Unpeople: Britain's Secret Human Rights Abuses

by Mark Curtis

  Foreign Office minister Mike O'Brien claimed that the British government had received assurances from Jakarta in 2002 that it would not use British equipment offensively or in violation of human rights. Indonesia, however, disputed that any such agreement existed, said that Hawks were not being used offensively anyway and pledged to continue to use them. 'I am going to use what I have', military commander General Sutarto said. 'After all, I have paid already'.7

  Faced with obvious embarrassment and public pressure, the Blair government was reported in June 2003 to be threatening to refuse export licences for spare parts for Hawk aircraft because of their use in Aceh.8 Foreign Office minister Mike O'Brien reportedly flew to Jakarta to urge President Sukarnoputri not to use British arms offensively in human-rights violations – an interesting position to adopt, given the lack of any other conceivable use to which Indonesia can put this equipment.

  An Indonesian military spokesman said in June 2003 that the Scorpion tanks being used in Aceh 'will become a key part of our campaign to finish off the separatists'. They 'are not to kill the people but to kill those who are controlled by [GAM leader] Hasan de Tiro to kill people'. He said that Indonesia would continue to use them and that 'there's no need for permission'.9

  In January 2004, the Indonesians announced that they were withdrawing the Scorpion tanks from Aceh and replacing them with a locally produced model. It was not clear whether this came as a result of pressure from Britain, where the Foreign Office said it had issued 'reminders' to Indonesia that it should not use them for internal repression. It was reported that local television in Aceh had shown heavy machine guns mounted on Scorpions firing on GAM positions on several occasions.10

  In February 2004 the Guardian reported that Britain had relaxed its arms-exports policy towards Indonesia. Previously, the British government had requested advance notice from the Indonesians before they used British equipment. But in 2003 the Foreign Office removed this request since, it claimed, Jakarta had given a fresh 'assurance' that no British equipment would be used to violate human rights or in offensive operations.11

  The concept of 'assurances' is a public-relations exercise on Whitehall's part to try to convince the public of its humanitarian concerns. That 'assurances' from the Indonesians are worthless has been shown time and again; the Indonesians have used British equipment, including Hawks, for repression on at least eight different occasions from 1996 until the 2003 intervention in Aceh. In this light, it is difficult not to believe that the equipment is being supplied by Britain to provide Jakarta with the necessary armoury to crush separatism, which the Indonesian military sees as its primary purpose. The only complication for Whitehall is that it is hard to conceal from the public, which in my view explains Mike O'Brien's protests.

  After the launch of Indonesia's campaign in Aceh, Britain, together with Australia, delivered a stark message of support to Jakarta. In a joint statement Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and his Australian counterpart, Alexander Downer, said that 'the UK, Australia and the international community as a whole support Indonesia's territorial integrity'. They said that they urged a 'peaceful' solution to the conflict and urged both the Indonesian government and the GAM 'to return to the negotiating table'.12

  The basic reason for supporting Indonesia's 'territorial integrity' is to ensure that its vast economic resources are available to British and Western corporations. Aceh, and other provinces with which Jakarta is at war, such as West Papua, is rich in liquid gas and petroleum, and provides around 15 per cent of Indonesia's oil and natural-gas exports. Britain is the largest foreign investor in Indonesia after Japan and has invested $38 billion in the country since 1967, amounting to over 15 per cent of foreign investment.13

  It appears to have been the Indonesian military that pushed the civilian government to break the ceasefire and launch the campaign in Aceh, defying some government ministers. The military never agreed in the first place to entering into dialogue with GAM; they feared Aceh's secession from Indonesia and the loss of prestige and resources this would entail.14

  The Indonesian military is also more generally on the offensive politically, increasingly dictating government policy and reversing some aspects of the civilian supremacy that had been established since the fall of Suharto. The rise of the military is therefore, if anything, being strengthened by importing British arms.

  British arms sales to Indonesia have increased from £2 million in 2000 to £15.5 million in 2001 and to £41 million in 2002. The number of licences approved rose from 54 in 2001 to 182 in 2002, reaching the highest number of licence issues in the last ten years. The range of equipment being exported includes aircraft cannons, armoured vehicles and components for air missile-launching equipment, combat aircraft and tanks. As Tapol has pointed out, these increases in military exports appear connected to the Indonesian military's wish to upgrade its offensive capabilities in areas of conflict such as Aceh and West Papua. Under New Labour Britain has sold £375 million worth of arms to Indonesia.15

  The intentions of the recipients have been made clear. General Sutarto, Indonesia's military commander, has told his forces that 'you must chase and wipe out GAM. . .you are trained to kill, so wipe them out'. As troops were being parachuted into the province, Sutarto was urging them to 'hunt down and exterminate' the separatists, 'chase them, destroy GAM . . . Don't talk about it, just finish them off'.16

  The Aceh operation was planned and implemented by many of the same men who directed the violence in East Timor in 1999. Indeed, one general charged with extensive humanrights crimes in East Timor failed to appear before a special tribunal in Jakarta in May 2003 because he was too busy on the Aceh campaign.17

  Indonesian aggression is taking place not only under the cover of the 'war against terrorism'. Recent media reports have cited Indonesian generals' references to the US war on Iraq as justification for the operation. US tactics have also been imitated, with Indonesia 'embedding' journalists with military units.18

  Andrew Tan, an expert on regional insurgencies at Singapore's Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, has commented that 'this is the right time to go back to war. In the context of the war against terrorism, there are few, if any, diplomatic costs to seeking a military solution'. Similarly, Lesley McCulloch, a research fellow at the Monash Asia Institute, comments that the precedent set by the invasion of Iraq and the ousting of an 'undesirable' regime has encouraged the Indonesian generals to take advantage of the current international political climate which 'provides the perfect arena for a massacre'.19

  Anglo-American covert action

  The story was somewhat different in the late 1950s. Britain and the US had long wanted to remove then President Sukarno. Sukarno's nationalist domestic policies and a foreign policy of non-alignment were a direct threat to Washington and London. The latter were especially concerned about the growing popularity and influence of the Communist party (PKI) on the Sukarno government. The Foreign Office, for example, viewed with 'anxiety' the 'trend of events in Indonesia' especially the recent 'electoral results' showing that the PKI 'has grown in strength to a disquieting degree'.20

  British planners were also mindful of the government's recent takeover of Dutch commercial interests. The Foreign Office wrote that 'clearly a serious blow has been struk [sic] at the confidence of all foreign concerns trading in and with Indonesia'. The latter 'is a country with a vast population and great potential wealth, and one in which United Kingdom interests are by no means negligible'.21

  In late 1957 dissident colonels in the Indonesian army were leading a challenge to Jakarta's rule in the outlying provinces. By the end of the year Jakarta's authority did not spread much beyond the island of Java and the north-eastern area of Sumatra; elsewhere, local commanders were in practice operating their provinces independently. In January 1958 a rebellion against the central government broke out in Sumatra and Celebes. The causes were described by the British ambassador in Indonesia as the desire to end the Indonesian government's inef
ficient economic policy and a demand for more self-government for the richer provinces. He also noted that 'anti-communism' has been included in the aims of the rebels and 'in order to attract Western support, it has been made to appear one of the main purposes of the rebellion'.22

  On 15 February, the rebels proclaimed a Republic of Indonesia in the city of Padang; following which the Jakarta government began military operations to crush the rebellion. By June the government had almost succeeded: Padang had been recaptured and the dissidents, although still in control of large areas of Sumatra, were forced to resort to guerrilla warfare. Their rebellion finally petered out and they surrendered in 1961.

  The US and Britain covertly supported this rebellion in its early phase, perhaps hoping to see Sukarno overthrown, or at least for what Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd understood as the rebels' 'nuisance value'. This meant using the rebellion to press the Jakarta government to adopt policies of London's and Washington's pleasing.23 When their clients outlived their usefulness – which the rebels did as soon as Jakarta had won the main war – London and Washington dropped them and reengaged with Jakarta.

  The covert programme was US-led, with Britain lending some important aid. The British files of this period are heavily censored but still shed some light on the British role; an excellent book by Audrey Kahin and George Kahin serves as a guide to US activities.24

  A prime mover in the British operation was Sir Robert Scott, Britain's Commissioner General in Singapore. In December 1957, Scott lamented 'the effects of the developing crisis in Indonesia in terms of dislocation of economic interests' and that Indonesia 'may pass under communist control'. Referring to the 'anti-communist elements in Sumatra and the other outlying provinces', he told the Foreign Office:

  I think the time has come to plan secretly with the Australians and Americans how best to give these elements the aid they need. This is a bold policy, carrying considerable risks . . . The action I am recommending will no doubt have little influence with President Sukarno. They are not designed to; I believe it should be one of our aims to bring about his downfall.

  Scott's aims included 'to limit the mischief the communists can do in Java, to save Sumatra' and 'to win complete American cooperation both public and private'. Maintaining the unity of Indonesia, however, was imperative.25

  There was some opposition in the Foreign Office to these proposals. One official, O. C. Morland, wrote that Scott was 'on the wrong track' and that: 'the result of secret help to the outer provinces would be to arouse keen resentment in Java and to increase the risk of armed conflict between the outer provinces and Java'.26

  Foreign Office opposition was overruled and the British covert role initiated. In February 1958, top-secret discussions in Washington between British, US and Australian officials 'revealed substantial agreement on the main lines of Western policy' in Indonesia, the Foreign Office reported. They should '(a) discreetly support and attempt to unite anti-communist elements in Java', so as to counter the increasing influence of the PKI. They should also '(b) respond where practicable to requests for help from the dissident provincial administrations'. But '(c) do nothing to further the break-up of Indonesia'.27

  Recently declassified Australian documents show that on 11 March Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies was informed that Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd believed 'that it is essential in the interests of the UK government and the West that the dissidents in Sumatra should at the worst be able to make a draw of it'. This meant 'considerable support for the dissidents from the West'. According to these files, Lloyd had advised Macmillan:

  As to the implementation that you and I discussed on Saturday night of covert action and what we called the 'overt but disavowable' aspect, I feel we have got to take considerable risks to see our policy succeed.

  The following day, 12 March, it was agreed between Britain and the US 'that all help that is possible to provide should be given to the dissidents although every possible care should be given to conceal the origins'. Sir Robert Scott even suggested as a longer term proposition' that Britain, the US and Australia 'should look into the possibility of encouraging rebellion on Amboina and the Moluccas [in eastern Indonesia], to widen the basis of any international attitude that the Indonesian government was not in control of the country'.28

  Serious US covert operations had already begun in the autumn of 1957. The US then authorised $10 million to be spent in support of the dissident colonels and arms were soon provided from US submarines and aircraft from the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand. According to the Kahins, the US supplied enough arms for 8,000 men. The CIA recruited around 350 Americans, Filipinos and nationalist Chinese to service and fly a small fleet of transport aircraft and 15 B-26 bombers. This rebel air force conducted numerous bombing raids on cities and civilian shipping, even destroying one British tanker. In April 1958 the British files reported that 12 of the crew of 26 on a 1,200-ton Panamanian steamer were killed, and a 5,000-ton Italian ship was sunk with 12 of her crew missing.29

  According to the Kahins, Britain also provided a small quantity of arms to the rebels and British warplanes flew reconnaissance missions over Sumatra and eastern Indonesia. Aside from that, the major British role was to provide the use of British military bases in Malaya and more importantly Singapore, then still colonies, for covert operations. This included the US use of Singapore to drop arms to the rebels.

  'Americans agreed they would take action from United Kingdom territories only with our consent', the Colonial Secretary told the British Governors of Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak (the latter in Malaya) in a top-secret message of February 1958. He also noted that 'Governor Singapore has reported that his ministers are privately inclined towards helping dissidents' but that since London formally recognises the Jakarta government 'Singapore cannot overtly take sides' – meaning this role would need to be kept secret.30

  A US brief prepared for US Secretary of State Dulles after meetings with the British in December 1957 states:

  We were promised [by the British] the maximum use of Singapore for operations, keeping in mind no arms shipments to dissidents would come thru [sic] that port, that knowledge of British consent to our operations be tightly held, and neither it nor our operations become subject to pol [sic – i.e., political] comment in Singapore.31

  These criteria, however, were soon ignored, the Kahins note, and by early 1958 British facilities in Singapore were welcoming the US navy. A British submarine was also seen apparently rescuing US paramilitary advisers as the rebels' positions collapsed; it was attacked by the Indonesians off Celebes.32

  Britain's ambassador to Indonesia, MacDermot, also told the Foreign Office that 'secret assurances of support by Malaya and Philippines would be most useful together with increased news cover acquired in our information broadcast [sic] to Asia about Indonesia'.35

  In June 1958 the Foreign Office was noting that 'for more than six months now' Britain had been 'principally motivated by our hopes that the activities of rebel groups in Indonesia would be of advantage to the Western cause'.34 But policy had changed in alliance with the Americans. Western support for the rebels was now explicitly to be used as a tool to press Sukarno.

  In May, with the Indonesian army having pushed back the rebels, the US ambassador in Indonesia was instructed by the State Department to tell Sukarno that if he removed 'the communist threat' to the government then the US would stop aiding the rebels. The files make clear that Britain supported this strategy.35 The ambassador instead met Indonesian Prime Minister Djuanda, who essentially rejected the US proposal saying that the rebels would be crushed first.

  Nevertheless, the US and British calculation was now that they should abandon the rebels and revert to encouraging 'pro-Western' tendencies in the Indonesian government. This meant pressing Sukarno to remove or undermine senior figures in the government who were sympathetic to or members of the PKI. That said, it appears that the British allowed the dissidents to c
ontinue some activities from Singapore; these finally ended only after Indonesian pressure on Singapore's first government after independence in 1959.36