Operation Neptune

by Kenneth Edwards

  Now, after the invasion of North-west Europe has been successfully carried through to its ultimate conclusion, it is at last possible to assess the value of the Dieppe raid in more precise terms. It had long been maintained, with perfect truth, that no invasion can be said to have been successfully launched and the troops properly established ashore until such time as the invading forces have captured a port at which the unloading of reinforcements and supplies can be continued irrespective of weather conditions. We knew that Dieppe was strongly defended, but we did not know how strongly. Had we not probed those defences we might have fallen into the error of attacking a port in the initial stages of the real invasion—an error which would have been disastrous indeed. The experience at Dieppe gave us the clue to German strategy in face of invasion—a strategy of holding the ports to the last, irrespective of the total loss of their garrisons. Realisation of this fact led to the design and construction of the great artificial harbours which had so great a part in the successful “build-up” of our armies after D-day.

  Other important but more technical lessons were learnt at Dieppe. It was realised, for instance, that no ordinary concentration of naval gunfire or air bombing would be sufficient to knock out the German prepared defences even for the few minutes while the assault troops were landing and crossing the open beach, and that something more effective would have to be devised. Something more effective was devised before D-day, and undoubtedly saved a great many lives among our assault troops on that day.

  It is important to remember that all the operations against North-west Europe prior to D-day were raids. They were concerned only with the landing and subsequent extrication of small bodies of assault troops. In no case was there an attempt to effect a “build-up,” even over a short period of a few hours. This is the essential difference between a raid or “reconnaissance in force” and an invasion. In the latter the “build-up” is a naval commitment as great as the delivery of the assault, and must be continued without a break for many months.

  The actual invasion experience of the United Nations was, prior to D-day, confined to operations in the Mediterranean and the Pacific, and in neither of these theatres of war did any operation approach in difficulty or complexity the invasion of the Normandy coast. The invasion of French North Africa was not against an uncompromisingly hostile coast. The invasion of Sicily and Southern Italy were against coasts held chiefly by dispirited Italian troops with fixed defences bearing little relation to Hitler’s “Atlantic Wall,” which the Todt Organisation had been building for years. The other invasions on the Italian coast had had limited objectives, while the invasions in the Pacific had, up till then, been against island outposts far removed from reserves.

  Yet from all these operations we had learnt lessons which were to stand us in good stead in the invasion of Normandy, where the whole strength of Germany in the west of Europe could be rapidly deployed against us. In Sicily we tried out a naval gunnery technique, both for bombardment and for giving naval supporting fire to our troops, and this we perfected at Salerno and Anzio. We even learnt from the Japanese. During their determined counter-attack against Henderson Field on Guadalcanal Island the Japanese used a squadron of battleships for bombardment. Since then no invasion in either hemisphere has been carried out without initial bombardments and supporting fire from battleships’ guns.

  So, gradually and often painfully, the experience was built up, and all the time the training of a nucleus of specialised personnel and the development and production of special craft and equipment went forward.

  A view from the gun port of a destroyed concrete block-house on the beach Vierville-sur-Mer, sometime just prior to the great storm of 19-22 June 1944 which destroyed the Mulberry Harbour.

  British Commando troops of the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division coming ashore from LCIs (Landing Craft Infantry) Gold Beach, D-Day, 6 June 1944.

  D-Day, Utah Beach, 08:00. Four battalions of the US 4th Infantry Division have landed.

  Part One

  PREPARATION

  CHAPTER I

  BY FORTITUDE, FAITH AND FORESIGHT

  The beginning of the planning—Early thoughts of invasion in the Pas de Calais area—Preliminary concentration on the Mediterranean—Choice of site for invasion of Northern France—The “X Staff”—The “COSSAC Plan”—Decisions of the Quebec Conference—Appointment of Admiral Ramsay.

  When Mr Winston Churchill made his second statement to a crowded and cheering House of Commons on D-day he announced that the commanders on the spot had reported that so far everything was going according to plan. He paused significantly and added, “and what a plan!”

  Those four words were a just tribute to all those who had worked unremittingly behind the scenes for so long in the preparation of a plan which provided for every possible contingency, and in which all the manifold and intricate parts fitted together with minute exactness and were carefully dovetailed with other movements far removed from the English Channel. Some idea of the magnitude of the task of planning this great expedition may be gained from the fact that the orders for “Operation Neptune” which was only the naval component of the invasion—amounted to a printed book of foolscap size three inches thick.

  The planning of the invasion of North-west Europe naturally sprang from small beginnings, and it passed through many vicissitudes, even before the final detailed planning of the operation was begun.

  The story begins in 1941, when two radical changes had taken place in the strategic aspect of the war. These were the entry of the United States of America into the war following Japan’s treacherous attack on Pearl Harbor, and Hitler’s assault on Russia. Both of these led indirectly to a review of plans for the establishment of a “second front” in Western Europe.

  The vast war-potential of the United States was beginning to make itself felt. American production of war materials was keyed to a pitch which already enabled it to expedite delivery in the West as well as the East, and the enormous planned expansion of the United States Army formed a potential strategic reserve—a reserve the lack of which had hitherto circumscribed all Allied strategy.

  At the other side of the world, Russia was being very hard pressed and was asking repeatedly for the establishment of a land front against Germany in the West in order to draw off some of the divisions of the German army, nearly the whole strength of which was being hurled against her.

  On both counts the establishment of a “second front” in North-west Europe seemed a tempting prospect, the more so as it would force Germany to fight the “two-front war” which had always been dreaded by the German High Command.

  Thus, towards the end of 1941, the Chiefs of Staff Committee charged Lord Louis Mountbatten, Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas and General Sir Bernard Paget to examine the possibilities and prepare a tentative outline plan for an assault on Europe across, the English Channel. Lord Louis Mountbatten was the Chief of Combined Operations; Sir Sholto Douglas was Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Fighter Command of the Royal Air Force, and Sir Bernard Paget was Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces. These three officers did much valuable and careful, work in examining the plethora of factors which of necessity influenced the choice of areas in which a footing on the continent might possibly have been obtained, having regard to the potentialities of the sea; air and land forces at that time available.

  The more these problems were studied the larger loomed the difficulties and the risks. The mere question of availability of ships and landing craft then restricted the possible area of assault to the heavily defended Pas de Calais area, and it seemed that, although beachheads might be secured, the shipping resources might prove insufficient to provide a sufficient “build-up” of the forces ashore to allow the beachheads to be exploited and consolidated to a degree which would ensure their ability to withstand the inevitable strong counter-attack of major German forces. Nevertheless, these three officers produced a tentative outline plan, making the best use of everything that was likely to be avai
lable.

  In May, 1942, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, who was at that time commanding at Dover, was temporarily relieved of his command and summoned to London. His absence from Dover was at that time intended to be only temporary, but he did not return to that command, for from that time on he was fully engaged in the planning and execution of amphibious operations.

  Admiral Ramsay was the naval commander designate for the projected operation against the Pas de Calais area, and General Freyberg was to be military Force Commander. The air component was to be commanded by Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory. These officers formed what was called a “Round-up Planning Staff,” and their first duty was to examine the outline plan for the invasion of the Pas de Calais and build around it a detailed plan for the proposed operation. It was not long before they found that the resources available or likely to be available to them would not allow of the plan being implemented without the acceptance of risks which they considered unjustifiable, not only because of the losses which would inevitably be incurred by failure, but also because failure would obviously lengthen the war and have a very serious effect upon our Allies and upon neutral opinion.

  The chief responsibility for deciding whether the proposed landing in the Pas de Calais area was, or was not, feasible rested with Admiral Ramsay and General Freyberg. When, on detailed examination of the situations which were likely to arise in the event of the attempt being made, General Freyberg found himself doubtful of the ability to take a certain vitally important objective unless he could be assured of a certain speed and volume of “build-up,” and Admiral Ramsay found that he could not be sure of providing that rate of “build-up” with the forces available to him, it was obvious that the proposed operation was unsound, and a definite report in this sense was made to the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

  There followed the mid-summer meeting between Mr Churchill and President Roosevelt in Washington.

  At their conference at Washington Mr Churchill and President Roosevelt examined the war situation in the light of the impracticability of attempting a cross-Channel invasion of France at that stage in the war, and they decided to adopt an alternative which had originally been suggested by Lord Louis Mountbatten. This was the invasion of French North Africa which, coupled with a great reinforcement of the strength of the Eighth Army, might be relied upon to clear the enemy from the whole of North Africa. This would in turn enable Italy to be invaded, in which case the surrender of Italy could be expected. Such a train of events would, by opening the Mediterranean, effect such a saving in shipping that the eventual invasion of Northern France would be brought nearer.

  This was not an easy decision for President Roosevelt to take. A large section of public opinion in the United States had been impatiently awaiting the invasion of Hitler’s “European Fortress” ever since the announcement, in February, 1942, of the arrival in the British Isles of the first contingent of United States troops. There was some excuse for such an attitude among a public far removed from the theatre of active warfare and without vivid and painful experience of German strength. Americans felt that if their men were to be overseas they might as well “get on with it and get it over” in the west so that the whole energies of the Allies might be diverted to the crushing of Japan. They blamed British dilatoriness when they received letters from the troops expressing boredom and homesickness, but containing no news of impending invasion. Even in some high places in the United States there was impatience and a conviction that the British were being over-cautious—but the justification of that caution came in August with the experience at Dieppe.

  The outcome of the talks at Washington was the victorious campaign of the Eighth Army, beginning with the battle of El Alamein in October, and the Allied invasion of French North and West Africa in the following month.

  The needs of “Operation Torch”—as the French North African invasion was called—entailed the diversion overseas of practically all the equipment which had up till then been earmarked for the proposed invasion of the Pas de Calais area of France. The British First Army and the United States Second Corps had to be taken to the Mediterranean, together with vast quantities of equipment and stores both for the armies and the air forces. The shipping commitments were tremendous, the numbers of ships and craft running into thousands. Most of the planning staff which had been working on the possibility of an invasion of Northern France were also diverted to “Torch,” from which they followed on almost automatically to “Operation Husky”—the invasion of Sicily.

  There remained in England, however, a skeleton planning staff whose work—and it was at this time mostly research—was still attuned to the invasion of France from Great Britain.

  By April, 1943, the situation in the Mediterranean had clarified. The whole of the North African coast from the frontier of Spanish Morocco opposite Gibraltar to Suez and beyond was dominated by the Allies. Convoys were already able to pass through the Mediterranean without provoking major naval and air battles. The requirements for the invasion of Sicily had been worked out. It was possible to think again about the invasion of Northern France without feeling that it was largely an academic study which might have to be postponed for so long that much of the preparatory work might prove useless.

  At this time it was considered that the naval Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth would be the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief for any cross-Channel invasion. Geographically this was perfectly sound. As a result of the preliminary research it had been decided in June, 1943, that the invasion landings would take place on the Normandy coast between the rivers Orne and Vire.

  It was a bold decision, taken by the then Combined Commanders, of which Admiral Ramsay was one, because any invasion on that coast would have the enemy-held naval bases of Le Havre on one flank and of Cherbourg on the other. Among the various points in favour of this choice, which was to be so amply justified by events, was that it would be sheltered by the Cotentin Peninsula against the prevailing westerly winds, while the whole of that part of North-west France could be converted almost into a vast island if all the bridges of the Seine and the Loire could be destroyed by air attack.

  It was obvious that, in the event of an invasion of the Normandy coast in the Bay of the Seine, the Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth would be more intimately concerned than any flag officer in any existing appointment. He was responsible for that sector of the English Channel, and a very high proportion of the Assault Forces and the “build-up” would inevitably sail from the chief ports under his jurisdiction—Portsmouth, Southampton, Cowes and Portland.

  In order to continue the preliminary planning of the cross-Channel invasion there was created a special staff called the “X Staff,” which worked in Norfolk House in St James’s Square, London, but which came under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, as Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief designate for the invasion. This staff, which was set up in April, 1943, was led by Commodore J. Hughes-Hallett, who had the title of “Chief of Staff (X)” to Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth.

  There could hardly have been a better choice for this appointment than Commodore Hughes-Hallett. He had plenty of sea experience and plenty of staff experience. Moreover, he had extensive knowledge of the planning of combined operations on a high inter-Service level, having been closely concerned with the planning side of the Combined Operations Command. Commodore Hughes-Hallett did not, however, hold that appointment for very long. He was required elsewhere, and was relieved a few months later by Rear-Admiral G. E. Creasy. Even so, Commodore Hughes-Hallett left his mark, and the cause of freedom owes him a tremendous debt of gratitude, for it was he who evolved the idea of the “Mulberries”—those immense synthetic harbours—one of which enabled us, without the use of an established port, to build up our invasion forces sufficiently to be able to deal with the worst that Rundstedt, von Kluge and Rommel could bring against them. There is no question that the idea of the “Mulberries,” together with the ability to build and place them, completely revolutionised
the technique of invasion.

  The section of the combined staff ruled over by the “Chief of Staff (X)” to the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, was only the naval component of an organisation embracing all three British Services and with a skeleton United States representation. The whole organisation was the department of the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, with the short—and of course secret—title of COSSAC. No Supreme Allied Commander had at that time been appointed, but this staff worked on all the preliminary questions in order that the Supreme Allied Commander should have a tangible plan to examine and comment upon when he was appointed. Experience had shown that it is better for the base of the pyramid to settle before the apex is placed in position, otherwise the Supreme Commander is apt to become so immersed in detail that he has little time left to discharge his duty of co-ordination and control at the highest level.

  The results of the work of the naval, air and military components of the department of the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander were co-ordinated in an outline plan which was called the “COSSAC Plan.” This “COSSAC Plan” was laid before the Chiefs of Staff Committee in July, 1943, who approved of it. There followed the meeting of Mr Churchill and President Roosevelt at Quebec, where the “COSSAC Plan” was discussed in detail and received the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the two nations.

  This was a great stride forward in the direction of successful invasion—not solely because an outline plan had been agreed and approved by those responsible for the higher direction of the war in both Great Britain and the United States. It was the knowledge behind the approval which was all-important; knowledge that a sufficiency of trained men, specialised equipment, shipping and aircraft would be forthcoming for that plan to be considered feasible, as the foundation of a detailed plan which could be carried out in face of the worst that the enemy might do to try and prevent its execution.