Cheney relied more on his wife, Lynne, and daughter Liz for advice. They reinforced his sense he was right, and Cheney became increasingly removed from reality, some of his close friends felt. He was even convinced that the administration's two nearly universally accepted missteps—the handling of Hurricane Katrina and the abortive Supreme Court nomination of White House Counsel Harriet Miers—would turn out to be net positives for Bush.
Tony Blair was getting increasing heat for the Iraq War and was in serious political trouble. He proposed to Bush that their top foreign policy people travel together to Iraq to apply pressure to form a new government.
Bush shared Blair's impatience. What could be going on? How could this possibly be taking months? He raised Blair's idea with Rice that she and British Foreign Minister Jack Straw go.
That's a little much, she told the president. I don't think that's a very good idea. It could too easily be viewed as a 63-yard field goal attempt in the final seconds, desperate.
Well, they were desperate. It would send a strong message, Bush said. And somebody needed to go talk about their growing impatience.
Rice was in England on April 2 when she and Straw took off secretly for Iraq in her plane. Straw was sick so Rice gave him the one foldout bed and she stretched out on the floor near the burn bags for classified information and slept during the overnight flight. There was a torrential rainstorm when they arrived, so they could not take helicopters to the Green Zone. Rice's staff and the press piled into large Rhinos, a kind of armored Death Star vehicle that is a cross between a bus and a tank. Inside they were required to put on body armor and helmets. It was a little nerve-wracking knowing they were going to travel the BIAP highway— the so-called Highway of Death—into town.
Don't worry, Jim Wilkinson joked sarcastically, echoing Cheney's famous line, we're going to be greeted with flowers and sweets.
Rice and Straw rode in an armored Suburban. They promptly got stuck in traffic for half an hour at a checkpoint, and the chief of security's heart raced. As they edged along, Rice and Straw tried to figure out Jafari's state of mind. They were going to push him. His record over the last year had been one of drift. They needed him out. He was supported by the Shiites in the National Assembly by only a single vote—64-63— and he had no other support. The Kurds particularly wanted to get rid of him.
Later that afternoon, Rice and Straw met alone with Jafari. They wanted an intimate setting. It was going to be as tough a meeting as foreign diplomats might have with a leader of a sovereign state. Rice had some Iraqi cartoons that had been published in the Iraqi press ridiculing and mocking the failure to form a government. The Iraqi people are very frustrated, she said. Americans and President Bush are very frustrated and impatient.
Time to step aside, Rice said bluntly to Jafari. Straw repeated it. The British also have a parliamentary system, he noted, and he explained the importance of forming new governments swiftly because the public would otherwise get frustrated. Did they have a government? Did they have leaders?
Jafari would not commit.
Afterward at a press briefing, a reporter asked Rice what she would do if she didn't see a new government taking shape in five weeks.
I can assure you that I'm not going to wait for five weeks, she answered.
Meghan O'Sullivan, Hadley's Iraq chief, had gone on the trip with Rice and stayed behind after Rice and Straw left. Later, she and Khalilzad spent three hours with Jafari. Their message was simple: Under the Iraqi constitution you have to form a government with the support of the other communities—Sunni and Kurd. You don't seem to have that support, so what is your plan for moving forward?
Jafari said he believed he had more support than the public expression in statements and letters.
The problem for the United States and the United Kingdom was that Jafari's support came from the Iranians and the detested Moqtada al-Sadr. After the Samarra bombing on February 22, Jafari did not move smartly to clamp down on Moqtada's attacks on the Sunnis, which had been horrific, especially in Baghdad. The worry was that if Jafari was elected prime minister for four years he would become Moqtada's pawn. After all the years of effort, such an outcome—a prime minister beholden to a warlord like Moqtada—was unthinkable.
No matter how bad the news might get, few were as good as Rumsfeld at reframing the issues and debate. In April 2006, six retired generals publicly called for his resignation, citing missteps in Iraq, especially the failure to have enough troops. On Tuesday, April 18, 2006, Rumsfeld appeared for one of his periodic press conferences with General Pace by his side. There was much anticipation about his response to the very public critique that was being labeled The Revolt of the Generals.
Good afternoon, folks, Rumsfeld began. One of the interesting things about this city is that there are so many distractions that people sometimes lose track of how fortunate we are.
It was 64 years ago today that Jimmy Doolittle led the against-all-odds raid on Tokyo during the early days of World War II, he said, and added that it was also a hundred years ago today that San Francisco was nearly destroyed by an earthquake.
After five minutes of this, a reporter got to ask about the retired generals who had said that you've been dismissive and even contemptuous of the advice offered by senior military officers.
I kind of would prefer to let a little time walk over it, Rumsfeld said and added, as if their comments about him were their problem, I just am not inclined to be instantaneously judgmental about them.
Mr. Secretary, a reporter tried.
Coming into work today, Rumsfeld continued with his history lesson, I did think about something that happened 30 years ago, I think close to this month. I was secretary of defense. He described in detail how he overruled the Army's recommendation for the gun and engine on its Ml battle tank.
Well, you would have thought the world had ended, he continued. The sky fell. Can you imagine making that decision and breaking tradition for decades in this country? Can you imagine overturning what the service had proposed for a main battle tank? Well, it went on and on in the press, and it was a firestorm.
The people involved were good people, he added, and there were differences of views, and somebody needed to make a decision. For another five minutes, he went on to list all the changes he had made in recent years. Lots of his personnel moves had ruffled feathers, he said, such as making a Marine like General Jones the NATO commander or General Pace the chairman. A Marine as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the first time in history—imagine! What a stunning thing to do! Rumsfeld said.
A reporter tried to interrupt with a question.
I was asked a question and I'm going to take all the time I want! Rumsfeld said. There was laughter.
But I think it's important that we recognize that there's a lot of change going on, it's challenging for people, it's difficult for people. When asked again about the concerns of the six retired generals, he noted, We've got what, 6,000, 7,000 retired admirals and generals ... Who thinks they're going to be unanimous on anything?
In other words it was very hard to be defense secretary with so many backward-looking forces arrayed against him. After the press conference Rumsfeld met privately with a group of a dozen retired generals—none of whom had called for his resignation—and other outside advisers. It was supposed to be a close-hold, off-the-record session.
He was asked about his thinking on the number of troops used in the Iraq war plan.
The final war plan called for a ramp-up to about 400,000, Rumsfeld said from one end of the table. That's right, isn't it, Pete?
Yes, sir, General Pace said from the other end.
Then General Franks called me, Rumsfeld recounted, and said stop the force flow. He didn't need more. Franks was the combatant commander on the ground, so, Rumsfeld said, he went with his general's recommendation.
How convenient, thought one of the retired military men, Major General William L. Nash, who was now a senior fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations. At the press conference, Rumsfeld had presented himself as the bold, decisive change agent. When it came to one of the most important decisions during the war, Rumsfeld simply acquiesced to General Franks.
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jafari finally stepped aside on April 20, and the next day, the Iraqi parliament selected its first permanent prime minister—a stiff but cerebral Shiite named Jawad al-Maliki, 56. U.S. intelligence knew little about him. He had been in exile for 23 years, apparently bouncing between Syria and Iran, a former spokesman for the Shiite Party Al Dawa (The Call), and seemed to say all the right things. But to Western eyes, he was basically one of the faceless Dawa people.
The president spoke with Rice. He was aware of the tension between Rice and Rumsfeld. They were veering out of their lanes—she was looking at the military, and he was looking at the politics. I think it would be really good if you and Don went over, Bush said. Show that we've got the military and the political really linked up. And I could hear from both of you. You both get to look at both parts of it and I can hear from you simultaneously.
Four days later Rice and Rumsfeld were in Baghdad. They went over to Khalilzad's residence and met with Maliki at 4 p.m. on Wednesday, April 26. Maliki does not shake hands with women and so he just crossed his extended arm across his chest and heart in a common Arab gesture. Small, balding with a distinctive fluff of hair above his forehead, Maliki wasted no time on small talk. While he understands English, he spoke in Arabic and used a translator.
His first challenge, he said, according to a U.S. note-taker, was to address the sectarian mistrust among the Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds.
Second, he said, his biggest challenge was terrorism. If I succeed at the first, he said, then this will help the terrorism.
Maliki said he believed that in the first three months he was going to have to demonstrate improvements in services. The people need power, he said, meaning electricity.
On the security issue Maliki said, If I'm out on the highway, I'm not so pleased to see the police. He didn't trust the police, and even indicated that he disguised himself.
Rice said she personally understood. As a black child she had been raised in racially torn Birmingham, Alabama, in the early 1960s, she said. If the police came into my neighborhood, we didn't feel a sense of comfort. We felt a sense of fear. In the 1960s, the city's public safety commissioner had been Bull Connor, a notorious segregationist who had ordered the use of fire hoses and attack dogs on civil rights marchers. One of the most remarkable things for me was to go back to Birmingham last year and meet the black woman who is Bull Connor's successor. And so these things can change. She did not note that in Alabama it had taken decades.
Maliki seemed to warm to that picture and said he was going to try to reestablish the Ministry of the Interior, which oversaw the police. There are a lot of those people who are not bad people, he said. They're just not trained to do the job and we have to work on that. He hoped to have a security plan he was going to call Take Back Baghdad. If the new government could make the capital secure, he indicated, the rest of the country would follow. As he would be selecting ministers, he said, Ministers should be ministers for Iraq, not a political party.
Khalilzad was working his worry beads furiously, and Maliki noticed and started fumbling around for his own. He located them, pulled them out and was soon churning through them.
At some point, Rumsfeld said, we need to begin to talk about U.S. forces. It was in the context of patrols. He didn't use the word drawdown or withdrawal but everyone else, including Maliki, knew what he meant.
The prime minister-designate looked at the American secretary of defense as if he were crazy. It's way too early to be talking about that, he said.
At a dinner that night with the key Iraqis and Americans, Maliki looked around and said, This is the team that shoulders the responsibility of our country. This team represents all the elements of Iraqi society. We believe in the unity of Iraq and we're going to work on our national security.
Success depends on competency, he told Rice. During a lengthy discussion of the message they wanted to send, he said, The world looks at Iraq with two eyes, meaning both violence on television and the high hopes.
Afterward Rice had a one-on-one session with Maliki. The Iraqi people have had enough, Maliki said to her. And if we don't demonstrate we can govern, then we're not going to be able to do this. All will be lost if we can't demonstrate we can govern.
Rice was surprised. It was the first time she had met an Iraqi leader who took things upon himself and wasn't immediately asking what the United States would do. She said there was a time when the confidence of the American people was gone as a result of the Great Depression in the 1930s. Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal had created the impression that something was going to be different. The New Deal, she said, didn't make people's lives better overnight. But they felt somebody cared. They felt someone was totally committed and trying to get the job done and get them to work. It was a message of hope that somebody was in charge and that life was going to be different.
What would be the one thing he could do? Maliki asked. Would it be delivering electricity? Would that give people a sense that things were different?
Rice was impressed. She took him over to see Jim Wilkinson, her communications adviser.
This is the man I was telling you about, Rice said to Maliki. This is Jim, and I'm going to leave him to help you. Wilkinson had headed government transitions, including hers to the State Department and in places ranging from Mongolia to Palestine. He'd studied Arabic for a year after 9/11, and she said he knew how to help with the management and structural issues of a new office down to the nuts-and-bolts questions of office space and phones. He looks very young but he has a lot of experience in management and policy and can really help you. And I'm going to leave him here as long as you want.
This came as a surprise to Wilkinson, who had no warning and had brought clothes for only a few days.
You're the professor, I'm the student, he told Maliki in Arabic. Maliki laughed and gave his new adviser a hug.
Rice and Rumsfeld met with American reporters.
You'll have to fly in secret, a reporter from Bloomberg News said. What does that say about prospects for restoring security and stability here and the true state of the security situation here?
It was at the heart of one of the disagreements between Rice and Rumsfeld. Rice turned to Rumsfeld. Security was his portfolio. Ten seconds of silence passed before Rumsfeld spoke, glaring at the reporter.
I guess I don't think it says anything about it, he answered abruptly. He said he was here to meet with his generals. But I just don't see anything to your question.
Rice interjected, Obviously, the security situation will continue to take our attention and the attention of the Iraqis. But we've always said, and I feel it even more strongly today, that the terrorists are ultimately going to be defeated by a political process here.
The next question was about how to diminish sectarian influence in the Iraqi military, police and militias. Exactly how do you accomplish the objective?
I guess the first thing I have to say is: We don't. The Iraqis do, Rumsfeld said. It's their country. It's a sovereign country. This is not a government that has an interim in front of it or a transition in front of it. Other countries have dealt with these issues and done them in a reasonably orderly way and over a period of time in a manner that was, in many instances, without much violence. So it's possible that these things can get done.
Rumsfeld wrote or doodled with his pen or stared at the ceiling as Rice carried the rest of the press conference.
Rice knew that it was inevitable now that her legacy too would be judged by what happened in Iraq. She briefed Bush about her meeting with Maliki when she returned, saying she was encouraged. This was the first Iraqi leader, she reported, who had said, This is on me.
Wilkinson went to meet Maliki at his office in the international press center. There was no
air-conditioning, and it was sweltering. The first order of business, however, was Maliki's personal security. After the three-year struggle to bring democracy to Iraq, the symbolism of the assassination of the new Iraqi prime minister would be too much to bear. Wilkinson introduced Maliki to the Navy SEAL team that would be assigned to guard him around the clock.
Pick your own management model, Wilkinson suggested. There's the Iraqi way. There's the American and Western way. And there's a Maliki way of doing business. I urge you to use the Maliki way.
They spent two and a half hours with computerized charts and diagrams—Maliki seemed very technology-savvy—putting together an arrangement to oversee the cabinet ministers, a personal office, and offices for media, finance, protocol and policy advisers. At Maliki's request, Wilkinson wrote job descriptions for each position and came up with a written plan for his first five days in office after he formally took office the next month. He noticed that Maliki had five cell phones.
Wilkinson had to get Khalilzad to intervene to get security for Maliki's offices. Maliki had appointed a spokesman, Dr. Salah Abdulrazzak, who lived outside the Green Zone with his wife and two young children. Not surprisingly, he feared for their lives. What can I do? the new spokesman asked Wilkinson, who took him to the Al Rashid Hotel.
We need to get this guy a room for tonight—he and his family, said Wilkinson.
Well, that would take a while.
He's moving in here tonight.
He did the next day.
Maliki's chief of staff and spokesman needed credentials to get into the Green Zone.
Can you get these guys badges? Maliki asked Wilkinson.
Sure, Wilkinson was told on his first inquiry, but it will take six to eight weeks. Wilkinson threw a fit and got Khalilzad involved. Maliki's two men soon had permanent badges.
The next days were occupied with the mundane. Maliki's office didn't have computers. Wilkinson found some and had them driven over and installed. We need phones, Maliki said. So the embassy team installed phones. At one point, Wilkinson had to send over pens and paper.
Bob Woodward Page 54