line Kis Velence – Sándor.

  The tenacious resistance of the units of the 3rd Ukrainian Front forced the enemy frequently to alter both the tactics and the direction of his attacks, undertaking them after a heavy artillery barrage or air strikes, or unexpectedly, with no preliminary preparation. For example, on 12 March the Germans attacked to the northeast toward Kis Velence, but on 13 March, they changed the direction of their attack – toward Pusztaszabolc and Adony, which is to say, toward the southwest. Up to four regiments of infantry and up to 100 tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated on a narrow sector of the front in the attacks toward Pusztaszabolc and Adony. The tanks were advancing in packed combat formations, and coming under the massed fire of Soviet artillery they suffered large losses. In the end, the Germans managed nevertheless to make a shallow penetration into t
he defenses, but their further advance was stopped by units of the 23rd Tank Corps, supported by three artillery regiments.

  On the evening of 13 March, approximately 90 German tanks and self-propelled guns with the support of infantry attacked out of the area of Tükres, but running into a powerful anti-tank defense here, the attack had no success. Thus, by the end of 13 March, Armeegruppe Balck only managed to push back units of the 163rd Rifle Division and to cut the Kis Velence – Adony road.

  Considering the looming threat of a breakthrough by the German panzer divisions to the Danube River, the command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front and the 27th Army took all possible measures to halt the enemy’s advance. In addition to the 23rd Tank Corps, between 10 and 12 March the 207th Self-propelled Artillery Brigade and three artillery and mortar regiments the were shifted to the 35th Guards Rifle Corps’ sector of defense. Altogether over the course of three days, the Soviet command committed 14 artillery and mortar regiments and more than 150 tanks and self-propelled guns into the fighting in the sectors of the 78th Guards Rifle and 163rd Rifle Divisions, which significantly augmented the defense.

  Simultaneously with the attacks by Armeegruppe Balck, the Germans undertook an offensive with the forces of the II SS Panzer Corps against units of the 30th Rifle Corps, having concentrated their main assault forces in the sector of the 68th Guards Rifle Division. After stubborn fighting, which continued through the entire day, the enemy managed to seize the Heinrich Estate.

  That night, muffling the sound of the tank engines with artillery salvoes, 20 German tanks stealthily approached the left-flank elements of the 36th Guards Rifle Division and launched an attack. The German tanks advanced slowly, firing incendiary shells intensively, in order to set fire to any of the buildings they met on their path. Simultaneously, a specially assigned group of soldiers of the 36th Infantry Division illuminated the area with flares, but batteries of the 1249th Destroyer Anti-tank and 1821st Self-propelled Artillery Regiments that were positioned here instantly opened fire and knocked out three tanks. Meanwhile, Soviet artillery, having opened fire with incendiary shells, set fire to two structures on the path of advance of the German tanks, and two howitzer batteries opened fire with illumination rounds. This enabled the placement of concentrated artillery fire on the attacking German elements, and the attack faltered. Later that night, the Germans attempted three more attacks on this axis, but each ended in failure.