The Real Chief - Liam Lynch

by Meda Ryan

  to offer GHQ (a) an unarmed flying column of 20 men for each two brigades, i.e. these flying columns to be armed by GHQ and sent by them to inactive areas; or (b) that the six brigades re­pre­sented between them arm one flying column for similar action. GHQ to see to their quartering and rationing. It is suggested that this column operate in inactive areas and as far as possible from enemy active bases.2

  This recommendation indicates how aware the assembled offi­cers were of the necessity to spread the fight. Though short of arms they were nevertheless prepared to arm a column of twenty men out of their own resources so that the fight could be carried on in inactive areas.

  From this period onwards arrangements were made for a more rapid exchange of intelligence between the brigades. It was decided to snipe at all enemy posts on one night each week and fire at them constantly by day. The key factor to emerge from the conference was that there should be mutual assistance between the brigades. The movement was also to become more wide­spread and take in the entire nation. This was the germ of a de­velopment for a divisional organisation initiated by Liam Lynch.

  A second conference of the southern brigades was held at Hickey’s in Glenville on 28 March 1921. This meeting included the representatives who had attended the previous meeting and also those of two Waterford and mid-Limerick brigades. The Third Cork and Second Cork brigades were repre­sented by a larger group of officers who were involved with Donal Hales of Italy and Michael Collins in the importation of a cargo of arms from Italy. At the conference it was planned to get the arms ship­ment into Quince Harbour near Union Hall – the distribution of arms was to extend northwards to the Limerick and Tipperary brigades as well as to Kerry. Routes were selected and the con­struction of dumps along the routes ordered. Tom Barry and Liam Deasy of Cork No. 3 brigade were selected to im­plement the decisions. Michael Leahy had gone to Italy in mid-April and was to return on the Italian ship carrying 20,000 rifles, 500 machine guns and 500,000 rounds of ammunition.3

  The formation into a divisional organisation took place on 26 April 1921 in Lynch’s brigade area at Kippagh near Millstreet. Nine brigades were included and at this meeting Liam Lynch was appointed divisional commandant.4This responsibility was far greater than that undertaken by any officer outside of Dublin and equalled only by a few officers at GHQ. He then com­mand­ed nine brigades comprising more than 30,000 officers and men.5

  Ernie O’Malley represented GHQ at the meeting and read a memorandum outlining GHQ’s conception of divisional func­tions.6According to Tom Barry, the document which he read did not find favour with many of the men: ‘Military terminology rol­led off his tongue.’ The more he continued to speak and use words like ‘terrain’ and ‘topography’ the more he angered his lis­teners.

  The men O’Malley was dealing with were shrewd and men­tally alert, men like Liam Lynch, Seán Moylan, Humphrey Mur­phy, Andy Cooney, Tom Barry, Liam Deasy, Dan Breen, John Joe Rice and other well-known names. Seán O’Hegarty com­mand­ing Cork No. 1 brigade jumped to his feet and told Ernie O’Mal­ley to shut up. O’Hegarty voiced the bitter feelings, which many of the IRA fighting officers now entertained to­wards GHQ. He asked why didn’t a senior staff officer like Michael Collins or Richard Mulcahy come, indeed, ‘why didn’t any of these ever think it worth their while to visit any of the active fighting units in the south?’ It was a plea of frustration. These men in the Sout­hern Division, in touch with the grass roots of the fight, living daily on their wits now had confirmed what they had for some time believed, that Collins, Mulcahy, and the men at GHQ had no conception of what guerrilla fighting was all about.

  As the meeting continued Barry told the meeting that the order from GHQ bore no relation whatever to the realities of the situation in the south. ‘There’s no point in using ornate language and meaningless military phrases to impress hard-bitten officers who are daily fighting forces against all odds. These men in GHQ don’t understand what is required to make split-second decisions when a group of men are in danger of being sur­rounded. They don’t know what quick action is needed when an ambush or bar­racks’ attack doesn’t go according to plan.’7It would not work hav­­­ing brigades moving around in a large battalion when ‘the three Cork brigades could hardly muster 300 rifles between them, were without automatic weapons, artillery or transport, had no proper signalling equipment and no proper staff arrangements.’8

  A close friend of Lynch, Seán Moylan of Cork, shouted, ‘We started this war with hurleys, but by heavens it seems to me we will finish it off with fountain pens.’

  Nevertheless, the First Southern Division was set up and Lynch now had to accept what the documents stated was ‘a grave and solemn responsibility’. In area and numerical strength Lynch’s division was more than three times the extent of any division subsequently formed – he now had the IRA in three and a half counties under his command. Hope was expressed at this meet­ing that the Italian consignment would materialise and trans­form the entire conflict in the south. Before the meeting closed Barry suggested that something should be done to stop the exe­cutions of IRA prisoners. Prisoners were held in the military de­tention barracks in Cork and a number of executions, after trial by military court, had already taken place. Barry suggested that Major General E. P. Strickland, the British General O/C in the martial law area, should be told that if the IRA’s demand was not met that reprisals would be carried out. Four of O’Hegarty’s volunteers from Cork and one from the Tipperary area were due for execution before a firing squad in Cork towards the end of April. Liam Lynch undertook to write to General Strickland in­forming him of their decision. A plan of reprisal was drawn up in case Strickland chose to ignore the warning.

  The executions of the four Cork volunteers took place on 28 April 1921 and the plan was immediately put into action. (Simul­taneous attacks on all British garrisons in the division on Satur­day 14 May at 3 p.m.) Not all the brigades participated in the action. Cork No. 3 under Barry’s command was the most suc­cessful. Throughout the south it resulted in a higher British casu­alty list than had ever been the case since Easter Week 1916.

  1 The brigades represented were Cork No. 1; Cork No 2; Cork No. 3; Tipperary No. 2; Tipperary No. 3; East Limerick.

  2 First formal conference, Southern Brigade, 6 January 1921

  3 Ewan Butler, Barry’s Flying Column.

  4 Brigades: three Kerry, three Cork, two Waterford and one West Lime­rick.

  5 Of these Cork No. 1 brigade with 7,500 all ranks was the largest; Cork No. 3 was next in strength with 5,270; Cork No. 2 numbered 4,700; Kerry No. 1 numbered 4,000; Kerry No. 2 numbered 3,400; Water­ford (2 brigades) 2,270; West Limerick 2,100 and Kerry No. 3, 1,350. The British forces occupying the area were estimated at 21,260 including 18,750 troops, 1,600 RIC, 340 Auxiliaries, 570 marines.

  6 At the meeting Cork No. 2 brigade was represented by Liam Lynch and Seán Moylan: Cork No. 1 by Seán O’Hegarty and Florence O’Donog­hue: Cork No 3. by Liam Deasy and Tom Barry: and Cork No. 1 by Andy Cooney: Kerry No. 2 by Humphrey Murphy: Kerry No. 3 by John Joe Rice: Tipperary by Dan Breen: the Waterford and West Limerick brigades were not repre­sented.

  7 Meda Ryan, The Tom Barry Story, p. 77.

  8 Ewan Butler, Barry’s Flying column, p. 149.

  13. GHQ’s lack of consultation with Cork brigades

  Liam Lynch realised that a central headquarters would now be neces­­sary for himself and his divisional staff. This was secured at Mac­Suibhne’s house, Coolea – an area where the people were loyal and trustworthy. Not a word of English was spoken in these head­quarters and from this isolated spot, lines of communication to all the brigade headquarters and to GHQ were quickly estab­lished. This meant the involvement of railway workers, lorry drivers and all who could help in getting dispatches to their des­tinations. Lynch had put in motion an intricate system to assi­milate what had been happening in different areas; for secu­rity reasons written orders and directions were kept to a mini­mum and often coded. M
aurice Walshe of Mitchelstown, who had been Lynch’s principal staff officer, moved to this area and took up duty.

  Lynch’s next task was to visit the brigades within a week of his appointment as divisional commander. With Florence O’Donog­hue, he travelled at times on foot, at times in pony trap, on horse­back or by boat and the entire inspection tour lasted fifteen days. In each of the brigade areas which the two men visited they had meetings with battalion and column commanders:

  Every factor influencing the development of the fight was reviewed in detail – organisation, training, arms, intelligence, supply of ex­plosives, communications, security, availability of men and wea­pons for columns, leadership and control of all formations down to the companies – all these were examined and orders given for such revisions and changes as were found to be necessary.1

  Flying columns had come to be accepted as the most effective formation of command while the arms’ position remained criti­cal. It was always Lynch’s hope that more arms might become available and thus change the situation. For successful guerrilla activity, speed and surprise was translated into success. When evasion was essential to survival, evasion was the correct policy. It upset Liam to think that the civilian popu­lation were often treated savagely, therefore he urged all units to remain vigilant, and impressed on the officers the value of sniping and road-cut­ting on a well-planned scale. According to Florence O’Donog­hue: ‘the impact of his vigorous personality and his confident grasp of every fact in a complex situation had a bracing effect. He inspired many officers with a new and wider concept of the task and the objective.’2

  Upon the formation of the Southern Division Lynch had to undertake responsibility for the administrative and supply prob­lems which a vigorous campaign entailed. While under­taking such a task he continued the policy he operated in his own bri­gade of giving officers the maximum authority and freedom of action, and of holding them responsible for the results. In order to ob­tain arms and provision of food and clothing they needed money. He adopted a method of putting a levy based on the Poor Law Valuation of the individual holdings to cover the entire popu­lation of each brigade area. This meant that the poor areas bore less of the burden as they were already over-taxed through pro­viding food on a large scale for the men ‘on the run’. In the majo­rity of cases the levy was freely given. Similar organisation was undertaken in the nine brigades in his division. However, all suf­fered from a lack of arms.

  In the No. 3 area, the flying column under Tom Barry’s com­mand fought a number of successful actions including Crossbarry on 19 March 1921 where 104 officers and men outfought 1,200 British forces by breaking the encirclement and inflicting casu­alties on the enemy, destroying part of their transport and captu­ring a large quantity of arms and ammunition.

  Lynch, in an effort to maintain a high standard of efficiency in the columns, suggested that all should remember the lessons learned in previous attacks – failures and success alike. He issued some orders and memoranda, an example of which is as follows:

  ... When moving, columns should have advance and rear guards connected with the main body.

  Columns should never move into the country until it is first scouted and the O/C has satisfied himself that it is either free of the enemy, or is aware of the exact position he occupies.3

  Lynch undertook all his activities in an efficient manner as can be seen from the many ‘Operation Orders’ which he issued.4

  As time progressed, further plans were worked out. On the horizon there was to be the establishment of a divisional training camp at which all brigade officers and column commanders would undergo courses of intensive training. The courses were to be continued for other officers and the whole project visualised the creation of a divisional column for operations. Commandant Tom Barry of Cork No. 3 brigade was to be training officer and was to command the divisional column when formed. The establishment of the camp in Clydagh Valley between Rathmore and Ballyvourney was also being planned. Barry was not in agree­ment with the idea as he felt that by bringing together so many senior officers, the IRA was running the risk of putting the entire armed effort in the south-west of Ireland in jeopardy. It was his contention that ‘if the officers were to be captured or wiped out in a confrontation it would cripple the decision-making of the re­­­maining volunteers as well as being a devastating blow to morale.’5He also believed that guerrilla warfare could not be taught. If men, with aggression and initiative, came into the active areas he felt this would be superior to any training camp as they would parti­cipate in action. This was the first major dis­agree­ment which Barry had with Lynch. However, though Barry dis­agreed with Liam Lynch’s decision on the divisional training camp issue, he was nevertheless prepared to give it a try. With Liam Deasy, Barry was on his way towards the Cork/Kerry border when at the end of the first day’s journey a dispatch arrived from Lynch informing them that the area of the proposed camp was infested by the enemy and it would be advisable to wait until the enemy with­drew.

  In early May 1921 the extremely fine weather did not favour guerrilla warfare. In certain areas British forces formed a type of mobile unit where ten or twenty men in lorries were dropped in regions under an officer or a senior NCO. They moved across the country silently and quickly with the minimum of equipment to a rendezvous where they were again picked up by their transport. Such activity was a potential threat to individuals and to the IRA communication system. It immobilised many of the volun­teers’ basic units, destroyed communications and added to their losses as a number of men were killed or captured. The failure of the Italian arms’ shipment as well as a large-scale extensive com­bing of mountainous areas made the task of fighting the crown forces extremely difficult.

  In Lynch’s area the combined force of Cork No. 2 and Kerry No. 2 brigades ambushed a party of police near the village of Rath­more on 4 May 1921. Eight policemen were killed and their arms and ammunition captured. That night the enemy forces as a reprisal set fire to five farmhouses (four of which were totally destroyed) in the vicinity of the scene of the ambush. Later they burned down Rathmore creamery and Co-operative Stores.

  On 1 June a cycle patrol of police was ambushed between Castle­maine and Milltown by Kerry No. 1 brigade under the com­­mand of Tadgh Brosnan – six Auxiliaries were killed and five wounded and their ammunition and arms were captured. Under the command of Paddy O’Brien a large-scale action against the crown forces took place on 16 June at Rathcoole (between Mill­street and Banteer) where columns from Millstreet, Kanturk, New­­market, Charleville and Mallow combined forces. They at­tacked four lorries of Auxiliaries. One hundred and forty IRA were involved and suffered no casualties. The following day they re­covered 1,350 rounds of ammunition which the Auxiliaries had abandoned. This was a great coup for Lynch’s brigade.

  On the night of 11 May, Paddy O’Brien, his brother Dan and Jack O’Regan were in John O’Donnell’s, near Liscarroll, when they were surprised by British troops. The two O’Briens and O’Regan ran out the back way but were fired on. O’Regan was hit and fell. Dan O’Brien and Jack O’Regan were captured. Paddy O’Brien escaped. Dan O’Brien was taken to Cork military bar­racks, tried by drumhead court-martial and sentenced to death. He was exe­cuted on 16 May 1921. That night, when returning from Limerick, Liam Lynch and Florrie O’Donoghue had a nar­row escape. They intended reaching Kiskeam, near Mallow, but be­cause their horse was tired they rested for the night near Tuar. In a round-up at Kis­keam, Seán Moylan was captured, and sub­sequently sen­­tenced to fifteen years penal servitude. Only for the tired horse Liam and Florrie would have slept in the same house with Moylan that night.

  Lynch arrived back at division headquarters on 17 May and remained there until 31 May, when he set out to visit the Water­ford brigade. Back in headquarters on 14 June he did some book­work, then left three days later for further visits to brigades. Dur­ing this period one of the most extensive combing operations under­­­taken by the British forces had bee
n carried out in the moun­tainous area enclosed by the circle – Kilgarven, Rathmore, Mill­street, Ballyvourney and Dunmanway. Several thousand lorry-cam­ping troops supported by armed vehicles and aircraft partici­pated in the operation, which began on 6 June. General Strick­land defined their mission as that of ‘seeking out the IRA columns, bringing them to action and annihilating’.

  According to the Morning Post, ‘Information has been re­ceived from Ireland that the IRA is being mobilised ... Present happenings seem clearly to indicate that the rebel army means to come into the open ... In the wild country around the Clydagh Mountains, County Kerry, the concentration of a rebel force is in progress and at least 1,000 are already massed.’6It seemed as if the forces of the crown and the British newspapers were under the impression that the IRA would come out and attack openly as they had done in 1916. A week after the appearance of this news item in the Morning Post the sweep began.

  Strickland’s order was in Lynch’s hands almost as soon as it reached Strickland’s own brigade commanders. Though the weather favoured the British action, broken bridges and trenched roads hindered their movement, and because of their slow rate the columns outstripped them. The columns generally moved under darkness whereas the British forces halted at night. The Cork columns and Kerry No. 2 column were the main targets. Good in­telligence and prompt reports made it possible to keep all units informed of the progress of the raiding forces. Divisional headquarters were centrally situated and were able to send dis­patches readily. Though it might have been possible for some of the columns such as Barry’s flying column to break the encircle­ment, evasion was considered to be a better policy because of the enor­mous superiority of the enemy in both men and weapons.