A Perfidious Distortion of History

by Jurgen Tampke

  Only two shadows fell upon this picture of Teutonic harmony.

  In 1871, Pope Pius IX had issued a ‘Declaration of Papal Infallibility’ intended to strengthen Rome’s hold over Catholic communities everywhere. This clashed with Bismarck’s goal to bring the Catholic Church in Prussia under the control of the state. When Catholic clergymen refused to undergo training at state institutions and to submit church appointments for government approval, the chancellor turned upon them. Soon, nearly 1,000 parishes were without a pastor, most Catholic religious orders had been suppressed, over 200 priests jailed, three bishops and two archbishops removed from office, and the archbishop of Trier had died shortly after he was released from a nine-month imprisonment. Although resentment lingered, particularly among the Bavarians, the Catholic Church was beaten into submission and was transformed, through its political arm, the Centre Party, into a conservative institution and one supporting the German Reich.

  The second shadow was cast by the German socialists. Founded in the 1860s, the German labour movement was peaceful and law-abiding. It hoped to improve the lives and working conditions of Germany’s rapidly growing industrial population by peaceful means, through parliament. The socialists were seen, however, by the barons of Germany’s coal and steel industries — all close friends of the chancellor — as a threat to the unlimited power they wielded over their workforce as the Herr im Hause, the ‘master of the house’. In 1878, two assassination attempts on Kaiser Wilhelm I led to a wave of hysteria. Although, in reality, the attempts had nothing to do with the German labour movement, but were staged individually by fanatics, the nation’s foremost historian, Heinrich von Treitschke, called on employers to sack workers suspected of socialist sympathies. In the late 1870s, Bismarck introduced anti-socialist laws that were passed by both the conservatives and the liberals. Mass arrests and widespread imprisonment followed. The socialist party was outlawed, meetings banned, and newspapers suppressed, and capital punishment was reintroduced in Prussia and other German states.

  Things were quiet domestically, at least for a while. Then, ten years later, a new wave of dissatisfaction and discontent swept the country, due not to new quarrels over church and religion, or even the socialist threat (the anti-socialist laws had been abandoned in 1890 after Wilhelm II had ascended to the throne and dismissed Bismarck). The new concern was that the young German empire was not enjoying the status it rightfully deserved among the world powers. In particular, the colonial carve-up of the globe was believed to have severely disadvantaged the Reich. To quote Max Weber’s inaugural lecture at Freiburg University, ‘the unification of Germany was a youthful prank’ too costly to have been undertaken unless it marked the beginning of a German Weltmachtpolitik or ‘world-power politics’. 15

  Imperial politics, parties, and pressure groups

  The Reich that Bismarck had created ensured that power firmly rested with the crown. The kaiser could appoint and dismiss any member of cabinet at will. There was a parliament made up of an upper house (the Bundesrat) and a lower house (the Reichstag), but neither the chancellor nor ministers had to account to these houses or accept any resolution passed by either. The kaiser was also in charge of all the chief aspects of the political decision-making process. In particular, he held the right to declare war and peace, and he was in charge of the army. With the kaiser at its head, the army — virtually a state within the state — was the empire’s most powerful institution. In cases of emergency, when it was believed there was a threat to the imperial establishment, the army had the power to declare martial law and suspend civil liberties. Its prestige after the unification wars was enormous. Most non-commissioned officers entered the German civil service after serving, and this meant that a pronounced spirit of Prussian militarism permeated the nation’s everyday life. The kaiser had the support of the nobility, whose members were naturally keen to prevent any erosion of their privileges. Conservatism and conservative parties also had solid support in Protestant rural and semi-rural regions, and the Lutheran pastors ensured that nonconformist or dissident thought had little chance of infiltrating their communities.

  Reichstag elections were based on direct, universal male suffrage. The Reichstag could debate all matters political, and the annual budget had to be passed by both the Bundesrat and the Reichstag. All decisions of the Reichstag, however, could be vetoed by the Bundesrat, which was the assembly of representatives from all states belonging to the Reich. Only the Bundesrat could initiate legislation, and Prussia clearly dominated this chamber. As elections in Prussia were conducted under a three-class franchise system based on title and wealth, significant social or political changes were not likely to occur. With the Reichstag holding no effective power, the German parliamentary system was less democratic than its British or French equivalent.

  The German middle classes did not lack political influence, and were not altogether excluded from the decision-making process. They dominated Germany’s rapidly growing industrialisation, were in charge of the nation’s outstanding education system, accounted for the bulk of lawyers and public servants, and, as the twentieth century approached, controlled a large share of the media — which was rapidly becoming a key factor in influencing both domestic and foreign policies. In fact, the majority of Germany’s middle classes (politically represented by the National Liberals) was opposed to any tampering with Bismarck’s constitution. The National Liberals believed that political power was not a matter for the masses. To them, Reichstag membership was properly the domain of the educated and propertied. Hence they had no inclination to challenge Prussia’s three-class franchise system or to support attempts to overcome the drastic inequalities that marked the distribution of electoral boundaries which discriminated heavily against the urban population.

  A minority of so-called progressive or left liberals advocated that the Reichstag be given more power, and that the cabinet be responsible to the legislative assembly. Some left-liberals even argued that the working class should be socially and politically integrated. 16 However, most of middle-class Germany, regardless of its party affiliation, stood behind the empire that Bismarck had created. They had little respect for the Western political systems where, it was widely believed, parliaments held excessive power. They said that in France’s Third Republic (where a popularly elected assembly could appoint and dismiss ministers at will), party bickering, personal ambitions, and a restless struggle for ministerial positions had led to widespread corruption, favouritism, nepotism, and administrative inefficiency. By contrast, they believed that in Germany a strong monarchy kept a check upon unlimited parliamentary power, and an incorrupt, independent civil service allowed for efficient and reliable government.

  In the United States, because of the ‘machine-like nature of American politics’, the bureaucracy was seen as being widely corrupt, suffering from the ‘domination of the stock exchange’. 17 The United Kingdom (commonly referred to in Germany as ‘England’), which had earlier drawn admiration from some German political observers, was now seen as sinking into decline if not decadence. ‘In the halls of Parliament’, a leading German historian proclaimed, ‘one heard only shameless British commercial morality, which, with the Bible in the right hand and the opium pipe in the left, spreads the benefits of civilisation around the world’. 18 Economically, too, Britain was said to be falling behind, and German exports had began to outstrip those of Britain.

  Pressure for global involvement came from many directions. The Zentralverein für Handelsgeographie und Förderung der deutschen Interessen im Ausland, an umbrella organisation of industry and commerce, impressed on the government the economic advantages of colonies. The Verein für Sozialpolitik, a group combining anti-free-trade economists, intellectuals, and academics, and headed by Gustav von Schmoller, argued that the creation of an overseas empire would assist in solving the social problems that had emerged with rapid industrialisation. A broad section of the middle classes from Kleinbürgertum (the petty bourgeoisie) to the Bi
ldungsbürgertum joined the chorus, as did most of the academic establishment.

  By the mid-1880s, public pressure for overseas expansion had swollen immensely; moreover, the National Liberals, upon whose support Bismarck’s government had been able to rely since unification, had suffered a massive loss at the 1881 Reichstag election. The acquisition of colonies, a major aim of the National Liberals, was bound to revive their electoral fortunes. In 1884, Bismarck gave his consent to the acquisition of colonies in Africa and the Pacific. Until then he had shown only limited interest in overseas ventures, which he considered unlikely to yield sound economic returns and which would entail the risk of costly and unnecessary involvement outside Europe. He allegedly claimed that his map of Africa lay in Europe.

  The raising of the German flag in South-West Africa in March 1884, and at various locations in north-eastern New Guinea and surrounding islands in November 1884, marked the beginning of Imperial Germany’s colonial enterprise. At its peak, the empire also included Togoland, the Cameroons, German East Africa, the Marshall, Caroline, Palau and Mariana Islands, part of Samoa, and Kiautschou Bay in China.

  German expansion overseas was accompanied by the formation of a plethora of nationalistic and imperialistic pressure groups. Most vociferous was the Colonial Society, founded in 1882 by Carl Peters, a daring colonial adventurer who virtually single-handedly acquired the German colony of East Africa. Peters was also prominent in the foundation of the Pan-German League in 1894, which pushed for German expansion overseas, German dominance in Europe, and the Germanisation of ethnic minorities within the Reich. Active also was the ‘Association for Germandom Abroad’, which aimed to carry German culture to the remote corners of the globe, and at home the ‘Society for the Eastern Marches’ was set up to destroy Polish identity in Germany’s eastern provinces. The largest of these imperialist organisations was the Navy League, whose membership was about 300,000 at the outbreak of World War I. The league was financially supported by the arms manufacturer Krupp, which was profiting from the construction of the German battle fleet.

  Krupp’s economic good fortune was one outcome of Germany’s naval construction program; another was the increasing diplomatic, political, and military isolation of the Reich. Whereas Germany’s colonial expansion did not cause overwhelming concern among the rival powers — they all were active in the global carve-up, and the best pickings had long been made — the construction of a large battle fleet soured relations with the British empire, still the world’s leading power. The consequences of this were to prove fatal.

  After unification, Bismarck’s foreign policies became conservative, and — in contrast to his oppressive domestic actions — aimed to consolidate the status quo. He knew that rapprochement with France was out of the question because of Alsace-Lorraine. But he nurtured friendly relations with the Austro-Hungarian empire and, more importantly, with tsarist Russia. Hence France was left isolated, with little chance to pursue revanchist policies. He also continued Prussia’s traditional policy of goodwill towards the United Kingdom.

  After his dismissal from office by Kaiser Wilhelm in 1890, this changed. The Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, a cornerstone of Bismarck’s foreign policy, was almost immediately abandoned by his successor, Leo von Caprivi. Worse, reciprocal treaties that lowered German tariffs on agricultural imports, particularly Russian grains, were strangled by the furious agitation of the Agrarian League (Bund der Landwirte). Made up chiefly of big East Elbian landowners, this organisation managed to recruit a multitude of members to campaign against any candidate opposed to agricultural tariff protection. The league has been seen as the first major step towards the formation of a radical political right bent on mobilising the masses for aggressive conservative ends — a precursor of twentieth-century fascism. 19 The tsarist government countered by entering a series of economic and military treaties with France.

  By the mid-1890s, Germany’s pursuit of Weltpolitik had gathered considerable momentum. In December 1897, the state secretary of the Foreign Office, Bernhard von Bülow, gave a memorable speech in the Reichstag’s debate on foreign policy. Von Bülow left no doubt about the future course of the German empire:

  Fears have been expressed that we are about to enter a risky venture. Don’t you worry, Gentlemen. Neither the Chancellor nor his advisors are the kind of people that seek unnecessary conflict. We don’t all feel the necessity to put our fingers into every pie. However, we do hold the opinion that it is not advisable to exclude Germany at the very beginning from the competitions of other countries.

  (Bravo!)

  The times when the Germans left the earth to the [the influence] of one of their neighbours, the seas to another, only reserving for themselves the heaven above where pure doctrine holds …

  (Laughter, Bravo!)

  … those times are over. We see it as one of our prominent tasks to support the interest of our navigation, our trade, and our industries … [and] we demand that German missionaries, German goods, the German flag, and German ships are treated with as much respect as those of other powers.

  (Bravo!)

  We are only too happy to allow for the interest of other nations, provided that our own nation’s are treated with the same respect.

  (Bravo!)

  In a word: we demand a place under the sun. 20

  His were not just empty words. Von Bülow, on becoming chancellor two years later, presided over two initial navy bills that authorised an increase in German battleships from seven to 38. Plans for further enlargement of the battle fleet did not take long to follow. Not many outside Germany believed that this sudden build-up was needed to safeguard Germany’s export trade or its overseas possessions. The broad belief in free trade that marked the Age of Imperialism meant that German trade did not need large-scale military protection. Some individuals and companies benefited from the colonial enterprise, but, by and large, the colonies were a financial liability. Costs of running them far outweighed the income they brought, and they did not provide raw materials or markets for industry — or an outlet for excess population.

  The British empire had little doubt about who would eventually be on the receiving end of this naval build-up. In 1902, the British government ordered large-scale modernisation and expansion of the empire’s battle-fleet. The launching of the all-big-gun Dreadnought in 1906 made all existing ships obsolete, and British naval construction over the subsequent years far outpaced Germany’s. Equally important, Britain entered into the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904, and made a similar agreement with Russia in 1907.

  Von Bülow’s claim that Germany had no intention of putting her fingers into every pie also proved misplaced, as governments in the new century blundered from mistake to mistake. Their policies aimed at humiliating the French over Morocco failed, and their abrupt and negative stand towards the attempts of the Hague Conference to keep the arms race under control, establish a universal system of arbitration, put limits on the conduct of warfare, and refrain from violence against civilians all offended international opinion. Equally offensive was German support of Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the Balkan peninsula. The Habsburg monarchy was now its only ally.

  This opposition to many of Imperial Germany’s policies led to a popular belief, fostered by the bulk of the media, pressure groups, and politicians, that Germany was being encircled and that Britain, France, and Russia were preventing the German nation from taking up its deserved role in the world. France had stooped so low as to enter into an alliance with reactionary tsarism in pursuit of her revanchist policies. Russia, in her craving for a pan-Slavonic empire, was seeking a crucial showdown between the Slavonic and Germanic peoples. To complete this dark scenario, England, ‘perfidious Albion’, envious of Germany’s economic growth (Handelsneid), had joined the international enterprise to prevent the proud German nation from taking its rightful place in the global community.

  Only the Social-Democratic German labour movement seemed to stand apar
t from this growing bellicosity.

  German social democracy

  The foundation of the German Social Democratic Party dates back to the merger of the General German Workers Association (Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein, ADAV) with the Social Democratic Workers Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, SDAP) in the Thuringian town of Gotha in 1875. The former organisation had been founded in 1863 by Ferdinand Lasalle, a lawyer and classical scholar, who had been active in the 1848 Revolution. To better the living conditions of the working population, it had advocated the introduction of universal manhood suffrage in free and equal elections; adequate salaries for elected deputies; a fairer wage system; the formation of independent workers’ co-operatives; a reduction in daily working hours; a curtailment of female labour and the abolition of child labour; the introduction of a single progressive income tax instead of indirect taxes; and the supervision of work conditions in mines, factories, and workshops by worker-elected officials.

  As its program was far too modest for Karl Marx, who had established himself as the most outspoken international socialist, Marx deputised two of his strongest supporters in Germany, Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel, to set up the SDAP as a rival organisation in 1869. It was soon obvious, however, that the existence of two separate parties was counter-productive, and this led to their unification into the German Socialist Workers Party (Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschland, SAP), renamed in 1890 the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD, the title it still carries today. The Gotha conference reaffirmed the previous demands, but added the Marxist principles of class abolition, the overthrow of the capitalist system, and international workers’ solidarity.

  By the mid-1870s, Marx had become the leading theoretician of the Socialist International labour movements. Marx’s key argument was that the capitalist system would collapse because of its cannibalistic nature. As he says in Chapter 32 of Capital: