(1) denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate;
(2) imposes more than a normal tax on emigration or on the visas or other documents required for emigration, for any purpose or cause whatsoever; or
(3) imposes more than nominal tax, levy, fine, fee, or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice, and ending on the date on which the President determines that such country is no longer in violation of paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
2. See, e.g., “Clear It with Everett,” New York Times editorial, June 3, 1969; and White House Years, pp. 150–155.
3. See Andrei D. Sakharov, Sakharov Speaks (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 211–215.
4. Andrei D. Sakharov, Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom (New York: New York Times Books, 1968).
5. Paula Stern, Water’s Edge: Domestic Politics and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979), p. 99.
6. See White House Years, pp. 199–215,938–949.
7. Edward R. Fried, Alice M. Rivlin, Charles L. Schultze, and Nancy H. Teeters, Setting National Priorities: The 1974 Budget (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 339. Similar arguments were made by George W. Rathjens and Jack Ruina in “Trident: A Major Weapons Decision,” Washington Post, September 22, 1973.
8. Fried, et al., Setting National Priorities: The 1974 Budget, p. 341.
9. White House Years, pp. 204–210.
10. Statement of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 9, 1979, in US Congress, Senate, Hearings on the SALT II Treaty before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st sess., Part, 3 p. III.
11. White House Years, pp. 130–138.
12. Ibid., Chapter XIII, note 4, p. 1486.
XXIII
THE SYRIAN SHUTTLE
1. See the New York Times, April 12 and 17, 1974.
2. Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life (New York: William Morrow, 1976), pp. 583–589.
3. The Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, signed in Geneva on May 31, 1974, and the “United States proposal” on force limits, read as follows:
A. Israel and Syria will scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and will refrain from all military actions against each other, from the time of the signing of this document, in implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 dated October 22, 1973.
B. The military forces of Israel and Syria will be separated in accordance with the following principles:
1. All Israeli military forces will be west of the line designated as Line A on the map attached hereto, except in the Quneitra area, where they will be west of Line A-I [see the map on p. 1100].
2. All territory east of Line A will be under Syrian administration, and Syrian civilians will return to this territory.
3. The area between Line A and the line designated as Line B on the attached map will be an area of separation. In this area will be stationed the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force established in accordance with the accompanying protocol.
4. All Syrian military forces will be east of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.
5. There will be two equal areas of limitation in armament and forces, one west of Line A and one east of Line B as agreed upon.
6. Air forces of the two sides will be permitted to operate up to their respective lines without interference from the other side.
C. In the area between Line A and Line A-i on the attached map there shall be no military forces.
D. This agreement and the attached map will be signed by the military representatives of Israel and Syria in Geneva not later than May 31, 1974, in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference under the aegis of the United Nations, after that group has been joined by a Syrian military representative, and with the participation of representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union. The precise delineation of a detailed map and a plan for the implementation of the disengagement of forces will be worked out by military representatives of Israel and Syria in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group who will agree on the stages of this process. The Military Working Group described above will start their work for this purpose in Geneva under the aegis of the United Nations within 24 hours after the signing of this agreement. They will complete this task within five days. Disengagement will begin within 24 hours after the completion of the task of the Military Working Group. The process of disengagement will be completed not later than twenty days after it begins.
E. The provisions of paragraphs A, B and C shall be inspected by personnel of the United Nations comprising the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force under this agreement.
F. Within 24 hours after the signing of this agreement in Geneva all wounded prisoners of war which each side holds of the other as certified by the ICRC will be repatriated. The morning after the completion of the task of the Military Working Group, all remaining prisoners of war will be repatriated.
G. The bodies of all dead soldiers held by either side will be returned for burial in their respective countries within ten days after the signing of this agreement.
H. This agreement is not a peace agreement. It is a step toward a just and durable peace on the basis of Security Council Resolution 338 dated October 22, 1973.
For Israel: [signed] Major General Herzl Shafir
For Syria: [signed] Brig. General Hikmat al-Shihabi
Witness for the United Nations: [signed] Ensio Siilasvuo
United States Proposal
In order to facilitate agreement between Israel and Syria and in implementation of that agreement, and to assist in maintaining scrupulous observance of the ceasefire on land, air and sea, the United States proposes the following provisions:
(1) That the area of limitation in armament and forces west of Line A and east of Line B will be 10 kilometers in width. In each area, respectively, the following are permitted: (a) two brigades of armed forces, including 75 tanks and 36 pieces of short-range 122 mm artillery; and (b) the entire force of each party shall not exceed 6,000 men. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force will inspect these provisions in the 10 kilometer zone.
(2) That in the area between 10 and 20 kilometers west of Line A and east of Line B: (a) there will be no artillery pieces whose range exceeds 20 kilometers; and (b) the total number of artillery pieces permitted is 162 with a range of not exceeding 20 kilometers; and (c) surface-to-air missiles will be stationed no closer than 25 kilometers west of Line A and east of Line B.
(3) Inspection of the provisions in paragraph 2 above will be performed by the U.S. aerial reconnaissance and the results will be provided to both sides.
(4) The area of separation between Lines A and B will not have any military forces. In the towns and villages in the area there will be stationed police forces of a size and character similar to those stationed in other Syrian towns and villages of comparable size.
(5) The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force will take over the positions in the area of separation on Mount Hermon. No military observation of any kind may be conducted in that area.
XXIV
THE LAST HURRAH
1. See the Baltimore Sun, May 18, 1974; the Miami Herald, May 19, 1974; the Detroit Free Press, May 19, 1974. The authors were James McCartney and Saul Friedman.
2. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Role of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger in the Wiretapping of Certain Government Officials and Newsmen, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974 (executive session of July 23, 1974, made public September 29, 1974), p. 227.
3. Nixon’s letter to Fulbright, dated July 12, 1974, read as follows:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Your letter of June 25 has been brought to my attention, and I welcome this opportunity to affirm my public statement of May 22, 1973, as quoted in your letter, and to add the following c
omments.
You appreciate, I am sure, the crucial importance of secrecy in negotiations with foreign countries. Without secret negotiations and essential confidentiality, the United States could not have secured a ceasefire in South Vietnam, opened relations with the People’s Republic of China, or realized progress in our relations on the SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union.
The circumstances that led to my decision to direct the initiation of an investigative program in 1969 are described in detail in the May 22 statement. I ordered the use of the most effective investigative procedures possible, including wiretaps, to deal with certain critically important national security problems. Where supporting evidence was available, I personally directed the surveillance, including wiretapping, of certain specific individuals.
I am familiar with the testimony given by Secretary Kissinger before your Committee to the effect that he performed the function, at my request, of furnishing information about individuals within investigative categories that I established so that an appropriate and effective investigation could be conducted in each case. This testimony is entirely correct; and I wish to affirm categorically that Secretary Kissinger and others involved in various aspects of this investigation were operating under my specific authority and were carrying out my express orders.
Sincerely,
[signed] Richard Nixon
4. See note 2 above.
5. A US-Egyptian agreement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was signed in Washington on June 29, 1981, and submitted to the Congress. See Barbara Crossette, “U. S. Nuclear Pact with Egypt Gains,” New York Times, September 13, 1981.
6. Asad interview with Arnaud de Borchgrave, Newsweek, June 10, 1974.
7. Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978),
p. 1015.
8. White House Years, pp. 1216–1222, 1229–1242.
9. Nixon, RN, p. 1024.
10. William Safire, “Under the Summit,” New York Times, June 27, 1974.
11. White House Years, Chapter XXVIII.
12. William G. Hyland, Soviet-American Relations: A New Cold War? (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, Series in International Security and Arms Control, R-2763-FF/RC, May 1981), pp. 26–28.
13. White House Years, p. 548.
14. Nixon, RN, p. 1030.
15. See also my testimony on the SALT II treaty before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 31, 1979, in US Congress, Senate, Hearings on the SALT II Treaty before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st sess., Part 3, p. 169.
XXV
THE END OF THE ADMINISTRATION
1. On assertions that the Kennedys may have resorted to wiretapping in the i960 campaign see Victor Lasky, It Didn’t Start with Watergate (New York: Dial Press, 1977), pp. 38–45 and sources cited on p. 418. On the possible wiretapping of Nixon’s campaign plane in 1968, see Nixon interview with James J. Kilpatrick in the Washington Star News, May 16, 1974, quoted, ibid., p. 215. Nixon was apparently told this by J. Edgar Hoover.
2. White House Years, pp. 1475–1476.
3. Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 21.
4. Other participants have slightly different recollections of the statement though they agree in substance. See Ford, A Time to Heal, pp. 21–22; Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 1066.
5. Carroll Kilpatrick, “Nixon Says He Won’t Resign,” Washington Post, August 7, 1974.
6. Nixon, RN, pp. 1076–1077; Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, The Final Days (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1976), pp. 422–424.
Index
A-4 Skyhawks, 512
Abdessalam, Belaid, 880, 882
Abdullah, King, 217
ABM systems: protocol on (1974), 1165–1166
SALT I treaty on (1972), 256, 261
Soviet, 1165–1166
US, 259, 1001, 1165–1166, 1194
Acheson, Dean, 434, 911, 1122
Action Committee for the United States of Europe, 138
Adenauer, Konrad, 144, 928
Afghanistan, 675, 677, 687, 1030
Agence France Presse (AFP), 342, 346, 367
Agency for International Development (AID), 385n
Agnew, Spiro T., 15, 310–311
relationship of, with Nixon, 90, 91, 92, 109
resigns, 470, 495, 499. 501
Agranat Commission, 1039
Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, 11, 42, 295, 370, 372
Article 7, 32, 33, 323, 330
Article 15(a), 32
Article 20, 10–11, 16, 32–33, 34, 35, 303, 320, 323, 332, 333
Article 21, 39
and Cambodia (see Article 20, above)
Chinese views on, 57–58, 60
Khmer Rouge views on, 348
HAK briefs press on (January 24, 1973), 8, 40
HAK on (press conference, April 23, 1973), 308
HAK statement to Nixon on prospects of, 42–43
and Laotian cease-fire, 21
Laotian views on, 20, 22
North Vietnamese views on, 29, 31–32, 37, 42, 372
and prisoners of war, 26n
terms of, 9
Thai views on, 14
US views on, 11, 15, 303–308, 315
VIOLATIONS OF: HAK-Tho talks on, 329–335
North Vietnamese, 16, 32, 35, 302–303, 316–317, 319–321, 323–324, 325–326, 327, 328
South Vietnamese, 32, 303
US response to, 316–327, 328
Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, 167, 274–286, 292–293, 723, 926
proposed, 274–275
linked to SALT II, 268–269, 283
signed, 285
Soviet drafts and positions on, 275–276, 277, 283–284
US drafts and positions on, 276, 277–278, 279, 281, 282, 283–284
Agriculture, Department of, 248, 385n, 410
Air Force, US, 1005
Air Force One, 294, 818, 1132
Air Force Two, 818
Akins, James E., 947, 974
and Arab oil embargo, 776, 880–881, 884, 885, 890, 893, 894, 978
Al-Ahram, 767
Alawite sect, Syria, 779, 780
Albert, Carl, 356, 359, 598, 991
Albertazzie, Ralph, 1132
Alert of US forces (October 1973), 587–589, 591, 596, 599–600
European response to, 712–714, 715
Alessandri paper company, 394
Algeria, 631, 761–766, 866n
Allende visits, 395–396
and Arab oil embargo, 884
and Geneva Middle East Peace Conference, 766, 793
and Israel, 197
and Syrian negotiations, 1061
relations of, with US, 534, 763–766
see also Boumedienne, Houari
HAK VISITS: December 1973, 761, 762–766
April 1974, 1050–1051
Algiers summit, 756–757, 945–947
Allen, James B., 1121
Ali, Ahmed Ismail, 205, 209, 751n
Allende Gossens, Salvador, 374–405, 411, 429
assaults Chile’s constitutional system, 381, 384, 392, 397, 402
coup attempt against (June 29, 1973), 400–401
stifles domestic opponents, 381–382, 399
domestic problems of, 391, 392–395, 396–398, 399–400, 401–402
stated objective of, in Chile, 376
overthrow of, 374, 404–405
becomes president of Chile, 374–375, 377
anti-US campaign of, 379–380, 384–385, 389–390, 392, 395–396, 397, 402
US responses to overthrow of, 406–413
Allon, Yigal, 830n, 1137, 1141
and Egyptian disengagement negotiations (meetings with HAK), 814, 816, 831, 832, 837, 851
and Syrian disengagement negotiations (meetings with HAK), 1079–1081, 1084–1085
Allon plan, 215, 847–848
Alsop, Joseph, 1207
Alsop, Stewart, 307
Amalrik, Andrei, 988
Americans for Democratic Action, 988
Amman, Jordan, 655
Anaconda copper company, 376
Andersen, Knut Borge, 701, 703–704, 724
Anderson, Jack, 389, 390
India-Pakistan documents leaked to, 806, 853
Anderson, Jim, 820n, 1086n
Anderson, Robert, 1049
Andreotti, Giulio, 89, 149–150
Andrews, Bonnie, 214n, 232
Andronikov, Constantin, 130
Angkor Wat, 16
Angola, 252, 440, 1030
antiballistic missiles. See ABM systems
anti-Confucian campaign, China, 680, 695–696
antiwar critics. See Vietnam war: opposition to, in US
AP. See Associated Press
Aqaba, Jordan, 846
Arab-Israeli conflict, 196–199, 205
see also Middle East war; individual countries
Arab Joint Defense Council, 205
Arab oil embargoes. See oil embargo
Arafat, Yasir, 503, 626, 627, 757, 972, 1037
Argentina, 376, 408
Armed Forces Appropriation Authorization for Fiscal Year 1971, Fulbright amendment to, 337–338
arms control, 134, 260, 261, 1008–1009, 1010, 1168
see also Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War; SALT
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 263, 270, 1009
Arms Control Law, Chile, 394
Armstrong, Anne, 110
Army, US, 1005
Asad, Hafez al-, 469, 490, 497, 629, 666, 761, 777, 779, 815, 832, 852, 1140
and Algiers summit, 947
and Arab oil embargo, 893, 894
Arab support for, 1071
and the cease-fire, 568
feelings about Syrian-Israeli disengagement, 1046
and Geneva Middle East Peace Conference, 748, 765, 782–785, 790, 791, 792
releases list of Israeli prisoners, 940
Years of Upheaval Page 187