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Stilicho: The Vandal Who Saved Rome

Page 4

by Ian Hughes


  The split amongst the Gothic tribes also seems to be mirrored in the division inherent in Hunnic society. The Huns appear to have been a large collection of tribes slowly moving West in a combination of small groups and large armies. There is no evidence that all Huns owed their allegiance to a single political leader. In fact, there is even evidence to suggest that Hunnic mercenaries served under the pay of the Goths against the Hunnic invasions.10 The modern concept of a centrally controlled, unified horde appears to have taken root due to the later kingship of Attila. Both before and after his rule division and separation would have been the norm, with individual Hun bands and tribes deciding their own fates and refusing to remain part of a large Hunnic nation. Therefore, despite their massive impact upon the policies and destinies of the West, the Huns will only be mentioned when individuals or groups appeared in the West, not as a major political force in their own right.

  5. The Battles of Argentoratum and Adrianople.

  Adrianople

  In 376 a large number of tribesmen appeared on the banks of the Danube and petitioned the emperor to be allowed to enter the Empire. Shortly afterwards a second group appeared and made a similar request. Valens decided to allow the former to enter the Empire but refused access to the latter.

  His decision may have been influenced by earlier dealings with one of the two leaders of the first group, Fritigern. The fact that there were two leaders of the Goths may represent the continuing religious divide amongst the Goths. Fritigern may have been elected to lead the Arians amongst the Goths, whilst the other leader, Alavivus, represented the pagan elements of the Gothic migrants. Ammianus claims that Fritigern was asked to become Christian before being allowed to enter yet this may represent confusion on the part of Ammianus, since it may be that the condition was that those not already Arian should convert.11 It is interesting to note in this context that Alavivus soon disappears from the narrative, suggesting that he may have opposed the conversion and was removed partly in order to convince the Goths to convert.

  Unfortunately for Valens, a complicated series of events resulted in the ‘Tervingi’ (as they became known) rebelling and defeating the local forces in battle. Furthermore, the second group, who were later labelled ‘Greuthungi’, had by this time also crossed the Danube.

  Although these tribal names had been known for a long time it is unclear what relationship the tribes entering the Empire had with the tribes previously described as being ‘free’ in Germania. There now followed extensive raiding of the Balkans, a situation which forced Valens to gather an army and travel to the area to face the two groups, collectively known as ‘The Goths’.

  Valens finally faced Fritigern outside the city of Adrianople. Fritigern attempted to negotiate with Valens but, before anything could come of the talks, two Roman units attacked the Goths and battle was joined. A large number of Gothic cavalry arrived late on the scene and chased away the Roman horsemen.12 At this point the Romans’ fate was sealed. It was one of the worst disasters in Roman history, with up to 20,000 men being lost. Valens was killed by the victorious Goths in the pursuit at the end of the battle, allegedly being burnt in a cottage by Goths who did not realize the prize they were destroying. It is interesting to note that ancient sources see the defeat in terms of its religious significance: pagans see it as a punishment inflicted by the old gods for their neglect, whilst Christians see it as divine punishment for adherence to the pagan gods and the failure of Christians to adhere to God’s laws.13

  Some historians analysing the battle accept Ammianus’ viewpoint that the Gothic attempts at negotiation were false and aimed at giving the Gothic cavalry time to reach the battlefield. Although Valens’ indecision did allow time for these troops to arrive, there is every reason to believe that Fritigern was genuine in his attempts to reach a peaceful agreement. It should be remembered that Fritigern was not the sole leader of the Goths and that part of the difficulty the Goths faced was divided opinion about the best course to take to ensure their survival. Many would be against dealing with the Romans, arguing instead that they should fight rather than face the same betrayals they had already suffered. Yet the overwhelming belief would have been a recognition that the Goths could not defeat the entire Empire, and even a victory might leave the Goths so weak as to be defenceless against renewed attack. As a consequence, it is possible to see Fritigern’s envoys as attempting to reach a real agreement rather than fighting a battle, with the result that the battle was actually a mistake for both sides.

  Yet although this question is rarely considered, it is crucial in understanding the position of the Goths after the battle, and also after the peace treaty of 382 which followed. Attempting to negotiate, they had been treacherously attacked by a Roman army under the direct command of the emperor. From this point on, the Goths would be extremely hesitant to trust any Roman offers and would feel justified in breaking any terms agreed. Furthermore, not long after the battle Fritigern disappears from history, and it may be that as an ‘appeaser’ he was overthrown by those who had recommended fighting the battle.

  On the Roman side there was a similar feeling of betrayal. Ammianus may have been following the line of an official Roman inquiry into the disaster when he pins the blame firmly on Fritigern’s dishonest attempts to secure a peaceful settlement. Henceforward, the Romans would be unhappy to negotiate with the Goths except when absolutely necessary and would take every opportunity that arose to weaken their strength. The relationship between the Goths and the Romans would henceforward be one of mutual suspicion and distrust.

  Theodosius I

  Prior to the battle, and as the war against the Goths gained momentum, Gratian, emperor of the West, had a problem. He needed somebody to take charge of the Western army in the (Western-controlled) Prefecture of Illyricum. As a result, he called the younger Theodosius out of ‘retirement’ and deployed him to Illyricum.14 Following the Battle, Gratian needed somebody to rule in the East, but a large number of important and capable military leaders had been killed at Adrianople. Theodosius would appear to have been the most obvious choice. Appointed as Caesar, Theodosius’ first act was to defeat a Sarmatian attack on the Empire. He was quickly made Augustus and assumed supreme command in the East. To help in the war against the Goths and ensure that there would be no friction between the commanders on the spot, Gratian assigned the Prefecture of Illyricum temporarily to the East, ensuring that the passes from Illyricum to the West were securely guarded. Theodosius now had complete control of the war against the Goths.

  Hastily conscripting fresh troops and assigning them to new units, Theodosius set about the task of restoring the situation in the Balkans. He posted as many of the new, raw troops as possible to peaceful provinces in the East, such as Egypt, and ordered the more experienced troops in these provinces to travel to the Balkans to face the Goths. His policy failed: in a battle with the Goths his ‘Eastern’ army was defeated and Theodosius retreated to repair the damage. Deciding to avoid facing the Goths in an open fight, Theodosius reverted to attacking isolated groups and the use of diplomacy to wean tribes away from the confederacy.

  After Adrianople the Goths had formed a new method of surviving. This was to threaten to attack towns unless the towns supplied them with goods and provisions. Once this was given, the Goths moved on to the next town. In this way they maintained a steady supply of necessities – especially food – but did not devastate the countryside, meaning that they could repeat the tactic later.

  Theodosius’ response was to wait until the Goths had left an area and then garrison the cities they had threatened. When the Goths returned, the cities refused to supply them and the regular troops in the towns dissuaded the Goths from attacking. As time wore on, the Goths found themselves slowly being starved into submission.

  Four years after the battle, in 382 the Goths capitulated. A peace treaty was signed and the Empire was seen as victorious. However, the gloss put on the treaty by the court panegyrists did not completely hide the re
ality of the situation. The Goths, far from being defeated and at the mercy of the Empire, retained their identity and their own leaders. Furthermore, although they were given lands in Thrace and northern Dacia, they were not given conubium, the right of intermarriage with Roman citizens. These tribes were not going to be integrated into the Empire. Instead, the treaty reinforced their isolation and helped to reinforce their identity as a people apart. This was a new departure for Romano-barbarian alliances: never before had the Romans allowed tribes to enter the Empire and also allowed them to retain their leaders and identity without attempting to assimilate them.15

  Far from showing the superiority of the Empire, it shows that the Empire was stretched to the limit and needed a peace to help alleviate its problems. These included diplomatic manoeuvres with the Persians.

  Once the treaty had been agreed, Theodosius sent ambassadors to Persia in an attempt to conclude the ongoing negotiations with regard to the status of Armenia. One of the leaders of the embassy was a young man by the name of Flavius Stilicho.

  Chapter Two

  Stilicho, Serena and Theodosius

  As was stated in Chapter One, Stilicho was born sometime around 360*. Unfortunately, we cannot be more accurate as we are simply not told. The date fits in with him being described as ‘young’ by Claudian when sent on the embassy in 383, as this would mean that he was around twenty-four years old: still young enough to have it remarked upon but old enough to have the responsibility.1

  His father was a Vandal who entered the Roman army and served as a cavalry officer under Valens; his mother was a Roman.2 Neither is named in the sources. Much has been made of his Vandal ancestry yet no attempt appears to have been made to analyse his mother’s status. Many nobles of barbarian origin were given high rank in the Roman army. However, there is no evidence that either they or their descendents were appointed to powerful posts at a young age. This suggests that Stilicho’s mother was of a sufficient status to help promote his career. Moreover, Stilicho was soon to enter the emperor’s immediate family by marriage. Although there is not necessarily a link between his mother’s status and his marriage, it is likely that Stilicho’s mother was of sufficient rank and influence to help counter the fact that his father was a Vandal.

  He joined the army early, obeying the law passed by Diocletian stating that sons had to follow their fathers into the army. Thanks to his father’s rank as a noble, along with his mother’s possible high status, Stilicho began his career in the elite corps of the protectores. The protectores began in the third century and over time became a bodyguard unit, reserved for individuals who were earmarked for rapid promotion. Stilicho’s talents were seen early and he appears to have been promoted to tribunus praetorianus militaris (praetorian military tribune), a tribune and notary on the imperial general staff, by 383.3

  He is first mentioned by name when he was sent on an embassy to Persia in 383/4.4 Thanks to the unsatisfactory peace treaty of 363 (following the death of Julian), there appears to have been an almost continuous procession of embassies between the two powers relating to the partitioning of Armenia. However, this particular mission had an additional agenda: in spring 383 Magnus Maximus, the comes Britanniarum (count of Britain), was proclaimed emperor in Britain. Maximus quickly crossed the English Channel into Gaul with his forces, and, surprisingly, little resistance was offered by the Gallic armies. When a little while later the Western Emperor Gratian arrived on the scene, Gratian’s army abandoned him and he was forced to flee. Captured at Lyon, Gratian was executed. He was twenty-four years old. As a result, Stilicho’s embassy to Persia was given the task of ensuring peace to allow Theodosius to prepare for a possible war against the usurper. What followed was a protracted period of talks, lasting for over three years, until in 387 a peace treaty was concluded and affairs in the East settled. Yet although Stilicho was one of the envoys, he did not lead the embassy: according to John Lydus the embassy was led by a man called Sporacius, who is otherwise unknown.5

  This leads to a slight dilemma. On his return in 383/4 Stilicho married Serena, the niece and adopted daughter of Theodosius. Most historians still refer to Serena as Theodosius’ niece. This is because, although Serena was adopted, it was not a full, formal adoption by Roman law: this would have placed her – and her husband and sons – in the line of succession. Theodosius did not want any complications when it came to his successors to the purple. Yet even so, by Roman custom the process of adoption superseded that of birth. With this in mind it should be remembered that, by law and by practice, Serena was Theodosius’ daughter. As a consequence, the question must be asked of why Theodosius allowed his daughter to marry a semi-barbarous youth with little or no political influence. Unfortunately, due to the paucity of the sources, there is no way to answer this question with any authority. Claudian claims that Theodosius chose Stilicho for Serena because of his ‘outstanding military achievements’, however at the time of their marriage Stilicho was still young and had not had a chance to display any military ability.6 In all likelihood the match was arranged by Serena herself.7 It is probable that, as a member of the protectores, Stilicho was in the imperial presence enough to have been noticed and singled out by Serena. It is also possible that his actions in the diplomatic mission helped to elevate his status enough for Theodosius to accept the marriage, based upon the talent latent in the ‘unknown’ youth. Whatever the cause, one additional factor needs to be recognized: when Serena married Stilicho she was not marrying an ‘uneducated barbarian’; she was marrying a man who, although his father was a Vandal, had been brought up and educated in the traditional imperial manner. Stilicho was not an outsider at the court but an integrated member of the imperial elite. Theodosius’ complete acceptance of the marriage was later reinforced: when Serena gave birth to a son, Eucherius, Theodosius acknowledged the boy as his grandson.8

  Yet in one way Theodosius was faced by a dilemma with the marriage of Serena and Stilicho. Stilicho was not of a suitable rank for his daughter. Therefore Theodosius immediately took measures to rectify the situation. Probably shortly after the marriage in 384, Stilicho was promoted to comes sacri stabuli (count of the sacred stables), a fact mentioned by Claudius in his Laus Serenae (In Praise of Serena), and this was quickly followed by his elevation to the post of comes domesticorum (commander of the household bodyguards).9 Zosimus claims that when Stilicho died in 408 he had been a general for twenty-three years. This could in theory suggest that he was magister militum in 385, but this would be too rapid a promotion. Zosimus is clearly referring to Stilicho’s appointment as comes domesticorum, so dating his promotion to 385, the year after his marriage.10 These two rapid promotions were probably intended to raise Stilicho to a suitable status for his marriage to Serena, and should not necessarily be taken as indicative of superior talents: indeed, despite his rapid promotion through the military ranks Stilicho remained pre-eminently a politician.11

  6. Magnus Maximus and the Civil War.

  Magnus Maximus

  As has already been noted, in 383 Magnus Maximus rebelled in Britain. He had served with Theodosius’ father and may have played a political part in promoting Theodosius as the successor to Valens in 378–9. As a result, he may have expected a favourable reception from Theodosius. After Gratian had been deserted by his troops, captured and executed (23 August 383), Maximus was left in control of Britain, Spain and Gaul. At this point he sent envoys to Valentinian II at Milan and Theodosius in the East. Maximus’ envoys demanded that Valentinian should accept Maximus as a ‘father figure’ and join him in Trier. The result would be that Maximus would become ruler of the West. Obviously, Valentinian could not accept such a subordinate status.

  Maximus’ envoys to Theodosius gave two options: either ‘peace and alliance or civil war’.12 Unfortunately, Theodosius was not in a position to oppose Maximus. Having only just concluded the Gothic War (in 382), he was also still in negotiations with Persia regarding the status of Armenia. Putting his difficulties to one side, in
384 Theodosius led a minor expedition to the West to demonstrate his support for Valentinian. Although little more than an exercise in public relations, it appears to have achieved its intended effect: Maximus made no military move against Valentinian, although diplomatic manoeuvring continued unabated.

  Theodosius’ weak position continued. Negotiations with Persia were protracted and in 386 a further group of Greuthungi appeared on the Danube and petitioned to be allowed to enter the Empire. Theodosius could not risk having more Germanic forces in the Balkans. Fortunately, they were opposed by Promotus, the magister militum per Thracias, and forced to retire.13

  Finally, in 387, Theodosius was able to establish a conclusive peace with Persia. Although the terms were unfavourable to the Romans – with only one-fifth of the Armenian provinces remaining in Roman hands – at last troops were freed on the Eastern front for service elsewhere. Maximus was no doubt aware of these developments and decided to act quickly. In 387 he invaded Italy. Valentinian fled to Thessalonica and asked Theodosius for help. He was aided in the request by circumstances. Theodosius’ wife Aelia Flaccilla had recently died and Valentinian’s sister Galla was available. The marriage was useful to both parties: it secured the support of Theodosius for Valentinian II and at the same time embedded Theodosius firmly within the dynasty of Valentinian I. However, as Maximus had struck late in the season, Theodosius was forced to wait until the following year to act.

  When the campaign season of 388 began, Theodosius acted with surprising speed. He used Thessalonica as his base and launched a two-pronged attack, with a naval invasion of Italy being sent at the same time as he led the majority of his troops in person by land into Italy. A large percentage of his forces appear to have been composed of Gothic troops serving under their own leaders, in accordance with the peace treaty of 382: these forces will feature prominently in the history of Stilicho. Alongside them were Huns and Alans, as well as a large force of regular Roman troops, including units from both the East and some that had followed Valentinian from the West.14

 

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