Bob Woodward

by State of Denial (lit)

  The president acknowledged that he had been off his game since Hurricane Katrina. There had been a lull in the political momentum, he said, no doubt. But now in Iraq, he said, they were doing things differently than they had two years ago. He would not withdraw troops until the conditions for victory were right.

  We're not leaving if Laura and Barney are the only ones who support me, Bush said.

  Representative Roy Blunt, the Missouri Republican who was acting majority leader, said that when Democrats like Murtha proposed getting out of Iraq, people realized the only acceptable alternative was what Bush was doing. They all agreed that forcing the issue with the vote in the House had been a great tactical victory.

  I know I make long and boring speeches, but my advisers say it's necessary, Bush said.

  Several congressmen encouraged the president and said he needed to make long, single-topic speeches because it forced the news media to cover them. Who cared if the media were annoyed? It was a matter of attempting to control their coverage.

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  the next day, December 8, 2005, Bush and Cheney held a video teleconference with Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey.

  How long would it take to stand up the new, permanent government after the elections for the National Assembly that would select a prime minister? Bush asked.

  Last time it took about 90 days, Khalilzad said, but this time he hoped to do it in about half that time, six weeks after the upcoming December 15 elections.

  Bush gave his third Iraq speech in Philadelphia on December 12. This time he answered questions from the audience, ordinary members of the public who had not been screened.

  The first question was pointed: Since the inception of the Iraqi war, I'd like to know the approximate total of Iraqis who have been killed. And by Iraqis I include civilians, military, police, insurgents, translators.

  How many Iraqi citizens have died in this war? the president responded. I would say 30,000, more or less, have died as a result of the initial incursion and the ongoing violence against Iraqis. We've lost about 2,140 of our own troops in Iraq. The numbers were telling, as was the fact that Bush had almost the precise death toll for Americans, 2,144, right on the tip of his tongue.

  The Defense Policy Board, the outside senior group of advisers for Rumsfeld that included Kissinger, Newt Gingrich and Ken Adelman, met at the Pentagon for two days of closed-door briefings on December 8 and 9. During the first day, Ryan Henry, a top Rumsfeld deputy, briefed on the Quadrennial Defense Review, the detailed strategy for the U.S. military over the next 20 years. Rumsfeld thought this was one of his greatest accomplishments—a blueprint for the future. Midway through a long PowerPoint briefing with slides and charts, Henry paused. The good news is that not one defense program had to be cut, he said.

  Well, why is that good news? Adelman interrupted. It was unusual to break in. A strategic review for four years since the war on terrorism began, since 9/11 happened, since the world is different and there wasn't one program that you could eliminate?

  Henry said that everyone in the building—civilians and those in uniform—had decided nothing had to be cut.

  I'm sorry I interrupted, Adelman said, but I just find it incredible.

  The next day, the board met with Rumsfeld, who was proud of the in-depth review, which included plans to increase Special Operations Forces by some 15 percent and to add sophisticated programs to fight terrorism and to deal with weapons of mass destruction.

  I think Ken has a different view on that, said Chris Williams, a defense contractor and lobbyist who was the board chairman. Dissent was unusual.

  What's that? asked Rumsfeld tartly of the man he had wanted to run his presidential campaign 20 years earlier.

  Adelman, exasperated, said that after four years of work, after 9/11, and after all the efforts at transformation, with Rumsfeld spending maybe a quarter of his time on the QDR, and the deputy up to half his time, I find it incredible that nothing is going to be cut.

  Who told you that?

  Adelman at first didn't want to single out Ryan Henry, so he said maybe he had misunderstood.

  Who said that? Rumsfeld pressed.

  Ryan Henry sitting right there told us that, Adelman said, pointing to Henry, who was sitting in the back, off to the side.

  The review isn't over, Rumsfeld said.

  Oh, I'm sorry. I thought it was going to the printer.

  Well, the president hasn't signed off.

  If it's going to the printer, Adelman said, whether the president's signed off or not, it seems pretty far along.

  All right, Rumsfeld challenged. Supposing it doesn't have any cuts.

  I think it's astonishing, Adelman said. The whole world has changed. This was supposed to be the new Pentagon.

  Rumsfeld gazed at Adelman, clearly furious. He said that everyone in the building had agreed. We all get along, he added. Sometimes you don't need to cut and there was no reason to cut.

  An hour later the policy board was talking about the briefing they had received from Abizaid and Casey. Both had said they were making progress in Iraq and things seemed to be going well.

  Again I think Ken has a different attitude, Williams said.

  What's that? Rumsfeld inquired.

  Adelman said that Casey had reported that military personnel— officers and enlisted—were being rotated out of Iraq about every nine months or less, on average. When you look at history, I don't know of any counterinsurgency that's won by a country that rotates people out every six to nine months.

  We're not rotating all the people out, Rumsfeld said. We have Casey there.

  I'm not talking about that, Adelman said. I'm talking about the people.

  Let me tell you the reason for that, Rumsfeld replied, describing Army and Marine recruiting and promotions.

  I'm not talking about what the Army wants to do and what the Marines want to do, Adelman said. What I'm talking about is winning the war. I don't know any counterinsurgency that wins on a strategy like that.

  Well, I think you've got it wrong because a lot of the soldiers go back in the theater for a second tour, Rumsfeld said.

  What do you mean by theater? Adelman asked.

  The CENTCOM theater.

  Oh, so they go back to Afghanistan. That's not what I'm talking about.

  Well, some of them go back to Iraq.

  Okay, but do they go back to the neighborhood they were in? What are the chances of that?

  Almost never, the secretary answered honestly.

  Well, that's my point.

  What's your point?

  They have to know who to pay off, Adelman said. They have to know whom to deal with. They have to know whom to maneuver. And that's tough sledding. That takes time. Six months, they know nothing. Nine months?

  Rumsfeld screwed up his face. He cited a recent study showing that most of the casualties came in the first months.

  That reinforces my point, Adelman said.

  It does, Rumsfeld conceded.

  Gingrich said even though a fortune in executive manpower had been spent on the QDR strategy review, None of that matters.

  Rumsfeld looked at him uncomfortably.

  Only Iraq really matters, the former speaker continued. He said that the measure of seriousness was the 132 days it took to go from Ambassador Negroponte to Ambassador Khalilzad. Iraq was only the most important country in the world that all of American foreign policy hinges on, he added sarcastically.

  After the meeting, Adelman ran into Rumsfeld in the Pentagon hallway. Rumsfeld indicated he wanted to talk further.

  See you, said Adelman.

  Behind the scenes, on December 13, the NSC principals approved a classified paper of some 10 rules or guidance to apply to forming the new Iraqi government. The ministers in the new government should have no affiliation with militias or external powers such as Iran or Syria. New ministers must have a clear record of competence. The new government should be formed quickly but not at the expense of q
uality; the minister of oil, for example, should have a history in that industry.

  In other words, the United States would still be vetting the government in sovereign Iraq.

  In his fourth Iraq speech the next day, December 14, at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, Bush said, When the history of these days is written, it will tell how America once again defended its own freedom by using liberty to transform nations from bitter foes to strong allies.

  In Iraq, on election day, December 15, some 11 million voted for members of the National Assembly, who would sit for four-year terms. It was about a 70 percent turnout, much larger than in most Western democracies.

  There's a lot of joy, the president said.

  The next day the headline on the front page of The New York Times was: Iraqis, Including Sunnis, Vote in Large Numbers on Calm Day. Bush was thrilled. During a meeting with the Iraqi ambassador to the United Nations, the ambassador stated, I think it was a turning point, and added extravagantly, and the beginning of the end of terrorism in Iraq.

  But the violence continued, with more than 2,500 insurgent attacks throughout December, according to the classified reports.

  At a meeting in the Situation Room, Rumsfeld noted, We don't have any more elections.

  Three days after the elections, on December 18, the president gave a prime-time TV speech from the Oval Office. After highlighting the apparent success of the elections, he recapped his history of the war, starting with the decision to invade, the toppling of Saddam, and on the question of WMD admitting flatly that we did not find those weapons.

  As the war continued, he acknowledged, many people were arguing that the U.S. was creating more problems than we're solving by remaining in Iraq. He rejected the notion. Defeatism may have its partisan uses, but it is not justified by the facts, Bush said, adding, To retreat before victory would be an act of recklessness and dishonor, and I will not allow it.

  Toward the end of the speech, Bush added a message he said was intended for those of you who did not support my decision to send troops to Iraq: I have heard your disagreement, and I know how deeply it is felt. Yet now there are only two options before our country—victory or defeat. And the need for victory is larger than any president or political party, because the security of our people is in the balance. I don't expect you to support everything I do, but tonight I have a request: Do not give in to despair, and do not give up on this fight for freedom.

  Americans can expect some things of me, as well. My most solemn responsibility is to protect our nation, and that requires me to make some tough decisions. I see the consequences of those decisions when I meet wounded servicemen and women who cannot leave their hospital beds, but summon the strength to look me in the eye and say they would do it all over again. I see the consequences when I talk to parents who miss a child so much—but tell me he loved being a soldier, he believed in his mission, and, Mr. President, finish the job.

  I know that some of my decisions have led to terrible loss—and not one of those decisions has been taken lightly. I know this war is controversial—yet being your President requires doing what I believe is right and accepting the consequences. And I have never been more certain that America's actions in Iraq are essential to the security of our citizens, and will lay the foundation of peace for our children and grandchildren. He had rarely sounded so somber.

  At the NSC meeting December 21, 2005, the paper on rules for forming the new government was presented to the president. It's one thing to influence voters in an election, Bush said, referring to his clear decision not to try to influence the results of the December 15 election. And it is another thing to influence government formation. He made it clear he wanted to weigh in heavily and looked to Ambassador Khalilzad, who was participating on secure video from Iraq. Zal, we need to work with the Brits not to dictate outcomes or choose personalities, but to shape an outcome. That outcome was to be consistent with the principles. It was a fine distinction—shape an outcome but not dictate it. After more than two and a half years it was clear that Bush and the others were not going to let power in Iraq slide to someone unacceptable to them.

  The discussion turned to the caliber of people who would be available in Iraq, and general frustration was voiced once again about the absence of a Washington or Jefferson, let alone a John Adams or lesser lights. There was so much corruption. It was a major obstacle. They agreed that lack of corruption should be included on their list of rules for Iraq. They had to find ministers who did not have a history of being on the take.

  Okay, Bush said, add corruption to this list of principles and then, Zal, use your influence to make it happen.

  The problem was fully in the ambassador's lap. The president was his case officer.

  You need to be clever about this, Zal, Bush continued. You need to be figuring out some things that are enough for the Sunnis to declare the process successful without being so stressing to the Kurds and the Shia that it fractures the process.

  It was another tall order. Bush wanted hard-nosed negotiations. Zal could threaten to cut off U.S. assistance, whatever he needed. Just fix it.

  Hadley's NSC staff prepared a situation report each morning for the president and invariably the first item was Iraq and the casualties. In November, 88 American troops in Iraq had been killed; December was less at 67. There was also a situation report available to Bush at midday and a third one at night.

  But the ebb and flow of the rate of attacks, probably the best measure of the level of violence and threat, was hard to predict. In October it had been 3,000. It dropped to 2,100 in November, and then shot back up to 2,500 in December.

  On New Year's Day, January 1, 2006, Bush visited Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio, Texas, where doctors and nurses had treated 2,300 casualties from Afghanistan and Iraq. It was the 34th time Bush had gone to visit the wounded.

  He encountered a young soldier whose body was about 99 percent burned, and stood speechless for perhaps 30 seconds. Later, Bush told his aides, I didn't know what possibly, as the most powerful man in the world—There's not a thing I could say. He then sat and prayed with the soldier's family, thanked them for their service and left, stunned by the family's spirit.

  Afterward, he spoke to a group of reporters. He had a minor gash on his forehead from clearing trees on his ranch, and he inappropriately drew attention to his wound.

  As you can probably see, I have injured myself, not here at the hospital but in combat with a cedar. I eventually won. The cedar gave me a little bit of a scratch. A military doctor asked if he needed first aid, Bush said. I was able to avoid any major surgical operations here.

  The office of the White House physician, Dr. Richard J. Tubb, a one-star general in the Air Force Medical Corps, kept track of the wounded the president had met so he could send personal notes or make calls. Not long afterward, Tubb sent word to Bush that the soldier he had seen at the San Antonio hospital had died.

  It hit the president hard. Dan Bartlett, his communications director, could see Bush's anguish. But Bush and the others in the White House tried hard to avoid conveying publicly that the president felt any torment. They believed such a disclosure would suggest he had doubts.

  But in the visits with the wounded, a number of times family members confronted the president.

  See? said a relative, pointing to a maimed soldier in a hospital bed. It's not worth it.

  You can stop this, said another.

  Only you can stop it, said someone on a third occasion.

  I can understand why you feel that way, Bush responded.

  you cannot help but come out of there— Rumsfeld said in an interview, recalling his own visits to military hospitals, I'll put it in priority order: Inspired. And strengthened. And you are because the wounded there are—an enormous percentage are—anxious to get back to their units, proud of what they've done, confident that they'll be able to survive the injuries in one way or another. In a case with a leg off, go back to jump school and qualify
first in the class and get back over to Iraq. So you come out inspired and strengthened, to be sure. You also cannot help but look at those wonderful human beings and see the damage that's been done to their bodies, and not understand the difficulty of tying a tie or putting a shirt on or the simple things.

  So do you feel anguish? I asked.

  Oh sure.

  At those moments?

  Sure. My goodness. You—no one could do that and not feel that, in my view, he answered. You come out and you get in the car and you talk about the experience of the people you've met, the soldiers and sailors and Marines, the families, and how inspiring they are and how different they are in their personalities and yet how almost predictable they are in their pride of their service. And we are so lucky to have people like that.

  Had he ever been challenged by the wounded or their families, the way Bush had, I asked.

  Sure. Sure.

  What have they said?

  I don't think I want to discuss the private conversations, Rumsfeld said. But they have indicated their disagreement with the conflict in Afghanistan or the conflict in Iraq. Personal disagreement.

  What do you say to them? I asked.

  My goodness. They're going through a period in their life where something that they loved and cared for and nurtured is damaged, and in a way that they never anticipated. And so you can certainly understand the fact that any person in that circumstance is going to go through some swings of emotion, and it depends on where you hit them and where they are when you're there.

  Does that give you any swing of emotion yourself, where you kind of go, Why do I have this job? I asked.

  No, Rumsfeld said. There are things that raise that question in my mind. But not that so much.