The drumbeat for change is not going to go away, Card told the president as they talked alone in the Oval Office that morning, and you should not be afraid to change me. The accumulation of troubles required visible, decisive presidential action.
No, that's stupid, the president replied. That's not the way it is.
Well, you should think about it, Card said. You owe it to yourself to think about it. A big personnel move was now almost required. There are only five and a half people that you can change and get any credit. Don Rumsfeld, Karl Rove, Andy Card, Condi Rice, Dan Bartlett. The president would not get a lot of credit for replacing Bartlett because most people didn't know who he was. And you get a half credit if you change John Snow. Snow was the treasury secretary, who received tepid reviews from almost everywhere. You won't get credit for removing him. You might get credit for putting somebody else in.
Karl you can't touch probably, Card said. Rove was under investigation about a discussion with a Time magazine reporter in the CIA leak case, and no one seemed to know if he would be indicted. There's a cloud over him, Card continued, and since I don't know that the sun is going to shine and I don't know that it's going to rain, you probably can't change Karl.
Changing the secretary of defense, that's a different set of questions. They both were aware of Card's efforts on this front. You can't change Condi. She's the star in the administration. But, he added, You can change me. He spoke with sadness. And there's no Senate hearing. The change can happen overnight. There's no confirmation. There's nobody being grilled about past policies or future biases. And Dan Bartlett is a very valuable counselor and you wouldn't get any credit for changing him. And the Snow thing is what it is, but that wouldn't represent real change. The White House chief of staff would be real change.
No, that's absurd. No, Bush said, dismissing his chief of staff. He left for New Orleans for his 10th trip there since Katrina.
Two days later, Friday, March 10, Card again went to Bush, Did you think about it, because it's the right thing? Bush again waved him away.
That afternoon the online magazine Slate reported that Claude A. Allen, who had been Bush's top domestic policy adviser until he had resigned the previous month, had been arrested by police in the Maryland suburbs and charged in a bizarre case of allegedly defrauding local stores of more than $5,000.
Bush called Card at home around 9:30 p.m., late for the president. He wanted a detailed explanation of what had happened to Allen, 45, a favorite on the staff, a lawyer and born-again Christian. Allen was Bush's highest-ranking African-American White House adviser, and he regularly briefed and traveled with the president. Card said that when Allen resigned the previous month he had told both Card and Harriet Miers that there was some misunderstanding. Bush said he thought the White House had done the right thing, handled it the right way, but he wondered how a senior White House official could be arrested without the chief of staff finding out.
Well, Mr. President, if this is not comfortable for you, this is a perfect time to lay it all on me. Just lay it on me. This is it. Perfect.
No! That's— Bush didn't even finish his sentence. It was out of the question.
The next morning, Saturday the 11th, Card went to the White House early. Bush had his daily intelligence brief, and later met with Rumsfeld and retired General Montgomery C. Meigs, the director of a $3.3 billion Defense Department program to defeat the new, increasingly lethal, advanced IEDs in Iraq. The components and the training for them had more and more clearly been traced to Iran, one of the most troubling turns in the war.
Afterward, Bush and Card talked again. The president said he was troubled by the conversation the previous night about Claude Allen, and troubled by Card's comment.
Don't worry about it, Card replied. But seriously, this is the role of the chief of staff. If this wasn't handled the way you think it should have been handled or wasn't handled the way the world thinks it should have been handled, or it wasn't handled, that's the chief of staff's job. So it's perfectly appropriate.
That night both Bush and Card attended the Gridiron Dinner. In his satirical speech, Bush joked that the media had blown Cheney's hunting accident way out of proportion. Good Lord, you'd thought he shot somebody or something.
two days later, March 13, Card was alone with the president again. Have you given this some thought? he inquired.
Agh, I don't know what to do, the president said.
Well, the drums are still beating out there, Card said.
Is there anything new on Karl? Bush asked impatiently.
There was not. For practical and legal reasons they couldn't find out much. There were questions that no one in the White House or administration could properly ask the prosecutor, the Justice Department or even Rove about. On March 15, Card continued to press.
Did you give it some thought?
Yeah, I've given it some thought, the president answered. What do you think?
Well, first of all, you shouldn't get advice from me on this. You should get some advice from wise counsel.
Okay. Well, who do you suggest?
You know better than I do, but you're going to see Jim Baker later today. I would get his counsel.
Yeah, he'll tell me what he thinks.
He will, Card said. I think he'll just tell you what he thinks. Ask Jim about it.
I will. I will.
Normally when Bush met with Jim Baker or Henry Kissinger or one of the old hands, he would either have Card there or right afterward would summarize for Card. But this time there was no recap.
At home later that night in Arlington, Virginia, Card told his wife, Kathi, what had happened.
I think the president made the tough decision but he doesn't know it yet, he said.
On March 16, General Abizaid was in Washington to testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee. He painted a careful but upbeat picture of the situation in Iraq.
Senator Elizabeth Dole, Republican of North Carolina, blamed the news media for the idea that Iraq was a mess. Now knowing the great progress that's been made, continues to be made, all the accomplishments in Iraq, it's got to be frustrating to hear accounts from our media that offer sometimes nothing but negativity and pessimism.
Abizaid was tactful, but he said he didn't think the media had any negative impact on morale.
Afterward, he went over to see Congressman Murtha in the Rayburn Office Building. Sitting at the round, dark wood table in the congressman's office, Abizaid, the deputy commander at CENTCOM during the invasion and the top general for the region since July 2003—the one uniformed military commander who had been intimately involved in Iraq from the beginning and who was still at it—indicated he wanted to speak frankly. According to Murtha, Abizaid raised his hand for emphasis and held his thumb and forefinger a quarter of an inch from each other and said, We're that far apart.
42
rice had wanted Zelikow to go back to Iraq again in February 2006, but the Askariya Mosque bombing and crisis postponed the trip. He made it over finally and wrote Rice a nine-page SECRET/NODIS memo dated March 18.
Iraq is holding together in an uneasy balance, he reported. The Iraqi Army has been rebuilt and the insurgency has been contained, but the underlying rhythm and scale of insurgent attacks has actually been remarkably steady for more than a year. Neither side has gained decisive edge. The result is a lingering unstable equilibrium. Whatever positive momentum had been built from the December 2005 election was starting to dissipate, and people across the spectrum were worried that the center was no longer going to be able to hold.
To succeed, Zelikow argued, the Iraqis would have to pass three major tests in the coming months: establish a truly national government, check communal violence and develop a security bargain that can sustain the Shia and Sunni moderates, and get the new government off to a visibly promising start.
Zelikow addressed the question of whether the United States could live with Jafari. Though he wasn't anyone's first choic
e, Zelikow feared they would start thinking of him as an acceptable second choice. As far as Zelikow could tell, Jafari was incompetent. But he was a shrewd and tenacious back-alley politician who was dramatically prolonging the attempts to form a new government. We could say we have lost confidence in Jafari's ability to lead the country out of its current crisis, and that if he remains prime minister we would have to fundamentally reevaluate our position and strategy in Iraq because we would no longer be sufficiently confident that our existing strategies could succeed.
In other words, dump Jafari. It would be bold and risky. It was dangerous not to hedge bets in Iraqi politics.
Card was still trying to get himself replaced, as he went with the president and first lady for a weekend at Camp David. There was the usual gaggle of Bush family and friends. Card tried to get the president alone, without success. It wasn't that Bush was avoiding Card; it was that he was avoiding being alone with him. There were always people around. Bush kept saying, We'll talk. But every time Card tried to talk to Bush there were other people sitting with them.
On Sunday, Card left Camp David at 5:30 a.m. so he could attend his wife's church service.
I'm feeling lousy, he told his wife in a phone call from the car. I'm not going to make it to church. I'm going to go right home and go to bed. He did, and Monday morning he was as sick as a dog. Nonetheless he got to the White House at 5:30 a.m. By about 6:15 a.m., Dr. Tubb, the White House physician, was in Card's office performing a quick exam.
You've got the flu, and are highly contagious, Tubb said. It was influenza B.
Then I'm out of here. I'm going home. I don't want to see anybody. I don't want to see the president. I don't want to see anybody. Card packed up some papers and left for home. He stayed there for three days.
Our strategy is getting results, Bush said in his March 18 radio address from Camp David. Evidence of real progress was lost in the news reports and pictures of violence. In the past three years, Iraqis have gone from living under a brutal tyrant to liberation, sovereignty, free elections, a constitutional referendum, and last December, elections of a fully constitutional government. None of these addressed, let alone solved, the security problem, or the basic political and infrastructure problems.
At a press conference on March 21, Bush was asked about the statement of former Prime Minister Allawi that some 50 to 60 Iraqis were dying each day. If this is not civil war, then God knows what civil war is, Allawi had said.
Bush said he disagreed. Other voices—the Kurdish leader Talabani, General Casey, Khalilzad—saw it differently, he noted. The Iraqis took a look and decided not to go to civil war.
That morning in a town north of Baghdad, armed men had overrun a police station and courthouse, killing 17 policemen and freeing at least 20 prisoners. What was his reaction? Bush was asked. We have a plan for victory, he responded. I'm optimistic about being able to achieve a victory.
And what about retired Army Major General Paul D. Eaton, who had run the training of the Iraqi military for the first year and in an op-ed piece that weekend in The New York Times called Rumsfeld incompetent strategically, operationally and tactically and urged his resignation?
No, Bush replied, I don't believe he should resign. I think he's done a fine job. The embedding of U.S. troops with Iraqis had been a success.
On and on he went, 7,484 words, according to the transcript.
Card was back at the White House, Thursday, March 23, but it was not until the end of the day that he found the president alone. The two men walked out of the Oval Office to the Rose Garden. It was overcast and cool. Mr. President, he said, the string has run out. You know it and I know it. In one of his more inelegant summations, he added, And right now the string is flopping around.
Why? Why do you say that?
I know it.
No. I don't know why you say that.
Well, the string has run out.
On Friday, March 24, Card again accompanied Bush to Camp David. Bush finally said what Card knew. The time had come, probably.
It was sad. The end of an era for both.
Don't worry, Card said, realizing it was emotional for the president. This is the right thing to do. Just don't worry. It's the right thing, he said almost like a comforting parent. Don't give it another thought. It's the right thing, and it can happen easily. He too was emotional. I wouldn't have written the script this way, but it wasn't up to me to write the script.
The decision made, they turned as they had done so many times before to the questions of who should know, in what order, and when and how to tell the world.
They didn't have to discuss the why. Like so many of Bush's decisions, such as the decision to invade Iraq, there was a momentum, the big and the little incremental steps that suddenly converged. Card's resignation might buy Bush a little time. He needed a new direction.
The president said that Josh Bolten, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, had agreed to take Card's place. Though it was Card who had been pushing, it was a jolt to realize that Bush was a step ahead of him. Bolten, who had been Card's deputy for two years before going to the budget office, had a Stanford law degree and had worked for Goldman Sachs before joining the Bush campaign in 1999 as policy director.
I'd like to have the announcement sooner rather than later, Card said. As a courtesy I'd like to tell my kids and my siblings and three very close friends.
On Monday afternoon, Card flew to Cincinnati for a Lincoln Day dinner speech that had been long arranged. Before about 600 people, Card focused mostly on what had happened on September 14, 2001, three days after the 9/11 terror attacks, when Bush ordered a change in direction for the FBI, visited Ground Zero in Manhattan, and visited with families of those killed in the attacks.
The next morning, Tuesday, March 28, at 8:30 a.m. the president, Card and Bolten stepped into the Oval Office and announced the changes.
Card had a sense of relief mixed with the knowledge that he was leaving unfinished business. One of his great worries was that Iraq would be compared to Vietnam. There were 58,249 names on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington. One of Henry Kissinger's private criticisms of Bush was that he had no mechanism in place, or even an inclination, to consider the downsides of impending decisions. Alternative courses of action were rarely considered. As best Card could remember there had been some informal, blue-sky discussions at times along the lines of What could we do differently? But there had been no formal sessions to consider alternatives to staying in Iraq. To his knowledge there were no anguished memos bearing the names of Cheney, Rice, Hadley, Rumsfeld, the CIA, Card himself or anyone else saying let's examine alternatives, as had surfaced after the Vietnam era.
Card put it on the generals—Myers and Pace in the Pentagon, Abizaid and Casey in Iraq. If they had come forward and said to the president, It's not worth it or The mission can't be accomplished, Card was certain the president would have said, I'm not going to ask another kid to sacrifice for it.
Card was enough of a realist to see that there were two negative aspects to Bush's public persona that had come to define his presidency: incompetence and arrogance. Card did not believe that Bush was incompetent, and so he had to face the possibility that he himself, as Bush's chief of staff, might have been incompetent. In addition, he did not think the president was arrogant. But the personality and presentation—the marketing—of Bush had come across as arrogant. Maybe unfair, unjustified in Card's opinion, but there it was. He was leaving. And the man most responsible for the postwar troubles, the one who should have gone, Rumsfeld, was staying.
It's Iraq, Iraq, Iraq, Card told Bolten. Then comes the economy. As budget director and earlier as Card's deputy, Bolten had not been involved in Iraq. You don't have that luxury now.
I can count on Steve, Bolten said.
You can't do that. It's not fair to the president. You should take the time to be informed. And you shouldn't be informed by me. It should be a fresh look. I have been involved a
nd I do have biases, but you should give it a fresh look because the president needs to have someone take a fresh look at it.
I don't want to deal with that, Bolten said.
You don't have a choice.
In his first days as chief of staff, Bolten called in some of the senior U.S. government officials who knew Iraq.
Where will Iraq be in six months? he asked one.
About where it is today.
Since 2005, as far as Rice's and Rumsfeld's top aides could tell, Vice President Cheney no longer had a visible role in the management of Iraq. At the NSC and other meetings and discussions, he had one message for Rice: Got to win it. Once he told her, Do whatever you need to do with whatever resources to win it. It's too important to the war on terror. It's too important to our policies worldwide. This is not something you can do without maximum effort. Rice began calling him a 100-percenter. A 100 percent effort had to be made on Iraq. She and Cheney were in total agreement.
But Cheney was lost without Libby, many of the vice president's close associates felt. Libby had done so much of the preparation for the vice president's meetings and events, and so much of the hard work. He had been almost part of Cheney's brain.
As criticism of the administration's handling of Iraq continued to grow, and as doubt suffused many weaker supporters, Cheney told associates that it was the true test of leadership for Bush. Cheney said there were few politicians, even the great leaders, who could withstand political pressure. Most succumb, but Bush hadn't, and Cheney said he marveled at it.
Bob Woodward Page 53