A Kingdom Strange

by James Horn

  By August 27 the flyboat was ready to sail. With little time to say good-bye to Eleanor, Ananias, and his close friends, White bundled his gear together and left the island to join the ship anchored off Hatarask, promising to return as soon as possible. Miraculously, that same morning Fernandes and the Lion reappeared at Port Ferdinando after six days riding out rough weather at sea. But for White the happy news of the ship’s safe return was tinged with the realization that it came too late to alter plans for his departure. Deeply troubled, he sailed for England shortly after midnight, wondering when and in what circumstances he would be with his family and the rest of the settlers again.7

  WHITE’S VOYAGE got off to a disastrous start. As the flyboat weighed anchor, one of the capstan’s bars broke, causing it to spin out of control. Several men hauling in the cable were badly injured and others were flung to the deck. The ship had a crew of only fifteen men, and as a result of the accident most were barely able to perform their work. Nevertheless, Captain Spicer managed to keep the flyboat alongside the Lion until they arrived in the Azores in mid-September. Then the two ships went their separate ways: Fernandes patrolled off Tercera for prizes in the Lion, and Captain Spicer headed for England.

  Again White’s luck failed him. After three weeks of indifferent weather, the flyboat was hit by a strong storm off the coast of Ireland, driving her back out into the Atlantic. By the time the ship eventually made landfall at Smerwick in Southwest Ireland on October 16, the men had exhausted their supplies and “expected nothing,” White wrote, “but by famine to perish at Sea.” Five sailors, a third of the crew, died on the voyage or soon after reaching Smerwick, and several others were in bad condition. Realizing the men would be unable to continue the journey to England, White rode to the nearby town of Dingle, where he arranged for the care of Spicer’s sick and for fresh provisions to be delivered to the flyboat. Then he took passage on board the Monkey on November 1, bound for Southampton.8

  When White arrived in England on November 8, he learned that the Lion had already docked at Portsmouth several weeks earlier. Fernandes had failed to take any prizes, and sickness had ravaged the Lion’s crew to such an extent that the ship had scarcely been able to make port. The return voyage of both ships had been terrible, but White was anxious to put his ordeal behind him and report to Ralegh as quickly as possible. He probably arrived in London a few days later but then had to wait more than a week to see Sir Walter.9

  Unfortunately White’s arrival and his efforts to organize a relief expedition could not have come at a worse time. England was preparing for invasion. In the late spring and summer of 1587, Sir Francis Drake had led a successful raid on Cadiz and ravaged Spanish shipping along the Iberian coast in an effort to disrupt preparations for the dispatch of the Armada, Philip II’s great fleet, later that year. Yet as Elizabeth’s councilors were aware, Drake’s action had only delayed Philip’s plans, not scuttled them. In early October, therefore, the Privy Council had ordered a general stay of English shipping, which prohibited ships from leaving port without permission because they might be needed to defend England’s shores.

  The following month Ralegh was appointed by the queen to her council of war. Along with Sir Richard Grenville, Ralph Lane, and eight others, he was to take charge of the country’s land defenses. The English fleet would be the first line of defense, but should Spanish forces break through, it would be left to the county militias and levies to repulse the attack. The entire coast from Cornwall to East Anglia was vulnerable, and Ralegh and his fellow councilors were extremely busy throughout the winter overseeing the strengthening of coastal fortifications, organizing the militias and trained bands, and securing supplies of arms and equipment.10

  On November 20, Ralegh managed to set aside his many responsibilities to meet White. White likely reported his differences with Fernandes and anxiety about the settlers’ difficulties on Roanoke Island in the light of continuing Indian hostility. He may well have been anxious about how Ralegh would react. Would his master be so exasperated with the setbacks that he would decide to abandon the venture altogether? But Sir Walter remained optimistic. Edward Stafford, who had returned on the Lion, had already met with Ralegh and described the voyage as a success. He had delivered the good news of the colonists’ safe arrival “in their wished [for] haven,” an exaggeration given that the settlers had been left on Roanoke Island instead of the Chesapeake Bay. Yet Stafford had assured Ralegh that the colonists were determined “to prosecute this action more thoroughly than ever,” which suggested they were committed to the venture and ready to move on to the Chesapeake once provisions and reinforcements arrived from England.

  Ralegh had also heard in October from Richard Hakluyt the younger, who remained highly enthusiastic about the colony’s prospects. Hakluyt had returned to London in the spring of 1587 and had likely spoken to Thomas Hariot as well as Stafford about Virginia. He had recently finished a translation of René de Laudonnière’s account of the French Huguenot settlements in Florida, and in the dedication to Ralegh he urged him to take possession of the “inward parts of the firme [mainland].” In the interior, Hakluyt wrote, there were many thousands of Indians who were more intelligent than the native peoples of Spanish America. The Indians would be easily converted to the Anglican Church and English ways. Inland, too, would be found “large and ample regions” suitable for stock rearing and the cultivation of all sorts of commodities. And most promising, the colonists might perhaps find precious minerals and a route to the Pacific. Although his argument largely repeated Hariot and Lane’s findings of the previous year, Hakluyt encouraged Ralegh to persevere with the venture now that it was so close to success.11

  SIR WALTER immediately began organizing a relief expedition. He promised White he would dispatch a pinnace with provisions and equipment as soon as it could be fitted out, and he sent word to Sir Richard Grenville at Bideford, in north Devon, to ready a fleet for a full-scale expedition. He also wrote letters to the settlers telling them that he was preparing “a good supply of shipping and men with sufficiency of all things needful.” God willing, he assured them, the fleet would be with them by the summer.12

  White must have been delighted by Ralegh’s response. If he was concerned that the fleet would not sail for several months, nevertheless the scale of the planned expedition was a clear indication of Ralegh’s commitment to the colony. Yet as December and the early new year passed, White became increasingly concerned. For reasons that are unclear, the promise to send out a pinnace was not fulfilled. Perhaps on second thought Ralegh and Grenville considered that dispatching a small ship unaccompanied across the Atlantic was too risky. Or possibly by the time preparations were made they decided there was little to be gained by sending the pinnace on ahead and arranged for her to sail with the fleet instead. Either way, White could only hope that Grenville’s expedition would be ready to depart in the spring.

  Grenville’s fleet was as large as that of 1585 and may have carried several dozen colonists to reinforce White’s settlers as well as plenty of supplies. The principal ships were the Galleon Dudley (250 tons), the Virgin God Save Her (200 tons), the Tiger (possibly part of the 1585 expedition), the Golden Hind, and the St. Leger. Grenville’s plan was probably to head first to Roanoke Island, where he would pick up the settlers and transport them to Chesapeake Bay. After establishing the colony he would take the fleet to the West Indies, where he would harry Spanish shipping and cruise the Atlantic for valuable prizes.

  White’s hopes, however, were dashed at the end of March 1588. Just as the fleet was about to depart, Grenville was ordered by the Privy Council not to proceed with the voyage. Ralegh had been confident during the winter that he would be able to use his influence with the queen to bypass the general stay on shipping and arrange for the fleet to sail, but the escalating national crisis had overtaken his plans. By the spring, White explained in his account of the voyage, the talk throughout the whole country was of the king of Spain’s “invincible fleets,�
� which were about to sail against England. Grenville was told to send his ships to Sir Francis Drake at Plymouth, where they would join the queen’s navy for service against the Armada.13

  White was able to take some comfort from the fact that the voyage to Roanoke did not have to be abandoned entirely. Ralegh managed to salvage two small ships that were not required by Drake: the Brave (30 tons), captained by Arthur Facy, and the Roe, a 25-ton pinnace. Fifteen settlers were on board the two ships (seven women, four men, and four children), as well as supplies of biscuit, meal, and vegetables. White, who sailed on the Brave, was surely maddened by the turn of events, but at least the two small vessels would provide some relief to the settlers.14

  The ships left Bideford on April 22, 1588, but unhappily for White and the other passengers, Facy showed no interest in getting them to Virginia. Shortly after leaving port he began plundering any vessel that came within reach. His rampage ended only when, on their way to Madeira, the Brave was attacked by two well-armed privateers out of La Rochelle. The larger of the two French ships carried 100 men and ten cannon and was faster than the English vessel. Facy had little choice but to surrender or fight. He chose to fight and signaled his intention by sending a volley of shot into the French ship at close range.

  The attack set off a fierce battle that lasted for an hour and a half, during which twenty-three men on both sides were killed or badly wounded. White was in the thick of the fighting as the two ships came together and some thirty Frenchmen clambered over the sides of the Brave. The Frenchmen clustered on the forecastle and poop deck (fore and aft decks), where they rained a withering crossfire upon the English crowded below. Outnumbered and outgunned, Facy and his men fought desperately until the French captain called on them to surrender, promising to spare their lives. After the English had surrendered, the French pirates set about pillaging the ship and took away everything they could carry.

  Facy was forced to abandon the voyage and limp back to England as best he could, “God justly punishing our former thievery of our evil disposed mariners,” White commented angrily, referring to Facy’s piracy. The English had been badly mauled in the hand-to-hand fighting. Three of the settlers were injured, the master and mate were so badly hurt they could not rise from their beds, and White had taken two wounds to the head from sword and pike and a graze from a bullet on his thigh. The ship arrived back at Bideford on May 22 and the Roe, which had been separated from the Brave before the battle, returned a few weeks later. Far more galling for White than the wounds he had suffered was the realization that there was now no chance of reaching the settlers by the summer or even later that year.15

  WHITE WAS not the only one seeking the English colony in the spring of 1588. On the other side of the Atlantic the governor of Florida, Pedro Menéndez Marqués, was ordered by Spain’s naval high command to prepare a ship to explore northward as far as San Juan (Bay of Fundy, Nova Scotia). Following Grenville and Drake’s expeditions of 1585 and 1586, the Spanish had learned that the English had located themselves somewhere along the mid-Atlantic coast and believed the most likely place was the Bahia de Madre de Dios (Chesapeake Bay). Menéndez Marqués had sailed to the Chesapeake in the summer of 1587 but had found no trace of them. Now, on the eve of the invasion of England, the Spanish were determined to make another effort to locate the English colony and rid themselves of pirate interlopers in North America.

  The governor turned to Captain Vicente Gonzáles, one of Florida’s most experienced mariners, to lead the expedition. Gonzáles possessed expert knowledge of the region’s coastal waters and had been to Chesapeake Bay several times before. He left San Augustine at the end of May 1588 in a small bark with thirty men, and after making rapid progress entered the Chesapeake Bay early the following month. The Spaniards explored the Western Shore and a number of the larger rivers. Along one of them they met many Indians who came down to the riverside, including a chief who wore a necklace of fine gold. Toward the end of June, having reached the head of the bay, they returned the way they had come. They then crossed to the Eastern Shore, where they landed on some small islands in sight of Cape Charles (Cabo de San Juan).

  Leaving the bay and heading south, the Spanish encountered strengthening winds off the Outer Banks and sought shelter in one of the inlets. Quite by chance, Gonzáles then discovered what he had been looking for: evidence of an English settlement. The Spanish had entered Port Ferdinando. There, to the south they saw Pamlico Sound and to the north a large arm of land that was well wooded, probably the eastern side of Roanoke Island. On Hatarask they found a slipway, where small vessels could be drawn up for loading or repair, bits and pieces of discarded equipment, as well as some barrels placed in the ground to collect rainwater. The Spaniards did not see any sign of the English, however, and deciding not to stay any longer, Gonzáles returned to San Augustine to report his important discovery to the governor. By the summer, the Spanish knew precisely where the English had been seated, but where they had gone remained uncertain.16

  AT THE END of May 1588 the decisive confrontation between England and Spain was at hand. Philip II’s Armada of 130 ships left Lisbon, carrying more than 19,000 troops and 8,000 mariners, and began its stately journey north to link up with the Duke of Parma’s army in Flanders. Such a fleet had never been seen in Atlantic waters: “the greatest and best furnished with men, munitions, and all warlike preparations that ever the Ocean did see,” William Camden wrote. Many feared the English navy would be powerless to prevent its descent on England.

  In its essentials Philip’s plan of attack remained the same as that formulated several years earlier. The Armada, commanded by Alonso Pérez de Guzman, the Duke of Medina Sidonia (who had replaced Santa Cruz upon his death in February), was to proceed up the English Channel and take up a station near Margate on the extreme northeast coast of Kent. There he would protect Parma’s army of 27,000 as they crossed the channel from Dunkirk. Philip knew that if Medina Sidonia was able to keep the English fleet at bay long enough to enable Parma to make a successful landing on the Kentish coast, there was little to prevent his army from reaching London. Parma’s troops would follow the old Roman road to Canterbury, then on to Chatham and Rochester before the final push to the capital. Though comparable or greater in number, Elizabeth’s land forces were made up primarily of raw recruits mustered in trained bands and county militias. They would be no match for Parma’s seasoned veterans, who would sweep through Kent and be in London within a week.

  Philip’s faith in his holy mission was unshakable. “As all victories are the gift of God Almighty,” he assured Medina Sidonia, “and the cause we champion is so exclusively His, we may look for His favor, unless by our sins we render ourselves unworthy.” Even serious setbacks failed to disturb the king’s resolute belief. When bad weather forced the Armada to put into Corunna after a month at sea, Philip wrote, “If this were an unjust war, the storm might be taken as a sign of God’s will that we should cease from our offence. As, however, it is so just, it is not to be believed that God will withhold His aid, but that He will rather favor that [our] cause even to the utmost of our desires.”

  Yet while Philip put his faith in God, Medina Sidonia and Parma were fully aware of the formidable logistical challenges they faced. The massive fleet was cumbersome and unwieldy, able to travel only as fast as the slowest of the ponderous urcas and hulks (transports and freight carriers), which sailed at a snail’s pace. Nor was the vast Armada unified. Brought together from all over Europe, the fleet had never before operated as a single unit and had little cohesion in practice. And the Spanish were poorly prepared for the kind of fighting they would encounter against the English fleet. Many of the larger vessels were heavily armed with great guns, but Spanish naval tactics relied mainly on close-range combat, grappling with the enemy and overpowering them with boarding parties, a tactic ill-suited to fighting the English in their fast, maneuverable ships, who favored firing from a distance with their long-range cannon.

  Timing
was the key to victory. Medina Sidonia would have to battle his way up the channel, immobilize the English fleet, and arrive off Flanders at the same time Parma was ready to launch his transports carrying the army. The riskiest part of the operation by far was getting the flotilla of barges from the embarkation point at Dunkirk across the Straits of Dover to Margate, approximately fifty miles. If a heavy sea or gale should arise, the barges would be swamped, and if caught in open waters by English or Dutch warships, they would have little chance of escape. “Neither the valor of our men nor any other human effort could save us,” Parma told the king in late June. Yet both Philip and Medina Sidonia remained confused about this most crucial aspect of the plan. Both men continued to believe that Parma had sufficient ships to be able to make his own way out of Dunkirk and rendezvous with the Armada at sea. This proved to be a fatal misunderstanding.17

  John White’s whereabouts on Friday, July 29, 1588, when the Armada was first sighted off the Lizard, the most southerly point of Cornwall, are unknown. He may have been with family and friends or was possibly at Durham House with Hariot. He would not have seen much of Ralegh, who was busy making last-minute arrangements for the defense of Cornwall and Devon and also attending the queen in his capacity as Captain of the Guard, responsible for her personal safety. News of the drama unfolding along the southern coast only gradually filtered through to the capital, and White, like most Londoners, had to make do with vague and sometimes confusing scraps of gossip.