Afgantsy
Page 39
Afghans told these tales not only to Russians, whom they might have wanted to flatter, but to other visitors, whom they did not. When I visited Afghanistan in September 2008—a national of one of the foreign countries now fighting there—I was told by almost every Afghan I met that things were better under the Russians. The Russians were not so stand-offish as the Americans, who had no interest in Afghanistan itself, and who looked like Martians with their elaborate equipment, their menacing body armour, and their impenetrable Ray-Bans when they briefly emerged from the high walls behind which they barricaded themselves. The Russians, I was told, had built the elements of industry, whereas now most of the aid money simply ended up in the wrong pockets in the wrong countries. In the Russian time everyone had had work; now things were getting steadily worse. The last Communist president, Najibullah, had been one of the best of Afghanistan’s recent rulers: more popular than Daud, the equal of Zahir Shah. Video recordings of Najibullah’s speeches were being sold round Kabul, with their warnings—which turned out to be true—that there would be civil war if he were overthrown. People were discreetly dismissive of President Karzai, whom they said was a puppet of the foreigners. Sher Ahmad Maladani, a mujahedin commander in Herat who fought the Communists and the Russians for a decade and the Taliban after them, told me that if Najibullah instead of Karmal had taken over in 1979, the country would not be in its present mess. He too preferred the Russians. The Russians were strong and brave, he said. They fought man to man on the ground, and they used their weapons only when their enemy was armed. They never killed women and children. But the Americans were afraid to fight on the ground and their bombing was indiscriminate.
As history much of this was travesty. But it did seem to indicate that the latest attempt to help the Afghans to help themselves was having little more success than its predecessor.
Leaders take their countries into foreign wars for reasons of ambition, greed, moral or messianic fervour, or on a calculation of national advantage which may or may not be flawed.
The generals manage the wars as well as they can. The best try to husband the lives of their soldiers and to keep them under proper control. When it is all over, they ransack the archives and write their memoirs, to carve out their niche in history, to justify the decisions they took, and sometimes to take a sideswipe at a former colleague.
The soldiers who do the actual fighting come home having seen and done terrible things which return to haunt them. The stories of heroism and comradeship help them to manage their memories and give meaning to what they have been through. Some claim that the war years were the best of their lives. Many more say nothing, and go to their graves without telling even their nearest and dearest what it was really like.
So it is after all wars. So it was after the Soviet war in Afghanistan.
ANNEXES
– ANNEX ONE –
Timeline
1717 Peter the Great sends an expedition to Central Asia. It fails.
1747 Ahmad Shah Abdali elected ruler of what becomes modern Afghan state.
1801 British take Peshawar from Afghans, later give it to Sikhs.
1835 Jan Witkiewicz, first Russian envoy to reach Kabul.
1838–42 First Anglo-Afghan War.
1878–80 Second Anglo-Afghan War.
1880–1901 Abdul Rahman Khan takes power, greatly strengthens state and army.
1901–19 Habibullah succeeds Abdur Rahman. Assassinated.
1919–29 Amanullah succeeds Habibullah. Exiled.
1919 Third Anglo-Afghan War.
1921 Afghan–Soviet Friendship Treaty signed.
1929–33 Nadir Shah, Amanullah’s uncle, takes power. Assassinated.
1933–73 Zahir Shah succeeds (dies in exile in 2007).
1959 President Eisenhower visits Afghanistan.
1965 Afghan Communist Party founded.
1973 Daud proclaims himself President.
April 1978 Afghan Communists seize power, kill Daud.
March 1979 Anti-Communist rising in Herat.
September 1979 President Taraki arrested and killed by Prime Minister Amin.
December 1979 Soviets enter Afghanistan. Amin killed, replaced by Babrak Karmal.
January 1980 UN condemns Soviet invasion.
February 1980 Massive demonstrations in Kabul. Soviets begin major operations.
November 1982 Leonid Brezhnev dies, succeeded by Yuri Andropov.
February 1983 UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar discusses withdrawal with Andropov.
February 1984 Andropov dies, succeeded by Konstantin Chernenko.
March 1985 Chernenko dies, succeeded by Mikhail Gorbachev.
October 1985 Politburo agrees troops should leave Afghanistan within eighteen months.
February 1986 Gorbachev tells Soviet Party Congress that troops will leave Afghanistan.
May 1986 Karmal replaced by Najibullah.
September 1986 First Stingers are fired, down three helicopters.
January 1987 Najibullah announces ‘National Reconciliation’.
December 1987 Operation Magistral relieves Khost.
December 1987 Gorbachev and Reagan discuss Afghanistan.
14 April 1988 Agreements for Soviet withdrawal signed in Geneva.
May 1988 40th Army begins withdrawal.
15 February 1989 Last Soviet troops leave.
April 1992 President Najibullah overthrown.
August 1992 Russian Embassy evacuated from Kabul.
September 1996 Taliban captures Kabul and kills Najibullah.
9 September 2001 Mujahedin leader Ahmad Shah Masud assassinated by Al Qaeda.
11 September 2001 Twin Towers destroyed in New York.
December 2001 Northern Alliance, backed by US, drives out Taliban.
– ANNEX TWO –
Order of Battle of the 40th Army
Formations mentioned in the text are marked *.
Divisions
5th Guards Motor-rifle Division (Shindand)*
12th Guards Motor-rifle Regiment (Herat)*
101st Motor-rifle Regiment (Herat)*
371st Guards Motor-rifle Regiment (Shindand)
24th Guards Tank Regiment (Shindand)
1060th Artillery Regiment (Shindand)
1122nd (later 1008th) Antiaircraft Rocket Regiment (Shindand)
650th Guards Reconnaissance Battalion (Shindand)
68th Guards Independent Engineer-sapper Battalion (Shindand)
108th Motor-rifle Division (Kabul, later Bagram)*
177th Motor-rifle Regiment (Jabal-Ussuraj)
180th Motor-rifle Regiment (Kabul)*
181st Motor-rifle Regiment (Kabul)
1074th Artillery Regiment (Kabul)
1415th (later 1049th) Antiaircraft Rocket Regiment (Kabul)
781st Independent Reconnaissance Battalion (Bagram)
271st Independent Engineer-sapper Battalion (Bagram)
201st Motor-rifle Divison (Kunduz)*
122nd Motor-rifle Regiment (Tashkurgan)
149th Guards Motor-rifle Regiment (Kunduz)
395th Motor-rifle Regiment (Pul-i Khumri)
234th Tank Regiment (Kunduz)
998th Artillery Regiment (Kunduz)
990th Antiaircraft Rocket Regiment (Kunduz)
783rd Independent Reconnaissance Battalion (Kunduz)
541st Independent Engineer-sapper Battalion (Kunduz)
103rd Guards Air Assault Division (Kabul airport)*
317th Guards Parachute Assault Regiment (Kabul airport)
350th Guards Parachute Assault Regiment (Kabul airport)
357th Guards Parachute Assault Regiment (1980–86: Bala Hissar fortress; 1986–9: Kabul airport)
1179th Guards Artillery Regiment (Kabul airport)
62nd Guards Independent Self-propelled Artillery Battalion (Kabul airport)
130th Guards Independent Engineer-sapper Battalion (Kabul airport)
105th Independent Antiaircraft Rocket-artillery Battalion (Kabul airport)
Independent Brigades and Regiments
56th Guards Independent Airborne Assault Brigade (Kunduz)*
66th Independent Motor-rifle Brigade/106th Motor-rifle Regiment (Jalalabad)*
70th Guards Independent Motor-rifle Brigade/373rd Guards Motor-rifle Regiment (Kandahar)
191st Independent Motor-rifle Regiment (Pul-i Khumri/Ghazni)
345th Guards Independent Parachute Assault Regiment (Bagram)*
860th Independent Motor-rifle Regiment (Faisabad)*
264th Independent Special Forces Regiment (Radio and Radiotechnical Intelligence) (Kabul)
15th Special Forces Brigade (Jalalabad)*
22nd Special Forces Brigade (Asadabad)*
58th Automobile Brigade/159th (Engineering) Road-construction Brigade (Kabul)
59th Logistics Brigade
276th Pipelaying Brigade (Doshi)*
278th Road-security Brigade (Doshi)
28th Artillery Regiment/Rocket Artillery Regiment (Shindand)
45th Engineering-sapper Regiment (Charikar)
103rd Independent Communications Regiment (Kabul)
Establishment of Motor-rifle Units
The establishment of motor-rifle divisions and their subordinate formations and units varied from time to time and place to place. Formations and units were almost never up to their establishment in Afghanistan. The following information is therefore not definitive.
Motor-rifle Division: 12,000 men—287 tanks, 150 BMPs (infantry fighting vehicles), 221 BTRs (armoured personnel carriers), 6 rocket launchers, 18 130mm heavy assault guns, 18 anti-tank guns, 126 self-propelled and towed howitzers, 96 mortars and multiple rocket launchers, 46 mobile anti-aircraft missile complexes, 16 self-propelled automatic anti-aircraft guns.
Independent Motor-rifle Regiment: 2,198 officers and men, 132 BMPs, 40 tanks, 18 122mm self-propelled howitzers, 264 vehicles.
Motor-rifle Battalion: 481 men, 41 BMPs.
Motor-rifle Company: 101 men, 11 BMPs.
Motor-rifle Platoon: 30 men, 3 BMPs.
Army Aviation
The 40th Army was unique in having its own integral air force. It consisted of two combat air regiments and one combat squadron, a mixed air regiment, three independent helicopter regiments, a helicopter detachment, and three independent helicopter squadrons, a total of 60 combat aircraft, 19 transport aircraft, and 253 helicopters. The aircraft shared their bases in Kabul, Shindand, Bagram, and Kandahar with Afghan air-force units.
The 40th Army was also supported by long-range bombers flying from bases in the Soviet Union.
Sources: ‘Komandiry soedinenii i chastei 40 Armii’, compiled by A. Volkov (http://www.rsva-ural.ru/library/mbook.php?cid64); V. Korolev, ‘Uroki voiny v Afganistane 1979–1989 godov’ (http://www.sdrvdv.org/node/159); ‘ ’ (http://pressa.budet.ru/article/detail.php?ID47643); ‘Dalnyaya Aviatsia Rossii’ (www.sinopa.ee/davia003/dav03.htm); information kindly provided by Alexander Kartsev.
– ANNEX THREE –
The Alliance of Seven and Its Leaders
There were more than seventy groups and parties opposing the Kabul government, most of little significance. The seven major parties which operated out of Pakistan made several abortive attempts to unite in order to direct the battle inside Afghanistan and to operate more effectively at the UN and elsewhere. The Pakistan government encouraged these efforts at unification, as did the Americans, Saudis, Chinese, and Muslim clerics both inside and outside Afghanistan. In May 1985 the seven formed themselves into a loosely organised alliance. This did not solve the underlying problem. The seven remained rivals rather than partners, and after the Russians left Afghanistan in 1989 the tensions between them broke out into open civil war. Another alliance, of less importance, operated from Iran.
Most of the seven parties originated in the university politics of the 1970s. They fell into two categories: Islamist and conservative nationalist. The Islamists were Hezb-i Islami (Gulbuddin), Hezb-i Islami (Khalis), Ittihad-i Islami Baraye Azadi Afghanistan, and Jamiat-i Islami Afghanistan. The traditionalists were Mahazi-Melli-Islamiye-Afghanistan, Jahar-i Nejar-i Melli, and Harakat-i Enqelab-i Islami (Islamic Revolution Movement). All were Sunnis and all were Pushtun, except Jamiat-i Islami, who were Tajiks. The conservative Islamists in the Pakistani military intelligence organisation, the ISI, favoured the three Pushtun Islamist parties, who got most of the money and weapons coming from the Americans and others.
Jamiat-i Islami and its effective field commander, Ahmad Shah Masud, were not well regarded by the Pakistanis because they were not Pushtuns and were unwilling to submit to Pakistani or Pushtun direction. In consequence they received comparatively little support from Pakistan or the Americans. They were the favourites of the British and French, who had, however, far fewer resources with which to support them.
These organisations fought among themselves during the war, and especially after it was over. In one of the most notorious incidents, in July 1989, after the Soviet war was over, Sayyed Jamal, one of Hekmatyar’s commanders, ambushed and murdered thirty of Masud’s men in northern Afghanistan.
Source: The information in this annex is based on G. Dorronosoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present (New York, 2005), p. 152.
– ANNEX FOUR –
Indo-China, Vietnam, Algeria, Afghanistan: A Comparison
In Indo-China and Algeria the French fought colonial wars in a vain attempt to preserve their empire. By contrast the American wars in Vietnam and South-East Asia and the Soviet war in Afghanistan were wars of intervention against a background of Cold War rivalry. But despite the differences, all these wars have much in common. They were conducted by sophisticated modern armies against determined guerrilla forces fighting on their own territory against a background of vicious civil war. The outsiders had superior weapons and were able to inflict devastating destruction, destroying towns, villages, crops, and animals, and killing disproportionate numbers of enemy soldiers and civilians. And yet all these wars ended in failure.
The figures for French, American, and Soviet losses in personnel and equipment are reliable: sophisticated armies keep accurate records of their casualties.
The figures for military and civilian losses among the Vietnamese, the Cambodians, the Laotians, the Algerians, and the Afghans are almost wholly unreliable: nobody on either side had the time or the interest to count the dead. In all these wars large numbers of casualties were inflicted by all sides in the civil wars that were being fought in parallel; and large numbers were inflicted in the revenge killings which followed the formal ending of hostilities.
But an extremely rough calculation indicates that the French lost one soldier for every eight Vietnamese who died in the Indo-Chinese war from 1945 to 1954. One French soldier or civilian died for every twenty-two Algerians in the war of 1954–62. Between twenty-seven and sixty-eight Vietnamese may have died for each American between 1959 and 1975. In Afghanistan somewhere between forty and 100 Afghans may have died for each Soviet soldier killed.
French Union military casualties in Indo-China were 75,867: this figure includes French colonial troops. Figures for Vietnamese deaths are estimated at 500–600,000.
The French lost 17,456 soldiers and 2,788 civilians in Algeria; about 141,000 Algerian fighters were killed; estimates of the number of civilians killed during the war range from 30,000 to 300,000; perhaps 150,000 more Algerians died in revenge killings after the war; Algerian sources have claimed that up to a million Algerians died as a result of the wars; the French deny this.
US military casualties in Vietnam were 58,260 killed, and missing. The North Vietnamese suffered 1.1 million combat deaths, the South 266,000; estimates of civilian deaths range from 361,000 to 2 million.
15,051 Soviet soldiers died in Afghanistan. For Afghan civilian casualties, Dr Antonio Giustozzi has suggested a low figure of 600,000; a widely accepted figure is 1–1.5 million; General Lyakhovski gives the highest figure of 2.5 million, but he gives no source.
&n
bsp; Sources: ‘Secondary Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century’ (http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat3.htm) contains tables and bibliographical references for a wide range of estimates of casualties in Indo-China and Algeria, and for the casualties in the civil wars and mass repressions that followed the American departure from Vietnam; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam_War_casualties) gives figures, with references, for losses on both sides in the US war in Vietnam; see also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam_War_casualties#United_States_Armed_Forces); for statistical information about casualties of the Vietnam War see the National Archive (http://www.archives.gov/research/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics.html); G. Krivosheev, Rossia i SSSR v voinakh XX veka: Poteri vooruzhennykh sil (Moscow, 2001), is reliable on Soviet losses; Dr Antonio Giustozzi, conversation, London, 5 December 2010; A. Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana (Moscow, 2009), p. 1018.
NOTES
Prologue
1 Thucydides, Book II, 8.
2 W. Olney, ‘Shiloh’ as Seen by a Private Soldier: A Paper Read before California Commandery of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, May 31, 1889 (Kessinger Publishing, Whitefish, Mont., 2007).
3 V. Krivenko, Ekipazh mashiny boevoi (St Petersburg, 2004), p. 380.
4 Unnamed Communist, quoted in R. Sikorski, Dust of the Saints: A Journey to Herat in Time of War (New York, 1990), pp.180–83.