Stilicho: The Vandal Who Saved Rome

by Ian Hughes

  The first marriage was probably accepted by the Senate out of necessity, since Stilicho at that time was far too powerful to resist. This second marriage would be opposed, both by Christians, who would see it as incest and so against scriptures, and by Stilicho’s opponents, who would be able to interpret it as the action of a desperate man. The latter would be able to use it for propaganda purposes to help persuade potential opponents to join their cause. In fact, it has been proposed that the unrest surrounding events in 407 and 408 was made worse by the marriage of Honorius and Thermantia for just this reason.30

  Gaul

  Following the aborted attack by Sarus, Constantine had no qualms about his reaction. He advanced south with his armies and by early summer had established his seat of government in Arles.31 Using some of the booty captured from Sarus (although it must be remembered that a proportion of this had earlier been captured by Sarus from Justinianus) Constantine began to mint new coins at Arles.

  These coins are useful in providing a date for Constantine’s setting up of the new mint. Both Sozomen and Zosimus imply that Constantine had only just reached Arles when the news arrived from the East that Arcadius had died.32 Unlike the earlier coins, which were minted with the legend AUGGGG in the hope that Constantine would be accepted as Augustus alongside Honorius, Arcadius and Theodosius II, these coins bore the imprint AUGGG. The loss of the fourth ‘Augustus’ dates the production of the coins to after the death of Arcadius in May. However, the coins also show that Constantine was willing to forget about the recent attack from Italy and still wanted to be accepted as an imperial colleague alongside Honorius and Theodosius.

  Spain33

  In spite of the defeat of Sarus, and the lukewarm reception to Thermantia’s marriage to Honorius, Stilicho, Honorius and even the Senate may have taken heart from events in Spain. In the spring of 408, as the army of Italy began to gather at Pavia ready for the war in Gaul, Didymus and Verinianus, relatives of Honorius, raised a rebellion in Spain.34 Although usually interpreted as a spontaneous reaction to Constantine’s occupation, it is more likely that they had been in contact with Honorius and Stilicho throughout 407 and had agreed to act in early 408. They may have been further encouraged by the news that the Italian army was collecting at Pavia prior to intervention in Gaul.35 They quickly succeeded in establishing themselves in Spain and set about attempting to seal the passes over the Pyrenees.

  In response Constantine ordered fresh troops to be raised from the Rhine frontier, as outlined above. After the attack by Sarus, Constantine established himself at Arles. Once settled, Constantine promoted his eldest son Constans as Caesar and sent him with an army to Spain, along with the magister militum Gerontius.36 Didymus and Verinianus resisted and won a victory in the Pyrenees. However, Constans called for reinforcements from Gaul and with these succeeded in forcing a crossing of the Pyrenees. Whilst Gerontius continued in command of the troops, Constans moved to Caesaraugusta with the newly appointed praefectus praetoriano, Apollinaris, and the magister officiorum, Decimius Rusticus, who were probably sent to reorganize the newly recaptured provinces.37 After stiff resistance, Gerontius defeated and captured the two rebels in Lusitania.38 In an attempt to cow resistance, Constans now allowed one unit, the Honoriaci, to sack the campi Pallentini.39 Although of uncertain location, this was possibly in the region of Pallantia (Palencia) in Spain, in the Castilian meseta along the middle course of the Duero (Douro). The area contains many sumptuous residential villas and was most likely the centre of Didymus’ and Verinianus’ estates. Once the territory was pacified, Constans left Gerontius in Spain with Gallic troops to cover the passes over the Pyrenees, and returned to his father in Arles with Didymus and Verinianus as captives.40 Strangely, he also left his wife in Spain with Gerontius.41 Despite not having taken part in the uprising, Lagodius and Theodosiolus fled, with Lagodius travelling to Constantinople and Theodosiolus seeking sanctuary at Ravenna.

  Italy

  It was during his time at Ravenna that Stilicho first received the envoys from Alaric, informing him that Alaric had moved to Emona.42 There has been debate concerning whether Emona was in Italy or Noricum, and so whether Alaric actually declared war on the Empire by leaving the boundaries of Illyricum (Pannonia).43 This is not claimed by the ancient sources, and in fact in the confused passage in Zosimus Alaric specifically sends envoys from Noricum.44 This implies that whether Emona was in Noricum or Italy was unimportant. What may have been important was that Emona was at the head of the pass across the Alps which led to the River Frigidus, the implications of which would not have been lost on either Alaric or Stilicho, since they had both served in the army that had crossed the pass in 394 under Theodosius to win the Battle of the Frigidus.

  The envoys also conveyed that Alaric had a grievance, which was that he had been forced to support his men from his own pocket during the stay in Epirus. Accordingly, Alaric was demanding that he be paid 4,000 pounds of gold to cover his expenses for the invasion of Epirus.45 This may have been enough to keep 72,000 men for a year, and it was twice the cost of the praetorian games that Symmachus produced for his son.46 Although the payment for the praetorian games was probably the result of senators’ saving for many years, the fact that one senator could amass such a sum implies that the gathering of 4,000 pounds of gold was still a viable prospect for the Senate as a whole.47

  There is no doubt that Alaric’s forces did not amount to 72,000 men. Zosimus later gives his forces the total of 40,000 men.48 However, this total is arrived at after he had been joined by 30,000 men from the army of Italy, and by fugitive slaves from Rome, and also by another large band of Gothic warriors under his brother-in-law Athaulf.49 This means that his army in early 408 probably mustered a maximum of 5–6,000 men. Yet Stilicho had no choice but to support the payment to Alaric. Stilicho needed the whole army to suppress Constantine’s rebellion, so it was vital that Alaric be kept on side. As with the decision to seek peace with the East, Stilicho knew that a war on two fronts – this time against Alaric – would be impossible to win. Conversely, should Alaric’s men fight alongside the Romans against Constantine there would be a good chance of victory.

  Although Alaric’s demand is usually interpreted as him being willing to manipulate Stilicho’s troubles to his own advantage, there are valid reasons for the ultimatum. First, as the defection of many Goths during the Italian campaign had shown, Alaric did not have complete control of his forces. As a result, he needed to maintain his standing in order to remain their leader. Second, he had actually spent a large amount of his financial reserves on the project and needed more money, again in order to maintain his status at the head of the Goths. For the campaign in Epirus it is almost certain that the Empire had provided provisions, but they had not provided pay.50 Finally, he had been ordered by Stilicho to march to Epirus to take part in what became a fictitious operation. In order not to lose face with his men, who could easily think of the whole episode as a waste of time and which had only served to make their leader look foolish, he needed a political concession to re-establish his standing. As a consequence, it is possible to see his actions as motivated, not by a desire to injure Stilicho politically, but as a need to maintain his own position at the head of his forces.51

  The debate in the Senate52

  Obviously, Stilicho would need clearance from the emperor to pay such a large sum and would need the cooperation of the Senate to gather the money. Leaving the envoys at Ravenna, Stilicho travelled to Rome and participated in the most crucial senatorial session of his career. The fact that Honorius and Stilicho needed to be present in person at the ensuing senatorial debate shows that the prestige of the imperial government had declined. They now needed the agreement of the Senate before they could act, a necessity that would have been anathema to many earlier emperors. The Senate had returned to a position of importance vital to the conduct of foreign policy.53

  Buoyed by the report that a small force had almost encompassed Constantine’s downfall, the new
s of the rebellion against Constantine in Spain, and further reinforced by their traditional views of barbarians and how they should be treated, the Senate was in no mood to be conciliatory. When Stilicho announced Alaric’s demands, there was a debate. This showed that there was a split in the Senate over whether Alaric or Constantine, who was still attempting to become a colleague of Honorius, was the major threat to Italy. Stilicho and his supporters wanted to employ Alaric against the usurper in Gaul, but the majority believed that Alaric posed the greater danger and so the Senate voted for a declaration of war on Alaric.54 Probably in angry and accusatory tones, Stilicho was then asked for his reasons for wanting to pay Alaric and so shame the reputation of the Romans.55 He replied that Alaric’s presence in Epirus had been following orders from the emperor and so the expenses were a reasonable request. At this some of the senators relented and a second vote was called. The vote split the Senate. Although Alaric was voted 4,000 pounds of gold to cover his losses, the result hardened opposition to Stilicho’s dominance.56 In due course the gold was sent to Alaric.57

  Lampadius

  Nowhere is the growth of opposition more apparent than in the comment of Lampadius after the second vote. At the end of the vote he made the acidic aside ‘non est ista pax sed pactio servitutis’ (‘this is slavery rather than peace’), probably quoting Appius Claudius’ phrase arguing against peace with Pyrrhus in the third century BC.58 At the end of the session, aware that he had spoken out of turn, he sought sanctuary in a nearby church.

  Lampadius was the brother of Flavius Manlius Theodorus, who had been made praefectus praetorio Italiae in 397, and himself had been made praefectus urbis Romae by Stilicho in 398 to force through the demands for recruits during the African crisis. It would appear that Lampadius was a senator who believed that Rome should be defended by her own forces, but was realistic enough to realize that to ensure this the senators should be forced to supply recruits from their own estates to build the army to the necessary strength. His early support for Stilicho had now been eroded and he had joined the opposition. The most likely cause is Stilicho’s continuous addition of barbarians to the ranks of the army over the preceding eight years, a persistence that offended Lampadius’ aristocratic beliefs beyond endurance.

  The growth of opposition may have begun to disturb Stilicho, but to become effective the disparate groups, including the army, the Senate and the Catholics who opposed Stilicho’s employment of pagans, needed a figure who could act as the focus for their resistance.59 Out of the shadows there emerged such a man: Olympius. During either late 407 or early 408 Olympius slowly came to the forefront and began to orchestrate the opposition.

  Olympius

  At this time serving as the magister scrinii (master of the imperial secretaries), Olympius was ideally placed to influence the emperor when Stilicho was not present. Ironically, he had been advanced thanks to Stilicho’s patronage.60 He worked on the emperor’s suspicions to widen the rift that was growing between Honorius and Stilicho, especially concerning Stilicho’s attempt to conquer Illyricum and his continued dominance of Western politics, despite Honorius being the emperor. As time passed Olympius’ influence over Honorius grew.

  For the moment, however, Stilicho had been victorious in the Senate and he prepared to leave for Ravenna. Honorius, apparently encouraged by Serena, who feared for his safety if Alaric broke the peace and again invaded Italy, also set out for Ravenna. Zosimus claims that Serena’s advice was more out of fear of losing her own position than worry over the safety of Honorius for his own sake.61 In this she may have been encouraged by Stilicho, who may have feared a repetition of the situation during the siege of Milan during Alaric’s first invasion, when Honorius had been besieged by Alaric.

  It is unlikely, despite Zosimus’ claims to the contrary, that on the way from Rome to Ravenna Honorius stopped at Pavia to collect troops to suppress Stilicho.62 It is possible, as has been claimed elsewhere, that Olympius did collect some forces, although it might not have been to suppress Stilicho; it may be that they were simply reinforcements for the garrison at Ravenna.63

  Shortly before they left Rome rumours arrived in Italy of the death of Arcadius. The two men continued their journeys, but at different speeds. When the news arrived that Arcadius had definitely died, Stilicho was already in Ravenna but Honorius had only reached as far as Bononia. The situation would now turn on the decisions of the emperor and his senior advisor upon receipt of the sad news.

  Chapter Fifteen

  The Fall of Stilicho

  When confirmation that Arcadius had died reached Italy Honorius sent a message for Stilicho to meet him at Bononia. One reason for the recall is that there appears to have been some unrest in the army at Bononia and Stilicho’s presence was needed to calm the troops.1 The disturbances were probably over the uncertainty caused by Arcadius’ death. The army would have known that Stilicho would take some form of action, but the nature of his response was unclear. All that is certain is that opposition to Stilicho within the army was continuing to mount and that the army was reaching the point where it was unwilling to follow Stilicho’s orders. Upon his arrival Stilicho reprimanded the troops and declared that Honorius had decreed that they should be punished and that those most guilty of stirring up trouble would be decimated. Terrified at the prospect, the troops begged Stilicho to intercede with the emperor. Stilicho announced that he would speak on their behalf and the unrest collapsed.2

  After he had calmed the troops Stilicho entered long discussions with the emperor concerning what action to take regarding the accession of Honorius’ nephew, Theodosius II. Aged only seven, it was clear that his future was in jeopardy should unscrupulous ministers manage to seize control in the East. Anthemius was an unknown quantity in this situation. He had occupied the post of praefectus praetoriano Orientis continuously since 405, and had opposed Stilicho’s claims as parens in the East. Yet at the same time he had engineered an enduring peace with Persia, showing that he had political ability. It was possible that he would survive the political chaos that usually surrounded the accession of a minor, but his loyalty to Theodosius was unknown. However, Honorius was now the senior emperor and decided that, as such, he would be able to exert influence upon the appointments and policies in Constantinople.

  He resolved that the best course of action was for him to travel East and personally oversee the installation of his nephew as emperor. In that way, he could ensure that Theodosius received guardians who would look after his welfare. According to the sources, and unfortunately for Honorius, Stilicho saw the death of Arcadius as an opportunity – and probably the last – of gaining the role of parens principum of the whole Empire. He will have been encouraged by the knowledge that, with the additional resources of the East at his disposal, he would be able to defeat Constantine in Gaul and at the same time unite the disparate halves of the Empire.3 He too wanted to travel to Constantinople to impose his will on the Eastern government.

  Still following Zosimus’ account, there followed an intensive argument over which of the two was to go to Constantinople. Honorius could claim to the superior political position, since he was the senior emperor and so, at least in theory, could give orders in the East. Stilicho, on the other hand, realized that if Honorius went and succeeded, then his own position would be seriously weakened. Honorius would gain confidence with the success of the mission. The new-found self-belief, coupled with the biased political advice he was certain to be given in the East, would weaken Stilicho’s position in the West. Stilicho could not afford to risk Honorius travelling to the East.

  22. The fall of Stilicho.

  There is considerable merit to the reconstruction. Honorius was relatively weak-willed and his arrival in Constantinople would leave him open to manipulation by the Eastern ministers. This included Anthemius, who had been in power since 404 and was Stilicho’s main opponent in the East. Obviously, Honorius could not be allowed to go. Fortunately for Stilicho, in the debate he had the upper hand due t
o circumstances in the West. The main difficulty with Honorius travelling East was the cost.4 Emperors were expected to travel in comfort and to have the splendour of the court mirrored in their baggage train. The fact that Stilicho could have used such an argument reveals how grave the financial situation was in Italy. With the loss of the revenues of Gaul, Spain and Britain, the West had to rely on the taxes from Italy, Africa, Sicily and Illyricum (Pannonia). The reality that the largest estates in these provinces were held by senators who would use any excuse to avoid paying taxes only added to the dilemma faced by Honorius and Stilicho.

  An even more persuasive argument concerned the presence on the Italian border of the usurper Constantine.5 Should Honorius travel to Constantinople, the way would be open for Constantine to enter Italy. If he managed to cross the Alps, there would be no guarantee that the troops in Italy would remain loyal – as witnessed by the near-mutiny that had only recently been suppressed. Honorius needed to remain in Italy as the figurehead to promote and maintain the loyalty of the army. Furthermore, it was expected that emperors be accompanied by a large number of troops when they travelled, and these could not be spared from the upcoming campaign in Gaul.

  There is also the claim in Zosimus that Honorius was needed in Italy as a counter to the presence of Alaric, since Alaric was a ‘faithless barbarian’ and he too might see Honorius’ absence as the opportunity to revolt and lead an attack on Italy.6 This last claim remains doubtful, not least because during the same discussion Stilicho proposed sending Alaric at the head of a combined army into Gaul.7 It is clear that Stilicho actually trusted Alaric to follow his commands. Furthermore, Stilicho had already arranged for the payment of 4,000 pounds of gold to Alaric, reinforcing the impression that Alaric was better off loyally serving the emperor. The claim was probably made by Zosimus as it emphasized the desperation felt by Stilicho; further, Zosimus knew the outcome and used the suggestion simply to build tension in his account. Despite that observation, it remained obvious that Honorius was safest in Italy, and Stilicho was unwilling to put the emperor at unnecessary risk. The events of 402, when Honorius was besieged in Milan by Alaric, was a fear that remained with Stilicho to the end.