by Mark Curtis
When BRIAM was technically wound up, the British advisory mission was formally incorporated into the embassy. One BRIAM official, Dennis Duncanson, continued his work as adviser to the Saigon government on 'information work and psychological warfare, for which he has a real talent', one Foreign Office official noted. One problem was in finding a suitable cover for this role so an official hit on the idea of saying Duncanson was an 'Aid Advisor'. Another official wrote that 'the title of "aid advisor" is an inspiration, which will make it easier to defend this appointment if it is ever challenged in Parliament'.101
Britain also provided arms to the US for use in Vietnam. Ministers debated in 1965-1966 whether to impose general conditions on arms exports to the US for use in Vietnam and decided against. This was done in the knowledge that supplying such arms was a breach of the Geneva Accords. In September 1965, for instance, the Foreign Office agreed to export 300 bombs intended for the US air force 'for use in Vietnam', saying that 'there must be no publicity' and that 'delivery should be in the UK'. The previous month the Foreign Secretary had agreed to provide the US with 200 Saracen armoured personnel carriers for use in Vietnam 'providing that delivery took place in Europe' and that there was 'no unavoidable publicity'.102
Indeed, a specific public-deception strategy was pursued. In June 1965, for example, the British government told the Americans that if they requested weapons specifically for use in Vietnam Britain would not be able to provide them, but if they just asked for the arms in a 'general enquiry' without mentioning Vietnam, then Britain would.103
Wilson told parliament in June 1967 that: 'we believe that, in our position as co-chairman [of the Geneva Accords] . . . we should not be shipping arms directly for use in Vietnam'.104 This was the official position decided in early 1967 that allowed 'non-lethal' items to be exported to the US. It also allowed lethal items to be supplied, provided that delivery was not made before the end of 1967, then the British estimate of when the Vietnam war would end.
The non-lethal/lethal distinction – a Whitehall classic – was as fictional then as it is now. In May 1967, for example, Wilson approved the supply of 'forgings and casings for various types of United States bombs and ammunition' after being told that these bombs could be for use in Vietnam. In June 1967 Britain also agreed to repair in Singapore Australian guns for use in Vietnam 'provided we can be sure of no (no) publicity'. In September 1970, the Conservative government relaxed the restrictions further and bombs and helicopter machine-gun turrets were sold to Thailand while the Thais were engaged in air attacks on Cambodia and Laos.105
The way out and British interests
The size of the US force in Vietnam rose to half a million by 1967 as the US deepened the war through the late 1960s, with mounting casualties. The size of this force meant that the US could not be militarily defeated but neither, it was openly recognised, could the war be won, largely owing to the lack of popular support for the South Vietnamese government and to Viet Cong success on the ground, notably the 1968 Tet (new year) offensive.
In South Vietnam in 1967, according to the British embassy in Saigon, 'corruption was unchecked, the government showed no capacity to govern and the Viet Cong remained the country's best-organised political force'. Twenty-five thousand political prisoners languished in South Vietnam's jails. By 1970, British officials continued to recognise that the Thieu government, which they continued to back, was 'still short on popular appeal'. After nearly five years in power Thieu had made 'little progress . . . in building for his regime a base of organised political support'. Rather, the regime's basic strategy was to repress popular, political forces – as well known to planners now, at the end of the decade, as it had been under Diern at the beginning.106
US brutality increased through a deepening of 'pacification' and 'Phoenix' operations. 'Pacification' programmes such as Operation Speedy Express, to name but one, begun in early 1969, involved the devastating use of US firepower and caused thousands of civilian casualties. The Phoenix programme had began in earnest in mid-1968 and aimed at assassinating NLF cadres. Abuse and torture of prisoners repeatedly occurred and even the Saigon government stated that 40,000 civilians were killed under the programme. The slaughter of villagers at My Lai, which gained worldwide attention, was just one of numerous massacres by US forces and its allies.107
With the war unwinnable, US military strategy was to inflict sufficient violence on Vietnam to allow Washington as good an exit as possible to preserve prestige. In June 1969, President Nixon announced the first US troop withdrawal and said that all US combat troops would leave Vietnam by the end of 1972. The war was escalated – US troops invaded Cambodia in April 1970 and in 1972 the US inflicted devastating bombing on Hanoi and Haiphong as well as mining all North Vietnamese ports. In January 1973 a peace agreement was signed and the last US troops left in March, after which the US continued to provide huge military aid to the South Vietnam government. In April 1975, Communist forces entered Saigon.
As massive public protests took place throughout the US and Europe, British governments did not waver in their fundamental support of US strategy. Vice President Hubert Humphrey told Harold Wilson in April 1967 that 'there were two Prime Ministers on whom he could really rely – those of the United Kingdom and of Australia'. The files show ongoing appreciation by US officials of the support provided by Britain throughout the second half of the decade; these officials frequently contacted their British counterparts to, for example, give praise for performances in parliament that fended off criticism of the US.108
Britain's new ambassador in Saigon, John Moreton, wrote in 1971 that due to Britain's economic interests in South-east Asia, especially Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, 'we must do all we can to help our closest ally, the United States, to extricate themselves with honor from their over-commitment'.109
The British attitude to the impact on people was starkly put by the Foreign Office's Denis Murray, in February 1967:
On the political level I must stress that Ministers are anxious to engage as little as possible in the House of Commons in discussions of casualties or damage in North Vietnam caused by American bombing; [sic] since to do so would immediately open the way for a general attack on US policy and on our support for it. This would oblige the Secretary of State, or the Prime Minister, in defending our general support for US policy to risk laying themselves open to charges of defending the results of this policy, eg casualties and damage to civilian property, that they deplore as much as anyone else . . . More generally, there is political danger and embarrassment in trying to define exactly what damage and casualties have occurred; any1> relaxation of the stonewalling would open the way to pressure to do so; and in any case I doubt if anyone . . . could give an accurate picture . . . For all these reasons, Ministers do not wish to reactivate interest, in this country, in our estimate of casualties and damage in North Vietnam.110
The US bombing of North Vietnam continued to elicit support from ministers and Whitehall officials, the only reservations being concerns about whether such bombing was 'wise' and likely to 'succeed'. The only protests appeared to come from an official in the consulate in Hanoi, John Colvin, who wrote in May 1967 that the bombing was 'unlikely to succeed' and 'may produce serious epidemics' as well as being a 'cruel and dishonourable tactic'. By this time, officials recorded that the US had flown 13,000 sorties in North Vietnam, an average of 250 a week.111
By late 1968 Britain's air attaché in Saigon was noting that such bombing, which was being carried out over all of North Vietnam, was aimed at industrial targets, electrical-powergenerating capacity and communications such as rail and roads. 'On the credit side' of this, he added, 'the destruction of the North Vietnamese industrial plant and agricultural production has forced the Russians and to a much lesser extent the Chinese to make this good, as well as to supply the North Vietnamese with increasing quantities of weapons, military supplies and assistance of all kinds'.112
A brief for the Prime Minister in Octo
ber 1967, which was intended to help Wilson answer parliamentary questions, suggested a reply saying: 'I do not believe that there has been any change in the American policy of bombing only military targets in the North'. This was fiction: an MoD report two months previously had mentioned the US widening the number of targets in the North so that bombing was 'increasingly directed toward interdiction or roads and railways serving Hanoi and Haiphong'. The objective of US bombing appeared to be 'to provide a position of greater strength in the event of negotiations taking place'.113
The British government was so keen not to protest against the US bombing in public that even when Britain's own consulate was damaged in a US raid in November 1967, officials decided to bury the matter and not seek compensation. The Foreign Office noted that 'our aim is to keep the temperature down and we shall therefore not be giving any publicity to American regrets unless the question is raised in either the House or the press'. When proof was provided that it was indeed a US bomb that had damaged the consulate, the Foreign Office stated that 'we shall not make this public'.114
When, in late 1971, British officials were expecting the US to renew their bombing of North Vietnam, a Foreign Office official wrote that if such attacks were launched the British government should say that they are consistent with declared US policy and are 'protective reaction strikes' in retaliation for US losses over recent days in Laos. In late December the US launched its heaviest attacks on North Vietnam for a year with a force of 200 fighter bombers. The British government reacted as planned. 'Provided the raids are short and sharp there will be no too emotive reaction' [sic], one Foreign Office official commented.115
Of particular interest in this period are the secret files on planners' views on the British interests now at stake.
By the end of the decade British officials were desperate for a US withdrawal, as long as it was on US terms. A draft Foreign Office Planning Committee report of June 1968 concluded that 'it is very much in our interests that the United States should as soon as possible find a means of escape from her present involvement' in Vietnam. The reason was British economic interests. Thus it was believed that US involvement in Vietnam was imposing 'strains on the world monetary system'. This was due to a lack of confidence in the reserve currencies in the monetary system, one of the main reasons for which was the deficit in the US balance of payments caused by spending on the Vietnam war. A US withdrawal 'would have a stimulating confidence effect on the dollar and in [sic] world trade, which should both directly benefit the UK balance of payments'. Since the existing monetary system was dependent largely on the willingness of the European countries to hold an increasing number of dollars in their reserves, a danger was that this would not continue indefinitely. This 'could result in a major monetary crisis which would cause us major damage whatever its outcome'. Therefore, 'on economic grounds alone a continuing United States involvement in South Vietnam would be highly unsatisfactory for British interests'.116
However, this did not mean that the best outcome was simply a total withdrawal of US forces. The problem was the massive US operation in Vietnam, not its overall position in South-east Asia, which was welcome. The Foreign Office concluded that the US balance of payments 'can be put right without a total withdrawal'. It was believed that:
Britain's economic interests would be promoted by a quick settlement in Vietnam only if it was a good settlement. A bad settlement would have as damaging an effect on the world financial situation as the prolongation of the present level of hostilities.117
The basic threat was not the one presented to the public – which was of Soviet or Chinese expansion. As a senior Foreign Office official recognised, if the US withdrew from Vietnam, the country 'is unlikely to be Russian or Chinese dominated; but it would certainly be nationalist with a heavy list to the left and strongly opposed to the Anglo-Saxon West'. Rather, a total US withdrawal would encourage other countries in South-east Asia 'to come to terms with the Communists'. In this situation 'our own interests, both trading and political, are likely to suffer'. At worst, 'Western trade in South-east Asia could be snuffed out', while:
the trading advantages which we now enjoy in certain countries – notably Malaysia and Singapore but including also in lesser degree Thailand and Indonesia – might well be wiped out and we would have to start foursquare with our major competitors in Europe and Japan.
Therefore, 'it will be important to try to hold the "danger line" north of Malaysia and Indonesia which are important as sources of raw materials as well as markets'. Given the danger of total US withdrawal, British interests lay in 'protracting these negotiations as much as possible'.118
Eighteen months later, in January 1970, the Foreign Office produced another brief. It warned again of the danger of a 'precipitate' US withdrawal, which would increase the threat to 'stability' and 'security' 'in influential circles' in South-east Asian countries. Also, such a withdrawal could have 'a deeply humiliating effect on American feeling and a traumatic effect on American foreign policy'. British interests in the war concerned not only the effects on US foreign policy generally but 'our substantial trade with and investment in the Southeast Asian arena'.119
The US invasion of Cambodia in April 1970, a further widening of the war that met with massive public protests in the US, was firmly supported by British officials. Ambassador Moreton wrote that leaving aside the political risks, 1 am now completely convinced of the soundness of the military arguments in favour of the decision'. He reasoned that this decision had been taken 'to improve the chances of a negotiated settlement' and to proceed with troop withdrawals. Britain's ambassador in Cambodia noted that 'this saves Cambodia from an immediate communist take-over but increases the longterm communist threat to the country'. Indeed, within five years the Khmer Rouge, strengthened as a result of the US violence inflicted on Cambodia, emerged to enact their 'year zero', with terrifying consequences for the millions who died in the killing fields.120
Edward Heath is remembered for taking Britain into the European Community; he should also be remembered for providing extreme apologias and support for the US violence in Vietnam. Heath wrote to Nixon in July 1970:
I do not need to assure you that you have our fullest support in your search for peace in the area. We deeply admire the firmness and persistence which you have shown.
This was in reply to Nixon's letter attaching a report on the US troop withdrawal from Cambodia, which the US had invaded three months previously.121
In December 1970, Heath told CBS television in the US that Nixon was carrying out 'an honourable withdrawal. And in the process, if there is difficulty from North Vietnam, then he is bound to take action . . . And this, I think, is quite justifiable'. This was in reference to US bombing of North Vietnam undertaken to strengthen the US negotiating position as US forces withdrew from the region.122
In April 1972, Nixon inflicted massive bombing on Hanoi and Haiphong; other cities were also targeted and system- atically destroyed. British officials recognised that this bombing was launched 'to attempt to create a position of strength against which to negotiate' by sending a signal to Moscow and Hanoi. It was therefore terrorism.
The government's news department was instructed to say that Nixon had all along 'reserve[d] the right' to bomb North Vietnam. On 17 April Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home defended the US bombing in parliament. This prompted US Secretary of State William Rodgers to phone him 'to thank him very much' and to say 'it was very much appreciated in Washington'. Rodgers informed Douglas-Home 'how pleased the President was'.123
The following month, Nixon told Heath that he had ordered the mining of North Vietnamese ports to effect a blockade. Heath replied: 'I fully understand the range of problems caused for you by the flagrant invasion launched by Hanoi', referring to an offensive into South Vietnam. Heath said there would be effects on shipping and 'freedom of navigation' but 'we shall do our best to avoid adding to your difficulties'.124
Britain backed the US to the last, throu
ghout the various escalations that inflicted increasing devastation on the Vietnamese people. It provided direct support to repressive and unpopular Vietnamese regimes and the US military, some of whose brutal 'counter-insurgency' programmes were based on British plans. It also engaged in covert action with US special forces and provided important intelligence that aided the US prosecution of the war. From the first days of the US intervention in 1961, planners in Whitehall strongly supported the war and obstructed a diplomatic outcome when it believed the US could win. When by mid-decade it became clear the US could not win, London wanted to be seen to be active in searching for a diplomatic solution, primarily as a way of placating public opinion at home and to secure a negotiated outcome on US terms only. As US violence reached unprecedented heights, Britain secretly reassured the US of its complete backing for the war while issuing the mildest criticism in public of some US actions. Throughout, there was not even the pretence of concern for the victims.