Bob Woodward

by State of Denial (lit)

  It's just so damn hot, she told Garner. I'm just burning up.

  Here, Margaret, he said, proposing an old soldier's solution. Here's what you do. Take your clothes off, as much of them as you're comfortable with. If you've got enough bottled water, just pour it all over and rinse your body and then lie on top of your bed inside the mosquito net. It's going to evaporate off of you and you'll be cooler.

  The next morning Garner asked her if it had worked.

  I drenched my body, Tutwiler said, and I got in and I was soaking wet and I closed my eyes and I went to sleep. When I woke up I was choking and I couldn't stand it. We had that big sandstorm. I was nothing but a mud ball.

  Iraq was such a catastrophe, Tutwiler concluded, that even Jim Baker would not have been able to fix it. The country had neither a functioning society nor a functioning government. But she knew from experience that every White House wanted total control and instant results. Soon she was getting calls from the White House and Pentagon complaining about the pictures of the looting and chaos on television and in the newspapers. Get those pictures off, they said.

  Tutwiler told everyone in Washington that the political power and infrastructure vacuums were of unimaginable magnitude. This surpassed anything she had ever seen.

  Tutwiler liked Garner. He was a genuine patriot, she thought, without a personal agenda. But he was no Jim Baker. Garner did not know how to line up all the players in the Washington game, the interagency process—how to make the Pentagon, the State Department, the CIA, the White House and Treasury all happy. Garner seemed to have the right ideas, but he just didn't have the contacts or clout in Washington, and he didn't have the manpower in Baghdad.

  Garner complained to Tutwiler that he'd been under orders not to talk to the press since he'd left Washington, when he'd shown indifference toward Chalabi and the INC at his press conference. It was ridiculous. Communicating and explaining were part of his job. The press was suspicious, madder than hell that he would not talk.

  Tutwiler tried and failed to get the embargo lifted. She talked to her own contacts in the White House, the Pentagon and State Department. No one wanted Garner talking to the press. They didn't want him making policy statements. He seemed too quick on the draw. Tutwiler even received complaints that Garner wasn't showing proper respect for the Iraqis because he went around the country without a coat and tie.

  Garner finally called Rumsfeld to complain.

  You're not embargoed, Rumsfeld said, you can talk to whoever you need to talk to.

  Tutwiler immediately arranged a press conference, but about 45 minutes later she told Garner, You've been reembargoed.

  I'll call Rumsfeld, Garner said.

  It won't do any good, she replied. It's from the White House. That meant from Karen Hughes.

  Tutwiler then set up a partial solution. She would tip off reporters when Garner was moving so he could be ambushed by one news organization or another about once a day and give brief comments. She then would handle Washington, telling them, He just got ambushed and he had to say something. The cameras were going. It would just be worse if he didn't say anything.

  But the little snippets of news or comments were terribly unsatisfying for both Garner and the media.

  Tutwiler became friendly with Hero Talabani, the wife of Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani. In one discussion, Hero turned to her and said something that Tutwiler remembered for years: We expected more from you Americans.

  Weeks into the war, more and more paper was flying around Rumsfeld's office and the Pentagon about how to organize the aftermath. One classified SECRET draft chart was titled Restoration: Civil Primacy, with SecDef at the top and everything flowing down through the Central Commander, General Franks. Another had the president at the top, then Rumsfeld and then a new Coalition Administrator. Garner was listed as the deputy for civil affairs, and General Abizaid was proposed as the deputy for security and support. Both would report to the new Coalition Administrator. Another chart listed a deputy for security and support, but did not name Abizaid.

  Herbits was still searching for the perfect envoy. By April 22, more than a month after the invasion, he'd completed a list of necessary characteristics: commitment to the president's mission, responsiveness to the president's and Rumsfeld's direction, judgment, stature, presence and ability to communicate, empathy, political negotiation skills, bipartisan respect, ability to work with senior military officers, interagency skills, availability and stamina. The organization chart had Garner reporting to the new, unnamed special envoy, separate from the military chain.

  Under the section concerning key tasks for the transition to an interim Iraqi government, all the economic and political issues were listed under the heading Not Currently Addressed. That was everything from debt, credit and oil policy to the tasks of reform, rule of law and political process for the new government. This was two weeks after the fall of Baghdad.

  Since anyone associated with the Clinton administration was automatically disqualified, one name kept popping up on Herbits's short list: L. Paul Jerry Bremer, a 61-year-old terrorism expert who had 23 years in the foreign service. A protégé of Henry Kissinger, Bremer had been U.S. ambassador to the Netherlands from 1983 to 1986, and then the State Department's ambassador-at-large for counterterrorism, but he had retired from the foreign service so he had not been tainted by serving in the Clinton State Department. He had been managing director of Kissinger Associates, the former secretary of state's consulting firm, for more than a decade before heading the 2000 National Commission on Terrorism. Before the 9/11 terrorist attacks he had publicly predicted that the U.S. homeland would be struck. Boyish with a thick head of hair, Bremer projected utter self-confidence and a toughness that bordered on smugness.

  On April 24, Rumsfeld called Powell to propose Bremer. Powell said he would have to think about it. He and Armitage reviewed Bremer's 23-year foreign service career and his close association with Kissinger and the State Department. Yeah! cheered Armitage. Bremer was a likely ally. But they didn't want to express too much enthusiasm. That would kill the appointment for sure.

  Rumsfeld was a little defensive about his role in selecting Bremer when I interviewed him in 2006.

  Jerry Bremer, of course, was a presidential envoy, and as such he reported to the president and to Condi and the NSC staff, Rumsfeld said.

  You picked him, I said.

  Just a minute, Rumsfeld said. We all agreed on him, that he was the guy. I think I've forgotten where his name came from, but it might have been George Shultz had recommended him.

  That is not correct, Shultz said later when I told him of Rumsfeld's recollection. Don called me and had a list. Shultz said he told Rumsfeld he thought well of Bremer. But he also had on his list Howard Baker, and he would be the ideal person because he was a politician and could reach out to others.

  I mentioned to Shultz that he initially was at the top of the Pentagon list to be the Iraq envoy.

  That's the first I heard of that! Shultz said, almost gasping. Neither Rumsfeld nor anybody else ever raised the possibility with him, he said.

  The Pentagon apparently felt he might lean too much to the State Department and could not be controlled, I said.

  I was never able to be controlled, Shultz said.

  The two Kurdish leaders, Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, longtime rivals and leaders of the semiautonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq, had largely set aside their differences in a pragmatic effort to promote the Iraqi Kurds' future. In April 2003, the two men put out word that they wanted to form an interim government in Baghdad.

  Garner was alarmed. Certainly it was part of the U.S. strategy to put an Iraqi face on an interim government, but Iraq was majority Shiite. The Kurds were a minority like the Sunnis. A new government would have to have more of a Shiite face. On April 22, just after arriving in Baghdad, Garner and Larry DiRita flew up north to see Barzani and Talabani. Both men were old acquaintances of Garner from Provide Comfort, though he had n
ot seen them in more than a decade. This day, for me, is like coming home, Garner said to a crowd of Iraqi Kurds who greeted his arrival.

  Barzani and Talabani welcomed him with hugs and kisses. Garner took the two leaders aside. One of the reasons I came up here is, number one, I wanted to see you, Garner said warmly. But number two, I understand you're planning to form a government in Baghdad. I've got some problems with that.

  We're not forming a government, Talabani said.

  That's what I was told, Garner replied.

  No. We're going to put together an advisory group, a face of leadership for you. Don't you think you need it?

  Absolutely, Garner said. I want to do that. Who will that be?

  Well, Talabani said, it will be all of us that worked with Zal. Zalmay Khalilzad of the NSC had been working with them for about a year and a half, and had been designated the ambassador-at-large for the Free Iraqis. Talabani listed three of the Iraqis he thought should be involved. There was Adnan Pachachi, a Sunni octogenarian who had been Iraq's foreign minister and ambassador to the U.N. before Saddam Hussein had taken power. Next, there was Ayad Allawi, the Shiite leader of a London-based exile opposition group called the Iraqi National Accord. Finally, inevitably, there was Ahmed Chalabi.

  Look, here's the problem I have with that, Garner said. All those guys except you two are expatriates, and you two are Kurds. What about someone from inside the country who's been here who's an Arab?

  We're going to bring in Hakim, Talabani said, referring to Mohammed Bakir Hakim, the spiritual leader of the biggest Shiite party in Iraq, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). We thought we'd bring in Jafari —Ibrahim al-Jafari, a Shiite exile and vehement Saddam opponent— and we'll bring in a Christian.

  Okay, that will work out, Garner said, but added, the one thing I'm uncomfortable with is Hakim. He's too Iranian.

  Jay, Talabani said, putting his hand on Garner's leg, it's better to have Hakim inside the tent than outside the tent.

  That's pretty damn good advice, Garner said. Let's go along with that. I want you in Baghdad in a week, all of you. I want you to bring your deputies. I want you to set up a deputies committee. It would work directly with Garner's team.

  We'll do that, Talabani said.

  Look, if this works I'll make you a provisional government, Garner told the two leaders. You'll still work for me but I'll make you a provisional government.

  He turned to some practical considerations. What are we going to do about a constitution, because we've got to get people involved, Garner asked.

  We already thought about that, Talabani answered. We'll have a big-tent meeting and we'll bring in somewhere between 200 and 300 people. Jay, this will be a mosaic of Iraq. It will be all the ethnic groups, all the religions, all the professions ... the genders. We'll write this constitution. We'll give you the list of people and you can take off anybody you don't want and you can add anyone you want to it.

  How quick can we do this? Garner asked, mindful that he'd promised his wife he'd be home by July Fourth.

  We'll have it started on the first of July, Talabani promised.

  Immediately after the meeting, Garner called General Abizaid to explain the plan.

  Abizaid wondered if it would work.

  I don't think we have a choice, Garner said.

  I don't think we do either. Let's go ahead and go with it.

  I want you to get safe passage for Talabani and Barzani from the north down into Baghdad, Garner said.

  Garner told DiRita to call the Pentagon and let them know what was happening. He called Powell himself.

  What are you doing down there? the secretary of state asked.

  Garner described the plan for a provisional government, bringing in everyone under a big tent.

  Interesting, Powell said. It sounded like one of those tent-event sale-a-thons advertised on television by big car dealers. He knew the issue was vastly more complicated. There were so many competing efforts. The Pentagon and Cheney obviously were promoting Chalabi. At one point, Khalilzad had presented Megabrief Two, a secret plan on the Iraqi political process, to the principals—Powell, Rumsfeld, Rice, Cheney, Myers and Tenet. It was a scheme about organizing Iraqis at the local level, taking a census, beginning the effort to build political parties, then establishing local governments and working up from there to the national level.

  By modest estimate this would entail years of work. The principals quickly sidelined both the idea and the Megabrief. They decided that it should not be presented to the president.

  Bush had agreed to put a super-administrator in charge over Garner.

  But the president wanted to see the organization chart on the U.S. side and also how the government in Iraq would be put together.

  Hadley called a deputies committee meeting, but they did not come up with the final organization chart. He indicated that the president was antsy, and said that he wanted key people from each department and agency to stay behind and work, such as Frank Miller, Elliott Abrams, someone from State and a CIA representative. Hadley quipped that he was going to keep them locked in the Situation Room until they finished.

  Doug Feith, who was representing Defense, got up to leave. Feith's deputy, William Luti, a retired Navy captain who had been an aide to Newt Gingrich and to Cheney, rose also. Well, Luti said, I've got to go back with Doug. He's my ride.

  You heard what Steve said, Frank Miller interjected, We're going to sit here and work.

  We will try and send someone back, Luti replied and left, but no one came back from the Pentagon.

  For about two hours, the group struggled to come up with a chart with the U.S. administrator at the top. An Iraqi Council of Elders and a United Nations representative would consult with the administrator, but the chain of command went from the American administrator to the Iraqi ministries, which would at first be headed by a U.S. official with Iraqi advisers. Over time Iraqis would take over and the U.S. representatives would become advisers. Some of the less important ministries would transition to Iraqi control quickly, but the crucial ones like Defense and Interior would stay under U.S. control for a long time.

  The scheme envisioned a long occupation.

  The next day the chart and diagram were presented to a principals meeting. Rumsfeld came in swinging. This isn't an interagency product, he said. My people weren't involved.

  Mr. Secretary, Miller said, Hadley said to do it. Your people left and said they might send somebody back. There was no other option. Your people left the game.

  Rumsfeld didn't respond, but charts and diagrams were only so much abstraction. Under the president's directive, NSPD-24, he was in charge.

  18

  though technically outside the government since 1999, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich threw himself into the mix, publicly blaming the State Department for the failed diplomacy and for the ideological warfare within the administration. The State Department is back at work pursuing policies that will clearly throw away all of the fruits of hard-won victory, he said on April 24 in a speech at the American Enterprise Institute.

  Armitage responded for Powell: It's clear that Mr. Gingrich is off his meds and out of therapy.

  A few days later, the staff threw a small party in Armitage's seventh-floor office for his 58th birthday. Tenet sent a large poster depicting a cartoon version of Armitage lifting weights, straining and dripping sweat. The caption read: Off His Meds and Out of Therapy. Happy Birthday.

  Garner knew little about all the meetings and squabbling in Washington. As far as he knew, the postwar responsibilities were his. On his arrival in Baghdad, a reporter had asked how long the U.S. would be in Iraq and whether he was the country's new ruler.

  I don't think I would put 90 days as a mark on the wall, but we will be here as long as it takes. We'll leave fairly rapidly, Garner replied, adding, The new ruler of Iraq is going to be an Iraqi. I don't rule anything.

  The situation in Iraq was clearly different fro
m what they had anticipated. The worst-case scenarios they had anticipated hadn't happened: oil fires, displaced people, refugees, epidemics, mass casualties from chemical warfare. But in many ways the problems were more insidious because they were so widespread and deep. On April 23, Garner sat down and made a list of nine things he wanted to accomplish before the July 1 big-tent meeting and his planned departure. It was basically an ambitious good-government agenda, covering everything from police to sewers.*

  In Baghdad on April 24, Garner met with General McKiernan to go over the nine objectives.

  There's a 10th you've got to add on there, McKiernan pointed out— security. There was still some fighting going on but no huge outbreak of violence. Garner agreed and added security as the 10th objective. Neither pointed out that McKiernan, who was in command of roughly 150,000 American and British troops, was subtly shifting responsibility for security to Garner, whose organization numbered only about 200.

  The looting was intense. Colonel Tom Baltazar on Garner's staff later recalled watching a freaking boat, a 25-foot boat, being dragged by a car down the middle of a main street there in Baghdad. Not on a trailer. Some guy had chained it to the back of a car, and was pulling it, completely wrecking the hull as he drove along. Another car drove past, pulling an antique cannon, one of two that the British had left as ceremonial decorations outside an Iraqi military academy in 1924.

  Baltazar implored McKiernan: You have got to stop this, he said. Our mission is to reestablish the government, and we can't do it if everything's being destroyed.

  Tom, I don't ever want to hear that from your lips again, Baltazar recalled McKiernan saying. This is not my job.

  Nevertheless, Garner felt he was working exceptionally well with McKiernan. McKiernan's staff was the best Garner had ever seen, with one- and two-star generals heading sections that might have had only a colonel in charge in a comparable organization. They agreed to put a flag