The Real Chief - Liam Lynch

by Meda Ryan

  Each of the eighteen officers of the Southern Division at this three-day council meeting openly expressed their opinion on the military situation. The division O/C reported:

  ... We are fought to a standstill, and at present we are flattened out ... The men are suffering great privations, and their morale is going ... These men have been continually going for years back ... quite satisfied to carry on until Executive meeting when he [O/C] will satisfy himself on the following points: (1) What are we fighting for? (2) Can we win militarily?... The majority, while believing that military victory was no longer a possibility expressed a willingness to continue the struggle though, ‘the present forces against us will cripple us eventually, and we cannot hope to last against them’.2

  They emphasised that because of reduced strength, diminished ammunition supplies and the difficulty of their position they would have to operate on a smaller scale with fewer units.

  Lynch, listening to the men who had the pulse of the situ­ation, was receiving a much more realistic view of the position than he could have visualised from headquarters in Dublin. He was aware, he told the meeting, that the southern counties were opposed by the heaviest concentration of Free State troops in the country; it was his view also that the peace offensive would be made mainly against the south. The relative strength of their forces was discussed, and Tom Barry emphasised strongly that in the entire country their strength did not exceed 8,000.3This number was opposed by the Free State authorities with a build up force of at least 38,000 combat troops, with the extra facilities of barracks, armoured cars and artillery. Lynch felt that a meeting of the Executive could be risky. But, as he listened to the out-spoken opinion of men whom he knew well for their loyalty and fighting quality, he became more convinced that they were in a crisis situation, therefore it was imperative that an Executive meeting should be held.

  When the conference ended he wrote to Con Moloney ex­pressing his resentment of action taken on the part of some offi­cers who were inclined to work independently of GHQ. ‘What they mean by acting on their own views I cannot understand. However, I hope we are now done with it.’

  It emerged from this meeting that Lynch was determined the fight should go on, despite the fact that some of the members of the First Southern Division were beginning to lose confidence. He was convinced that eventually the Free State government would be forced to enter into some form of negotiations as em­phasised in a long letter, which he wrote to Con Moloney, dated 29 March: ‘I still have an optimistic view of the situation; if we can hold the army fast all will be well.’4However, instead things began to take a turn for the worse.

  A tragic sequence of death and captures were to follow. Denny Lacey, O/C Tipperary, had been killed on 18 February 1923 in the Glen of Aherlow. Con Moloney was wounded and captured after a fight in the Glen. His brother Jim, intelligence officer of the Southern Command and Tom Conway O/C communica­tions, who were wounded in that fight, were also taken prisoners. (Tom Derrig replaced Con Moloney as adjutant general and Lynch himself temporarily took over the duties of the command O/C.) In Knocknagoshal, Co. Kerry when three Free State offi­cers and two men were killed in a mine trap, nine Republican prisoners were taken from Tralee jail as a reprisal, they were tied together and placed over a mine at Ballyseedy on 7 March. When the mine was exploded, eight of the prisoners were shat­tered and one was blown over a tree to a nearby field and so es­caped; on the same day five prisoners taken from Killarney jail were bru­tally treated and four died. A few days later four priso­ners on the way to jail were taken from the lorry and shot in a field. On 12 March, five prisoners met a similar fate. The conflict was now de­teriorating into a bitter attack, such atro­cities were unmatched by anything previously seen in an Irish conflict.

  ‘Liam was nauseated by the news,’ according to Todd An­drews. ‘He seemed to live with the irradicable belief that Irish men, particularly if they had served in the pre-truce IRA, were born without the stain of original sin.’5

  On 2 March, Lynch had directed the adjutant general (Con Moloney before capture) to call a meeting of the Executive for 9 a.m. on Thursday 15 March in the Second Southern Division area. Northern members were to assemble at Rathgormach, west­ern members at the Glen of Aherlow and southern members at Araglin on the same date. It had been decided that all mem­bers would eventually go to the vicinity of Goatenbridge. How­ever, because of continuous Free State activity in the area, arrange­ments had to be cancelled and the meeting was post­poned until 23 March. De Valera had meanwhile written to Con Moloney (5 March) stating his disappointment that Lynch, ‘has sent no report. His silence seems ominous to me. I think the former O/C Second Southern Division should proceed to that area and in­vestigate the condition there.’6

  During this period, while arrangements were being made for the holding of the Executive meeting, a proposal for the cessa­tion of hostilities was being mooted by the archbishop of Cashel Dr Harty. A letter as well as a number of other pro­posals were mooted by priests and laymen who had contacted Tom Barry requesting that Republican leaders should be in­formed of the contents of the letter which was issued on 2 March.7

  The idea behind the letter was to bring the sides together and ‘end the present deplorable state of affairs in Ireland ...’ Under three points there was a call for ‘the immediate cessation of hostilities ... the dumping of arms ...’ and ‘subsequent to a General Election the arms and munitions to be handed over to the elected Government of the country.’8

  Fr Tom Duggan was one of the main instigators in preparing the peace proposals and, at his request, Tom Barry agreed to cir­culate the document. On 15 March, Lynch, Barry and other offi­cers of the First Southern Division were in the Ballyvourney district when Fr Duggan called on them and again spoke of some ‘peace formula’. Lynch stuck to his views as set out in previous docu­ments. Fr Duggan, still hopeful, left two days later for Dub­lin to meet Archbishop Byrne and W. T. Cosgrave, head of the Free State government. According to Todd Andrews, ‘Barry was much more flexible; but Lynch made it clear to all that he was not willing to compromise in any way. There was a strongly word­ed letter to Barry which I saw, in which Lynch ordered him to discontinue further involvement in peace talks.’9

  Lynch and Andrews were in bed one night when the bed­room door was suddenly kicked open. A figure appeared in the doorway holding a lighted candle in one hand and a sheet of paper in the other. Both men jumped up believing ‘that we are at the mercy of the Staters.’ Then Liam recognised Tom Barry.

  Barry waved the piece of paper. ‘Lynch, did you write this?’ he shouted angrily.

  ‘Yes,’ Liam replied.

  ‘A tirade of abuse followed from Barry, mainly directed at asserting the superiority of his fighting record.’ The paper in Barry’s hand was Liam’s order to withdraw from peace feelers. Liam did not respond to Barry’s abuse, but waited until ‘having emptied himself of indignation, Barry withdrew slamming the door ...’

  At night time, Lynch, who spoke little by day, would chat about the day’s events or newspaper items which, according to Andrews, had become mere propaganda sheets for the Free State government. Lynch specifically resented the term ‘irregulars’ which was used by the Provisional Government and others to describe the anti-treaty forces. ‘He often adverted to his beliefs that if we accepted the treaty we would become a mere province of Britain.’ Andrews once ventured to suggest what a misfortune it was that the country had not given De Valera full control and stood by him in his rejection of the treaty. ‘Liam didn’t altoget­her agree with this view; even Document No. 2 would have been too much for him willingly to accept. Liam had not been at all in favour of the IRA setting up an alternative government; he be­lieved that De Valera would make a compromise peace and he opposed the holding of a meeting of the Executive for the same reason’.10

  Lynch, accompanied by Todd Andrews, left Gurteenflugh on 17 March for the Executive meeting which was to be held in Bliantas at the foot of the Monavullagh mou
ntains. At Carriganimma they were joined by Tom Crofts, Tom Barry, Humphrey Murphy and a number of other men.11

  They were taken by lorry to Bweening, from there they tra­velled by pony and trap. ‘Tom Barry immediately took com­mand,’ said Todd Andrews. ‘We drove into the night and it was easy to see why Barry was probably the best field commander in the IRA. Before approaching any cross roads he dismounted, cover­ing the passage of the lorry with the bodyguards. The opera­tion he was commanding was not complicated, but his air of con­fidence and authority impressed me. One felt safe with Barry in charge.’12Around midnight they arrived outside Kil­worth hav­ing decided previously to abandon the lorry and con­tinue on foot towards Araglin. Feeling thirsty they decided to call on a pub, had one round, and moved off in three pony and traps provided by the local company to pre-arranged billets organised by these North Cork men.

  Apparently ‘the boys’ had some days previously acquired a lorry-load of bacon and distributed it to the people around the area. Lynch, Barry and the others had a wholesome meal before trudging twenty miles over the Knockmealdowns to Ballinamult for the all-important Executive meeting – the meeting which the members had waited months for Lynch to convene.13

  1 Captured documents, P7a/199, Mulcahy papers, University Col­lege Dublin, Archives; see also Irish Independent, 9 April 1923.

  2 Mulcahy papers, University College, Dublin, Archives, P7a/199.

  3 In First Southern Division relative strength: Republicans 1,270; Free State, 9,000; Southern Command – Counties: Cork, Kerry, Lime­rick, Clare, Tipperary, Kilkenny, Carlow, Wexford, and ap­proxi­mately half Galway, 6,800 Republicans; Free State 15,000. Total Free State combat troops 38,000 approximately.

  4 Lynch to Con Moloney, 29 March 1923.

  5 Todd Andrews, Dublin Made Me, p. 280.

  6 Captured documents, P7a/199, Mulcahy papers, University College Dub­lin, Archives.

  7 Signatures of Canon Ryan, adm. Thurles; Rev. P. O’Leary, CC, Cork. Rev. Tom Duggan; Frank Daly, chairman Cork Harbour Board; G. P. Dowdall and Dr Tadgh O’Donovan, Cork; Most Rev. D. Harty, Cashel.

  8 Irish Independent, 8 March 1923.

  9 Todd Andrews, author interview, 4/11/1983.

  10 Ibid.

  11 Seán McSwiney; Michael Crowley, Liam Riordan, Peter Donovan, Ned Fitzgibbon, Seán Cotter and Denis Galvin. A lorry driven by Michael Lucy took them to Bweening; Batt Walshe, Tadgh Mullane and Jim McCarthy took them to Jack O’Sullivan’s.

  12 Todd Andrews, Dublin Made Me, p. 212.

  13 Lynch was feeling sick, so he gave £5 to Todd Andrews and asked him to remain in Araglin until the return of the members.

  26. Death on the Knockmealdowns

  The available Executive members assembled on 23 March 1923 at James Cullinane’s, Bliantas. In view of the important matters to be discussed, De Valera, was also present.1Anxious to stop the war De Valera stated at the meeting that Irish sovereignty and the abolition of the oath were prerequisites. Following a discus­sion on the general situation, Tom Barry proposed that the Exe­cutive recognise that continued resistance would not further the cause of independence.

  The meeting had to move into the Nire Valley on 25 March because of reports of raiding forces in the area. Here the session continued at John Wall’s, Glenanore until 26 March. (This meet­­­ing took three days.)2No minutes are available, but cap­tured documents of the proceedings were published in the Irish Inde­pendent of 9 April 1923. From this long conference three view­points emerged. The following is a summary:

  (1) Lynch’s decision was to continue to fight, despite losses or dis­aster, until opponents agreed to the conditions of negotiation. It was his belief that they were still capable of offering resistance to the im­position of the treaty and that it was their duty to do so. That point of view received little support.

  (2) The belief was held that a continuation of the armed struggle was no longer the best means of advancing the cause of the Re­public, and that it would be possible through negotiations with the Free State government to agree to certain principles which would leave the Irish people uncommitted to the Treaty, and Re­publicans free to advance their cause without restriction. In prin­ciple, this meant that it would be possible for the Republicans to participate in the political and parliamentary life of the nation without taking the oath of allegiance to a foreign monarch.

  (3) The view was held that the Free State authorities were un­willing to negotiate despite the maximum military effort which had been made, and had failed. Therefore, the war should be end­ed, thus saving further sacrifice of lives in the cause of the Re­pub­lic. This view advocated the dumping of arms as the most accep­table way of ending the resistance.

  These main points were discussed in view of:

  1: The heavy losses by death and capture of officers and men.

  2: The executions which had again been resumed in March following their suspension in February.

  3: Lack of arms and ammunition to continue with further resistance.

  It was estimated that, at this time, internment camps held ap­proxi­mately 13,000 prisoners. There seemed to be no way that they could retaliate against the execution of men other than through anarchy and Lynch would not agree to this policy.

  Though Michael Cremin had been negotiating the impor­tation of arms from the continent, there was no indication that this would be successful. Lynch was more hopeful than the situ­ation warranted that arms would be forthcoming from Germany. In December 1922 as chief-of-staff of the IRA, he had written to Joe McGarrity in the United States expressing the hope that ‘you have by now met Comdt Gen. Seán Moylan who has been sent by Army Council as Executive Representative to Clan’ for the purpose of collecting funds and negotiating the purchase of heavy weapons to be got through Germany and dispatched to Ire­land.3

  In a letter that Lynch had sent to Seán Moylan on 6 Feb­ruary 1923 it appears as if he was confident of obtaining at least ‘one piece of artillery now ... which could be moved round amongst our strong force and this would completely demoralise enemy and end the war ... A big cargo is not required; even a few, with sufficient shells, would finish up the business here ...’4Dur­ing this period Lynch appeared to live under the false hope that things would go his way – that arms would come, that all would be right for the Republicans and, therefore, for Ireland.

  A proposition at the March Executive meeting, formulated and proposed by Tom Barry and seconded by Tom Crofts sug­gested:

  That in the opinion of the Executive further armed resistance and operations against F. S. government will not further the cause of independence of the country.

  As this motion (which De Valera was not allowed to vote on, but was allowed to speak in its favour)5was defeated by one vote, five against six (Lynch voting against the motion),6it appeared im­possible to reconcile the divergent views held by members of the Executive. Because of this, and also the hope that mountain artil­­lery would soon become available, a decision was taken to ad­journ the meeting until 10 April. Meanwhile, De Valera was to endeavour to bring certain negotiations which had been pro­gressing through intermediaries to finer points so that they could be presented at the next Executive meeting, which would re-as­semble at Araglin.

  After the meeting, Lynch walked down the road with De Valera. He reflected aloud ‘I wonder what Tom Clarke would think of this decision.’7

  De Valera stopped. ‘Tom Clarke is dead,’ he said. ‘He has not our responsibilities. Nobody will ever know what he would do, for this situation did not arise for him. But it has risen for us and we must face it with our intelligence and conscious of our re­spon­sibility.’8

  Southern members, Barry, Crofts, and McSwiney returned to the Ballyvourney area while Lynch, Aiken and Hyde moved northwards towards Callan. While billeted in Kilcash on Good Friday 30 March, Lynch received news that Matt Ryan, a mem­ber of his staff, had been killed the previous day. It was again a moment of soul-searching for Liam. When Kathleen Barry spoke to him, he sai
d that there were three courses open to him: ‘to fight on; to surrender; a third option – he would not mention as he did not like to contemplate – the dumping of arms.’ But he told her that the adjourned Executive meeting would clarify the position. Even then, he had an optimistic faith in the ability of the west­ern divisions to continue the fight. Lynch told Todd An­drews before they parted a few days earlier, that ‘he hoped he would be able to carry the Executive with him in his determination to fight on ... he had hopes of making a comeback in the west’ and had suggested that after the Executive meeting he would send Andrews to the west ‘to take charge there’.

  Lynch, at this stage, wished to visit Kirwans of Graigavalla where he had billeted while on the run after action in Fermoy in September 1919. He wanted to be with Bridie Keyes. It was the last time she would see him alive. It was a very memorable visit; the Republic’s cause was foremost in most of the conversations; as Liam’s boots were pretty worn, Jerry Kirwan took it upon him­self to repair them. (These are now in the National Museum, Dub­lin.)