by Ian Hughes
Army unit hierarchy
Yet the hierarchy was to become even more complex. At the top were the scholae who were now unchallenged as the elite bodyguard to the emperor. Below them were the palatina, with the auxilia palatina ranking above the legiones palatina. Below these were the comitatenses, and below them were the limitanei and riparienses. As time passed there grew an intermediate group known as the pseudocomitatenses, formed from border troops who were promoted to the ranks of comitatenses in order to fill gaps or take part in specific campaigns.10 Finally, there were units whose status is either unclear or whose rank could differ between individual units, such as the foederati, gentiles, dediticii, tributarii, and laeti. However, the actual status of the troops at the lower end of the scale is vague. This is mainly because the sources use a wide range of terminology which is applied almost indiscriminately to a variety of units, usually of barbarian origin, and the application of titles need not necessarily follow a set pattern.11
The gentiles appear to have been composed of tribesmen, either recently settled within the Empire or recruited from tribes still living beyond the frontiers: with the sources available it is impossible to say for certain which of these was more prevalent.12 Their exact status is unclear but gentiles are later listed amongst the scholae of Diocletian, and in the Notitia Dignitatum they are found in the scholae attached to both the Eastern and the Western magister officiorum.13 Units of Sarmatian gentiles (Sarmatarum gentilium) are also attested as being stationed in Italy.14 Due to the context, it is possible that they were settled as farmers throughout these regions with individuals then being enrolled in regular units.15
The laeti may have been different to the gentiles. They were formed from barbarians settled within the Empire who were obliged to provide troops for the army in exchange for land. The settlements were not self-governing, being administered either by a Roman military official or by the council of a local city.16 However, there were units combining the two titles, such as the laetorum gentilium stationed in Belgica Secunda, which suggests that any differences between the two may be coincidental and more of a reflection of modern prejudices than of ancient custom.
Tributarii and dediticii appear to have been obtained from external sources. As their names suggest, it is possible that they were supplied as part of a treaty by tribes who had been defeated by the Romans.17
The foederati cause the greatest confusion to historians. This may be because the same title was given to troops recruited in several different ways. The name usually refers to barbarian troops serving under their own leaders as part of a Roman force. However, it may also refer to barbarian troops recruited directly into the army to either fill the ranks of normal Roman units, or instead to form their own, distinct, tribal units within the framework of the army. Furthermore, the name is given to barbarian troops of different tribes who were attracted to serve under one leader, either Roman or barbarian, who was part of the Roman hierarchy. Finally, as with the Goths, the name may be given to non-Roman troops serving the emperor as part of a treaty but who are not a part of the regular Roman army and do not serve under Roman officers. Due to the indeterminate nature of the foederati it is impossible to be clear on their nature and their status. As a result, each unit so designated has to be assessed solely using its own history.
There is also the problem of the emergence of the bucellarii. These men may have started as foederati serving under one leader, however they are generally accepted as serving under local magnates rather than generals. Only slowly were they accepted as part of the military hierarchy, serving as bodyguards to Roman generals. In fact, it is possible that Stilicho was the first Roman general to have had bucellarii serving as a bodyguard.18 They would become increasingly important during the course of the fifth and sixth centuries.
Whatever their origin, wherever possible the Romans tended to employ barbarians, who may by now have composed nearly a quarter of the Roman army, away from the area of their origin.19 In this way they would not be tempted to desert in the knowledge that they could easily find their way home, and, furthermore, coupled with their new training the distance from home would help to foster an esprit de corps with their unit, the only people they would know in a large and potentially unfriendly Empire.20
The above shows that, contrary to the expectations of modern authorities whose experience is dominated by rigid hierarchies and naming conventions, troop designation was not linked to specific methods of recruitment or use and appears to have been dependent upon the needs or whim of the emperor founding the units. As a consequence, the changes must be seen as ‘organic and progressive, not wholesale or ordered’.21 With this in mind, any attempt to analyse the titles of army commanders in an attempt to impose a rigid structure that lasts throughout the course of the later Empire is doomed to failure.
Training for command: the protectores domestici and the protectores
There were two sections of the imperial household whose function was to train and assess candidates for potential military command.
The lower of these was the protectores. Men who were recommended for the protectores spent time with their fellows under the supervision of the emperor or one of his deputies before being sent to command either single units or, when there were two stationed together, pairs of units.
The protectores domestici (household guards) were the successors to the protectores divini lateris (‘observed guards of the divine emperor’) of Gallienus (253–68). The title was originally given by Gallienus to his high-ranking officers, possibly as a visible reward for their loyal service, although it should be seen as a distinction, not a rank.22 Over time the title and function changed and the group of men later known as the protectores domestici generally provided the army with its senior commanders. It was also possible for a member of the protectores domestici to become emperor on the death of the previous incumbent: examples include Diocletian (284) and Justin (518).
The protectores has been called a ‘corps of officer cadets’ and the protectores domestici a ‘staff college’.23 Both of these terms are misleading, prompting modern visions of men in uniform attending lectures on subjects such as grand strategy, battlefield tactics and logistics. This is unlikely to have been the case. It is more likely that they were ordered to read some of the military manuals that had been produced, observe more experienced officers in action, and then given commands of an ever greater nature to both build up their experience and observe their capabilities. There was no modern, written, ‘theoretical’ test prior to them being assigned a permanent rank. Only if they had the necessary qualities of command and control in the military sphere and if they were deemed loyal enough in the personal and political sphere would they be given a placement in a senior post. Especially in the case of the protectores domestici, these matters could only be decided through personal observation by the emperor, not by abstract written exams.24 If the protectores domestici had in truth been a ‘staff college’, it failed in its purpose. The histories are replete with commanders who failed in their duty either through cowardice or inability: furthermore, the Emperor Valens was described as being unhappy with the quality of his subordinate commanders.25
Command hierarchy
An examination of the pages of the Notitia Dignitatum clearly shows troops commanded by officers, who in turn are subordinate to men of higher rank. This system appears to mirror the linear hierarchies of modern armies and so is assumed to work in the same way. Unfortunately, an investigation of the history of the various positions somewhat dispels the illusion.
Before an analysis can take place, two notes of caution must be applied. The first note is that ancient sources tend not to be interested in applying strict military rankings according to an accepted hierarchy. Therefore, the use of titles such as magister peditum, magister equitum, magister utriusque militiae and so forth may all actually represent the same post, depending upon the authority, accuracy and sources used by the author in question.
Furthermore, it is
possible that in many cases these posts were short-lived under specific emperors or created for an individual and legitimately held but that they were then left vacant or abolished when the occupier left the post. Other uses of titles may have been caused by an author falsely ‘promoting’ his patron in order to gain extra patronage, or by his applying a later title to an earlier period in order to help his readers better understand events. Moreover, titles were liable to change without notice and they need not necessarily match the limits that are implied. Examples of this will be given below.
The second cautionary note is that the Notitia describes the standing army in time of peace. On campaign, the realities of warfare would have resulted in ad hoc command structures, rather than a strict adherence to the peacetime organization.26 Although these changes may have been short-lived, their ramifications may have lasted longer than the campaign itself, with the individuals promoted for the campaign retaining their rank as a form of reward from the emperor. However, they subsequently did not fit easily into the command structure represented in the Notitia.
After his victory over Licinius in 324 Constantine (306–337) amalgamated his own troops with those of Licinius, so expanding the comitatenses. He then redeployed the troops around the newly conquered Empire to fit with his view of how the army should operate. Obviously, he also reorganized the command structure to accommodate the changes.
A major part of this reorganization was that the praefecti lost their military powers. These tasks were assumed by the magister peditum (master of the infantry) and the magister equitum (master of the cavalry). These magistri controlled the comitatenses and in theory had authority above the provincial duces (dukes). However, the duces retained the right to correspond directly with the emperor. The result was actually a division in the command structure, which could have severe and unexpected consequences. If a
dux disagreed with the magister who was nominally his superior, he had the right to petition the emperor for alternative orders, leading to confusion and delay.27 As a consequence, no magister could rely on his subordinates for unquestioning obedience.
Yet Constantine realized that the new powers given to the magistri were in some respects dangerous to his own authority, since they now commanded substantial forces in the field. Therefore, for his own security the emperor retained control of the elite scholae via the magister officiorum.28 These troops would act as the nucleus for an army which would defeat any magister unwise enough to raise the standard of revolt.
It is possible that Constantine had two motives for the new, dual appointments of magister equitum and magister peditum. Firstly, it split the military command between two individuals, so making revolt more difficult. Secondly, it mirrored earlier dual institutions – especially the consulship – and so appealed to traditional values. It would now also be possible to send the two magistri to two separate theatres of war; with the addition of Constantine the Empire could now – in theory – fight a war on three fronts, or deploy multiple armies in the same war. Finally, it would allow Constantine to reward more than one man with the highest accolade short of being emperor.
Unfortunately, the system quickly changed, not least in the fact that differences emerged between the East and the West. In the East, under Valens I (364–378) there were at least two magistri equitum.29 To differentiate between the two, one added the title in praesenti or praesentalis (in the presence). To ensure that the situation did not become unbalanced, the magister peditum also appears to have been given the suffix praesentalis. Over time the magister peditum praesentalis gained superiority, presumably due to his continued presence at court. In the West, the division between peditum and equitum slowly disappeared, with the change probably occurring later, possibly following the tenure of Merobaudes under the Emperors Gratian (375–83) and Valentinian II (375–392).30 After this both commanders were nominally in control of equally sized mixed forces.
Below the various magistri were the comes and duces. As with the magistri, the two titles were not wholly distinct, with one serving above the other – although by the time of the Notitia Dignitatum this may have been the ambition. An example of the mixing of the titles dates from the reign of Constantine. He gave the title dux Aegypti to the military commander of Egypt. From about 384 the title of this commander changed to comes rei militaris per Aegyptum. The example shows that without more specific evidence the use of the Notitia to trace the development of ranks and titles within the army is fraught with danger. It seems likely that the designations comes and dux were given by different emperors depending upon the individual circumstances surrounding the appointment.
Having seen that there was little continuity in the use of the titles dux or comes, it is possible to look at other posts. On inspection, the same appears to be true of the title praepositus. It began as a temporary command, for example given to commanders in charge of detachments in transit. It then appears to have changed and become the title given to commanders of ‘non-standard’ Roman units, such as the numeri of the early Empire. In the later Empire the title was more widely used but there does not appear to have been any consistency in its use; for example, there were praepositi in the scholae, but also praepositi legionis and praepositi cohortales in the limitanei.31
In conclusion, it would appear that great care needs to be taken before deductions are made based on specific titles held by military commanders. We should not see the army’s ranks as being a defined hierarchy that remained the same throughout the period. Instead, it should be seen as a fluid entity, changing its nature on the whim of emperors and/or as circumstances dictated. Both the date of the appointment, the actual nature of the appointment, and the predisposition of the emperor who appointed the post need to be taken into account before definitive statements are made. It may be possible to draw up a table showing the chain of command under one or possibly two consecutive emperors. To attempt to do the same for the entire fourth and fifth centuries would be impossible.
This situation can lead to confusion amongst historians. In a similar manner, the creation of new titles and the promotion of individuals to fill them is likely to have caused confusion in the military men serving at the time. As a consequence, in part at least the Notitia may have been an attempt to codify and organize all of the changes that had taken place in the previous century, primarily in an attempt to eliminate obsolete titles and functions and also to accord the recipients of posts their correct status in society. Yet although it should be accepted that, on the whole, the command structure of the Notitia may have been the goal for Theodosius, how far later emperors
– especially in the West – maintained the progress towards that goal is a matter for debate.
Recruitment
There would appear to have been three methods of recruitment in the later Empire: the enrolment of volunteers, conscription and levies from ‘barbarians’ settled either as prisoners of war or as normal Roman farmers with a duty to provide troops for the army when a levy was demanded.32
Both volunteers and conscripts had to show that they were fit for the army. It was a long-standing tradition that many men were exempt from conscription. This included cooks, bakers, innkeepers and others whose jobs were deemed to be unsuitable as a background for service in the army. Slaves were also exempt for most of the time, only being conscripted in times of emergency when they were encouraged to fight by the promise of freedom and other rewards. On the other hand, the sons of serving soldiers were obliged by law to join the army.
Even following the army reforms of the late-third and early-fourth centuries, once the army had been enlarged the population of the Empire, notwithstanding losses from almost continuous warfare and epidemics, should have been able to provide the recruits necessary to maintain army strengths. Yet there were severe difficulties in maintaining the army’s size.
The first of these was that a career in the army was unpopular. One of the main difficulties was that in the uncertain times of the fourth century joining the army co
uld mean a recruit being posted to a province far from his home.33 This could leave his family unprotected and so many men preferred to stay and defend their own homes. Furthermore, there is some evidence for citizens being disillusioned with the government and its heavy taxation, and angry at the behaviour of troops (who may now have been billeted in homes in cities); there is even evidence of them siding with invaders in the expectation of better treatment and booty.34
Ammianus states that in some provinces – especially those such as Italy where conscription had become unknown in the previous centuries – some citizens preferred to cut off their own thumbs, so making them unsuitable for service, rather than serve in the army.35 In 368 Valentinian I ordered that such men should be burnt alive as a discouragement to others.36 However, this should not be overplayed. The cutting off of thumbs appears to have been restricted to provinces that had remained peaceful during the height of the Empire and so had no history of military service. Frontier provinces such as Gaul did not suffer from these habits; a law in the Codex Theodosianus merely shows that a problem existed, not the extent of the problem.37
Nor should it be thought that conscription was an ever-present feature of Roman civilian life. In times of war conscription would be needed to fill the gaps in the ranks, but in times of peace emperors had different agendas. When the need for men was not urgent, provinces were allowed to pay a tax – the aurem tironicum (gold for recruits) – instead of supplying men. As time went by this practice became more widespread, as emperors realized that they could use the tax to pay for mercenaries who were willing to fight and had less need of training. Yet the system was open to corruption. Emperors often found themselves to be short of money, since the income from taxes rarely covered the expenditure needed to maintain the Empire. When this happened, it was tempting to pass a decree calling for conscription simply in order to commute this to the aurem tironicum to boost the treasury.38