Years of Upheaval

by Henry Kissinger

  It goes without saying that as is true with other states, there are cases in the USSR, and there may be such cases in the future, where citizens are denied permission to go abroad for reasons of state security.

  In reply to certain supplementary questions, the Soviet government provided the following information:

  a. The above statement should be regarded as an official one.

  b. The phrase in the statement that “only such normal duties — which were also collected before the decree of August 3, 1972 — are being collected and will be collected” has no time limit attached to it, and any interpretation implying the existence of a time limit would not correspond to the position of the Soviet Government.

  c. The exemption from the requirement to refund state educational expenses is being granted on the basis of the terms of the decree of August 3, 1972, itself and of a subsequent decision taken in accordance with that decree by the USSR Council of Ministers. In the Soviet view, this situation obviates the need for suspending or repealing the decree of August 3, 1972.

  d. The President and members of the Administration are free to transmit the contents of the official Soviet statement and these additional explanatory points to the Congress.

  11. For a detailed discussion of these and other aspects of SALT I, see White House Years, especially Chapter XXVIII.

  12. Ibid., pp. 1130–1131.

  13. Compare the McNamara Posture Statement of February 24, 1965, with Secretary Clark Clifford’s Posture Statement of January 22, 1968, p. 94.

  14. See White House Years, pp. 1152, 1251.

  15. The final text signed in Washington on June 22, 1973, read as follows:

  AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

  The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

  Guided by the objectives of strengthening world peace and international security,

  Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for mankind,

  Proceeding from the desire to bring about conditions in which the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war anywhere in the world would be reduced and ultimately eliminated,

  Proceeding from their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations regarding the maintenance of peace, refraining from the threat or use of force, and the avoidance of war, and in conformity with the agreements to which either Party has subscribed,

  Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972,

  Reaffirming that the development of relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is not directed against other countries and their interests,

  Have agreed as follows:

  ARTICLE I

  The United States and the Soviet Union agree that an objective of their policies is to remove the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons.

  Accordingly, the Parties agree that they will act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, as to avoid military confrontations, and as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them and between either of the Parties and other countries.

  ARTICLE II

  The Parties agree, in accordance with Article I and to realize the objective stated in that Article, to proceed from the premise that each Party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the other Party, against the allies of the other Party and against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security. The Parties agree that they will be guided by these considerations in the formulation of their foreign policies and in their actions in the field of international relations.

  ARTICLE III

  The Parties undertake to develop their relations with each other and with other countries in a way consistent with the purposes of this Agreement.

  ARTICLE IV

  If at any time relations between the Parties or between either Party and other countries appear to involve the risk of a nuclear conflict, or if relations between countries not parties to this Agreement appear to involve the risk of nuclear war between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or between either Party and other countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, acting in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, shall immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to avert this risk.

  ARTICLE V

  Each Party shall be free to inform the Security Council of the United Nations, the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Governments of allied or other countries of the progress and outcome of consultations initiated in accordance with Article IV of this Agreement.

  ARTICLE VI

  Nothing in this Agreement shall affect or impair:

  (a) the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as envisaged by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,

  (b) the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, including those relating to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, and

  (c) the obligations undertaken by either Party towards its allies or other countries in treaties, agreements, and other appropriate documents.

  ARTICLE VII

  This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.

  ARTICLE VIII

  This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

  DONE at Washington on June 22, 1973, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

  16. See White House Years, pp. 1222–1229; Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 613–614.

  17. The Middle East section of the US-Soviet summit communiqué of June 24, 1973, read as follows:

  The parties expressed their deep concern with the situation in the Middle East and exchanged opinions regarding ways of reaching a Middle East settlement.

  Each of the parties set forth its position on this problem.

  Both parties agreed to continue to exert their efforts to promote the quickest possible settlement in the Middle East. This settlement should be in accordance with the interests of all states in the area, be consistent with their independence and sovereignty and should take into due account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.

  VIII

  INDOCHINA: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

  1. See Chapter II, note 11.

  2. See Chapter II, note 4.

  3. See Spencer Rich, “No Legal Bar Is Found To Resuming Warfare,” Washington Post, April 9, 1973. Secretary Rogers’s memorandum on the legality of air operations is at note 21 below.

  4. See, e.g., McGeorge Bundy, “Vietnam, Watergate and Presidential Powers,” Foreign Affairs 58, no. 2 (Winter 1979–1980): 397–407.

  5. President Kennedy’s private assurances to the President of Pakistan are listed in White House Years, p. 895 and note 7 on p. 1488. In 1963, messages from President Kennedy to Crown Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia pledged to send American military forces to aid Saudi Arabia against threats from Nasser’s Egypt during the Yemen crisis. See Christopher J. McMullen, Resolution of the Yemen Crisis, 1963: A Case Study in Mediation (Washington: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1980), pp. 9–10, 13, 20.

  6. Among the many public statements pledging US enforcement of the Paris Agreement were the following:

  President Nixon’s Address to the Nation, January 23, 1973:

  [T]he terms of the agreement must be scrupulously adhered to. We shall do everything the agreement requires of us, and we shall expect the other parties to do everything it requires of them. We shall also expect other interested nations to help insure that the agreement is carried out and peace is maintained.

  Dr. Kiss
inger’s Press Conference, January 24, 1973:

  QUESTION: If a peace treaty is violated and if the ICC proves ineffective, will the United States ever again send troops into Vietnam?

  KISSINGER: I don’t want to speculate on hypothetical situations that we don’t expect to arise. . . .

  Deputy Assistant Secretary William Sullivan on NBC-TV’s Meet the Press, January 28, 1973:

  QUESTION: There’s also reports from Saigon today, Mr. Ambassador, that the United States has given official but private assurances to Saigon that we would intervene militarily again if Hanoi commits serious violations. Just what is our commitment? What would we do if a cease-fire breaks down?

  SULLIVAN: I am not going to speculate on that, Mr. Rosenfeld. I think you have seen Dr. Kissinger’s statement concerning the method in which the agreement has stipulated the requirements for carrying out this accord. There are no inhibitions upon us, but we are not going to discuss any hypothetical questions at this time about what the future prospects may bring.

  Dr. Kissinger’s Interview on CBS News with Marvin Kalb, February 1, 1973:

  KALB: Dr. Kissinger, I think what I was trying to get at is what happens — and I suppose this question must be asked. In the best of all possible worlds the cease-fire is going to hold. In the world that we live in it may not. President Thieu said in an interview tonight on CBS that he would never call upon American air power to go back. And Ambassador Sullivan said only last Sunday that there are no inhibitions — I believe were his words — on the use of this air power. Is that correct?

  KISSINGER: That is legally correct.

  KALB: Politically and diplomatically?

  KISSINGER: We have the right to do this. The question is very difficult to answer in the abstract. It depends on the extent of the challenge, on the nature of the threat, on the circumstances in which it arises; and it would be extremely unwise for a responsible American official at this stage, when the peace is in the process of being established, to give a checklist about what the United States will or will not do in every circumstance that is likely to arise.

  For the future that we can foresee, the North Vietnamese are not in a position to launch an overwhelming attack on the South, even if they violate the agreement. What happens after a year or two has to be seen in the circumstances which then exist.

  Most of the violations that one can now foresee should be handled by the South Vietnamese.

  KALB: So that for the next year or two, if I understand you right, there would be no need for a reinvolvement of American military power?

  KISSINGER: Marvin, we did not end this war in order to look for an excuse to reenter it, but it would be irresponsible for us at this moment to give a precise checklist to potential aggressors as to what they can or cannot safely do.

  President Nixon’s News Conference, March 15, 1973:

  I will only suggest this: that we have informed the North Vietnamese of our concern about this infiltration and of what we believe it to be, a violation of the cease-fire, the cease-fire and the peace agreement. Our concern has also been expressed to other interested parties. And I would only suggest that based on my actions over the past four years, that the North Vietnamese should not lightly disregard such expressions of concern when they are made with regard to a violation. That is all I will say about it.

  Under Secretary for Political Affairs William Porter, speech in Grand Rapids, March 21, 1973:

  President Nixon has made clear our concern at North Vietnamese infiltration of large amounts of equipment into South Vietnam. If it continued, this infiltration could lead to serious consequences. The North Vietnamese should not lightly disregard our expressions of concern.

  President Nixon’s Address to the Nation, March 29, 1973:

  There are still some problem areas. The provisions of the agreement requiring an accounting for all missing in action in Indochina, the provisions with regard to Laos and Cambodia, the provisions prohibiting infiltration from North Vietnam into South Vietnam have not been complied with. We have and will continue to comply with the agreement. We shall insist that North Vietnam comply with the agreement. And the leaders of North Vietnam should have no doubt as to the consequences if they fail to comply with the agreement.

  Defense Secretary Richardson on NBC-TV’s Meet the Press, April 1, 1973:

  RON NESSEN: Mr. Secretary, can you say that the United States will never under any circumstances send military forces back to Indochina?

  RICHARDSON: No, I cannot give any categorical assurance, Mr. Nessen. Obviously the future holds possible developments that are unforeseeable now. But certainly we very much hope that this will not be necessary.

  NESSEN: And if I ask you the same question about, can you say whether the United States will never bomb again in North or South Vietnam, your answer would be the same?

  RICHARDSON: Yes, but of course our hope and expectation is that the cease-fire agreements will be observed.

  NESSEN: President Nixon has warned several times North Vietnam that it should have no doubt about the consequences if it violates the cease-fire. What does he mean, what are the consequences?

  RICHARDSON: This is obviously something that cannot be spelled out in advance, Mr. Nessen. . . .

  They have, I think, had some reason, looking back over the past, to know that the President has been willing to do what has been necessary in order to bring about a negotiated solution and to bring an end to the war.

  Defense Secretary Richardson to the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 2, 1973:

  QUESTION: There are reports out of South Vietnam today that President Thieu of South Vietnam says that the United States and the South Vietnamese Government have an agreement that if there is an offensive, that if the North Vietnamese do come in, that the United States will come back with its airplanes and with its air support? Do we have such a commitment?

  RICHARDSON: This is a question simply of very possible contingencies. I wouldn’t want to try to amplify on anything he said or to subtract from it. . . .

  We, of course, continue to adhere to the proposition that the cease-fire agreements not only have been signed but are in the interest of all the parties and our objective is to assure so far as is possible that they are carried out. . . .

  Our job is to reinforce the considerations that will, we trust, lead them to carry out the agreement. . . .

  If he [the President] had the constitutional power to carry on the war while winding it down, we think it’s a natural extension of this to say that he has the constitutional power to take whatever incidental steps that are now required in order to assure that the ceasefire agreements are carried out.

  US-GVN Communiqué (San Clemente), April 3, 1973:

  Both Presidents, while acknowledging that progress was being made toward military and political settlements in South Vietnam, nevertheless viewed with great concern infiltrations of men and weapons in sizeable numbers from North Vietnam into South Vietnam in violation of the Agreement on Ending the War, and considered that actions which would threaten the basis of the agreement would call for appropriately vigorous reactions. They expressed their conviction that all the provisions of the Agreement, including in particular those concerning military forces and military supplies, must be faithfully implemented if the cease-fire is to be preserved and the prospects for a peaceful settlement are to be assured. President Nixon stated in this connection that the United States views violations of any provision of the Agreement with great and continuing concern. . . .

  Defense Secretary Elliot Richardson, interviewed by newsmen prior to his appearance before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, April 3, 1973:

  QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, under what conditions might we have to begin bombing in support of the South Vietnamese?

  RICHARDSON: It would be one of those questions that it’s impossible to answer in general terms. We can only see what develops, and hopefully, what will develop is the full and complete implementation of the cease-fire
agreements.

  QUESTION: But is it possible that we will have to bomb either North Vietnam or in support of the South Vietnamese army again?

  RICHARDSON: It’s certainly something we cannot rule out at this time.

  Dr. Kissinger’s Press Conference, May 2, 1973:

  QUESTION: You say if North Vietnam does not obey the call for an honorable ceasefire, it would risk revived confrontation with us. Could you spell out a little bit more clearly what you mean there [in the Foreign Policy Report]?

  KISSINGER: . . . Now, on the confrontation, we have made clear that we mean to have the agreement observed. We are now engaged in an effort to discuss with the North Vietnamese what is required to bring about the strict implementation of the agreement. We have evèry intention and every incentive to make certain that our side of the agreement is maintained, and to use our influence wherever we can to bring about the strict implementation of the agreement.

  But the United States cannot sign a solemn agreement and within weeks have major provisions violated without our making an attempt to indicate it. Now, the particular measures: Some of them are, of course, obvious and we would prefer, as we state in the report and as we have stated publicly many times, to move our relationship with the North Vietnamese toward normalization, and to start a process which would accelerate, such as other processes normally have.

  So the general thrust of this paragraph is that the tension existing between us certainly cannot ease as rapidly as we want if the agreement is not observed.

  President’s Foreign Policy Report, May 3, 1973:

  We hope that the contending factions will now prefer to pursue their objectives through peaceful means and political competition rather than through the brutal and costly methods of the past. This choice is up to them. We shall be vigilant concerning violations of the Agreement. . . .