Unpeople: Britain's Secret Human Rights Abuses

by Mark Curtis

  While Biafra was threatening to secede and declare an independent state, the FMG imposed sanctions against it to bring it into line. On 26 May the eastern-region consultative assembly voted to secede from Nigeria and the following day Gowon declared a state of emergency throughout the country, banned political activity and announced a decree restoring full powers to the FMG. Also announced was a decree dividing the country into twelve states, including six in the north and three in the east.

  On 30 May 1967 Biafra declared independence and on 7 July the FMG began operations to defeat it. It lasted until January 1970, when an extremely well-equipped Nigerian federal army of more than 85,000 men supplied by Britain, the Soviet Union and few others, took on a volunteer Biafran army, much of whose equipment came from captured Nigerian supplies.

  It remains far from clear as to where the blame lay for the failure of peaceful negotiations. It does appear, however, that the FMG did go back on its agreement at Aburi as to the extent of regional autonomy it was prepared to offer the easterners. Before they began to back the FMG unequivocally when war commenced, British officials had previously recognised the legitimacy of some of Ojukwu's claims. The British High Commissioner in Lagos, Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce, had told Gowon in November 1966, for example, that the September 1966 massacres of the Ibos in the north 'changed the relationship between the regions and made it impossible for eastern Nigerians to associate with northerners on the same basis as in the past'. The issue was one of basic 'law and order and physical safety throughout the federation'. He told Gowon that the FMG had to go 'a considerable distance to meet the views of Colonel Ojukwu'.9

  British officials also recognised that the Aburi agreements were 'extremely woolly on many important points and lend themselves to infinite arguments over interpretation'. By the end of January 1967, Cumming-Bruce was saying that both Gowon and Ojuwku were 'seriously at fault and they share responsibility for poisoning of atmosphere [sic]'.10

  Then there was the wider question of whether Biafra should have been allowed to establish its independence. British officials feared that if Biafra were to secede many other regions in Africa would too, threatening 'stability' across the whole of the continent. Most of the great powers, including the US and the Soviet Union, shared this view.

  Yet there appears to be no reason why Biafra, with its 15 million people, could not have established a viable, independent state. Biafrans argued that they were a people with a distinctive language and culture, that they were Christian as opposed to the Muslim communities lumped into the Nigeria federal state, which had, after all, been a colonial creation. In fact, Biafra was also one of the most developed regions in Africa with a high density of roads, schools, hospitals and factories. The struggle for an independent state certainly appeared to have the support of the majority of Biafrans, whose sense of nationhood deepened as enormous sacrifices were made to contribute to the war effort.

  What is clear is that the wishes of the Biafrans were never a major concern of British planners; what they wanted, or what Nigerians elsewhere in the federation wanted, was simply not an issue for Whitehall. The priorities for London were maintaining the unity of Nigeria for geopolitical interests and protecting British oil interests. This meant that Gowon's FMG was backed right from the start.

  Nigerian aggression, British support

  'Our direct interests are trade and investment, including an important stake by Shell/BP in the eastern Region. There are nearly 20,000 British nationals in Nigeria, for whose welfare we are of course specially [sic] concerned', the Foreign Office noted a few days before the outbreak of the war.11 Shell/BP's investments amounted to around £200 million, with other British investment in Nigeria accounting for a further £90 million. It was then partly owned by the British government, and was the largest producer of oil in Nigeria, providing most of the country's export earnings. Most of this oil was in the eastern region.

  Commonwealth minister George Thomas wrote in August 1967 that:

  The sole immediate British interest in Nigeria is that the Nigerian economy should be brought back to a condi- tion in which our substantial trade and investment in the country can be further developed, and particularly so we can regain access to important oil installations.

  Thomas further outlined the primary reason why Britain was so keen to preserve Nigerian unity, noting that 'our only direct interest in the maintenance of the federation is that Nigeria has been developed as an economic unit and any disruption of this would have adverse effects on trade and development'. If Nigeria were to break up, he added:

  We cannot expect that economic cooperation between the component parts of what was Nigeria, particularly between the East and the West, will necessarily enable development and trade to proceed at the same level as they would have done in a unified Nigeria; nor can we now count on the Shell/BP oil concession being regained on the same terms as in the past if the East and the mid- West assume full control of their own economies.12

  Ojukwu initially tried to get Shell/BP to pay royalties to the Biafran government rather than the FMG. The oil companies, after giving the Biafrans a small token payment, eventually refused and Ojukwu responded by sequestering Shell's property and installations, forbidding Shell to do any further business and ordering all its staff out. They 'have much to lose if the FMG do not achieve the expected victory', George Thomas noted in August 1967.13 A key British aim throughout the war was to secure the lifting of the blockade which Gowon imposed on the east and which stopped oil exports.

  In the run-up to Gowon's declaration of war, Britain had made it clear to the FMG that it completely supported Nigerian unity. George Thomas had told the Nigerian High Commissioner in London at the end of April 1967, for example, that 'the Federal government had our sympathy and our full support' but said that he hoped the use of force against the east could be avoided. On 28 May Gowon, having just declared a state of emergency, explicitly told Britain's defence attaché that the FMG was likely to 'mount an invasion from the north'. Gowon asked whether Britain would provide fighter cover for the attack and naval support to reinforce the blockade of eastern ports; the defence attaché replied that both were out of the question.14

  By the time Gowon ordered military action in early July, therefore, Britain had refused Nigerian requests to be militarily involved and had urged Gowon to seek a 'peaceful' solution. However, the Wilson government had also assured Gowon of British support for Nigerian unity at a time when military preparations were taking place. And Britain had also made no signs that it might cut off, or reduce, arms supplies if a military campaign were launched.

  The new High Commissioner in Lagos, Sir David Hunt, wrote in a memo to London on 12 June that the 'only way. . . of preserving unity [sic] of Nigeria is to remove Ojukwu by force'. He said that Ojukwu was committed to remaining the ruler of an independent state and that British interests lay in firmly supporting the FMG.15

  Before going to war, Gowon began what was to become a two-and-a-half-year shopping list of arms that the FMG wanted from Britain. On 1 July he asked Britain for jet fighter/bomber aircraft, six fast boats and 24 anti-aircraft guns. 'We want to help the Federal Government in any way we can', British officials wrote.'6 However, Britain rejected the request for aircraft and boats, fearing that they would publicly demonstrate direct British intervention in the war. London did, however, agree to supply the anti-aircraft guns and to provide training courses in how to use them.

  The Deputy High Commissioner in Enugu, Biafra's main city, noted that the supply of these anti-aircraft guns and their ammunition would be seen as British backing for the FMG and also that they were not entirely defensive weapons anyway since "they could also take on an offensive role if mounted in an invasion fleet'. Nevertheless, the government's news department was instructed to stress the 'defensive nature of these weapons' when pressed but generally to avoid publicity on their export from Britain. High Commissioner Hunt said that 'it would be better to use civil aircraft' to deliver these guns
and secured agreement from the Nigerians that 'there would be no publicity' in supplying them.17

  Faced with Gowon's complaints about Britain not supplying more arms, Wilson also agreed in mid-July to supply the FMG with the fast patrol boats. This was done in the knowledge that they would help the FMG maintain the blockade against Biafra. Wilson wrote to Gowon saying that 'we have demonstrated in many ways our support for your government as the legal government of Nigeria and our refusal to recognise the secessionists'. He also told him that Britain does 'not intend to put any obstacle in the way' of orders for 'reasonable quantities of military material of types similar to those you have obtained here in the past'. Gowon replied saying that 'I have taken note of your concurrence for the usual purchases of arms supplies to continue and will take advantage of what is available now and others when necessary'.18

  By early August Biafran forces had made major gains against the FMG and had invaded the mid-west region. Commonwealth minister George Thomas noted that 'the chances of a clear-cut military decision being achieved by either side now look rather distant'. Rather, 'we are now faced with the probability of an escalating and increasingly disorderly war, with both sides shopping around for arms'. In this situation, he raised the option of Britain launching a peace offensive and halting all arms supplies. But this was rejected by David Hunt in Lagos and others since it would cause 'great resentment' on the part of the FMG against the British government and be regarded as a 'hostile act'. Instead, the government decided to continue the flow of arms and ammunition of types previously supplied by Britain but to continue to refuse supplies of 'sophisticated equipment' like aircraft and tanks.19

  The decision to continue arms exports was taken after it had become clear in the behaviour of the Nigerian forces that any weapons supplied would be likely to be used against civilians.30 It was also at a time when Commonwealth Secretary General Arnold Smith was making renewed attempts to push for peace negotiations after having been rebuffed by Gowon in a visit to Lagos in early July.

  By early November 1967 the FMG had pushed back the Biafrans and captured Enugu; British officials were now reporting that the FMG had 'a clear military advantage'. Now that Britain's client seemed like winning, talk of reducing arms to it disappeared; George Thomas now said that 'it seems to me that British interests would now be served by a quick FMG victory'. He recommended that the arms export policy be 'relaxed' and that Lagos be supplied with items that 'have importance in increasing their ability to achieve a quicker victory'. This meant 'reasonable quantities' of equipment such as mortars and 'infantry weapons generally', though not aircraft or other 'sophisticated' equipment.21

  On 23 November 1967 the Cabinet agreed that 'a quick Federal military victory' provided the best hope for 'an early end to the fighting'. By early December, Commonwealth Secretary George Thomson noted that the 'lack of supplies and ammunition is one of the things that are holding operations up'. He said that Britain should agree to the FMG's recent shopping list since 'a favourable response to this request ought to give us every chance of establishing ourselves again as the main supplier of the Nigerian forces after the war'. If the war ended soon, the Nigerian economy would start to expand and 'there should be valuable business to be done'. Also:

  Anything that we now do to assist the FMG should help our oil companies to re-establish and expand their activities in Nigeria after the war, and, more generally should help our commercial and political relationship with post-war Nigeria.

  He ended by saying he hoped Britain could supply armoured cars since they 'have proved of especial value in the type of fighting that is going on in Nigeria and the FMG are most impressed with the Saladins and Ferrets' previously supplied by Britain.22

  As a result Britain supplied six Saladin armoured personnel carriers (APCs), 30 Saracen APCs along with 2,000 machine guns for them, anti-tank guns and 9 million rounds of ammunition. Denis Healey, the Defence Secretary, wrote that he hoped these supplies would encourage the Nigerians 'to look to the United Kingdom for their future purchases of defence equipment'. By the end of the year Britain had also approved the export of 1,050 bayonets, 700 grenades, 1,950 rifles with grenade launchers, 15,000 pounds of explosives and two helicopters.23

  In the first half of the following year, 1968, Britain approved the export of 15 million rounds of ammunition, 21,000 mortar bombs, 42,500 Howitzer rounds, 12 Oerlikon guns, 3 Bofors guns, 500 submachine guns, 12 Saladins with guns and spare parts, 30 Saracens and spare parts, 800 bayonets, 4,000 rifles and two other helicopters. At the same time Wilson was constantly reassuring Gowon of British support for a united Nigeria, saying in April 1968 that 'I think we can fairly claim that we have not wavered in this support throughout the civil war.24

  These massive arms exports were being secretly supplied – indeed, stepped up – at a time when one could read about atrocities committed by the recipients in the newspapers. After the Biafran withdrawal from the mid-west in September 1967 a series of massacres started against Ibo residents. The New York Times reported that more than 5,000 had been killed in various towns of the mid-west About 1,000 Ibos were killed in Benin city by local people with the acquiescence of the federal forces, the New York Review noted in December 1967. Around 700 Ibo males were lined up and shot in the town of Asaba, according to the Observer in January 1968. Eyewitnesses claimed that the Nigerian commander ordered the execution of every Ibo male over the age often.25

  Nigerian officials informed the British government that the arms were 'important to them, but not vital'. More important than the actual arms 'was the policy of the British government in supporting the FMG'.26

  This support was now taking place amid public and parliamentary pressure for a halt to British arms to Lagos, with 70 Labour MPs, for example, filing a motion for an embargo in May 1968. Yet the real extent of arms supplied by Britain was concealed from the public.

  Throughout 1967 and 1968, ministers had been telling parliament that Britain was essentially neutral in the conflict: it was not interfering in the internal affairs of Nigeria but simply continuing to supply arms to Nigeria on the same basis as before the war. As the declassified files show, this was a lie. For example, Wilson told the House on 16 May 1968 that:

  We have continued the supply . . . of arms by private manufacturers in this country exactly on the basis that it has been in the past, but there has been no special provision for the needs of the war.27

  One British file at this time – mid-1968 – refers to deaths of 70,000-100,000 as 'realistic'. The Red Cross estimated that there were around 600,000 refugees in Biafra alone and was trying to arrange desperately needed supplies to meet needs, around 30 tons a day.28

  Humanitarian suffering, especially starvation, was severe as a result of the FMG's blockade of Biafra. Pictures of starving and malnourished children went around the world. The FMG was widely seen as indulging in atrocities and attacks against civilians, including apparently indiscriminate air strikes.

  The files show that Wilson told Gowon on several occasions in private letters that he had successfully fended off public and parliamentary criticism in Britain, in order to continue to support the FMG.29 As in Vietnam at the same time (see Chapter 12), Wilson was not going to be deflected by mere public opposition, whatever the level of atrocities and casualties.

  By mid-year, with federal forces in control of Port Harcourt, the most important southern coastal city, British officials noted that 'having gone this far in supporting the FMG, it would be a pity to throw away the credit we have built up with them just when they seem to have the upper hand'. Britain could not halt the supply of arms since 'apart from other considerations, such an outcome would seriously put at risk about £200m of British investments in non-Biafra Nigeria', George Thomson explained to Harold Wilson.30

  It was at this point that British officials sought to counter widespread opposition to the Nigerian government by con- niving with it to improve the 'presentation' of FMG policies. Britain urged the FMG to convince
the outside world that it was not engaged in genocide or a policy of massacre and to make public statements on the need for a ceasefire and humanitarian access to Biafra.

  High Commissioner Hunt suggested to Gowon that the federal air force be used for 'psychological warfare' and to drop leaflets over the Ibo towns which would help the FMG score a 'propaganda point'. Officials noted that their support for the FMG was under attack and that 'our ability to sustain it . . . depends very much on implementing enlightened and humane federal policies and securing public recognition for them'. What was needed was 'good and well-presented Nigerian policies which permit that support to continue'. Wilson therefore urged a senior Nigerian government official, Chief Enahoro, 'to make a greater effort to ensure that their case did not go by default'.31