by Mark Curtis
In parliamentary debates following the beginning of the US bombing of North Vietnam, Wilson refused to condemn US actions. Rather, he noted that 'we fully support the action of the United States in resisting aggression in Vietnam'. This support continued after Britain had been privately informed by the US in April that attacks would take place against 'economic and industrial targets' as well as military targets, in a bombing campaign that would 'continue without pause' – i.e., would go well beyond what Britain had hitherto promised to support.70
After Wilson had fended off MPs' questions on Vietnam and offered no criticism of US policy in parliament on 9 March, Secretary of State Dean Rusk telephoned the British embassy in Washington saying that 'he greatly appreciated the way in which the Prime Minister handled questions on Vietnam in the House today. He was most grateful'. By the time Wilson met Johnson in Washington in April, the US President 'expressed very deep appreciation of the line we [Britain] had taken on Vietnam'. Britain's ambassador in Washington had similarly told President Johnson that the US 'was receiving staunch support from the British government'.71
The bombing of North Vietnam was greatly welcomed by the British embassy in Saigon. Ambassador Etherington-Smith noted that the attacks were 'a logical and inherently justifiable retort' to North Vietnamese 'aggression'. He said that 'since the West had been losing the battle in the political and countersubversive field, they should concentrate on the military sector in order to gain time' – a further admission, in effect, of the moral bankruptcy of US/British policy and the resort to war to overcome it.72
He also noted that the attacks had resulted in 'a distinct feeling of relief and a noticeable, if temporary, relaxation of political tension'. The bombing had created a:
tonic effect both as a means of retaliation against Northern aggression, as an indication of increased American involvement and as offering hope of an early victory or at least an early end to the war.
It was also a tonic in response to the 'political and popular pressures' that had 'grown alarmingly in the past year'.73
Our man in Saigon well understood what the eventual outcome of the US bombing might be. He was told by General Maxwell Taylor, the US ambassador to Vietnam, that if North Vietnam did not yield then 'this would make things very simple, because Hanoi and the North would be destroyed'. Etherington-Smith's support came despite the view of the consul general in Hanoi who said that the attacks 'have, if anything, increased Northern determination to prosecute the war in defiance of the Americans'.74
The bombing of North Vietnam continued against bridges, railways and road vehicles, power plants, harbour facilities, military barracks, supply depots, military radio stations and other economic and industrial targets. By mid-year the US was averaging 80-100 sorties a day, with 500 aircraft carrying 3,000-5,000 bomb loads, according to the British files. British officials were also informed by the US that these attacks were 'being very gradually stepped up all the time and that this would continue'.
I found no opposition to this bombing, or any concern about the effect it might be having on people, anywhere in the government files. It has been estimated that 80 per cent of the casualties from the bombing of North Vietnam were civilians.75
When the US first used its own aircraft in South Vietnam in March 1965, this was also welcomed by the British ambassador, who said that it had 'beneficial effects' both on the Vietnamese government and the 'morale of the American pilots'. On 8 March the US landed 3,500 marines in South Vietnam which the Foreign Office said in private was 'in contravention of Article 16 and 17 of the 1954 agreement, but we have not yet received any protests on the subject' – therefore, best keep quiet. This illegal act was also welcomed by the British ambassador in Saigon who said it was 'a logical continuation of the policy begun with the air strikes on North Vietnam', a sign of the US 'determination to step up their effort in Vietnam'.76
Then, in June 1965, the US announced that US ground forces would now be going into combat on a routine basis – in effect, another significant escalation of US strategy, even though US troops were already regularly involved in combat. One Foreign Office official wrote:
I feel sure we should try to help the US administration, who have now been landed in some difficulty in handling the president's announcement, by implying that the commitment of ground troops is mostly a matter of degree.
Thus British officials passed to the US State Department a copy of their draft response to the US announcement. 'I think the draft reply would be the best way of meeting the concern we can expect to be expressed in the House of Commons', one official noted.77
On 25 July 1965 Johnson wrote to Wilson saying that he was increasing the number of troops, possibly to double the 80,000 already there. Wilson's reply said that 'I can assure you that Her Majesty's Government are determined to persevere in their support for American policies which I believe to be in the interests of peace and stability'. He also boasted to Johnson that:
Our attitude has been of great benefit to the United States government in terms of international opinion, for our example has helped to restrain a number of European and Commonwealth countries from giving more vocal and forceful expression to their own apprehensions about the course of American policy in Vietnam.78
The comparisons with Iraq in 2003 are difficult to avoid.
Etherington-Smith in Saigon was extremely enthused about the new US commitments, noting that Johnson's announcement had created a 'more hopeful atmosphere'. It will provide the US 'with a striking force of supremely well-equipped, highly air-mobile troops available for operations in any part of the country . . . to inflict heavy punishment on the Viet Cong'.79
The Foreign Office said in September that 'we are glad that the arrival of large American reinforcements has enabled so much progress to be made towards stabilising the military situation in South Vietnam'. It had 'restored Vietnamese morale and enabled striking military successes to be achieved against the Viet Cong'.80
The next major escalation was the direct bombing of North Vietnam's two largest cities, Hanoi and Haiphong.
British officials consistently told the US that they could not be seen to support US attacks against these cities, due to public opposition. They consistently told the US that if it decided to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong they would publicly have to dissociate the British government from the strikes. What the files reveal is that when the US told Britain in June 1966 that it was indeed going to bomb the two cities, Britain connived with the US to continue to back it in private.
The files show that the British were at pains to minimise the effect of the British 'disassociation' from the US. One of Wilson's advisers wrote:
What we might do, when the bombing happens and you put out your statement, is to send a further short message to the President, saying that, as he knew, we could not avoid disassociating ourselves from this action, but that in doing so, we did our best to take account of the points he asked for; and that, as he knew, the statement implied no change in our policy of support for him generally over Vietnam.81
Thus the British passed the draft response to the US for approval. Wilson wrote to Johnson saying that:
Dean [Rusk, US Secretary of State] tells me that you understand why we must publicly disassociate ourselves and you know that it will not affect our general support. . . you have my personal sympathy in finding yourself confronted with such a choice.82
After Johnson informed Wilson that the US had decided to strike at oil installations in Hanoi and Haiphong, Wilson replied that he was grateful for the advance warning, and that he would have to be seen to disassociate Britain from these actions. He added:
But I wish to assure you that, in this statement, we shall make it equally clear that we remain convinced that the United States government are right to continue to assist the South Vietnamese and that the onus for continuing the fighting and refusing a negotiation [sic] rests with Hanoi.83
The actual response made in public by the government came on 29 June,
saying that it noted 'with regret' the attacks on targets 'touching on the populated areas of Hanoi and Haiphong' and that 'we have made it clear on many occasions that we could not support an extension of the bombing to such areas, even though we were confident that the United States forces would take every precaution, as always, to avoid civilian casualties'. Then the statement reiterated that the US were right to 'assist' South Vietnam etc., as outlined above.84
This statement is so full of qualifications that, together with the promises of ongoing support in private, it was no more than a PR exercise to placate public opinion at home. Indeed, on the same day that Wilson delivered the statement, the US Vice President and Defence Secretary both met the British ambassador in Washington. The latter recorded that 'both said that the Prime Minister's position was well understood and indicated that there would be no hard feelings'.85
Then Wilson wrote again to Johnson and in effect apologised for the British public, saying that since they were 'physically remote from the problem' and were 'not suffering the tragedy of the losses which your people are suffering', this 'serves to increase the lack of understanding of my full support for your basic policy'. He then said 'I cannot see that there is any change in your basic position that I could urge on you' and that 'I want you to realise that. . . we have differed in detail. . . but never in basic policy'. Where the British government has 'had to express a different point of view', T must be quite frank in saying that this is the price I have to pay for being able to hold the line in our own country'.86
While this was going on, Wilson told parliament that 'in regard to bombing policy, we have made it clear that we would totally oppose any bombing involving Hanoi or Haiphong'.87
There is no evidence that I found that British 'opposition' to the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong was due to humanitarian concerns. Rather, the concern was that such a strategy would impede rather than help the US prosecution of the war. As an official in the British embassy in Washington put it, the New China News Agency would 'no doubt flood the world with pictures of mangled babies in the maternity ward of a Hanoi hospital, which could do a great harm to the Americans'. He also argued that it might backfire on the US since the North Vietnamese government might simply retreat to the hills.88
Britain continued to avoid engagement in a possible negotiated settlement to the war until it became clear that the US could not win it. The Foreign Office noted, for example, that in the discussions with the Americans in December 1964:
We did not then take the opportunity to recommend to the US government a policy of seeking negotiations on Indo-China. On the contrary, we promised qualified support to the American policy . . . of military pressure on North Vietnam aimed at winning the war rather than negotiating a settlement.
The problem was that 'in the present circumstances these [negotiations] could only lead to a settlement gravely adverse to Western interests and deeply humiliating to the United States'.89
It was only in early 1965, by which time British ministers and officials realised the war was unwinnable, that they began even half-seriously to promote peace negotiations. They approached the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth and the countries involved in the Geneva Accords and essentially called for a settlement along the lines of the 1954 conference: free elections in South Vietnam, the neutralisation of North and South Vietnam with no foreign troops and no military alliances with others – that is, a settlement along the lines that London had previously rejected in favour of the chance of the US winning the war. North Vietnam had presented a four-point programme by 1965 that called for the evacuation of US forces from South Vietnam, no US alliance with the latter, South Vietnam to accept the domestic programme of the National Liberation Front and an end to US aggression against South Vietnam.
The files make clear that Britain promoted negotiations not only to placate public opinion by wanting to be seen to be a peace-maker while it really backed the war; it also did this specifically in support of US military policy. A Foreign Office brief, for example, states that 'British initiatives of this kind would complement American military pressure and make it much easier to justify to British public opinion our continued support for American policy in Vietnam'.90
It was sometimes very frankly put. Thus the Foreign Office's Edward Peck wrote to Etherington-Smith in Saigon that:
The government are fighting a continuous rearguard action to preserve British diplomatic support for American policy in Vietnam. They can only get away with this by constantly emphasising that our objective, and that of the Americans, is a negotiated settlement.91
Promoting negotiations for Britain meant enabling the US 'to withdraw from Vietnam without major damage to American prestige'. The Foreign Office stated that 'our efforts to promote negotiations must . . . proceed hand in hand with continued support for American policy'. The policy was to promote 'a negotiated settlement on terms acceptable to the Americans'.92
By February 1965 British officials were being told that US' embassy staff in Saigon no longer considered victory 'but an improved negotiating position, to be the objective of military action against North Vietnam'. The British ambassador noted in the same month that 'Johnson regarded action against the North as a prelude to eventual negotiation'.93
This use of force to achieve a political goal is terrorism, and was a policy supported by the Wilson government. Foreign Office Minister Lord Walton, for example, noted in late 1964 that the US:
should step up military activities to the maximum of her powers during the next two to three months: at the same time the United Kingdom, as co-chairman should press for a reconvening of the Geneva conference.94
Thus when Wilson told parliament in June 1965 that 'the bombing of North Vietnam is not related to any attempt to try to persuade or force Hanoi to come to the conference table', this is the opposite of what his officials were saying. It is hard to believe this was not simply yet another lie.95
Direct British support for the US military and Saigon government continued although US requests in 1965 for Britain openly to send troops were rejected. The request was described by one Foreign Office official in this way: 'what the President wants is for a few British soldiers to get killed in Vietnam alongside the Americans so that their photographs can appear in the American press'.96
In the British propaganda system, the customary (and usually only) reference to British policy in the Vietnam war was the Wilson government's refusal to agree to US requests to deploy troops. This certainly infuriated President Johnson and it was a public rebuff to the US. Yet Britain did virtually everything else to back the US war.
BRIAM continued to train Vietnamese army and police officers in Malaya while the fiction was maintained that Britain was providing no military advice. In 1964-1965, 356 South Vietnamese were given 'military training' in Malaysia; it was agreed to increase this military training after requests from the US during the talks in December 1964. Indeed, the files show that the US paid an 'allowance' to BRIAM members who in 1967 came under US military command. The Foreign Office notes that 'in order to maintain a publicly defensible position' that BRIAM was not providing military training – i.e., to lie – 'HMG decided that the additional American payments' were to be paid through the British embassy and not through individual contracts.97
Officials from Britain's Jungle Warfare School in Malaya also personally visited South Vietnam to give advice on 'counterinsurgency'. Robert Thompson attended numerous meetings with US military officers and continued to advise the US and Vietnamese. However, in doing so he must, the Foreign Office noted, 'be careful to make it clear that his military advice . . . is given in his personal capacity as an expert on these problems and not on behalf of Her Majesty's Government'.98
When Thompson suggested taking US military officers in Vietnam to Borneo to show them British military operations, the Foreign Office told him that any Americans should 'travel in plain clothes and no publicity would be given to their presence in Malaysia'. "We would regard this as a natura
l counterpart of the visits paid to Vietnam by various British serving officers' who had been able to 'see something of the conduct of operations in that country'. Observation visits to Vietnam by serving British personnel were 'restricted on political advice to occasional short visits . . . with the minimum risk of publicity'.99
British officials were keen to get serving military officers into Vietnam to observe US operations but were fearful of the publicity. Therefore, Defence Secretary Denis Healey suggested that the embassy in Saigon could be used as a cover and two new assistant defence attaché posts were created. They began in January 1966 and were still there two years later. These were seen as 'the only way of introducing extra British military personnel into Vietnam which could stand up to critical public comment in this country', the Foreign Office noted.100