Stilicho: The Vandal Who Saved Rome

by Ian Hughes

  The war was now over. Its importance is difficult to overstate: Stilicho had come close to leading the Western Empire into another civil war with the East – as later admitted by Claudian.67 Only by accepting that Mascezel needed to lead the expedition and by dispatching it as fast as possible had Stilicho pre-empted any serious claim to Africa from the East. Furthermore, by quickly dashing the designs of Eutropius Stilicho managed to inflict a political defeat on him that would help those who were determined to undermine his power in the East.

  There still remained the problem of controlling the newly retaken territory. Theodosian policy was to keep power in the hands of local nobles, in the hope that in return they would be loyally served. Stilicho no longer had this option. Instead, he opted for a new solution to the problem. He combined the forces of Africa and Tingitana, including the limitanei, and placed them under the command of a single individual who was given the post of comites (count).68 Although this placed a lot of power in the hands of one man, as long as the man could be trusted this would not be a problem.

  Aftermath

  Once the war was over, and after Eutropius’ death (see below), Claudian changed the tone of his claims. In ‘de Bello Gildico’ (‘The War Against Gildo’) Honorius is credited with the initiative for the war, yet in the later ‘de Consulatu Stiliconis Liber Primo’ (‘On the Consulship of Stilicho Book One’) it was Stilicho that was acclaimed for the victory. Although it is possible that this was a device to clear Stilicho of any connection with the war – after all, at the time he was hostis publicus and so involvement in a province claimed by the East could create political difficulties – it is more likely that this was simply a means to magnify Stilicho’s achievements.69

  Claudian also took the opportunity of shifting the blame for the war away from Gildo and placing it on Eutropius, who was by then dead and discredited even in the East. The change in emphasis in Claudian’s work is usually explained as an earlier need to pin Eutropius’ actual guilt for the war on Gildo in order to avert a new civil war; Eutropius was actually responsible but Claudian could not say this at the time as it would have caused a heightening of political tension.70 Yet this need not necessarily be the case.

  The change can be explained by political expediency. In his earlier works Claudian correctly blamed Gildo for the war Gildo had actually started. At this time Stilicho was still hoping that his claim to be parens principum would be accepted by Eutropius. As a result, any part played by Eutropius is downplayed in order to avoid conflict. Furthermore, with Stilicho declared hostis publicus in the East Claudian took a soft line with regard to Eutropius in his early works in an attempt to minimize the crisis brought about by the war.

  Once Eutropius was dead, Claudian switched the blame away from Gildo in an attempt to further damage Eutropius’ reputation. In this way he could magnify the deeds of Stilicho in resisting the foul acts of Eutropius and promote his patron as acting wisely in resisting Eutropius’ political machinations. In this manner it may have been hoped that the East would see their mistake in appointing Eutropius and instead accept the wise and loyal Stilicho as parens principum.

  Yet when the war ended such considerations were still in the future. At the time, all that mattered was that the grain supplies to Rome had been restored and a potential threat to Stilicho’s regime removed. Yet there was a further benefit to the campaign in Africa; although the successful conclusion to the war had enhanced Stilicho’s reputation and position in the West, in the East Gildo’s speedy defeat and death damaged Eutropius’ standing, since he had been unable or unwilling to give physical support to a governor who had specifically asked to join his regime. Opposition to Eutropius in the East began to stiffen.

  Chapter Nine

  Consolidation, 398–400

  When news arrived in Rome and Milan of the victory in Africa, Stilicho’s place as the head of the Western government was assured – at least for the present. Although he had been ruling since 395, Stilicho had focused more on his claim to parens principum of the East and on opposing Alaric than on ruling the West. Accordingly, his reaction to events between 395 and 398 was more one of improvisation to meet the current needs than that of long-term strategy. For the first time he now had both the incentive and the time to begin to put into place those measures that would enable him to defy rivals for the next ten years.

  With Mascezel’s death Stilicho was able to claim the victory in Africa as his own, and Claudian immediately set about composing works to that effect. Yet although he had removed a rival who could have risen to become a powerful figurehead, influential opposition remained in the form of militant Catholic senators opposed to his use of pagans and heretics. To counter this, Stilicho had to take steps to ensure that the army was strong and loyal. As a consequence he put in process measures aimed at enlarging the army in Italy and at bringing the military establishment under his personal control.

  The condition of the army was to remain his major challenge, a problem to which he would never find the answer. Stilicho was in command of the last substantial army in the West. Over the course of the previous ten years the others had been denuded to supply recruits for the praesental army in Italy, especially for the civil wars against Theodosius. Heavily defeated, they had remained in Italy as part of the army of the magister peditum. The defeats had further resulted in a loss of morale in the army, although the procession along the Rhine frontier in 396 may have restored confidence to some degree. Nevertheless, the events of 395 and 397, where the army, or sections of it, displayed a lack of discipline and loyalty towards its new leader showed that Stilicho was not yet secure in his position.

  Army reforms

  The dating and precise nature of Stilicho’s changes are not specified in the sources and are as yet poorly understood and open to interpretation. It is extremely unfortunate that the main evidence for the army comes from the Notitia Dignitatum. Although a valuable resource, the Notitia raises more questions than it answers. One of these is the date that the army units listed were raised. The dating of changes has to be inferred by close scrutiny, especially of the titles of units. As is to be expected, controversy about the ensuing theories continues.1 All that can be said is that it is probable that Stilicho began at least part of the process of strengthening the army and ensuring its loyalty early in his rule, during the campaign along the Rhine in 396. However, the Western command structure shown in the Notitia Dignitatum almost certainly reflects Stilicho’s recognition that he would not be accepted by the East, which only really became apparent after the Greek campaign and the revolt of Gildo. Therefore the majority of the changes were probably implemented once he realized that he would only rule in the West and so had to consolidate his position by bringing the Western military establishment under his personal control.2

  Needing to augment the forces at his personal command, Stilicho followed the policies used by Theodosius. He removed units designated as limitanei and riparienses from the frontiers and upgraded them either to the position of comitatenses or to the lesser status of pseudo-comitatenses.3 As an additional effect, the move would advance these troops in seniority and privileges and probably increase their loyalty to their commander. The units so upgraded are assumed to be those named Honoriani after the Emperor Honorius in the Notitia Dignitatum (see below).4

  Those units who had suffered heavy losses received an infusion of new recruits built around the core of the old units.5 The newcomers were men enlisted from inside the Empire and recruits from barbarian tribes or from the Goths still inside the Empire. Stilicho slowly began to augment the strength of the army of the magister peditum in Italy, although it should be remembered that he preferred to use other titles for his rule.6

  The gaps created by the withdrawals may have been filled by newly recruited foederati from across the frontier, especially where these were cavalry.7 In this he followed another of Theodosius’ policies: that of the conciliation, management and, above all, employment of barbarians.8 After all, Stilicho n
eeded troops and it was easier to recruit readily available Germans than antagonize the Senate by attempting to enforce conscription. In this context it is important to note the issuing of a law which pressed into service ‘any laetus (sons of laeti), Allamannus (Alamanni already in the army), Sarmatians (probably any trans-Danubian barbarian), vagrant, son of a veteran or any person of any group subject to the draft’.9 On the whole, however, any new forces under their own leaders were not recognized as part of the formal structure of the army and so were not included in the lists of the Notitia Dignitatum.10

  What is also clear is that the financial straits surrounding the early years of Stilicho’s tenure suggest that few if any troops were raised before the African campaign against Gildo. It was only with the defeat of the revolt that the Western coffers were replenished; as has already been seen, the victory allowed Stilicho to confiscate Gildo’s land in Africa for the emperor, and released so much money that Stilicho may have been able to add ten new bodies of troops to his forces and begin the fortification of those imperial frontiers on the Rhine and in Britain that required it, a task that continued until 401.11 Furthermore, he now felt relatively secure and was confident enough to promote Jacobus to be magister equitum, alongside but inferior to himself who remained magister peditum. The experiment may not have been a success, since in a short poem Claudian reprimanded Jacobus for attacking his, Claudian’s, poetry.12 By late 402 Jacobus was out of office, carrying relics from the West to Constantinople.13

  Comes rei militaris

  Another of Stilicho’s reforms is harder to pin down. Study of the Notitia Dignitatum reveals that he created new posts in Africa, Britain, Italy, Illyricum and Spain in order to defend the Empire.14 In the East, Theodosius had created five magistri militiae to defend imperial territory. In the West there were only three: the magister militum per peditum, the magister militum per equitum and the magister militum per Gallias. Two magistri were not enough to defend the West; Stilicho would be willing to appoint a magister militum per Gallias, but rarely felt secure enough to appoint anybody as magister militum per equitum, since they would have practically equalled his own position.

  As a consequence, he appears to have created five new posts of comes rei militaris. These posts are evident in the Notitia and can be dated to Stilicho’s rule, but the lack of other information makes it impossible to date the appointments precisely. Although it is possible that they were all appointed simultaneously as part of a ‘grand strategy’, it is more likely that each one was appointed on an ad hoc basis as they were deemed necessary.

  The first of these appointments was seen in the last chapter. Following Gildo’s defeat, Stilicho created a new post of comes rei militaris to control the provinces of Africa and Tingitana. Once it was seen that this was a success, Stilicho appears to have extended the idea to further areas where military control was becoming a problem. It is likely that the next comes appointed was in Spain. Although the provinces in the peninsula were some of the most peaceful in the West, it is probable that inactivity had caused a weakening of imperial forces, both in terms of recruitment and morale; when danger threatened the frontiers, troops from Spain were rarely called upon. A new commander could instil discipline and return the forces in Spain to the peak of efficiency. This would have the additional benefit that, should they be required, they would be able to match the regular forces serving in Italy.

  Further commands were created in Britain, Illyricum and Italy. The circumstances surrounding the creation of the other posts will be dealt with at appropriate moments in the text rather than being outlined here. However, it should be noted that these new commands contained forces that were similar in size and location to the positioning of the legions earlier in the Empire.15

  The Notitia Dignitatum and the Honoriani

  Within the Notitia, units with the word ‘Honoriani’ in the title are assumed – almost certainly correctly – to have been raised during the reign of Honorius. Yet the date and manner of their recruitment remains unknown; they may have been completely new units made from Roman and/or barbarian recruits, or they may have been created by using the remnants of existing units as a core around which new recruits could learn combat skills and discipline.16 We simply do not know.

  Realistically there are only two generals who could have had such a major impact on the army during Honorius’ reign: Stilicho and Constantius (c.410–21). However, the fact that there is a large time span for either Stilicho or Constantius to raise the troops results in any theories being conjecture. On the other hand, since units are listed in the Notitia in order of seniority, and since new units or possibly even renamed units would be lower down the list, it is more than likely that the troops at the top of the following list were raised by Stilicho during his time as head of the Western government. Furthermore, it is possible that the units were named for a specific reason.17 The following table lists the units and suggests reasons for their names.

  Having to rely on the money released by internal warfare meant that Stilicho could not count upon similar funds becoming available again in the near future. Stilicho could not afford to squander his resources. The army needed to be husbanded and nurtured, not risked in battle, since finding recruits was becoming a major difficulty.18 In fact, it was only the need to restore the grain supply to Rome that had prompted Stilicho to risk sending troops to Africa in 397. Fortunately, they won without incurring significant losses.

  Federates

  To augment the army in time of war Stilicho relied more and more on recruiting ad hoc bodies of barbarian troops to serve when needed. Given the financial condition of the West this was an extremely useful method of recruitment, since these troops could be hired for single campaigns or campaign seasons. This reduced costs since they would only be hired for a limited period and so would not need paying after the campaign had finished – unlike regular troops. Furthermore, by hiring these mercenaries a smaller standing army was needed, so there was less need to pay for the training of new recruits. Moreover, the hiring of foreign mercenaries reduced the number of regular troops reaching retirement age, which had the additional benefit of lowering the number of troops retiring and equally of lowering the amount of money needed to pay for retirement benefits.19

  Interestingly, Olympiodorus claimed that the title ‘federates’ was first given to non-Roman units in the reign of Honorius.20 This was almost certainly during the guardianship of Stilicho. It is possible that although he was not the first individual to raise such troops, Stilicho was responsible for regularizing and formalizing the recruitment of wholly barbarian units serving under their own leaders into the army.21 The system was attractive to the barbarians. Their leaders were eager to gain a foothold in the Roman command system because it could give them wealth they could not expect in their own countries. Furthermore, in return for the protection of a strong leader their followers would look after them and be willing to demonstrate for their promotion, leading to their achieving greater wealth and power. Examples of such leaders include Gainas and Tribigild.

  However, there were inherent dangers in hiring large numbers of ‘barbarians’. The most obvious was that this would antagonize the Senate, who traditionally wanted the army to be ‘Roman’ and place less reliance on barbarians. Although both Stilicho and his predecessors had raised foreign auxiliaries, for the most part these remained stationed on the frontier in Gaul and Germany. The result was that the army in Italy contained mainly Roman troops who had been freed from service on the frontiers by the employment of barbarians. This method of recruitment allowed Stilicho to maintain the fiction that the Empire was being defended by troops who were almost wholly Roman. Later, Stilicho was forced to maintain a greater number of barbarian troops in Italy, with an associated rise in opposition from an aristocracy infuriated by his use of non-Roman troops.

  Yet such recruiting practices were to prove harmful to the Empire. By allowing evermore Germans to enter the army, with many attaining high rank, Rome lost some of
her military prestige. This is not because the use of Germanic mercenaries ‘tainted’ the army itself, but because the Roman military machine which had so long terrorized the barbarians now became intimately known to their enemies. Once a process is understood, not only can the fear factor become lessened but successful countermeasures can be put in place to deal with them.22 With the increased use of mercenaries, a larger percentage of the German tribes became immune to the fear previously caused by the Roman military machine. Furthermore, at the same time as Roman armies began to look more and more like their Germanic opponents, so the Germans began to look like and use their own forces in the Roman manner. Wars which had once been of Roman efficiency against barbarian inefficiency now became more akin to civil wars, especially in the number of losses inflicted. This may help to explain the increasing reluctance of Roman generals – including Stilicho – to face Germanic warriors in open battle; the losses were now becoming prohibitive and hard to replace.

  On the other hand it is possible that Stilicho was looking at the larger picture and attempting to use the example of the Franks as a model. The Franks had been allowed to settle on Roman territory earlier in the century on condition that they guard against further intruders. This had worked well since the Franks had – by and large – kept to their promise. Their part of the frontier had stabilized, with the added benefit that emperors in need of Roman troops had been able to withdraw garrisons freed by the Frankish occupation. By involving other tribes on the frontier in the garrisoning of that frontier, Stilicho may have been hoping to both stabilize the border and allow the withdrawal of ever more Roman forces.23 This would help explain the diplomatic activity on the Rhine, culminating in a treaty in late summer 398 with both the Franks and the Alamanni, which ‘secured the Rhine border in an impressive way’.24 In this way he could further strengthen his army with ‘Roman’ troops without weakening the frontiers against attack.25 It is also possible that Stilicho was consciously trying to emulate the pattern seen in the early Empire, where existing kingdoms in Asia Minor and the Middle East had first been employed as ‘Client Kingdoms’ that acted as buffer-states and sources of manpower. Only later were these absorbed into the Empire.