Unpeople: Britain's Secret Human Rights Abuses

by Mark Curtis

  British support for state terror in Colombia is not entirely unconnected with BP's massive investment in the country. BP's £2 billion project in the Casanare oilfields is Britain's largest commercial investment in the whole of Latin America and controls half of Colombia's oil output. Baroness Symons said in October 1997 that 'Colombia's economy has been one of the most stable in the region' and 'it is that performance which has attracted substantial British investment to the country, to the point at which Britain is now the largest investor, even ahead of the United States'. In 2003, British investments in Colombia amounted to around $10 billion.23

  BP chief executive Lord Browne is reported to be very close to Blair, while some of the Prime Minister's senior aides have close connections and friendships with senior BP executives. BP is also part of a group of companies in the US-Colombia business partnership which has lobbied the US administration to promote favourable US policies towards Colombia. BP is believed to have been involved in lobbying the Clinton administration to push for a military solution that became Plan Colombia.24

  Oil operations and human-rights violations are two sides of the same coin. BP receives protection from the Colombian military and has recruited ex-SAS soldiers to protect its oilfields and infrastructure. Former SAS soldiers have reportedly secretly trained the Colombian police in counter-insurgency tactics on BP oil rigs. The Ocensa oil-pipeline company, in which BP is the major shareholder, was reported in 1998 to have bought and supplied paramilitary equipment for the protection of its pipeline to a Colombian army brigade which had been implicated in two massacres by right-wing death squads.25 This complex nexus of actors and interests ensures that resources remain in the correct hands.

  Israel: Taking sides

  One of the great myths promoted by the media has been Britain's even-handedness in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This myth was of supreme importance in drumming up support for the invasion of Iraq – many MPs, it appears, were prepared to support the invasion in the belief that Blair would then use supposed British influence over Washington to press the US for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

  It is amazing that such a theory managed to gain widespread currency. For one thing, the US has never had any intention of pressing Israel for a solution on anything except US-Israeli terms. For another, there is no evidence that London has much influence in Washington anyway, least of all in the context of Israel. But thirdly, and what I will concentrate on here, the Blair government itself has consistently acted as an apologist for Israeli actions.

  The period since the invasion of Iraq has seen the continued Israeli expansion of illegal settlements and a descent into spiralling violence in the occupied territories. The toll of rising desperation has been especially gruesome for the millions of Palestinians living under Israeli occupation and for those Palestinians killed by Israeli forces, as well as for Israeli civilians murdered in horrific suicide bombings.

  According to the UN, by the time of the invasion of lraq, half the Palestinian population in the occupied territories were unemployed and two-thirds were living below the poverty line. A quarter of Palestinian children were suffering from acute or chronic malnutrition. Israel's policy of encircling Palestinian cities, together with its frequent military attacks, house demolitions and farmland clearances, have brought the Palestinian economy near to collapse. The plight of Palestinians in the occupied territories had reached such a point that even a British parliamentary committee had noticed it. A report of January 2004 notes that 'life under the occupation is becoming increasingly oppressive and increasingly inhuman'. Rates of malnutrition in Gaza and parts of the West Bank are similar to those in sub-Saharan Africa.26

  It is instructive to view the Foreign Office's analysis of Israeli policy on settlements in the occupied territories. It notes that 42 per cent of the West Bank is now slated for settlement expansion and that:

  HMG, together with the rest of the international community, regard Israeli settlements in the territories which Israel occupied in June 1967 as illegal under international law (including under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). Settlement activity is also politically damaging. It fuels Palestinian anger with Israel. And it strengthens the widespread belief among Palestinians that Israel is not interested in reaching a peace agreement through a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders.

  The Foreign Office concludes that 'these are dark times for advocates of a lasting settlement in the Middle East'.27

  Yet London's basic strategy has always been to blame 'both sides' for violence and to overlook the fact that one side is in illegal occupation of territory and, indeed, that Israel is responsible for far more deaths than the Palestinians. Blair's statements in particular have invariably been careful not to condemn Israel outright while the government has repeatedly adopted the Sharon line that Palestinian suicide bombings need to stop first before Israeli 'reprisals' would stop.

  British arms exports were doubled from 2000 to 2001, reaching £22.5 million, in the year which marked a sharp escalation of Israeli aggression in the occupied territories. Supplies included small arms, grenade-making kits and components for a range of equipment such as armoured fighting vehicles, tanks and combat aircraft. In 2002 press reports noted that Britain was apparently blocking the export of some military items to Israel and considering them on a case by case basis. It was after this, however, that Whitehall approved the export of British spare parts to be used in US F-16 aircraft which were being used to target Palestinians. Throughout 2001/2002,14 Israeli military officers were trained in Britain.28

  Since the invasion of Iraq, London's policies have if anything hardened in support of Israel. On arms, the case-by-case review policy has resulted in exports falling from £22, million to £10 million. However, goods supplied include machine guns, rifles, ammunition, components for tanks and helicopters, leg irons, electric-shock belts, chemical and biological agents such as tear gas and categories covering mortars, rocket launchers, antitank weapons and military explosives.

  Tony Blair assured parliament in February 2003 that in recent discussions with Israeli opposition leader, Amran Mitna, 'I made clear that there is no arms embargo on Israel. We continue to support Israel's right to defend itself. Given the use to which Israel puts 'defence' equipment, this was a clear message of support. An official in the DTI's Trade Partners unit has similarly said that 'there was no question of treating applications for Israel more harshly or rigorously than [other countries]'. This is at least consistent since the illegal occupation, violence and terrorism which define Israeli military policy are indeed no worse than the practices of many other recipients of British arms.29

  The British arming of Israel continues even as unarmed British citizens are shot in the occupied territories, three of them between December 2002 and May 2003. The Foreign Office has reportedly taken an extremely softly-softly approach to raising these killings with the Israelis.30

  In early 2004 the British government gave assurances to the Israeli Defence Minister, Shaul Mofaz, that he would be immune from arrest for crimes against humanity on his visit to London. Mofaz was the army chief of staff during Israel's brutal military reoccupation of the West Bank in 2002 and thus responsible for targeted assassinations and other violations of international law. Human-rights lawyers accused the government of a 'creative legal interpretation' to protect Mofaz from an investigation by Scotland Yard; the basis of their argument was that, since he was a serving government minister, he was immune from investigation."

  London has provided extraordinary de facto support to Israel concerning its building of the wall along the West Bank. Although the British government repeatedly says that it believes the construction of the wall to be illegal, its actions point in a different direction. In October 2003, Britain abstained on the UN Security Council vote declaring the construction of the wall to be illegal. Asked in parliament why it had so voted, Foreign Office minister Bill Rammell said that the declaration 'did not condemn suicide bombings
and therefore did not acknowledge Israel's real security concerns'. What Britain wanted was 'a more balanced text'.32

  Then in late 2003 the government also abstained on a UN General Assembly resolution proposal to seek the opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the wall. Asked in parliament why, Foreign Office minister Baroness Symons said that 'we believe it inappropriate to take such action without the consent of both parties' – an extraordinary example of deference to Israel. This was followed in early 2004 by the Foreign Office lodging an objection at the ICJ which was scheduled to review the barrier's legality, citing technical reasons about the role of the court."

  This period has also seen Israel bomb Syria, in October 2003, in an action directed at 'a training camp used by terrorist organisations' allegedly including Islamic Jihad, which had claimed responsibility for an horrific suicide attack on a Haifa restaurant. Israel's obviously illegal action was condemned by France and Germany; yet the Foreign Office simply called on 'all sides to exercise restraint' and said that any Israeli actions to 'protect itself from terrorist attack . . . should be within international law'.34

  Then in April 2004, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced a unilateral plan to annex six major West Bank settlement blocs and reject the universally recognised Palestinian right of return, as well as a pledge to withdraw from the settlements in Gaza (but with Israel retaining control of the borders). This would make permanent the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, renounce previous UN resolutions requiring Israeli withdrawal and scupper the two-state solution and the possibility of achieving a lasting solution to the conflict. As US analyst Stephen Zunes has pointed out, the plan is a direct challenge to the UN charter which forbids any country from expanding its territory through military force, 'effectively recognising the right of conquest'.

  The plan has been warmly welcomed by both the US and Britain. Tony Blair delivered an amazing apologia for the plan in a joint press conference with President Bush, imploring the Palestinians to 'seize this opportunity' in Gaza and 'those parts of the West Bank that will be under their control'. No hint of criticism of Israeli intentions was mentioned, even though the plan undermines just about every public position that Britain has adopted on the need for a comprehensive peace plan. Press reports later suggested that the British government was to make clear to President Bush 'in private' that Britain could not sign up to Sharon's unilateral plan. Any evidence of such a policy has yet to emerge at the time of writing.35

  The issue of trade sanctions against Israel – reserved for official enemies – is completely off the agenda. Rather, Israel continues to receive preferential trade treatment by the British government and the EU. Britain has designated Israel one of 14 favoured 'target markets'; when asked in parliament what plans the government had to change this status, a DTI official replied: 'None'.36 Britain has consistently resisted calls for the EU's special trade and aid agreement with Israel to be cut off, despite the urging of the all-party Development Select Committee. Worth £8.4 billion in EU exports to Israel and £5.3 billion in EU imports, trade could provide a significant lever. The EU, however, has moved in the opposite direction: in December 2003 EU ministers agreed further to liberalise EU markets to Israeli exports. By contrast, Britain has been very active in securing agreement in the EU to ban the political wing of Hamas and place its leaders on a terrorist blacklist. London has reportedly taken the lead in calling for strict European curbs on charities raising funds for Hamas.37

  In 2003 a group of 30 Israeli Black Hawk helicopter and F-16 fighter pilots said they would no longer bomb Palestinian cities. They were promptly thrown out of the Israeli Air Force. "This is us being terrorists', one captain, a pilot for 15 years, said.38 Britain's refusal to take on Israel over settlements, the wall or anything else, and preference for 'constructive engagement' with an Israeli government (under Sharon) that has made plain its commitment to violence, constitute a programme of support for Israel.

  What explains British policy? Many of the answers can be found in the secret files of more than 30 years ago. Consider, for example, a Foreign Office report from 1970 called 'Future British policy toward the Arab/Israel Dispute'. This report considers British options for its stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict and especially its effect on the alliance with the US. This report considers adopting first an overt pro-Israel policy, and then a pro-Arab policy. It rejects both, saying that: 'a pro-Israeli policy would destroy all hopes of preserving British economic and political interests in the Arab Middle East'; while a pro-Arab policy:

  would be hard or impossible to adopt: (a) because of British public and political commitment to Israel as an ideal and the political force of support for Israel in the country; (b) because of the pressure which the United States government undoubtedly exert on HMG to keep us in line in any public pronouncements or negotiations on the dispute.

  It then considers the middle options, the first of which is 'active pursuit of a settlement without disassociation from the US'. The problem with this is that 'as long as we are associated with the US government in active policies toward the dispute, we shall confirm the Arab belief that we are pro-Israel'. It then considers another option of 'active neutrality', which would mean 'we should have to say and do things the US government did not like and to be more pro-Arab (or at least less pro-Israeli) than the Americans'. However, the disadvantages of this are the damage 'to our world-wide relationship with the US', that it would be criticised by some public opinion in Britain and that 'there is no prospect of a European political entity' playing a 'third force' role.

  Therefore, the paper argues for 'the low risk policy', described as 'the less continuously active variant' of the last option above. 'This policy should mean, in practical terms, that our efforts should first and foremost take the form of private pressure upon the US to do all in their power to bring about a settlement'. This would mean Britain would have a 'strictly limited role' while 'modest contributions and not peace plans should be our aim'; that is, to continue doing business with the Arab world, including arms sales, and to maintain commercial links with Israel. In conclusion, it notes that:

  In terms of the national interest, there would be much to be gained by adopting a thoroughgoing pro-Arab policy. . . It would, however, be difficult to defend such a policy on grounds of principle and it would be extremely unpopular in this country. The US government would dislike it intensely and oppose it strongly if it entailed (as logically it should) showing sympathy for the Arab point of view in the international effort to help bring about a settlement. It would be incompatible with support for, or even acquiescence in, the US position in the quest for a settlement.39

  The policy adopted then differs slightly from the New Labour approach. The evidence suggests that the Blair government is trying publicly to position itself in alignment with the 1970 stance, but in reality has tilted strongly towards Israel. The motives, however, may be the same: these documents openly recognise that it is the fear of upsetting the US which prevents Britain adopting a pro-Arab position.

  Moreover, it was argued in files from 1969 that, even given Britain's massive stake in oil in the Middle East and the subsequent need to keep friendly relations with Arab despots, Britain's economic interests in Israel were also a factor. The Joint Intelligence Committee reported in 1969 that:

  rapid industrialisation [in Israel] is taking place in fields where British industry can readily supply the necessary capital goods . . . Israel is already a valuable trading partner with a considerable future potential in the industrial areas where we want to develop Britain as a major world-wide manufacturer and supplier.

  Britain's ambassador to Israel added that:

  Israel is already a valuable trading partner for Britain, and . . . there is a high future potential for our economic relations with her . . . On the other hand, it seems hard to avoid the conclusion . . . that our prospects for profitable economic dealings with the Arab states are at best static, and may indeed
over the long term inevitably decline.40

  If this was the case then, it is even more so now, as Britain steps up its trade with Israel, especially in new technologies. It is this priority, together with maintaining special relations with Washington, that defines Whitehall's stance on the plight of the Palestinians.

  And others

  There are several other cases where Britain is backing state terror. In Nepal, Britain continues to supply military aid and training for security forces guilty of worse abuses and killings than the Maoist rebels they are fighting. In early 2004, Human Rights Watch reported violence on both sides but claimed that 'the Nepalese army has allegedly carried out extra-judicial executions of Maoists and villagers, arbitrary arrests, "disappearances", harassed and intimidated press and NGOs, and interfered in the work of the judiciary'.41 This is in a conflict that has cost around 4,000 lives. Support for Nepal appears to be another coordinated strategy with the US, which is providing $27 million in military aid along with advisers.