Bob Woodward

by State of Denial (lit)

  A report to Garner on May 4 begins: Security continues to be the top concern of all ministry and senior advisors. . . . Scheduled trips to ministries continue to be canceled due to insufficient numbers of military police escorts; advisors have stressed that such cancellations undermine their credibility with ministry staff, particularly given that advisors rarely can contact staff to let them know of changed events. U.S. advisers reached the Ministry of Defense building for the first time, nearly a month after the collapse of Saddam's government, to find that it had been heavily looted. There was gunfire in the streets as they arrived. The team carted off a thousand pounds of highly classified documents, the report said, but there were still many more documents left behind, uncollected and unguarded.

  MEMORANDUM FOR Director, begins another document, this one dated May 6 and written by Colonel Paul Hughes in the formal style of official military correspondence. Subject: Meeting with Iraqi Military Officers—INFORMATION MEMO.

  The day before, Hughes had met with a group of senior Iraqi military officers who claimed to represent about 30,000 army officers, soldiers and Iraqi civilians from the Ministry of Defense. A colonel with the group named Mirjan Dhiya translated.

  Before and during the war, Hughes wrote, these Iraqi officers and others removed computers and files from the MOD and placed them in their homes. They'd now heard that the coalition was going to give a $20 emergency payment to every government worker in the other ministries, and they hoped they could get the same deal for the former soldiers. Among the officers was a brigadier who had been the comptroller of the Iraqi army. They had all the pay records, and the group was willing to turn all of its information over to the Coalition.

  Hughes wrote that he'd explained to the group that they could not be paid salaries, but that the $20 emergency payment might be possible. I also informed them that this money was originally Iraqi money being returned to them, something that overwhelmed all of them with a deep sense of gratitude.

  Hughes met with the Iraqi officers again two days later, and the list of Iraqi soldiers they claimed to be able to organize had grown to 137,000. On May 8, a document was prepared for the signature of another member of Garner's team, Major General Carl A. Strock, who was acting as the interim senior adviser to the Ministry of Defense, authorizing the Iraqi generals to work with the coalition at the Baghdad building where Garner's team was headquartered. The computers began printing out page after page of records of Iraqi soldiers. Hughes was very excited, believing he had stumbled on an opportunity to get the former Iraqi army on the coalition's side and help them retain some honor. It was what General Grant had done in the Civil War after Lee's surrender at Appomattox, he thought. For $20 a head—less than $3 million for all 137,000 soldiers on the lists—they could offer parole to part of the Iraqi military, and get them invested in the post-Saddam society. He just needed the money.

  19

  jerry Bremer had just over two weeks from the first time he met with Bush in the Oval Office until he left for Iraq. While he had a long career in foreign policy and counterterrorism, he was not a Middle East expert. In essence, he was putting together a new pickup team to take the place of Garner's pickup team. The issue that would likely define the Bush presidency was being handled by a series of pickup teams.

  At one point, James Dobbins, the post-conflict expert and former State Department official who worked for the RAND Corporation, brought Bremer a draft of a study estimating that 500,000 troops were needed in postwar Iraq, three times as many as currently deployed.

  Bremer sent a summary of the draft to Rumsfeld with a cover memo saying, I think we should consider this. He never heard back, and Bremer never followed up.

  After 1 p.m. on May 6, with Bremer by his side in the Oval Office, Bush formally announced his appointment as presidential envoy to Iraq. He's a can-do type person, Bush said, bestowing one of his greatest compliments. The ambassador goes with the full blessings of this administration and the full confidence of all of us in this administration that he can get the job done. The press generally described Bremer as a buttoned-down, conservative organization man who contrasted with the informal, unbuttoned Garner.

  Four days before his departure, Bremer had lunch with Bush alone at the White House. He raised the unity of command issue, but not about the military, as Powell and others had done. I could not succeed if there were others in Iraq saying they too represented the president, Bremer later wrote—meaning especially Zalmay Khalilzad, the NSC staffer who still bore the title presidential envoy.

  Bush said he understood and agreed. By Bremer's account he also mentioned the RAND study calling for 500,000 troops, but got no response, and he never pursued it with the president.

  After their lunch, Bush led Bremer into the Oval Office for a meeting with Rumsfeld, Powell, Rice and Card. As they filed in, Bush waved me to the chair beside him and joked, 'I don't know whether we need this meeting at all. Jerry and I have just had it.'

  His message was clear, Bremer wrote. I was neither Rumsfeld's nor Powell's man. I was the president's man.

  On May 9, Bush put it in writing, appointing Bremer as his envoy, reporting through the Secretary of Defense. He was in charge of everyone except Rumsfeld and General Franks.

  That day, Bremer met with Feith and his deputy, William Luti, a retired Navy captain and veteran of Cheney's office.

  I have my letter, Bremer said, referring to his appointment letter from the president. He proudly patted the breast pocket of his suit jacket.

  Feith had a draft de-Baathification order, and Bremer recalls that Feith was going to have Garner issue it.

  According to Bremer, he replied, Hold on a minute. I agree it's a very important step, so important that I think it should wait until I get there. Bremer later recalled that Feith agreed and said it was to be carried out even if implementing it causes administrative inconvenience. For his part, Feith has recalled that it was Bremer pushing a de-Baathification order and another order to disband the Iraqi army.

  Garner's deputy, Ron Adams, had come down with severe pneumonia in early April, and was evacuated back to the U.S. to recover. As he recuperated, he resumed work at the Pentagon as Garner's liaison.

  Everything's changed here, Adams told Garner in one of their daily phone conversations. They don't like us.

  After a month, Adams finally got clearance to return to the Middle East, and he flew to Kuwait on May 6. It took four frustrating days for the retired three-star general and deputy director of the organization still officially in charge of postwar Iraq just to get a seat on a military airplane to travel the 350 or so miles from Kuwait to Baghdad.

  Sunday 11 May D + 53, begins another entry in Spider Marks's war diary. No WMD, he wrote again.

  It was almost too late to worry about it. There was no such thing as un-invading Iraq. They still had to drive on, and check all 946 sites on the list, even if he was now nearly as sure there was nothing to find as he had previously been positive that the weapons were there.

  Colonel Rotkoff summed up the situation:

  Where is WMD?

  What a kick if he has none

  Sorry about that

  On May 11, Garner flew to Qatar to meet Bremer at Franks's headquarters. The two shook hands briefly, and after a routine military briefing, Garner handed Bremer a copy of his list of the 10 major objectives to be accomplished before July 1.

  Okay, Bremer said. Thanks.

  General Myers had flown with Bremer to Qatar en route to Iraq. He had been out of the loop on the Bremer decision, and thought Garner should have stayed in place as a kind of civilian number two to General Franks.

  Myers and Garner later talked privately. Garner pushed his idea of making Abizaid the military commander in Baghdad, but giving him a fourth star so he would have greater authority.

  Bring Abizaid in here as the sub-unified commander, Garner said. Let Bremer do the civilian stuff. Keep McKiernan here. He's got a great staff. Abizaid could then arbitrate the inevitab
le disputes between Bremer and McKiernan. Franks was heading for retirement, and had left Iraq. Abizaid was the man for the job.

  I agree with you, but I can't get any headway on that, Myers told Garner. He'd made the same proposal to Rumsfeld. The chart in the Pentagon that showed the transition from military to civilian control never had a timeline on it, and that was for a reason. This new idea of putting Bremer in control was happening too abruptly in Myers's view. We've had that discussion, Myers added in obvious frustration. Rumsfeld just won't listen.

  Bremer and Garner spent a day in Basra before flying on to Baghdad. Bremer later recalled his feeling on arriving in the Iraqi capital. I was driving down the muddy road in a fog at 100 miles per hour, he said. That night, he and Garner gathered about 30 senior staff members into a small conference room at the so-called palace. Bremer was gracious, thanking Garner and his team and emphasizing that they knew the challenges better than he did.

  The media coverage of the unchecked looting makes us look powerless, Bremer said. When the American-led forces occupied Haiti in 1994, our troops shot six looters breaking the curfew and the looting stopped. I believe we should do the same thing here, even if it means changing the military's Rules of Engagement. But he never got the rules changed to allow that kind of shooting.

  About 7 a.m. on May 14, Bremer's first full day in Baghdad, Robin Raphel ran up to Garner.

  Have you read this? she asked.

  No, Garner replied. I don't know what the hell you've got there.

  It's a de-Baathification policy, she said, handing him a two-page document.

  Garner read quickly: Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1—De-Baathification of Iraqi Society. The Baath Party was organized by rank, and the order said that all full members —those in the top four ranks—would be immediately removed from their posts and banned from future government employment. Additionally, the three top layers of management in the ministries would be investigated for crimes and as possible security risks.

  We can't do this, Garner said. He still envisioned what he had told Rumsfeld would be a gentle de-Baathification —eliminating only the number one Baathist and the personnel directors in each ministry. It's too deep, he added.

  That's exactly why you can't go home, Raphel said.

  Garner ran into Charlie, the CIA station chief.

  Have you read this? Garner asked.

  That's why I'm over here, Charlie said.

  Let's go see Bremer. The two men got in to see the new administrator of Iraq around 1 p.m. Jerry, this is too deep, Garner said. Give Charlie and I about an hour. We'll sit down with this. We'll do the pros and cons and then we'll get on the telephone with Rumsfeld and soften it a bit.

  Absolutely not, Bremer said. Those are my instructions and I intend to execute them.

  Hell, Garner answered, you won't be able to run anything if you go this deep.

  Garner turned to Charlie. The experienced CIA man had been station chief in other Middle East countries.

  Charlie, what's going to happen?

  If you put this out, you're going to drive between 30,000 and 50,000 Baathists underground before nightfall, Charlie said, according to notes taken by Kim Olson, Garner's assistant. Charlie said the number was closer to 50,000 than 30,000. You will put 50,000 people on the street, underground and mad at Americans. And these 50,000 were the most powerful, well-connected elites from all walks of life.

  I told you, Bremer said, looking at Charlie. I have my instructions and I have to implement this.

  Garner called Rumsfeld and tried to get the depth reconsidered and the language of the order softened.

  This is not coming from this building, he replied. That came from somewhere else.

  Garner presumed that meant the White House, NSC or Cheney. According to other participants, however, the de-Baathification order was purely a Pentagon creation. Telling Garner it came from somewhere else, though, had the advantage for Rumsfeld of ending the argument.

  The next day, May 15, Robin Raphel brought Garner another draft order. This was Order Number 2, disbanding the Iraqi ministries of Defense and Interior, the entire Iraqi military, and all of Saddam's bodyguard and special paramilitary organizations.

  Garner was stunned. The de-Baathification order was dumb, but this was a disaster. Garner had told the president and the whole National Security Council explicitly that they planned to use the Iraqi military—at least 200,000 to 300,000 troops—as the backbone of a corps to rebuild the country and provide security. And he'd been giving regular secure video reports to Rumsfeld and Washington on the plan.

  Moreover, Colonel Hughes had been meeting with his former Iraqi generals with their lists of some 137,000 who wanted to rejoin their old units or sign on with new units if they each received a $20 emergency payment. The CIA had also compiled lists and was meeting with generals and arranging for a reconstitution of the Iraqi military. The former Iraqi military was making more and more overtures, just waiting to come back in some form.

  Garner went to see Bremer for the second day in a row. We have always made plans to bring the army back, he insisted. This new plan was just coming out of the blue, subverting months of work.

  Well, the plans have changed, Bremer replied. The thought is that we don't want the residuals of the old army. We want a new and fresh army.

  Jerry, you can get rid of an army in a day, but it takes years to build one. Garner tried to explain that it was not just about a soldier in the field, or getting a bunch of riflemen. Any army is all the processes it takes to equip it and train it and sustain it and make it last. Bremer shook his head.

  You can't get rid of the Ministry of Interior, Garner said.

  Why not?

  You just made a speech yesterday and told everybody how important the police force is.

  It is important.

  All the police are in the Ministry of the Interior, Garner said. If you put this out, they'll all go home today.

  Bremer, looking surprised, asked Garner to go see Walter B. Slocombe, Bremer's director of defense and national security. Slocombe, 62, had been the defense undersecretary for policy during most of the Clinton administration, Feith's predecessor. A Rhodes Scholar, a former clerk for Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas and a prominent tax attorney, Slocombe felt that as a matter of international law the U.S. invasion meant Iraq was under military occupation. It was not an elective status and the U.S. should not be shy about asserting authority. The governmental system had imploded and the Iraqi army had dissolved, he believed. Everyone—the Iraqis and the United States—needed there to be a new government and a new army in Iraq. Saddam's army had been a principal instrument of repression. In Slocombe's opinion it could hardly be used as the shield for a new democracy.

  But Slocombe agreed to excise the Ministry of Interior from the draft so the police could stay. Bremer soon signed the order, which canceled all military rank, title or status. In his book published in 2006, Bremer did not recount his exchanges with Garner over disbanding the Iraqi army, but he made clear his belief that by the time he got to Iraq, there no longer was an Iraqi army—it had self-demobilized. Signing the order abolishing the old regime's military services would not send home a single soldier or disband a single unit, he wrote. All that had happened weeks before. He was also convinced that the Kurds, who hated and feared the old army, would secede if it was brought back.

  But over the next year, every one of the officers and sergeants who made up the new Iraqi army came from the old Iraqi army.

  Bremer huddled in a tiny office in the Republican Palace with four of his aides: Scott Carpenter from State, whom Liz Cheney had put in charge of the Iraqi governance issue; Meghan O'Sullivan, the State Department official who had come over to Garner's team with Tom Warrick, only to be chased out by Cheney's office and sneaked back in with the tacit approval of Rumsfeld and Hadley; Ryan Crocker of the State Department; and Roman Martinez, a 24-year-old Harvard graduate who had worked for Feith at the Pentagon. Eac
h of the five had a copy of the de-Baathification order.

  The White House, DOD, and State all signed off on this, Bremer said. So let's give it one final reading and, unless there's some major screwup in the language, I'll sign it.

  The next morning, May 16, Bremer signed the de-Baathification order. Later that day, he wrote in his book, he e-mailed his wife back home in the United States, as he tried to do each day, to tell her about the response he'd heard from the Americans on the ground. There was a sea of bitching and moaning with lots of them saying how hard it was going to be. I reminded them that the president's guidance is clear: de-Baathification will be carried out even if at a cost to administrative efficiency. An ungood time was had by all.

  About 4 p.m. that day, Abizaid, the likely successor to General Franks as CENTCOM commander, flew to Baghdad to meet with Garner. Both men were worried about the combat continuing north of Baghdad. Some Iraqis weren't giving up, but they were so ill equipped for the fight that they were being slaughtered. One way to stop the pointless resistance and carnage, Garner and Abizaid agreed, was to show the Iraqis convincingly that there would be a new government, and Saddam's rule was over. They turned to the policies on de-Baathification and disbanding the army.

  Garner told Abizaid, John, I'm telling you. If you do this it's going to be ugly. It'll take 10 years to fix this country, and for three years you'll be sending kids home in body bags.