6. Kalb and Kalb, Kissinger, p. 509.
7. See Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger, pp. 51–61.
XIV
PERSIAN GULF INTERLUDE
1. See Norman Podhoretz, “AWACS: The Ghost of Presidents Past,” Washington Post, April 26, 1981, p. C7.
2. See, e.g., Nixon’s foreign policy report, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: Building for Peace, February 25, 1971, Part I, “The Nixon Doctrine.”
XVI
TROUBLES WITH ALLIES
1. See the Christian Science Monitor, October 26, 1973.
2. Ibid., October 11 and October 30, 1973.
3. See the New York Times, October 15, 1973, p. 16.
4. Christian Science Monitor, October 29, 1973.
5. Paul Kemezis, “Common Market Said to Resist U.S. on Joint Statement,” New York Times, November 9, 1973.
6. See Nan Robertson, “French Criticize U.S.-Soviet Role,” New York Times, November 13, 1973.
7. Quoted in David Binder, “U.S. and 3 Allies Try to Heal Rift,” New York Times, November 3, 1973.
8. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Mideast: Who Won?” Washington Post, November 21, 1973.
9. See Ezra Vogel, Japan as Number One (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979). See also Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970).
10. See White House Years, pp. 336–340.
11. Masayoshi Ohira, Brush Strokes: Moments from My Life (Tokyo: Foreign Press Center, 1979), pp. 119–120.
12. Ibid., p. 118.
XVII
THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
1. The text of the Algiers Arab summit communiqué of November 28, 1973, may be found in the New York Times, November 29, 1973.
2. Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1974), p. 520
3. Ibid., p. 524.
4. Letter of invitation to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim from the Foreign Ministers of the United States and the USSR, December 18, 1973:
Dear Mr. Secretary-General:
On 22 October 1973, the Security Council adopted Resolution 338 jointly sponsored by the Soviet Union and the United States which calls for negotiations to start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices, aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The Soviet Union and the United States have now been informed by the parties concerned of their readiness to participate in the peace conference which will begin in Geneva on 21 December. The conference should be convened under the auspices of the United Nations.
The parties have agreed that the conference should be under the co-chairmanship of the Soviet Union and United States. The parties have also agreed that the question of other participants from the Middle East area will be discussed during the first stage of the conference.
It is our hope that you will find it possible to participate in the opening phase of the conference, at which it is expected that the governments concerned will be represented by their respective foreign ministers and later by their specially appointed representatives with ambassadorial rank. We also hope that you can make available a representative who would keep you fully informed as the conference proceeds. Finally, we would also appreciate it if the United Nations could make appropriate arrangements for the necessary conference facilities.
If as we hope you find it possible to participate, as co-chairmen the Soviet Union and the United States would appreciate it if you would agree to serve as convener of the conference and preside in the opening phase.
We request that you circulate this letter to members of the Security Council for their information. We believe it would be appropriate for the President of the Security Council to consult informally with the membership with a view to secure a favorable consensus of the Council.
Sincerely, . . .
5. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
December 19, 1973
FROM: Secretary Kissinger
As we look towards the opening of the Conference on the Mid East in Geneva of Friday, I thought you might want to have some perspectives of where we are and where we want to go. The strategy we developed in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war is unfolding largely as planned. We have built on the ceasefire and negotiating formula worked out during my October 20–22 trip to Moscow to stabilize the ceasefire on the Israeli-Egyptian front and to launch the negotiating process which will begin in Geneva. This is a historical development, the first time the Arabs and the Israelis will negotiate face to face in a quarter of a century. We have done this while enhancing our influence in the Arab world and reducing that of the USSR.
Egypt, Jordan, and Israel will participate. Syria, historically the great spoiler of the Mid East, has decided for the time being to stay away. Waldheim will be there in a limited role, taking some of the European and non-aligned pressure off our back while satisfying Israeli concern.
The Syrian non participation decision is very satisfactory for us — a blessing in disguise. We narrowly averted a situation in which all three Arab states would go to Geneva while Israel, in the midst of an election campaign, would decide not to participate because of Syrian intransigence in refusing to give prisoner lists.
But Asad, under pressure from the Baath Party, adhered rigidly to the position that there must be prior agreement on Syrian-Israeli disengagement before he attends the Conference. If he had dropped this condition, Israel would not have participated unless Syria first made available the list of POWs and allowed Red Cross visits. This was unlikely. If it was Israel that was seen balking, our whole effort and hard won renewal of confidence in the Arab world would have been set back; the likelihood of renewal of war increased; any chance of easing the oil embargo would have disappeared and further restrictions applied; and the possibilities for a Russian resurgence in the area enhanced.
In present circumstances: (1) we can now concentrate on agreement between Egypt, Jordan, and Israel; (2) the fact that there is a Geneva Conference will help achieve disengagement of forces in the next six weeks; (3) the Geneva Conference provides some, though not a decisive deterrent to a renewal of hostilities; (4) it provides Faisal an excuse to lift the embargo, hopefully sometime in January.
For these reasons, we should let Asad stew in his own juice for a while and let moderate Arab pressures and possibly some Soviet pressure build on him as he watchfully, with suspicion and mistrust, awaits developments at Geneva. We shall have to watch him carefully and make clear to the Soviets that they are contributing to another war in the Middle East by the substantial supplying of Syria, and that another war would have a serious effect on our relations. Intelligence indicators are beginning to point to a possible renewal of fighting on the Syrian-Israeli front, and we should make clear to the Russians they must pull out all the stops with their Syrian ally to prevent this. If it were to occur, Sadat could not stay out, and Hussein would be under even greater pressure than in the past to participate in a meaningful way, and once again the specter of a Soviet-American confrontation could face us.
As I look ahead, I believe there is a real chance of an Egyptian-Israeli agreement on disengagement. Sadat has bought our concept of a step by step phased approach. He has been consistent throughout — he decided he was going to Geneva no matter what.
The prospects between Jordan and Israel are also hopeful since they share a mutual interest in keeping out the Palestinian radicals from the West Bank. Both seem ready to explore ideas that will strengthen Hussein’s authority in the West Bank as an insulation against radical inroads.
As to Syria, its participation later may prove possible if progress can be made behind the scenes with our help to resolve the POW issue and get agreement on the outlines of Syrian-Israeli disengagement. We thus in a way have the best of both worlds. Regardless of their non participation, their unwillingness to talk separately to the Israelis, and their distaste for partial solutions, our relations with Syria have improved. As a result of my talk with President Asad, we shall soon be establishi
ng an Interests Section in Damascus. This should lead to a better dialogue and enable us to play a more effective role between Israel and Syria.
The Russian role will be tested anew. I do not believe they will be obstructive; neither will they be particularly helpful. We must meet the strong Arab desire that they deal with us directly; they want agreements to come largely as a result of US efforts. At the same time, we will have to keep the Russians in the picture and coordinate our efforts with them as much as possible.
As for Israel, the reality of their situation is beginning to sink in. If Mrs. Meir’s Labor Party wins sufficient support, at least the door is open. Israel finds itself unable to afford another attritional war, and at the same time unable to score an overwhelmingly decisive victory. They are beginning to see this very unpleasant fact. Anguishingly, they seem to be moving towards serious negotiations. In this connection, our continuing sea pipeline of arms is absolutely essential. But a rightist victory could be seriously complicating to our peace efforts; we will know soon.
XVIII
THE FIRST SHUTTLE: EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT
1. Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 971.
2. See US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Transmittal of Documents from the National Security Council to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., Part 1 (February 6, 1974) and Part 2 (February 20, 21, 1974).
3. J. F. terHorst and Colonel Ralph Albertazzie, The Flying White House: The Story of Air Force One (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1979).
4. On the adventures of the traveling press, see Richard Valeriani, Travels with Henry (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1979).
5. The Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on Disengagement of Forces in Pursuance of the Geneva Peace Conference, signed on January 18, 1974, at Kilometer 101 by the Chiefs of Staff of Egypt (Gamasy) and Israel (Elazar) and witnessed by UNEF Commander Siilasvuo, read as follows:
A. Egypt and Israel will scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, sea, and air called for by the UN Security Council and will refrain from the time of the signing of this document from all military or paramilitary actions against each other.
B. The military forces of Egypt and Israel will be separated in accordance with the following principles:
1. All Egyptian forces on the east side of the Canal will be deployed west of the line designated as Line A on the attached map [see the map on p. 839]. All Israeli forces, including those west of the Suez Canal and the Bitter Lakes, will be deployed east of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.
2. The area between the Egyptian and Israeli lines will be a zone of disengagement in which the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed. The UNEF will continue to consist of units from countries that are not permanent members of the Security Council.
3. The area between the Egyptian line and the Suez Canal will be limited in armament and forces.
4. The area between the Israeli line (Line B on the attached map) and the line designated as Line C on the attached map, which runs along the western base of the mountains where the Gidi and Mitla Passes are located, will be limited in armament and forces.
5. The limitations referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 will be inspected by UNEF. Existing procedures of the UNEF, including the attaching of Egyptian and Israeli liaison officers to UNEF, will be continued.
6. Air forces of the two sides will be permitted to operate up to their respective lines without interference from the other side.
C. The detailed implementation of the disengagement of forces will be worked out by military representatives of Egypt and Israel, who will agree on the stages of this process. These representatives will meet no later than 48 hours after the signature of this agreement at Kilometer 101 under the aegis of the United Nations for this purpose. They will complete this task within five days. Disengagement will begin within 48 hours after the completion of the work of the military representatives and in no event later than seven days after the signature of this agreement. The process of disengagement will be completed not later than 40 days after it begins.
D. This agreement is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement. It constitutes a first step toward a final, just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 and within the framework of the Geneva Conference.
For Egypt: [signed] Mohammad Abdel Ghani Al-Gamasi, Major General
Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces
For Israel: [signed] David Elazar, Lieutenant General
Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces
Witness:
[signed] Ensio P. H. Siilasvuo, Lieutenant General Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force
6. The “United States proposal” on force limitations, signed by President Sadat and Golda Meir, read as follows:
In order to facilitate agreement between Egypt and Israel and as part of that agreement, and to assist in maintaining scrupulous observance of the ceasefire on land, air, and sea the United States proposes the following:
1. That within the areas of limited armaments and forces described in the agreement, there will be: (a) no more than eight reinforced battalions of armed forces and 30 tanks; (b) no artillery except anti-tank guns, anti-tank missiles, mortars and six batteries of howitzers of a caliber up to 122 mm. (M-3) with a range not to exceed 12 kilometers; (c) no weapons capable of interfering with the other party’s flights over its own forces; (d) no permanent, fixed installations for missile sites. The entire force of each party shall not exceed 7,000 men.
2. That to a distance 30 kilometers west of the Egyptian line and east of the Israeli line, there will be no weapons in areas from which they can reach the other line.
3. That to a distance 30 kilometers west of the Egyptian line and east of the Israeli line, there will be no surface-to-air missiles.
4. That the above limitations will apply as from the time the agreement on disengagement between Egypt and Israel is signed by the parties and will be implemented in accordance with the schedule of implementation of the basic agreement.
XIX
THE ENERGY CRISIS
1. US Cabinet Task Force on Import Control, The Oil Import Question: A Report on the Relationship of Oil Imports to the National Security, February 1970, pp. 124–125.
2. John M. Blair, The Control of Oil (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), p. 215.
3. Craufurd D. Goodwin, ed., Energy Policy in Perspective: Today’s Problems, Yesterday’s Solutions (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981), Table A-4, p. 694.
4. See, e.g., David D. Newsom, “Our Arsenal Must Include Our Values,” Washington Star, April 2, 1981. Newsom was the Assistant Secretary of State responsible for relations with Libya at the time of Qaddafi’s takeover.
5. Blair, The Control of Oil, pp. 221 ff.
6. For example, at least twice in 1973 (once during the October war), James E. Akins, White House energy expert and subsequently Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, advised the oil companies to urge Saudi Arabia to link oil policy to a “satisfactory” change of American policy in the Arab-Israeli dispute. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Multinational Oil Corporations and US Foreign Policy, Report by the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, 93d Cong., 2d sess., January 2, 1975, p. 143.
7. See New York Times, November 23, 1973.
8. This was the sophomoric thesis of a segment of CBS television’s news program 60 Minutes — “The Kissinger-Shah Connection?” — broadcast on May 4, 1980, as well as of numerous columns by Jack Anderson in the Washington Post, e.g., December 5, 10, and 26, 1979. See also the even more spurious account in Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, The World Challenge (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981), pp. 51–56, 65–70.
9. US Senate, Multinational Oil Corporations and US Foreign Policy, p. 150; Edith Penrose, “The Development of Crisis,” in Raymond Vernon, et al., “The Oil
Crisis: In Perspective,” Daedalus 104, no. 4 (Fall 1975): 51. See also Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York: Stein & Day, 1980), p. 97.
10. Blair, The Control of Oil, p. 264.
XX
ENERGY AND THE DEMOCRACIES
1. Quoted in Daniel Colard, “De la crise de l’énergie au dialogue ‘Nord-Sud,’ ” Studia Diplomatica (Brussels), 28 (1975): 647; Richard P. Stebbins and Elaine P. Adam, eds., American Foreign Relations 1974: A Documentary Record (New York: New York University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1977), p. 34.
2. Michel Jobert, Mémoires d’avenir (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1974), p. 287; Michel Jobert, L’Autre regard (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1976), p. 379.
3. William M. Brown and Herman Kahn, “Why OPEC is Vulnerable,” Fortune, July 14, 1980: The decline was 25 percent measured in US dollars; in deutsche marks the real price of oil fell 40 percent; in yen 50 percent. “Moreover, during much of that five year period, almost every OPEC country offered substantial discounts from the official prices in order to increase its own exports.”
4. See, e.g., the column by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak in the Washington Post, March 23, 1974. The French Ambassador denied the charge in a letter to the editor, Washington Post, March 26, 1974.
XXI
THE ROAD TO DAMASCUS: AN EXPLORATORY SHUTTLE
1. Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life (New York: William Morrow, 1976), p. 599.
2. Golda Meir, My Life (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1975), p. 455.
3. See Richard Valeriani, Travels with Henry (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1979), pp. 267–269.
XXII
THE DECLINE OF DÉTENTE: A TURNING POINT
1. As finally passed in the Trade Act, P.L. 93–618 of January 3, 1975, the key paragraph of the Jackson amendment read as follows:
SEC. 402. FREEDOM OF EMIGRATION IN EAST-WEST TRADE
(a) To assure the continued dedication of the United States to fundamental human rights, and notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act products from any nonmarket economy country shall not be eligible to receive non-discriminatory treatment (most-favored-nation treatment), such country shall not participate in any program of the Government of the United States which extends credits or credit guarantees or investment guarantees, directly or indirectly, and the President of the United States shall not conclude any commercial agreement with any such country, during the period beginning with the date on which the President determines that such country —
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