The Mammoth Book of Hard Bastards (Mammoth Books)

by Robin Barratt

  The precision of the attack was made possible by weeks of surveillance and planning that enabled the Red Army Faction terrorists to accurately predict Herrhausen’s habits. They knew that, due to the vehicle’s armour, the bomb had to be placed close to the road and had to explode at the exact instant his door went past. They posed as a construction crew near his home to observe his routines and decided to utilize a Trojan Horse device: a bicycle parked alongside the road with a child’s knapsack on the luggage rack. The bag contained 44 pounds of TNT. To ensure that Herrhausen’s car door received the brunt of the blast, they rigged a photoelectric cell, which would be armed by a nearby terrorist after the lead car went by. The front of Herrhausen’s car then closed the circuit, firing the device on the bicycle, which was parked at the same distance from the photocell as the distance from Herrhausen’s front bumper to his door. It sounds complicated and ingenious, but is hardly as difficult as figuring out the trajectory of a space shuttle mission.

  What might have defeated this attack? Perhaps if Herrhausen had kept a more unpredictable schedule, the terrorists would have chosen a softer target. Perhaps if the neighbour, who was raking his leaves a week before the attack and found the firing cord running across his property, had called authorities. Perhaps if someone had questioned why a bicycle was parked alongside the road for about six weeks prior to the attack. Perhaps if a curious neighbour had called to check on the construction crew, which didn’t seem to be doing much work. Without a doubt, had Herrhausen’s security detail practised, at least prior to his departures and arrivals, an intensive level of counter-surveillance around his home and office – the most likely kill zones – they might have noted people and activities that were foreign to the normal environment.

  Timing Is Everything

  The successful ambush calls for perfect tinning on the part of the assassin. Being a few seconds too early or too late will decrease the odds of success. As Ralph Waldo Emerson stated, “In skating over thin ice our safety is in our speed.” Moving makes for an elusive target. Charles de Gaulle survived dozens of attempts on his life as president of France. His small protective detail often drove him at high speed with minimal escort. This saved his life during an attack at Petit-Clamart in 1962, where the assassins’ plan was to hose down his car with gunfire as he passed by. The problem arose when de Gaulle’s car arrived somewhat later than originally planned, which had two effects: daylight was fading fast, and traffic was lighter than during rush hour, permitting higher speed through the kill zone. When the ambush was launched de Gaulle’s car, its police follow-up car and two motorcycles were going over 70 miles-per-hour. The terrorists fired over a hundred rounds at the motorcade, using carbines, pistols and submachine guns. The six bodyguards, including the two motorcycle officers, didn’t fire a single shot, but relied on the speed of the vehicles and evasive driving to escape. The un-armoured limo arrived at Vélizy-Villacoublay with broken windows and punctured tyres, but with the president and his wife unharmed.

  One of the most spectacular bomb attacks on a public figure occurred in Madrid, Spain, in 1973. Four young Basque terrorists learned an interesting fact: Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, who was the premier of Spain and General Franco’s number two man, liked to go to mass at the same church every morning at 9 a.m. Their intelligence also advised that Blanco didn’t use much security, making him a soft target. They began by checking out Blanco’s route to church, and learned that his chauffeur used the same route each day. The terrorists studied the route, learning the surrounding area. They thoroughly checked out the church to determine where Blanco’s car parked, which door he used, where he sat and when he left. They noticed that one bodyguard always accompanied Blanco into the church, while the chauffeur remained in the car. The guard always stood in the back, intently watching his protectee. The terrorists often stood right next to the bodyguard during the service, but he took no notice of them. He usually stood with his arms folded in front or with his hands locked behind him, and one terrorist fantasized about grabbing his hands and handcuffing him before he could react. Their plan was to neutralize the bodyguard and kidnap Blanco in an operation that would take no more than two minutes. They would wait until the end of mass because the bodyguard was always more alert at the beginning than the end. Two terrorists would take out the bodyguard, two would cover the entrances and six would grab Blanco, the team being comprised of ten militants with three vehicles outside. Several safe houses were planned, including one apartment that would serve as a hospital, if needed.

  Suddenly, things changed. Blanco began altering his schedule. He began travelling to other areas in Spain and they rarely saw him in mass. He started using a follow-up car with additional bodyguards. Now three bodyguards accompanied him into mass when he attended. The terrorists’ surveillance operation now became more dangerous. They determined that a kidnapping was now too risky and decided, instead, to assassinate Premier Blanco. They discussed different options: to machine-gun him on the street or to use a car bomb, but they wanted to keep the number of innocent victims to a minimum. The plan they chose was incredible. They rented a basement apartment on a street that Blanco regularly used to drive to work each day. The terrorists then dug a T-shaped tunnel which extended twenty-one feet out under the street, and packed the top of the “T” with three explosive charges totalling over 500 pounds. To complete the ambush, they double-parked a car to force Blanco’s motorcade to drive directly over the bomb.

  On the morning of the attack, Blanco left his home right on time. He was riding in his armoured Dodge Dart limo with his chauffeur and one bodyguard. They were trailed by a follow-up car, containing a driver and two more bodyguards. As they neared the ambush, a lookout signalled their approach and the double-parked car forced them into the one open lane. The triggerman on the street waited until Blanco’s car was adjacent to the mark they had made on a building and set off the bomb. The tremendous blast was perfectly timed and catapulted the heavy Dodge over the roof of a five-storey church! The car hit the cornice as it went over and crashed on to a second-floor terrace in the courtyard of the church. Incredibly, the persons in the limo survived the initial blast, but all died that day. The three occupants of the follow-up car survived. The blast, which was initially thought to be from a gas explosion, ruptured sewer and water lines, and its massive crater quickly filled with water. Everyone thought Blanco’s car was underwater until someone called the police to report that a car was parked on the church terrace.

  Counter-Ambush Strategies

  It’s been said that the ultimate warrior leaves no openings, except in his mind. “The Prince must keep his secrets well so as to safeguard his room for manoeuvre and be able to avoid contradiction. If the enemy gets to know his secrets, he must at once take appropriate countermeasures.” So states the thirteenth-century Persian manuscript The Use of War.

  When Cyrus (c.600–529 BC), the King of Persia, conquered the city of Babylon, he became concerned about his personal safety:

  as he reflected on this, he decided that he needed a bodyguard. And as he realized that men are nowhere an easier prey to violence than when at meals or at wine, in the bath, or in bed and asleep, he looked around to see who were the most faithful men that he could have around him at such times; and he held that no man was ever faithful who loved anyone else better than the one who needed his protection.

  Cyrus recognized that he was most vulnerable to ambush during routine situations. “Accordingly, he took from among [the Persians] ten thousand spearmen, who kept guard about the palace day and night, whenever he was in residence; but whenever he went away anywhere, they went along drawn up in order on either side of him.”

  In 1759, Major Robert Rogers (1731–1795) issued a set of guidelines to his squad of rangers. The directives became known as the “Standing Orders of Rogers’ Rangers”. One of the items instructed his soldiers that “when you’re on the march, act the way you would if you was sneaking up on a deer. See the enemy first.” The first k
ey to avoiding an ambush situation is to maintain a high level of awareness, so as to spot the enemy lying in wait. Surveillance is the assassin’s weak link. A world-class counter-surveillance operation will spot the ambush before the victim walks into it.

  What is the most hazardous aspect of an activity that a public figure engages in? It’s the PREDICTABILITY, stupid! Predictability leads to vulnerability. Therefore, the second key to avoiding an ambush is to be unpredictable. World-class protective specialists build spontaneity into their security plan, forcing the enemy to constantly readjust. A Yiddish proverb warns that luck without brains is a perforated sack. When Whitney Houston gets into trouble at a nightclub in The Bodyguard, her huge protector, Tony, fights to clear a path out the front door, the same way they came in. But Kevin Costner chooses to sneak her out the back. It is a strategy of being flexible and never leaving the same way you arrived. This scene was intended to illustrate the difference between a bodyguard and a world-class protective specialist, although Costner acts more like the former than the latter in nearly every crisis. Imagine that a celebrity is attending three high-profile functions and is accompanied by three security officers: the detail leader, who provides close-in protection; an advance agent, who has prepared each site; and a driver, who takes them to the sites and secures the vehicle. Prior to the VIP’s arrival at the first event, the advance agent learns that a known threat was at the second site (a hotel) earlier, asking about the celebrity’s schedule. The agent contacts the detail leader by cellular phone and warns him of the problem. The detail goes into high-alert, asking for additional assistance from hotel security, and changes to an alternate arrival point more secure than the lobby entrance. The detail maintains extra-close coverage throughout the evening, and discourages the celebrity from going into the crowds. The threat does not show up and the evening goes off without a hitch. In reality, each member of the celebrity’s detail should maintain this heightened state of awareness and practise evasive tactics every day. Statistically, no one who actually intends to harm or kidnap the celebrity will be helpful enough to issue a threat first, in essence, making an appointment for the attack. What a shame that the VIP is afforded this higher, more intensive level of protection only when the perceived risk is higher, and not every day. Dull-witted bodyguards are often the chink in the protectee’s armour that the assassin observes and then exploits.

  Unfortunately, it is axiomatic that bodyguards exert more vigilance after an attack or threat than before. According to author A. Wesley Johns in Heyday for Assassins, the security officers who were protecting President William McKinley:

  thought that they were showing great vigilance before the President was murdered; after his assassination their circumspection knew no bounds. Their increased watchfulness was especially evident on the mild, pleasant morning of September 23 [1901] when eighty policemen, selected for their size and brawn, were assigned to guard City Hall and the courtroom where the President’s assassin, Leon Czolgosz, was to stand trial on a charge of first degree murder.

  How odd that history’s assassins are usually afforded more protection than the leaders they killed! Had the level of protection around prisoner Tim McVeigh been in place around the Alfred P. Murrain Building prior to McVeigh’s attack – the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995 that killed 168 people – it likely would have failed or been aborted.

  “Skill in the game means learning to exploit the other player’s predictability, while otherwise behaving unpredictably yourself,” explains physics professor H.W. Lewis in his book Why Flip a Coin? As an example, he uses the child’s game in which one person holds out both hands with a pebble hidden in one, and the other person tries to guess which hand it’s in. The one holding the stone tries to predict how the other will guess. The other one tries to predict which hand will be selected to hold the pebble. Let’s say that in protective operations, the stone is the protectee, the person holding it is the bodyguard and the guesser is the assassin. Even if the assassin is an idiot and the bodyguard is an expert in quantum mechanics, the idiot will probably guess right every now and then. Imagine that you have two bodyguards – four hands – and only one assassin. Now imagine that you have three bodyguards, hiding the stone in one of six hands. As the possibilities increase, the likelihood of the assassin guessing right becomes less and less. That’s why most assassins choose the most predictable place to strike: the protectee’s seat at the head table, the door leading from his office, the car he rides in and so forth. These areas become what SWAT teams refer to as “fatal funnels”.

  “Strategic thinking is the art of outdoing an adversary, knowing that the adversary is trying to do the same to you,” state authors Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff in Thinking Strategically. Nineteenth-century German field marshal Helmuth von Moltke noted that “an attacker has a plain goal before him, and selects himself the best way to reach it. A defender must guess at the intentions of his opponent, and consider the best way to meet them.” Peter Bernstein asserts that “game theory brings a new meaning to uncertainty … Game theory says that the true source of uncertainty lies in the intentions of others.” The trick, he concludes, lies not in trying to guess the intentions of the opponent so much as in not revealing your own intentions.

  While protecting Missouri’s governors, members of my detail often found themselves standing outside the doorway of a legislator’s office on the third floor of the Capitol while the governor met with the legislator inside. Almost without fail, a member of the press corps would walk up and say, “I always know when the governor is working the third floor, because one of you guys is standing outside someone’s office!” This caused us to change our tactics. We began waiting inside the legislator’s reception room, or using two officers to cover each end of the hallway the governor was working. It made our presence less noticeable, and made the boss a little less predictable. What we wanted to avoid at all costs was the governor saying, “The press knows I’m up there when they see you guys, so I’m going up there alone!”

  Richard Marcinko, the former US Navy Seal, suggests:

  If you want to win your battles, let your competition make assumptions – and then find out what they are. If you know your enemy’s assumptions, you have captured the element of surprise. And if you hold the element of surprise, you can determine the rules of engagement. You can control where you engage the enemy, when you engage them, and how extensive the battle will be.

  He concludes, “To the extent that you must make assumptions, you should devise alternative plans to put into action if your assumptions prove to be false. You should always have a fallback position, a Plan B.”

  NOEL “RAZOR” SMITH (UK)

  Teddy Boy

  Introducing … Noel “Razor” Smith

  NOEL “RAZOR” SMITH was born in south London in 1960 and has spent a large portion of the last thirty years in various prisons for armed robbery, possession of firearms with intent, prison escape and grievous bodily harm. He is currently serving eight life sentences, plus eighty years in concurrent sentences. He was undoubtedly one of Britain’s toughest criminals, but over the last few years has turned away from violence, taught himself to read and write and gained an A-level in law and an honours diploma in journalism. He has recently received several awards for his writing and has contributed a number of articles to the UK’s Independent and Guardian newspapers, Punch, Big Issue, New Statesman and the New Law Journal, among many others.

  Smith started his life of violence when he was just fifteen years old. He was among many south London kids keen to stamp their mark on the world and find an identity and a sense of belonging. Rock ’n’ roll music of the 1950s had gripped his imagination and, adopting the dress, hairstyle and dance moves, a Teddy boy was born. Many of his peers followed suit and soon the Balham Wildkatz gang was formed; mob-handed, arrogant, aggressive and spoiling for a fight at every opportunity.

  Life for the Balham Wildkatz was all about flying your colours, cultivating both a personal and gang r
eputation, claiming new turf and protecting your own patch against the enemy: the other teen subcultures based around the music scene – mods, rockers, soul boys, punks, skinheads, smoothies, rockabillies – that formed a volatile melting pot of juvenile angst waiting to explode. Clubbing, drinking, thieving and fighting became the norm and a wave of increasingly reckless and violent behaviour ensued, resulting ultimately in internecine warfare.

  Smith was a veteran of that scene and former gang leader of the Wildkatz. This chapter, taken from his book Warrior Kings, The South London Gang Wars 1976–1982, looks at the early influence music had on Smith and his early days as a Teddy boy.

  THE JOHNNY KIDD MEMORIAL NIGHT

  By Noel “Razor” Smith

  The Edwardian Club was a large function room situated up a wide flight of stairs at the rear of a pub called the Loughborough Hotel, at Loughborough Junction in Brixton. With its large stage and horseshoe-shaped bar it could comfortably hold around 150 people, but on Friday nights it sometimes packed in more like 250. On summer nights it got so crowded that condensation would roll down the walls like mini-rivers and pool under the tables. The Edwardian was a Teddy boy club and the creation of one of south London’s most well-known original Teds, Tommy Hogan. Tommy had been a Ted since 1953 and had been at the Trocadero cinema at the Elephant and Castle on that fateful evening in 1954 when the Teds had made their name in an orgy of seat-slashing and riot. Tommy was married to an original Teddy girl named Lynne and they had five kids, all brought up to worship and respect the golden age and its idols. The oldest son, Tony, known as Bopper, was a year younger than me and well known on the Teddy boy scene. Then there was Tommy Jr, Tina, Mandy and Jimmy, who was no more than a toddler at this time. The family were rock ’n’ roll through and through.