Operation Neptune

by Kenneth Edwards

  The requirements of “balanced loading” were so complicated and imposed so great a strain upon an already fully extended transport system that it was determined to operate it only for the very minimum of time. Thus it was to be used only in the initial stages of the invasion of Normandy. As soon as it could be said that our invading troops were firmly established ashore in France, “balanced loading” was to be abandoned, except in certain special cases. The problem would then become one of ensuring that every ship was used to the utmost to speed the rapid reinforcement and supply of the invasion armies.

  Here again, a tremendous amount of planning and organisation was necessary. One of the first things to be done was to earmark cargoes for particular ships well in advance. This entailed considerable “cargo planning,” which depended not only upon the characteristics of the ship but also upon the characteristics of the cargo. It is one thing to say that a ship is capable of stowing in her holds a certain tonnage of cargo, but quite another thing to say how much cargo of a particular type she can carry. It is quite impossible to produce any sort of rule or formula which will tell how many packages of different shapes, sizes and weight will fit into a ship’s hold with a theoretical capacity of, say, 500 tons. The “cargo planning” therefore had to consider each ship and each cargo separately and contrive means of “marrying” them harmoniously.

  Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay was very conscious of the vital importance of speed and quantity during the “build-up,” and of the fact that the ideal maximum could only be obtained if there were no delay to any vessel at either end of her voyage or during the marshalling and transit of the convoys.

  To eradicate as far as was humanly possible all chances of delay, he set up two organisations. One was the “Build-Up Control Organisation,” with the short title “BUCO,” and the other the “Turn-round Control Organisation,” called “TURCO” for short.

  Both “BUCO” and “TURCO” were keyed to the same object—reducing to the minimum, and if possible eradicating, any delay of ships; which is in effect the same thing as economising in shipping space. But, while “TURCO” dealt with the routeing of ships to and from ports where berths and cargoes were immediately available, the marshalling of the ships into the convoys, and clearing unloaded ships from the beachhead area as quickly as possible; “BUCO” dealt with the more involved problems of co-ordinating all available shipping with the needs of the military authorities.

  In formulating his plans for the “build-up” phase of the operation, Admiral Ramsay insisted upon adherence to three basic principles. The first of these was to strain every nerve and available resource to land in France the maximum military force and the maximum quantity of stores and equipment within the first three days—that is, by D plus 3. The second was that the “build-up” organisation after D plus 3 should settle down to work to a regular schedule of daily voyages which would avoid sudden “peaks” of delivery at the beaches, interspersed with comparatively slack periods. The third was that, in working out the “build-up” schedule, LCT’s (Landing Craft, Tanks) and LST’s (Landing Ships, Tanks) should as far as possible always use the same ports and “hards” for loading in this country. He knew that a great many of the landing ships and landing craft would be commanded by young officers of very limited experience, so that an organisation which enabled them to become familiar with one port and one berth, and always to use that port and that berth, would avoid delays and reduce the possibilities of accidental damage.

  The essence of the planning of the “build-up” was to reduce its many complications and introduce simplicity into the organisation. Only by making it as simple as possible could a plethora of orders and instructions be avoided. Although Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay insisted upon the most minute planning and upon detailed orders, nobody appreciated more clearly than he did that undue complications and too many orders are a sure foundation for mistakes and confusion.

  No man could say far how long the “build-up” period would last, but it would certainly be many months. The preparation and issue of detailed orders for every convoy for every day for months would have swamped all concerned in paper work. Hence the adoption of a scheme whereby, as soon as the initial period of the first three days was over, there should be established a schedule for the “build-up” which could be repeated indefinitely, with only such small alterations as changing circumstances dictated. In working out the details of the “build-up,” “BUCO” found that any particular voyage or convoy could be repeated every fourth day. Thus the working schedule for the “build-up” was laid down in detail for three days in such a way that this three-day schedule could be repeated indefinitely. This repetitive three-day time-table would begin on D plus 4—the day after the initial three-day period in which Admiral Ramsay was determined to follow up the initial assault by landing the maximum in France without sparing any ship or any man—a pressure which neither man nor material could indefinitely maintain.

  With this three-day recurring time-table only six days’ detailed orders were necessary; those for the initial three days and those for the first three days of the repetitive “build-up” schedule. The recurring time-table would, of course, be subject to small alterations dictated by circumstances, but it would remain substantially the same.

  Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay himself said that his task was to build a bridge to France. The bridge that he was designing was to carry two-way traffic at a steady speed which would allow of each “vehicle” delivering a precisely similar load every fourth day, so that the whole vexed question of traffic control and loading and unloading could be reduced to the simplest possible operation, which would be completely repetitive for as long as was necessary.

  The metaphor of the bridge was really an over-simplification of the maritime problems involved in the “build-up,” for there had to be several points of departure from this country, and these were dictated by considerations of harbour facilities and inland transport rather than by convenience for the organisation of the convoys at sea.

  To simplify the assembly of convoys, their control during the voyage and the dispersal of the ships to their loading ports when homeward bound, every ship carried over each side of her bridge a large blackboard on which were painted some letters and figures. These showed to what convoy she belonged, what that convoy was carrying, whether it was outward or homeward bound, and from what area in Great Britain it had sailed or to which it was consigned. To condense all this information into a form which could be painted on a board to be seen and read at a distance, a simple code was evolved. The first letter on the board was the initial letter of the country of departure, and so indicated whether the ship was outward or homeward bound. The second letter indicated the area in Great Britain from which the ship came or to which she was going. The third letter indicated the type of the cargo which she was carrying, and therefore the nature of the convoy to which she belonged. After these three letters there followed a number, which was the number of the convoy for which the ship was detailed.

  In this way the commanding officer of a destroyer could see at a glance as he steamed through a crowded anchorage what ships belonged to the convoy which he was to assemble; and the control authorities could read on the ships in the anchorage all the details which they required to know. It would be impossible to guess at the amount of paper work, signalling and time that was saved by this system.

  Here are two typical examples of the working of this simple code. If a ship had painted on her boards on each side of the bridge the legend “ETM5” it would indicate:

  “E,” standing for England, the country of departure.

  “T,” standing for Thames, the area of departure.

  “M,” standing for motor transport, the nature of her cargo.

  “5,” the number of her convoy.

  Hence “ETM5” would mean that the ship belonged to the 5th motor transport convoy outward bound from the Thames area. Similarly, a board with the legend “FWP3” would indicate that the ship belonged to
the 3rd personnel convoy from France to the Isle of Wight area.

  It will be noticed that the literal translation of the letters in the code gives the information in the reverse order to that used in ordinary parlance; but the order given in the code is the order in which it is required by the control organisation. For instance, the commanding officer of an escort group assembling an outward bound convoy could ignore all ships with legends beginning with the letter “F” without wasting time in reading the remainder of the legend.

  Giles was a famous cartoonist for the Daily Express from the 1940s through to the 1960s. Two of his signature characters were Grandma and baby. This cartoon was published 30 December 1943 with Grandma character-swapped as Churchill, and Baby being the New Year.

  CHAPTER V

  MEN MUST BE TRAINED

  Shortage of officers—Special training—the Lochailort system—Lessons of Dieppe—Bombardment requirements and training—Rocket craft—Bombardment organisation—Air “spotters” and “weavers”—The “V Scheme” for merchant seamen.

  While vast material resources were being harnessed on both sides of the Atlantic to the task of the invasion of North-west Europe, there was great acceleration in the training of personnel for amphibious warfare.

  From the naval point of view this training was always an uphill struggle. It was for a long time a question of finding means of making the best possible use of very limited material and still more limited personnel.

  The naval problem in amphibious training had been from its inception far more difficult of solution than that of the army.

  The fundamental reason for this was that, from 1941 onwards the commitments of the military forces in the United Kingdom were small, whereas the Royal Navy was at full strength, fighting the Battle of the Atlantic, the Battle of the Coastal Trade Routes, and called upon at frequent intervals to mount important and large-scale operations in the Arctic, in the Mediterranean and even farther afield.

  Nevertheless, two great training centres for naval officers and ratings who were to serve in landing craft during amphibious operations had been established. These were at Hayling Island, on the south coast of England, and at Inveraray, on Loch Fyne, on the west coast of Scotland. The former was known as HMS Northney and the latter as HMS Quebec.

  There was a great difference between these two training establishments, to a great extent dictated by their geographical positions. There was every chance that the enemy would not become aware by his air reconnaissance of what was going on at Inveraray, but the reverse was true of Hayling Island. The Hayling establishment was, therefore, used only to give the landing craft crews their preliminary training in handling these queer vessels, both at sea and during the ticklish businesses of beaching and of “unbeaching.” The Inveraray establishment became the base for advanced training for combined operations, where the Services worked together on exercises and where theories were put to the test and experiments carried out. Inveraray was, in fact, the first and most important Combined Training Centre, while Hayling Island continued to be a naval establishment for specialist training in much the same way as there were gunnery, torpedo and navigation schools in the Portsmouth area.

  The naval commander at Inveraray, and the naval officer who was responsible for working out and superintending the whole of the combined training, was Vice-Admiral Sir Theodore Hallett. Admiral Hallett is a man of energy and of vision. Moreover, he had first-hand experience of some combined operations—albeit these had been concerned with the extrication of troops rather than in victorious invasion—and knew some of the difficulties of embarking and disembarking troops. He had served with tireless distinction as a beach commander during the withdrawal of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk, and had also been at Namsos during the Norwegian campaign.

  Under Admiral Hallett’s direction and that of Brigadier Greenslade—his military “opposite number”—the work of the Combined Training Centre went rapidly forward. Not a minute was wasted. Every day officers and men practised embarking and disembarking men, vehicles and equipment. At the beginning of each course this was done by platoons. Then it was stepped up to companies and then to battalion and brigade landings. Moreover, these exercises were done both by day and by night.

  Once the men were accustomed to embarking in their craft and to landing from them across beaches; assaults were practised with fire support using live ammunition. Thus before he had completed his combined operations training every man knew what it is like to storm a beach from landing craft with live shell bursting in the close vicinity and when he himself is using live ammunition.

  The process of “stepping up” the scope of the training exercises was again carried out under these conditions, until finally each course carried out that was known as the “Brigade Exercise.” In this a whole Assault Brigade was landed, with live ammunition and with live ammunition covering fire, under conditions which would approximate as closely as possible to those which would obtain during the actual operation against the enemy which was in prospect.

  That is but a brief and sketchy outline of the work of the Combined Training Centre, but it is sufficient to demonstrate its thoroughness.

  A problem which threatened for some time to retard training was lack of junior officers to command and to act as second-in-command of landing craft. This was not due to reluctance on the part of the Admiralty to part with young officers; there were barely enough of these available to commission the ever-increasing number of ships, particularly escorts and light coastal craft, at a time when the great emergency building programmes were turning out war vessels at a rate never approached in the war of 1914-18.

  Thus, at a time when young officers were at a premium, the Combined Operations Command needed very large numbers to officer the ever-increasing number of landing craft which were becoming available. The situation was difficult, and it was aggravated by the fact that the proportion of officers to ratings required by the Combined Operations Command for the manning of landing craft bore no relation to the proportion of officers to ratings in the Navy as a whole. It thus became necessary for the Combined Operations Command to open a special cadet training establishment at Lochailort, near the western coast of Inverness-shire.

  The officers trained at Lochailort for combined operations requirements were drawn from those who had already been selected for or begun their courses of instruction before being commissioned in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. When they went to Lochailort they received the highly specialised instruction and training necessary to fit them to become officers of landing ships and craft during invasion. In order to allow them to receive this training and instruction in the time available, and to make a greater number of officer candidates available for the Lochailort training, the Admiralty waived, for the time being, certain general training and instruction which these men would normally have had to undergo before being commissioned as officers. The effect of this step, combined with the Lochailort training, was to produce a temporary but considerable acceleration in the commissioning of officers. This system successfully met the sudden and very large demand for officers of junior rank for the thousands of landing craft to be used in invasion.

  It was agreed at the time that officers commissioned from the Lochailort establishment would hold commissions which were not applicable to the naval service as a whole. This was common sense, for the Lochailort officers had received special training at the expense of training in subjects which would be most necessary for them as ordinary naval officers. One of the subjects waived in the case of the Lochailort commissions was deep-sea navigation.

  There is no denying that this system, while meeting the urgent demands for officers for invasion, did for the time being produce a specialist officer who was not a fully qualified officer in the general sense of the term. It was, however, a matter of necessity rather than of choice.

  The peak requirement for officers for the Combined Operations Command was naturally around D-day and during the immediately su
cceeding weeks. As soon as established ports on the French coast began to fall into our hands and be rehabilitated, more orthodox shipping methods could be resorted to for the reinforcement and supply of the Armies of Liberation. It followed that the demand for officers for the specialised landing craft began to decline. As soon as the needs of the Combined Operations Command for officers began to fall off and Lochailort trained officers could be released from their duties with landing ships and craft, they were detailed by the Admiralty to go through the training and courses of instruction which they had missed by going to Lochailort. Thus they became fully fledged “blue water” officers as well as having had valuable training and experience in combined operations. It is confidently expected that these young men will prove, by reason of their experience, to be even better officers than those turned out in the ordinary way for the naval service as a whole. This scheme had another advantage in that it employed a number of officers who would otherwise have been without appointments, and it produced a retardation in the rate of production of fully qualified officers which went far towards compensating for the abnormal acceleration in the rate of production of specially, but not fully, qualified officers which was necessary before the invasion.