by Ian Hughes
There can be little doubt that this had an effect on the attitude of the citizens being taxed. The provincials will have clearly understood the motives for the levying of such taxes, which will have caused discontent. Furthermore, there were naturally imperial officials who used the procedure to increase their personal wealth. The result was an increase in tensions, since the provincials felt they were being taxed for services that were not then being provided, and that dishonest officials were growing wealthy at their expense. In 375 the Emperor Valens passed laws attempting to curb the corruption, but the attempt seems to have had little impact before Adrianople in 378.39
Whether new troops were conscripts, volunteers or mercenaries, the duces were responsible for recruitment and for the assigning of individuals to units, which task also included the weeding out of men unsuitable for a military career.40 Unfortunately we are not given any details as to how this took place. All that can be accepted is that the system appears to have worked prior to the battle of Adrianople.
Training
According to Zosimus, the training and discipline of the army was not as it had been in earlier centuries.41 This is echoed by some authors, who maintain that the billeting of troops in cities had a detrimental effect on the army. Since the troops did not have a purpose-built training area such as those found in earlier forts, it is assumed that training must have declined and army efficiency deteriorated. However, the presumption does not allow for officer professionalism or troop needs. In all armies training can be undertaken in any open space of sufficient size. The predominant factor is the quality and enthusiasm of the officers. If the officers were of high quality, the troops would receive regular training; if not, they would not be trained.
The question of leadership is rarely raised in relation to the Late Roman Empire. It is generally assumed that the junior officers slowly lost the efficiency and skills that had helped the army achieve its peak. To a degree this must be accepted as the truth. There are indications in Ammianus that not all was well with the army’s leaders. For example, when Julian was in the West a man called Dagalaifus was put in charge of troops with orders to attack marauding barbarians. Unfortunately, he delayed, claiming that he could not attack the barbarians as they were ‘scattered over various places’. Shortly after, he was replaced by Jovinus, who promptly attacked and annihilated two separate groups, before fighting a drawn-out battle with a third force that later slipped away at night.42 The episode reflects the situation in the army in the fourth century, with the army commanders varying widely in ability. The concept is reinforced, again by Ammianus, when he states that Julian removed commanders deemed incompetent and replaced them with ‘men approved by long trial’.43
To a large degree training would also depend upon where within the Empire the troops were stationed. Troops deployed in Egypt, where their role was mainly of policing and crowd control, would likely need either less training or at least a different kind of training to those stationed on the Rhine or the Danube, where action against the enemy would be a daily possibility.
Questions have also been raised about the esprit de corps that was such an integral part of the early army. It has been argued that the billeting of troops on civilian households in cities would lead to the troops losing their unity because of continued interaction with civilians. However, it is possible to argue that the opposite may be true. The population often voiced its unhappiness with the situation, and it is likely that the troops in cities were faced with hostility and obstructions from the civilian population. In these circumstances, group loyalty could be reinforced, since the troops were in constant contact with people who did not share their aspirations or understand their problems. In short, the troops would not fit in with the civilians and remain isolated in ‘hostile’ territory. Such conditions probably resulted in greater esprit de corps, not less.
Although the poor quality of troops in the Later Empire has long been accepted as fact, analysis of battles – especially those of Argentoratum (Strasbourg) and Adrianople – has resulted in a reappraisal. It is now accepted that, to a large degree, Roman training methods continued into the fourth century: indeed, Ammianus affirms the esprit de corps and the survival of old skills in the comitatenses, such as the building of marching camps and permanent forts.44 When properly led, and when training was combined with strict discipline, it can be seen that the Roman army was still a formidable fighting force.
Discipline
As with training, when analysing the discipline of the army historians have tended to focus upon Zosimus when he claimed that training and discipline had declined.45 To reinforce this view, reference is also made to the variety of methods used by different emperors to punish undisciplined troops. Examples include Julian ordering such men to be hamstrung or to be paraded through camp dressed in women’s clothes, or Theodosius ordering the amputation of hands.46 It is usually implied that if such methods were needed, then the situation must have become severe.
Yet drastic measures against cowardice and poor discipline were a factor in Roman armies from the time of the Republic. It would be possible to use very early references to decimation, or the fact that on occasion troops who had shown cowardice were to sleep outside marching camps as signs that the armies of the early Republic were of poor quality.47 Yet these armies conquered an Empire and are not assessed as being ‘poor-quality’ troops.
Again, the same analyses of the battles of the late Empire have shown that, on the whole, the troops were capable of beating any opponent that came against them. In fact, the best-known case of poor discipline was the cavalry at the battle of Argentoratum.48 Yet even here the cavalry rallied and regrouped before rejoining the fight. In fact, historians are slowly coming to the conclusion that, at least in large, set-piece battles, the Roman army maintained its discipline and training, and that Zosimus’ statement concerning the decline of the army is exaggerated.49 In fact, there are few examples of defeat in large battles; most losses were on a smaller scale.50
Supply
Apart from the supervision of the recruitment process, the main duty of the duces was to liaise with the praetorian prefects, who by now had lost their military duties but had retained control of army logistics, the provision of food and military supplies such as weapons and armour. It is possible that the result was that the military function of the duces took lower priority than their bureaucratic and organizational role.
As with so much within the organization of the army, a lot depended upon the personal skills, efficiency and corruption of individuals. Two examples from Ammianus will suffice to show the distinctions. Both concern praetorian prefects. In the first, the praefectus praetorio Orientis, Rufinus, was forced to go before the troops and give them an explanation as to why their supplies had not yet arrived.51 It should be pointed out that Ammianus gives floods and unseasonable weather as part of the cause of the failure, yet Rufinus is portrayed as inefficient in his logistical duties. In contrast, Anatolius the praefectus praetorio Illyrici (prefect of Illyricum) had gathered the necessary supplies ahead of time, with more continually arriving ‘without trouble to anyone’.52 Again, a note of caution is applicable: it should be mentioned that Anatolius is praised by Ammianus not only for his efficiency but also for his incorruptibility: the story may be biased.
Possibly in part as a response to these difficulties, supplies in kind slowly began to change to payment in lieu. In the early Empire, the government had supplied all of the requirements of the soldier, but had deducted the cost of these from the men’s wages. By the time of Valentinian I the limitanei still received the supplies needed for nine months of the year straight from the government. However, for the remaining three months they were paid in gold and had to locate and purchase the supplies themselves.53 Over the course of time the system had been extended until by 406 it included virtually all military personnel.54 In such a situation, it would be easy for the troops to begin taking more than their money was worth. It is hard for military men to pay
full price for goods from people they are protecting. Instead, they are likely to have expected a discount for any goods bought from the people they are protecting.
One final aspect is never assessed. Historians writing after the event have the benefit of hindsight and realize that the Empire would fall eventually. The Romans did not have this. It is likely that barbarian groups allowed into the Empire were not seen as the threat that they later became. This is due in part to Roman arrogance: why should the barbarians wish to overthrow Rome? In the preceding centuries all of the tribes and political entities that had been conquered by Rome had seen the benefits of inclusion and become members of the Empire: why should tribes such as the Goths or Franks be any different? Let them settle, allow them to have the benefits of rule and then they would lose their identity amongst the common Roman citizenry. This theory helps to explain why so many German leaders were accepted into service in the army. By serving the Empire they would gradually absorb the benefits and mentality of citizens – as had happened to the Gauls, the Britons and many other belligerent tribes.
Conclusion
Although the Roman army is considered by some to be the most efficient and modern army of the ancient world, these conclusions rest on very unstable foundations. Although much in the army appears to reflect modern practice, a large proportion of this is based more upon modern perceptions than upon reality. In the same way as today’s armies are the product of centuries of development, so too were those of the later Empire. Yet an inefficient bureaucracy and the lack of rapid communications resulted in an army that resembles more those of the sixteenth century than of the twentieth.
The main difficulties faced by the army appear to have been caused by the reforms of the previous century. The army operating at a small scale could no longer rely on every aspect of its needs being supplied in an efficient manner, as this was now in the hands of a civilian bureaucrat. Furthermore, the division of the army into smaller commands resulted in the need for a larger number of military commanders. It is obvious that the increased demand resulted in some individuals being appointed who did not have the ability to fulfil their duties effectively. Yet in the mid-fourth century, when it was led by efficient officers the army retained its ability to defeat any enemy that challenged it.
Stilicho’s army
Having examined the military capabilities of the whole of the Empire prior to the reign of Theodosius, it is now possible to analyse the condition of the forces that Stilicho became legal head of in 395. There will be no in-depth analysis of the Eastern army, since this was shortly to return to the East and so no longer be part of Stilicho’s forces. All that needs to be remembered is that in 395 the Eastern army, as well as the Western army, incorporated large numbers of non-Romans, many of whom served for long periods in regular units whilst others formed distinct units led by their native commanders for single campaigns.
Prior to the battle of Adrianople the army of the West had maintained its integrity and had been employed to defeat the barbarian attacks that had caused Gratian to be delayed with such drastic consequences in 378. In contrast, the Eastern army had been severely defeated and lost large amounts of men and materiel at Adrianople.
By 395 the army of the West was in a perilous condition. After 378 the situation had turned on its head. Theodosius had managed to reform at least part of the Eastern army and by 382 had used it to force the Goths to capitulate and make the treaty in which they were given land in the Balkans. In a strange twist, their agreement to aid the emperor in his wars actually saved the East, as with the addition of their forces the East was stronger than it had been for quite some time.
Furthermore, whilst Theodosius had been engaged against the Goths, the West had dissolved into one of its many civil wars with the rebellion of Magnus Maximus in 383. When he had crossed the English Channel from Britain into Gaul he had taken with him a core of troops from the island. This had left the island’s defences weaker whilst at the same time helping to secure Gaul for Maximus. The death of Gratian had obviated the need for the use of military force, but the balance of forces in the West had been changed to the detriment of Britain’s defences.
Once it became clear to Maximus that he could not expect peace from Theodosius, he had collected a large army from the Western provinces, the core of it being the men that he had brought from Britain along with troops stationed in Gaul. When Maximus had invaded Italy Valentinian II had withdrawn with those loyal troops he could muster and travelled east to ask Theodosius for help.
Theodosius had mustered an Eastern army, including his Gothic foederati, and invaded Italy. At the battle of Siscia and then at the hard-fought battle of Poetovio, Theodosius had defeated Maximus and brought the rebellion to an end. Although many of the fallen were Western Germanic tribesmen recruited by Maximus for the campaign, the defeat weakened the Western army, and especially those units originating in Gaul and Britain. In contrast, the troops from Italy fought alongside Theodosius and so, presumably, their losses were comparatively light.
Following the defeat of Maximus, the remainder of the Western army were gathered by Arbogast and used in extensive campaigns to quell the barbarians across the Rhine and force them to come to terms with him – including the by now obligatory demand that they provide troops for his armies. Yet these armies too were to meet the fate of their predecessors. Gathered from Gaul and Italy, and including troops originally from Britain and the ever-present Germanic tribesmen, these men fought against Theodosius at the Battle of the Frigidus. Again, after a hard-fought contest over two days the armies of the West were defeated – this time with severe casualties – with the East escaping comparatively lightly, since the heaviest losses were suffered in the first day when the assault was led by the Goths.
The losses incurred by the Western army are all too often ignored by modern writers. Intent on discussing the Battle of Adrianople, the conflict at the Frigidus and its impact on the Western army is usually ignored. Even those who do acknowledge that the East’s disaster at Adrianople was mirrored at Frigidus fail to recognize that the battles of Siscia and Poetovio were also major blows for the West.55
As a result of the defeats and the continuous demand for troops from Gaul and Britain to reinforce the army of Italy, Theodosius recognized the weakened condition of the Western army and employed the increasingly common method of bolstering the forces directly under imperial control. He upgraded units of limitanei to pseudocomitatenses. These units were given the title Honoriani, and can be found in the Western portions of the Notitia Dignitatum.56
Yet as usual these troops were probably drawn from the Rhine and/or British frontiers, so weakening these areas still further. Therefore, when Stilicho assumed command in the West, only the recently defeated Italian army was in condition to fight effectively.
It was clear that Stilicho needed time in which to recruit heavily, train and reorganize his demoralized army. The security of the West, at least for the present, was severely compromised. The field army led by Stilicho was depleted and its morale was at a low ebb. The traditional short term solution to the problem of army weakness was to recruit Franks, Alamanni and other Germanic tribesmen into the army. The West was already used to such service and had many Germanic leaders reaching high rank in the Roman army. A mini-campaign along the Rhine would both help to quell potential trouble after news of the defeat at Frigidus reached the tribesmen, as well as promoting a recruitment drive to build up the strength of the army. However, this would take time and until then the Western army was not in a condition to fight and win battles; it would be a while before Stilicho would be able to trust his new forces in open battle. Furthermore, the West was being forced to accommodate the Eastern army, probably with the result of constant minor frictions and the occasional more serious affray between the armies of East and West. The huge combined army in Northern Italy was one of Stilicho’s first priorities.
In fact, one of Stilicho’s first decisions concerned the Eastern forces that had
been brought by Theodosius to the West. Desperate to cut down the need for supplies and eager to avoid at least some of the friction, Stilicho dismissed the Gothic foederati and other troops that had been recruited from tribesmen in the Balkans and beyond the Danube and sent them home. Amongst these forces were the troops led by Alaric, according to Socrates made comes rei militaris after the battle.57
However, it is possible that one group of barbarian warriors that had served under Theodosius and Stilicho remained in the West. It is known that at the end of his career Stilicho had acquired a bodyguard composed of Hunnic mercenaries. This is probably the first occasion when a Roman general formed a unit that was later to be known as bucellarii.58 Although Stilicho was later to become concerned by the use of bucellarii by private individuals – especially as the size of these forces, which were in effect private armies, grew considerably – it is unclear at what date and on what scale they were first recruited by Stilicho himself.59 It is possible that he brought with him a small force of mercenaries after he had served as magister militum per Thracias in the East, however this cannot be proved and remains a source of debate.
Army equipment
Unlike earlier periods in Roman history, the type of equipment used by the later Roman army is open to question. This is thanks to a combination of the statement in Vegetius that the army no longer wore armour, a lack of archaeological findings that can be specifically dated to the period, and the confusing picture painted by surviving monuments and funeral stelae.
It is worth quoting the passage from Vegetius:
From the founding of the city down to the time of the deified Gratian, the infantry army was equipped with both cataphracts (body armour) and helmets. But upon the intervention of neglect and idleness field exercises ceased, and arms which soldiers rarely donned began to be thought heavy. So they petitioned the emperor that they should hand in first the cataphracts, then helmets.