Unpeople: Britain's Secret Human Rights Abuses

by Mark Curtis

  In February, Ambassador Hohler said that 'we must clearly give the sorely tried Americans all the support that we can for the courageous action they have taken here' and counsel patience for the US 'clamour for results'. He said that he thought the British role should be to urge the US 'to avoid unnecessary provocation in an increasingly dangerous situation' while 'we should do our best to make it clear to them that we are on their side'.24

  By mid-1962, Hohler was saying that as regards military intelligence, 'this embassy now enjoys closer relations with the Americans than ever before'. The military attaché was receiving weekly US military reports and he enjoyed 'excellent working relations' with US military officials. "Though there are, inevitably, differences of emphasis', Hohler added, 'I would not say that there are any basic disagreements between us'. A Foreign Office brief similarly noted that 'there are no major differences of view [between Britain and the US] about the measures needed to defeat the Viet Cong'.25

  It is plausible to argue that if the British had acted at this stage in their role as guarantor of the Geneva Accords, they just might have been able to prevent the US intervention, or undermine it in some way. They could have at least made it more difficult for the US by stressing the stipulations in the accords for elections and limits on military involvement. But there was no question of Britain acting in this way. Indeed, it is important to realise that Britain backed the military not the diplomatic option.

  'Surely we should aim to divert and not to focus international attention on our actions in Vietnam while we get on with the task of defeating the Viet Cong', Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home wrote in November 1961.26 (The use of 'we' here suggests the extent to which British ministers regarded the war as their struggle also.)

  Thus the Foreign Office made clear, in private, its opposition to a UN or other international conference on Vietnam, saying that 'until the insurgency is mastered and the South Vietnamese are in a position to negotiate on an equal footing with the North, a conference could achieve nothing useful'. Translated from diplo-speak: the war must continue since the South Vietnamese regime lacks any popular support and is bound to lose out in any deal. The fear, indeed, was that 'the West would be faced with . . . proposals for the reunification and neutralisation of Vietnam'.27

  In May 1962 Prime Minister Harold Macmillan sent a personal letter to President Diem saying that 'we have viewed with admiration the way in which your government and people have resisted' North Vietnamese attempts to 'overthrow the freely established regime in South Vietnam', adding 'we wish you every success in your struggle'.28

  Other files show the British fear of a North Vietnamese peace offensive and the danger that 'if a Communist campaign for international discussions gets under way it will receive a great deal of support'. The 'neutral countries' were bound to support such a campaign and 'in many countries of the West it might also be thought quite reasonable that we should try for a peaceful negotiation over Vietnam'. But not in British government circles. Instead, since the US 'have overall relative military superiority and are ready for a real trial of strength', then 'this must not be bargained away'.29

  Hohler also said in November 1961 that he agreed with the US ambassador, Nolting, that 'this was not the time for the political reform' of the Diem regime. Foreign Office official Fred Warner agreed, saying that 'this is not the time to talk about liberalisation [of the Diem regime, meaning to push for democratic reform]. Military measures must be given priority'.30

  Throughout 1962 and 1963 the US poured money and military equipment into South Vietnam while US 'advisers' 'daily accompanied the Vietnamese forces into battle', Ambassador Hohler commented. Seventeen months into the war – in April 1963 – the Foreign Office stated that 'it would be a mistake to abandon present policies of going all out for a military victory'. It noted that 'the communists' might soon press for a negotiated settlement based on neutrality for South Vietnam. 'We remain strongly against giving this any encouragement'.31

  This continuing British support for war rather than diplomacy is easily explained: throughout the first half of the 1960s, Britain thought the US could win. Hohler's recognition that 'people are horribly tired of a war' did not shake his preference, or that of his bosses in London, for the military option.'2

  My research for this chapter involved looking at most of the British planning files for over a decade between 1961 and 1972, which consisted of hundreds of documents. As in the other episodes described in this book, there are no concerns expressed in any of these files for the people on the receiving end of Anglo-American policy. British officials were perfectly aware of what was happening to ordinary Vietnamese. In December 1962, for example, Ambassador Hohler noted the South Vietnamese forces' 'indiscriminate air activity' and the killing of innocent villagers. The only reservation expressed was that this would have an adverse 'psychological impact' and is 'grist to the mill of local communist propaganda'.33

  By December 1962 US State Department intelligence was reporting that 'indiscriminate bombing in the countryside is forcing innocent or wavering peasants towards the Viet Cong' and that over 100,000 Montagnards have fled Viet Congcontrolled areas due in part to 'the extensive use of artillery and aerial bombardment and other apparently excessive and indiscriminate measures by GVN [i.e., South Vietnamese] military and security forces'. This had 'undoubtedly killed many innocent peasants and made many others more willing than before to cooperate with the Viet Cong'.34

  January 1962 is the first mention in the British files that I have seen of a 'chemical substance used for clearing strips of jungle vegetation'. In March the following year, Foreign Office official Fred Warner wrote that 'there is no doubt the Americans have used toxic chemicals' and that 'we believe that these chemicals are a legitimate weapon' to destroy the insurgents' cover. He noted that the Soviet government had made an official request to the International Control Commission (ICC) of the Geneva Accords, which Britain co-chaired, to mount an investigation. But Warner said this was simply a matter for the ICC, not Britain. Again, British officials protected the US, and the consequences were horrific.35

  Over a nine-year period beginning in late 1961, 20 per cent of Vietnam's jungles and 36 per cent of its mangrove swamps were sprayed by the US, with 42 per cent of the spraying allocated to food crops. In 1963 the US began to study the dioxin in the major defoliant being used – Agent Orange – suspecting it might cause cancer, birth defects and other grave problems. The fears were confirmed by 1967 but never affected policy in any way.36

  At the same time, British officials also knew that napalm was being used. Ambassador Hohler rejected the idea of a complaint, saying that the war in Vietnam 'is a very ruthless one and there is little to choose between the two sides when it comes to cruelty'. An appeal against the use of napalm might 'satisfy some tender consciences', Hohler noted, but 'the net result would probably be to draw attention to a practice that has hitherto been largely overlooked'.37

  When the subsequent Wilson government raised its concerns to the US about the latter's use of gas and napalm in Vietnam it was always in the context of 'difficulties' that this caused with the presentation of policy to the public. There is no evidence that British officials were motivated by anything else – that they might have been opposed to the use of such weapons because of the effect they had on people.

  Britain's support for Diem

  Britain provided considerable direct support to the Diem regime and US military in support of the US war. British aid to Diem was formally provided in the British Advisory Administrative Mission (BRIAM). BRIAM was agreed in July 1961 and began work in Saigon two months later with a small team of experts in 'counter-subversion', intelligence and 'information', its activities intended to complement those of US advisers. The head of BRIAM, Robert Thompson, quickly became one of, if not the most, important of Diem's foreign advisers.38

  The British government's claim that BRIAM had a purely civilian (and not military) role, maintained in various parliamentary answ
ers and debates, was a complete lie. The memo proposing the establishment of BRIAM says that training was to be provided 'over the whole counter-insurgency field'. Ambassador Hohler said in June 1962 that Diem had ratified 'proposals for the conduct of the war put forward by the highly-experienced Advisory Mission (BRIAM)'. Around 300 Vietnamese soldiers were trained in 'counter-insurgency' in Malaya in 1962-1963 alone. By August 1963 the Diem regime was described as 'most appreciative of the type of training and of the assistance' provided by the British.'9

  I found other examples of British military cooperation with the Diem regime and the US during this time:

  In late 1962 a team of 20 British technicians, all given American Service identity cards, installed and began to operate a navigation system for US warplanes. This was described as 'invaluable for pin-pointing targets for straffing [sic], bombing, supply dropping and dropping parachutists'.

  In November 1962 the British government agreed to loan the US two Ferret armoured cars to be tested in Vietnam. This followed a US military official's inspection of Ferrets in action with the British army in Malaya, with which he "was most impressed'.

  In late 1962 a British Lieutenant-General was allowed to accept a US invitation to take part in the work of the US's Advanced Research Projects Agency in Bangkok, in the course of which he was required to operate 'in the forward areas of South Vietnam'. He was described as a Combat Research Officer.40

  The major British contribution to the war, however, was Robert Thompson's counter-insurgency programmes, based on (extremely brutal) measures in Malaya, which led to the 'Delta Plan' and the 'strategic hamlets' programmes in Vietnam. US military officials, it was reported, were much impressed by Thompson and 'were most anxious' that the 'valuable experience we had gained in Malaya [be] put to the best possible use in South Vietnam'.41

  At the Diem regime's invitation, Thompson, then a senior official in the colonial Malayan government, visited South Vietnam in April i960 and produced a report on 'anti-terrorist operations'. This report 'impressed the Vietnamese government', the Foreign Office later noted, and provided the basis for the US counter-insurgency plan of February 1961.

  In late 1961, Thompson produced a draft of 'a campaign on Malayan lines' that was to be known as the Delta Plan. The aim, according to the Foreign Office, was 'to dominate, control and win over the population, particularly in the rural areas, beginning in the delta' region. The proposal involved establishing curfews and prohibited areas to control movement on all roads and waterways to 'hamper the Communist courier system', along with 'limited food control' in some areas.

  'If the system works successfully', the Ambassador wrote, 'this provides the main opportunity for killing terrorists'. As and when the areas are declared 'white', i.e. free of'terrorists', social improvement would follow along with the relaxing of controls. According to the Foreign Office, "Thompson considers that the struggle will last some five years and that the campaign must be conducted on methodical lines with the country being cleared area by area'.42

  In February 1962 the Diem regime asked Thompson to put the Delta Plan into practice, but implementation by Vietnamese forces was 'ineffective', partly due to the poor application of the strategic hamlets programme, according to the Foreign Office.43 Largely based on the Delta Plan, the US produced a further 'counter-insurgency' programme for operations in the Delta.

  Thompson's Delta Plan was also the basis for the US 'strategic hamlets' programme, devised by Roger Hilsman at the US State Department. 'Hilsman's basic concept owes a great deal to Thompson', one British official in the Washington Embassy commented. According to the State Department:

  The strategic hamlet is essentially a fortified hamlet. . . A fence of bamboo and barbed wire is built around the entire hamlet, and a ditch or moat is dug around the fence; the ditch or moat, in turn, is encircled by an earthen mound. The area immediately around the village is cleared to permit fields of fire and to avoid giving guerrillas and terrorists hiding places close to the hamlet.44

  The programme began in late 1961 and became national policy in April 1962, with such 'strategic hamlets' soon established all over the country.

  In February 1963, Ambassador Hohler told the Foreign Secretary that with the building of 'strategic hamlets' and 'resettlement' 'there are new burdens to be borne' by the Vietnamese peasants. 'The benefits of the hamlets programme have, for the most part, yet to be seen', he added. Strange, then, that Edward Heath, then Lord Privy Seal, should say in answer to a parliamentary question just two months later that:

  The 'strategic hamlet' programme is giving improved security to villagers and a chance to build up again the traditional system of Vietnamese village councils and communal activity. We hope this improvement can be maintained.45

  In reality, the 'strategic hamlets' programme was extremely brutal and the fortifications were often little different from concentration camps. Peasants were ordered to abandon their homes and land for new sites in often quite distant locations, while the cash and building materials they were allocated were inadequate. They were also compelled to give much of their labour to building stockades. The South Vietnamese officials governing this process were there 'to loot, collect back taxes, reinstall landlords and conduct reprisals against the people', according to one US marine 'pacification' expert quoted by Gabriel Kolko. Above all, the programme failed to address land redistribution, which fuelled the popularity of the National Liberation Front.46

  By the end of 1963 Thompson had become critical at the ineffectiveness of the Vietnamese and US in implementing 'strategic hamlets', saying that they had been created in a haphazard way and that military operations were not designed to support the programme. To 'save' the programme he said 'the government must be absolutely determined and, if necessary, ruthless'. He advised that when the 'strategic hamlets' were being constructed no house should be left outside the perimeter and all should be persuaded 'and forced if necessary' to move their houses inside. 'In constructing the hamlets, peasants should be required to give their labour, preferably during off-seasons, free', Thompson urged. 'Dusk to dawn curfews outside the hamlet should be imposed and enforced'.

  Reiterating that the government must be prepared to be ruthless, Thompson adds:

  Just as an example of a ruthless measure, I quote the case of a village in Malaya (Jenderam) of about three thousand inhabitants. This was a very bad area and the village itself was a centre of support and supply for a large unit of communist terrorists when most of the other areas around it had been cleared. Having given the inhabitants a choice between the Government and the communists and having failed to make any headway by appealing to or persuading them to cooperate we moved in several battalions at dawn one morning and moved the whole village out. Everyone in it, men, women and children, went into detention for two years. All the houses were razed to the ground. Surprisingly, this did not cause a public outcry and the effectiveness of the result, by leading to the elimination of the communist terrorist unit concerned, silenced all criticism. When the area was finally cleared of terrorists the people were allowed to return and the restoration of the village was then heavily subsidised by the government. It is now peaceful and prosperous . . . There is no easy way if victory is to be achieved. A price has to be paid now by the population to prevent a much heavier price being paid later.47

  The Foreign Office stated in January 1964 that Thompson's 'main contribution' to BRIAM's operations had been 'to convince the Vietnamese authorities of the usefulness of strategic hamlets'. At the same time, Britain's new ambassador in Saigon, Gordon Etherington-Smith, was recognising the reality of the programme as implemented. He said that it was 'widely unpopular' and that the new government – which had just overthrown Diem – 'have no intention of incurring the same unpopularity by forcing the peasants into hamlets against their will'. The programme had become 'discredited' and was no longer being carried out as it had been envisaged by Diem. It had also been pushed forward 'too fast' and not enough had been done,
he said, to ensure that 'communist influence was effectively removed' from the hamlets.48

  The British government has never admitted that British forces fought in Vietnam. Yet the files confirm that they did, even though several remain censored.

  In August 1962, the military attaché in Saigon, Colonel Lee, wrote to the War Office in London attaching a report by someone whose name is censored but who is described as an adviser to the colonial Malayan government. This adviser proposed that an SAS team be sent to Vietnam, which Lee said was unacceptable owing to Britain's position as co-chair of the Geneva Accords. Then Lee writes: