Stilicho: The Vandal Who Saved Rome

by Ian Hughes

  What followed is a mystery. For some reason Alaric halted near to the town of Verona. One possibility is that Stilicho had decided that he needed a firm victory to bolster his regime and so advanced to battle. Or maybe Alaric decided to stop in order to put pressure on the government in order to receive a more favourable deal – according to Claudian, his men were suffering from the heat and bad food, implying that Stilicho had refused to give him access to Italian food supplies as he retired.61 It may even be that Alaric was still intent on crossing the Alps to reach either Raetia or Gaul and changed direction in order to cross the mountains, forcing Stilicho to react.62 The exact reason is unknown.

  In the circumstances, it is most likely that Alaric attempted to force the crossing of the Alps.63 Politically he was in a cul-de sac. He had broken his treaty with the East and so could not expect a welcome upon his return. In the West he had been defeated – albeit narrowly – by Stilicho and would not be given the senior military post he needed in order to reward his followers for their loyalty. In the circumstances, it is most likely that he decided to strike out for the Alps. If he could achieve a crossing he could either gain land for his people in Gaul despite the Roman resistance, or at least force the Romans to come to an agreement whereby he gained the status he needed. The claim by Claudian that Stilicho had lured Alaric over the Po and so ensured that Rome was safe before attacking him does not stand up to analysis. Any defeat, anywhere in Italy, would once again leave Italy open to Alaric; the fact that he was beyond the River Po, which has many crossing points, is irrelevant.64

  Stilicho had been following shortly behind Alaric. When Alaric made his move, Stilicho was ready for him. It is almost certain that by this time Stilicho had been joined by the troops from Gaul and Britain. Furthermore, the Battle of Pollentia had shown that Alaric’s forces were not invincible, and the Roman troops would have had superior morale compared to the recently defeated Goths. In the circumstances, Stilicho did something that he had never done before. He led his troops in a concerted attack upon the Goths.

  The Battle of Verona

  Unfortunately, as is usual with this era, we have no actual details of the battle that took place outside Verona in summer 402. Despite the fact that Alaric was still strong in cavalry and that the terrain was ideal for their use, Alaric was undeniably defeated by Stilicho, at one point almost being captured.65 According to Claudian only the failure of the Alans to follow Stilicho’s tactical plans allowed Alaric to escape, although there is no reason to accept the claim at face value.66 Once the battle was lost Alaric attempted to break out to Raetia, but was blockaded on a hill before he could reach the mountain passes.67 At this point, many of the troops that Alaric had led over the Alps into Italy lost faith in their leader; large numbers now began to desert to Rome.68 Amongst these was Sarus, a Goth of some standing, who along with his brother Sigeric (also known as Sigerichus and Segericus) were vehement opponents of Alaric.69 Also taking service with Stilicho was Ulfilas, who later rose to high rank in the Roman army.70 Although Claudian doubtless exaggerates the scale of the desertions, there were undoubtedly many who felt that Alaric could no longer command the respect and fear that he once had and they decided that secure employment with Stilicho was preferable to an unknown future with Alaric. A large proportion of the deserting troops were the Gothic cavalry.71

  Aftermath

  Alaric was no longer in a position to intimidate Stilicho. Before the end of the year he crossed the Julian Alps and settled in Pannonia (Illyricum). Although his precise destination is unclear, there is no indication that he attempted to resettle in Eastern Illyricum. He was no longer magister militum per Illyricum, instead being simply an intruder, and he would have feared being attacked by the Eastern army under Fravitta.72 It is almost certain that he negotiated with Stilicho and was allowed to settle with what remained of his forces on the borders of Dalmatia and Pannonia, most likely in Pannonia II (Map 12), as otherwise he would have been forced to mount yearly campaigns in Illyricum to support his men, which is nowhere indicated in our sources.73

  Although the exact circumstances are unknown, Sozomen suggests that Alaric was allotted annona as part of the settlement.74 It is also possible that Stilicho gave hostages to Alaric at this point, rather than as usually claimed in 405, although the dating is debatable.75 As a consequence, it is possible that Alaric was made dux Pannoniae secundae, or possibly was the first comes rei militaris per ‘Illyricum’, as claimed by Orosius, in this way gaining power similar to that enjoyed by the comes rei militaris of Africa, or Britain, or Spain.76 Whatever the case, for the next three years he caused few problems for Stilicho.

  Stilicho and Alaric

  Different interpretations

  Even in modern works there remains confusion and doubt over Stilicho’s failure to ‘destroy’ Alaric when he had the chance at both Pollentia and Verona. Various interpretations have been advanced for Stilicho’s failure. These range from: his being a poor military commander and so not taking his chance when it was there; his being hampered by his inability to control his troops – especially at Pollentia; his having a secret agreement with Alaric; to his not wanting to destroy Alaric, but to keep him as a threat with which to subdue the Senate. All of these are valid, in that they fit the information that has come down to us and explain the seemingly inexplicable fact that Stilicho had Alaric at his mercy on two separate occasions and failed on both to destroy Alaric.

  Many of these interpretations have been heavily affected by the conflicting views that even the ancient sources held. Claudian and Prudentius consider the battles to be Roman victories.77 Conversely, both Cassiodorus and Jordanes consider them to be Gothic victories.78 Finally, Prosper of Aquitaine, Orosius, and Jerome consider them to have been drawn battles.79

  The claims of Cassiodorus and Jordanes are of doubtful legitimacy, since both were writing for later Gothic kings and are so unlikely to have risked their patron’s wrath by commenting negatively upon Alaric’s deeds.

  The claims of Claudian and Prudentius deserve attention, since they appear to fit the facts: Alaric withdrew after Pollentia, and following Verona he did not attempt to put pressure on Stilicho for several years, even failing to take advantage of the invasion of Italy by Radagaisus (see next chapter). In these circumstances, it is clear that the victories lay with Stilicho, and that the defeat at Verona was significant and reduced Alaric to virtual impotence.

  The comments of Prosper, Orosius and Jerome, however, deserve more recognition. It is clear that they believed that Stilicho could not have defeated Alaric, since Alaric’s forces remained a threat after the battle. According to traditional Roman values a defeated foe lost all ability to act on their own initiative apart from the ability to flee. It is clear that Alaric had not been forced to flee Italy after the battle. These writers – and the modern authorities that have followed them – adhere to the traditional aristocratic manner of their predecessors: all enemies of Rome were to be instantly defeated in battle, using all of the forces necessary.80 Where they were not defeated, the Romans themselves had obviously lost and so the emperor (or whoever was in charge) immediately gathered greater forces with which to avenge the defeat. To put it simply, the purpose of the Roman army was to fight and win decisive victories, not to be defeated or to delay.

  However, in attempting to fit Stilicho’s actions within a specific political framework, most writers have overlooked the military consequences of the victories in 402. Especially following the loss at Adrianople, the army adopted the policies soon to be described by Vegetius and later written down by Maurikios in his Strategikon.81 Examples in Maurikios include: ‘it is well to hurt the enemy by deceit, by raids, or by hunger, and never be enticed into a pitched battle, which is a demonstration more of luck than of bravery’;82 or ‘if an enemy force, superior in strength or even equal to ours, invades our country, especially at the beginning of the invasion, we must be sure not to engage it in pitched battle’.83 Many historians, both ancient and modern,
are anachronistically applying the methods and principles of the earlier Empire to the fourth century and later. This is due to the ancient sources being members of the Roman aristocracy who wanted to uphold the traditions of their forbears whilst failing to understand that circumstances had changed and that the methodology of the earlier Empire was now inappropriate. Modern writers have tended to follow their lead. Over the preceding 200 years the manner of battle had changed. Long gone were the days when the Romans put in the field thousands of legionaries and attacked the enemy. Politics, economics and manpower shortages had changed the ethos of the Roman army.

  Stilicho and others of his generation – including Theodosius – had followed the new methods of fighting wars. These were by their nature less likely to give a fast, decisive result. The more politically inclined and conservative senators were unaware of this profound shift of emphasis and continued to hold the examples of their predecessors – especially individuals such as Caesar, Trajan and Septimius Severus, with their fast, decisive campaigns – as military role-models. However, the potential losses in such military campaigns were no longer tenable, since the Empire no longer had access to willing recruits except from outside the borders. The conservative senators were unwilling to accept that this was the case. Prosper, Orosius and Jerome were part of this tradition and did not understand that it had passed. Some members of the Senate, however, may have held a different view. Despite doubts about the level of the victory, a monument was erected in the forum to celebrate the defeat of Alaric at Pollentia and Verona (see Plate 2), and Stilicho and Honorius marched under a triumphal arch built to commemorate the victory. Although this may have been erected in large part due to political pressure from Stilicho and/or Symmachus, the fact that it was built suggests that in a large part of Italy there was simply relief that the Gothic threat had finally been removed.

  Conclusion

  With these considerations in mind it is possible to formulate a theory that covers all of the existing evidence. This assumes that the circumstances after every battle were different and assumes that Stilicho was reacting to a different situation after each of the two battles. To understand why he acted as he did, it is necessary to deal with each battle in isolation, rather than judging the campaign of 402 as a single entity.

  First, it is necessary to assess the tradition that Stilicho, having won at Pollentia, wasted the opportunity to reduce Alaric’s position even further by not following up and defeating his forces again. This repeats the error of anachronistically expecting Stilicho to behave as Caesar or Trajan and attack the enemy regardless of the strategical necessities; and the strategical necessity in question was that Stilicho could not afford even a small defeat. The Senate were unwilling to allow him to conscript men from their estates, nor did they want him to continually ‘dilute’ the Roman army with barbarian troops. In the end he was to take the only option available to him: he was to open negotiations with Alaric.

  Up to the Battle of Pollentia Stilicho was adhering to the methods of his time, using manoeuvre and blockade to defeat the enemy, rather than risking all in a pitched battle.84 Not only did this accord with his military experience, but he also knew that a heavy defeat would be disastrous for the Empire since there were now only a limited number of recruits available for the army. In all of his life Stilicho had only ever taken part in one decisive battle, when Theodosius led his forces over the Alps and faced Arbogast and Eugenius at the Battle of the Frigidus in 394. In this battle losses had been heavy, especially on the first day, and, although the casualties were mainly amongst the foederati, the experience illustrated how easily things could go wrong. Stilicho did not have the resources of Theodosius, and especially he did not have the sheer volume of foederati that Theodosius had had in 394. As a consequence, any losses were likely to come from his own troops, and these would be extremely difficult to replace.

  Furthermore, Stilicho did not have the need to win a quick battle. Theodosius knew that he had to have a decisive victory at the Battle of the Frigidus in order to neutralize Eugenius. Eugenius was a political opponent in a civil war, and should Theodosius not act decisively support in the East could easily waver and switch to Eugenius. In contrast, there was no point at which Alaric would begin to gain support in the Senate in Rome.

  Yet it is possible that something else was at work here. As has been noted, Stilicho had received accelerated promotion due to his marriage to Serena. As a result, his military experience was extremely limited. In the fighting against Alaric in 395 and 397 he demonstrated that he was adept at using manoeuvre and blockade. On the other hand, his actions during the Gildonic War (where he placed Mascezel in command) and at Pollentia (where he placed the army under the command of Saul) suggests that when it came to leading an army into a standard, set-piece battle, Stilicho was almost totally lacking in confidence. This helps to explain why Claudian took such pains to promote Stilicho’s martial ability; he knew that Stilicho was not comfortable leading an army into battle and so had to exaggerate his feats in order to boost Stilicho’s confidence, as well as simply supporting his patron.

  It is also usually claimed that Stilicho followed the long-standing Roman tradition of deploying the foederati in such a way that they bore the brunt of the fighting at the Battles of Pollentia and Verona – a similar claim to the use of the foederati by Theodosius at the Battle of the Frigidus.85 The claim concerning Theodosius has already been analysed and found to be at fault (Chapter 2). As with Theodosius, the later claim originates from a contemporary account of the Battle of Verona, in this case Claudian:

  If the soldiers flag with wearied ranks he throws the auxiliaries into the line heedless of their loss; thus he cunningly weakens the savage tribes of the Danube by opposing one tribe to another and with twofold gain joins battle that turns barbarians against themselves to perish in either army for our sake.

  Claudian, VI Cons. Hon., 223f.

  Modern writers have tended to accept the concept of the Empire using allied troops in this way practically at face value.86 Yet at the Battle of Pollentia, the Alan Saul deployed the army, and the Alans did not suffer many casualties during the initial attack. It was only when they were counter-attacked by the Gothic cavalry that the Alans suffered significant casualties. As a consequence, it is plain that the Alans were deployed where they were most effective, not where they would absorb casualties. In fact, Claudian makes no mention of the Alans at Pollentia being used to absorb casualties, merely noting that Saul was heroically killed and his men would have fled if not for the timely intervention of Stilicho.87

  The quotation above refers to the Battle of Verona. The phrase ‘If the soldiers flag’ implies that the Roman troops were in the front line and were only replaced by the allies when the Roman troops became tired. Contrary to popular belief, it would appear that the Alans did not fight in the front line on this occasion. The losses appear to have been mainly suffered by the regular Roman forces.

  Claudian could not report that casualties amongst the Romans had been high. Instead, Claudian introduces the claim that the barbarians had been used to kill barbarians. This downplays the losses incurred by the Roman army and emphasizes the skills of Stilicho as a general by comparing him to Theodosius. Furthermore, the claim acts as a counter to the traditional senatorial demand that only Roman troops should serve in the Roman army. If an army was composed only of Romans, all of the casualties were suffered by native troops. On the other hand, by employing barbarians the losses were suffered only by barbarians on both sides, to the greater glory and security of the Empire.

  Claudian was in part following literary traditional when he exulted in ‘barbarian fighting barbarian’. This is seen, for example, in Tacitus, who states that:

  He (Agricola) arrayed his eager and impetuous troops in such a manner that the auxiliary infantry, 8,000 in number, strengthened his centre, while 3,000 cavalry were posted on his wings. The legions were drawn up in front of the entrenched camp; his victory would be vastly more g
lorious if won without the loss of Roman blood, and he would have a reserve in case of repulse.

  Tacitus, Agricola, 1.35.

  Yet this is not the only reason for Claudian’s claim. Claudian was also attempting to use it as a lever to encourage the Senate to allow Stilicho to recruit more non-Roman troops into the army; after all, if the army used barbarian troops in this way, it was to the greater benefit of the Empire. Furthermore, dead mercenaries did not need paying and using them in this manner saved Roman lives. Although later Claudian blames the Alans for letting Alaric escape, this is part of his balancing act of endorsing Stilicho to the Senate; the barbarians are useful in that they save Roman lives in battle, but Stilicho had to have an excuse for allowing Alaric to escape again.88

  There is one final factor relating to the argument of whether or not Stilicho would use the Alans in order to weaken them. Throughout his military career in the West Stilicho’s main difficulty was in obtaining recruits for the army in the face of stiff opposition from the Senate in Rome. With limited manpower, he is unlikely to have risked weakening the Alans, part of his own army, by sending them in first.

  Having discounted some of the traditional claims, it is possible instead to interpret the Battle of Pollentia as a turning point for Stilicho. Having saved the army from disaster following Saul’s death and the defeat of the Alans, Stilicho seems to have gained in confidence. He followed the Goths back across northern Italy and when they attempted to change their route of march in order to cross the Alps, he did not hesitate in launching an assault on their forces. The ensuing victory, although not as crushing as Claudian claims, ended Alaric’s threat to the West. Realizing that their leader was no longer in a strong position and was now running from the Western Army, many of the Gothic troops – especially the cavalry – began to defect to the Romans.

  On the other hand, although Stilicho had gained confidence and defeated the Goths in battle, there still remains the question of why he did not finish the job and eliminate Alaric after Verona. It is quite likely that some of the claims made previously, especially that of Stilicho wanting to retain Alaric as a threat to intimidate the Senate, remain valid. After all, a former ally was always a potential future ally.89 Yet one aspect has always been overlooked: the composition of Stilicho’s forces.