In a midget submarine there are no refinements such as air conditioning plant. When the craft is submerged the crew have to breathe the air that has been shut into the hull before diving—and the tiny hull of an “X Craft” does not hold much air. To add to the hardships and discomfort all the crew were wet through and the labour of pumping had been added to the normal work and anxiety. So bad had been the weather that all the officers had been washed overboard during the time off the beaches when checking their navigational position. Nor was their task completed with the initial assault in their sector. The position had to be marked for the succeeding waves until the beaches were organised and clear of the enemy’s fire so that more permanent navigational marks could be set up.
When X23 finally completed her mission she was taken alongside the headquarters ship Largs, where her gallant crew, who were “all in,” were given exhaustion treatment, refreshments, and a rest before their craft was towed back to England.
A large landing craft convoy crosses the English Channel, 6 June 1944.
Rear-Admiral Talbot, commanding “Force S” said of X23 in his official report: “So ended an exploit of fine courage and no ordinary hazard and endurance. The weather was such that all officers were washed off the casing at one time or another and much water was shipped, which necessitated continued pumping. Sixty-four out of seventy-six hours were spent submerged in this small craft.” The same applied to “X20.”
Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, commented that the official reports rendered by the commanding officers of the “X Craft” made “the operation appear somewhat in the nature of a routine exercise. The hazards of the operation and the skill and endurance of the officers and men who completed it so successfully are fully appreciated.”
Early in the afternoon of 5 June the Fleet Minesweeping Flotillas duly began to sweep the ten channels southward from “Piccadilly Circus” to the assault area off the Normandy beaches. That morning a German mine had claimed the first casualty to the forces of invasion—one discounts the LST’s sunk by E-boats as they were lost during an exercise and not during the actual invasion operations. The 14th Minesweeping Flotilla found one more mine in the field that it had discovered twenty-four hours before, and the 16th Minesweeping Flotilla swept four mines in this field, but unfortunately the USS Osprey of the 7th US Minesweeping Squadron struck a mine in this field and sank with the loss of six men.
On the whole, however, the minesweeping was not as eventful as had been feared. Either the great German off-shore barrage of moored mines, which ran in a great belt almost down the middle of the English Channel, had been very greatly thinned by the weather, or it had never been properly laid and, apart from patches, existed more in propaganda than in fact. It is probable that the latter explanation is the correct one. In any case, comparatively few moored mines were encountered.
USS Osprey (AM–56), was a Raven-class minesweeper of the US Navy. On 3 April 1944, the minesweeper departed for England to take part in the invasion. At about 1700 on 5 June 1944 Osprey hit a mine that blew a large hole in the forward engine room. Fires broke out and at 1815 the ship had to be abandoned. She sank soon after with the loss of six men.
Hour after hour the minesweeping flotillas ploughed on southwards, cutting clear channels which were marked at frequent intervals by lighted danbuoys, so that the effect for the convoys following after dark was that of steaming down a street with a row of street lamps on each side. One channel alone—No. 7 which was swept by the 9th Minesweeping Flotilla—was marked by over 80 lighted danbuoys. And every one of the minesweeping flotillas engaged performed that intricate manoeuvre of changing over their sweeps to conform to the change of the tide without mistake or mishap. The weather was still far from good, but it did not worry the Fleet Minesweepers. The minesweeping motor launches, which preceded the leader of each minesweeping flotilla, however, had a very wet passage, but they stuck to their tasks and managed their sweeps most skilfully under very trying and difficult circumstances.
That the enemy’s off shore barrage of moored mines did not come up to expectation did not in any sense mean that the minesweepers had a “dull” time in those hours before H-hour on 6 June. They were very conscious of the magnitude of the task before them and of the heavy responsibility which was theirs, and they were all resolved that their minesweeping should be faultless. As Rear-Admiral Alan G. Kirk, USN, Commanding the Western Task Force, so rightly remarked in his official report: “The minesweepers were the keystone of the arch, and their task was one of unprecedented complexity.”
That all the minesweepers without exception did so well was the more noteworthy because the flotillas had not had much time to work together or to practise the manoeuvres entailed in changing the sweeps from port to starboard while sweeping a channel.
At the end of February the 1st Minesweeping Flotilla had been convoying off the North Russian coast, the 18th Flotilla had been carrying out anti-submarine patrols south of Iceland, the 6th Flotilla had been “working up,” the 14th Flotilla had been refitting, and the 4th, 7th, 9th, 15th and 16th Flotillas had been minesweeping in home waters. The 31st (Canadian) Minesweeping Flotilla had at that time been crossing the Atlantic, but the crews of this flotilla had little minesweeping experience and much of their minesweeping gear was not in good condition, for they had been used in the Western Atlantic as convoy escorts and not as minesweepers. In April the 7th and 40th United States Minesweeping Squadrons had been allocated, and the 7th Squadron had arrived in United Kingdom waters early in May.
In these circumstances the co-ordination of training for the minesweeping flotillas had been of the greatest importance. The Admiralty had entrusted the task to Captain R. B. Jennings, DSO, DSC, RN, and the success of the minesweepers in “Operation Neptune” must be accounted in no small degree a monument to his efficiency and tireless energy.
The 1st Minesweeping Flotilla, commanded by Commander R. E. H. Nicholls, RN, in HMS Harrier, was responsible for the sweeping of Channel No. 9. They found no mines at all and Commander Nicholls described it as “money for old rope.” On the other hand, the 9th, 14th and 18th Minesweeping Flotillas found and cut moored mines in the German anti-invasion mine barrage. The 9th Flotilla, commanded by Commander R. W. B. Thomson, RN in HMS Sidmouth, was responsible for clearing Channel No. 7. Not only did this flotilla find and cut moored mines, but one or two of the ships found that mines had become foul of their sweeps. This is always an awkward predicament, but far more so when sweeping an all-important channel in which there must be no risk whatever of mines being left. There was only one thing to be done. The ships steamed out of the channel into unswept water although they knew that they were in a minefield. Then they cut away their sweeps clear of the channel, streamed new sweeps, and resumed their positions in the sweeping order. It sounds courageous but simple, but it was by no means simple, for steps had to be taken to ensure that not one square yard of the water in the channel was left unswept as a result of these manoeuvres.
A little later one of the motor launches sweeping ahead of HMS Sidmouth—it was ML185—“put up” a mine right ahead of the Sidmouth which would otherwise certainly have claimed her as a casualty. A sentence from Commander Thomson’s report is worth quoting. He said: “All ships carried out their duties faithfully and exactly in circumstances where a mistake by one might easily have ruined the whole channel.” There are no two better words to describe the work of minesweepers than “faithfully” and “exactly.” What this exactness entailed may be gauged from the fact that Commander J. C. Richards, RN in HMS Vestal, commanding the 6th Flotilla, found that it was necessary at times to make an allowance in the course of as much as 20 degrees to allow for the tide.
The 14th Flotilla, commanded by Commander J. W. A. Irvine, RNR in HMS Romney, cut some mines and then had trouble of a different nature. The minesweepers were followed by a convoy of LST’s (Landing Ships, Tanks), which was over eager to get to France and launch the assault. That conv
oy got nearly half an hour ahead of time and was pressing so hard on the heels of the minesweepers that Commander Irvine was forced to send a message by PT500 (one of the American despatch boats) to the destroyer escorting the convoy telling him to slow down the convoy.
Both the 14th Flotilla and the 16th Flotilla had a most unpleasant and eerie experience on the evening of 5 June—“D minus 1.” Both these flotillas were within sight of the French coast for some hours before darkness fell, yet they had to go on sweeping steadily towards the enemy-held coast.
Commander Irvine’s 14th Flotilla found that the French coast was plainly visible by 7.40 p.m., with nearly three hours of daylight remaining. The flotilla carried on sweeping steadily towards France, expecting at any moment to be engaged by the German coast defence batteries—a prospect which was far from pleasant because the minesweepers’ first thought had to be for the channel which they were sweeping, so that they would have been unable to take any avoiding action or to dodge the enemy’s salvoes. Extraordinary as it seems, however, the enemy completely ignored the minesweepers, although by 9.45 p.m. the 14th Flotilla had approached so close to the land that individual features upon it such as houses could be plainly discerned with the naked eye. Not until 11.45 p.m. did Commander Irvine see any signs of activity from the enemy. Then there were some heavy gun-flashes from batteries in the neighbourhood of Fomenay and Roché de Grandcamp. So certain were the minesweepers that the batteries were shooting at them that their crews looked round for the shell-splashes, but they saw none and concluded that they could not be the target. Soon afterwards the men of the minesweepers had a “grand-stand” view of the heavy air attack on these and other coastal batteries, which fully engaged the Germans’ attention and effectively, if only temporarily, silenced the guns.
The 16th Minesweeping Flotilla, commanded by Commander M. H. Brown, RN in HMS Shippigan, sighted the coast of France at 8.40 p.m. at a distance of 18 miles, and had to continue to sweep towards it until the flotilla was within 11 miles of the coast. Then, to Commander Brown’s relief, came the time to carry out the manoeuvre of changing the sweep from port to starboard, which entailed steaming away from the land. As Commander Brown said in his report: “Having been described as the Lady Godiva of the party, who had to lead the parade, I felt remarkably naked at this time.”
The reason why the Germans so completely ignored the approach of these two minesweeping flotillas remains one of the great mysteries of the invasion of Normandy. It is true that the attacks of the Royal and United States Air Forces had reduced the German radar network in that part of France to a mere one-tenth of what it had been, but radar is not necessary to detect the presence of groups of ships within a dozen miles of the coast in daylight and good visibility. Even if one accepts the theory that the Germans were so highly technical that they had come to rely upon their radar to the exclusion of ordinary and more simple precautions it is not easy to believe that the minesweepers were in fact unobserved. Even if no special look-outs or coast watchers had been posted—and it is almost impossible to believe that they had not been when the Germans knew very well that ninety per cent of their radar organisation was out of action—the ships must surely have been seen by anyone who gave even a casual glance to seaward. The 14th Minesweeping Flotilla was within sight of the coast by daylight for at least three hours, and the 16th Flotilla for about an hour. Before darkness fell the men of the 14th Flotilla could clearly distinguish individual buildings ashore. A ship, to say nothing of a group of ships, is far easier to distinguish than buildings ashore, where there is in summer nearly always an evening haze. Thus the most casual of sentries must surely have seen the minesweepers.
Yet the Germans did nothing to impede the work of the minesweepers. They did not open fire with their coastal batteries even when the ships were well within range. Nor did they send to sea any of the E-boats or R-boats which were known to be lurking in Cherbourg and Le Havre. Nor did the Luftwaffe put in an appearance.
Even more amazing is the fact that the Germans apparently took no warning from the approach of these minesweeping flotillas, for the Allied High Command was quite convinced that complete tactical surprise was secured by the initial assault on the Normandy beaches next morning.
The only possible explanation would seem to be that the Germans thought that the appearance of the minesweepers was a feint, designed to “draw them.” It is worth recalling in this connection that some twenty months before D-day we had “trailed our coats” close off Boulogne with ships laden with deck cargoes of motor transport and with hundreds of landing craft. The idea had been to “draw” the Luftwaffe, and our fighter squadrons had been massed for a great “killing.” The Germans, however, had refused to respond and had not even fired a gun from a coast defence battery, although some of the ships were at one time within five miles of Boulogne in the middle of a bright, clear day.
The work of the minesweepers was far from over when they had completed the sweeping of the ten channels from “Piccadilly Circus” to the assault area off the Normandy beaches. At the ends of their swept channels they had to turn parallel to the beaches and sweep an area free of mines in which the infantry landing ships and transports could safely deploy and anchor while lowering their assault landing craft and disembarking their troops. Moreover, the areas in which the bombarding ships were to operate had to be searched for mines.
It was a matter of considerable difficulty to disengage ten minesweeping flotillas from the southern ends of their swept channels and to deploy them for the sweeping of the “lowering areas” and the searching of the “bombardment areas,” but all the arrangements had been carefully worked out beforehand and there was no hitch although some flotillas were working within two miles of the coast, and in some cases flotillas were forced to diverge from their chosen sweeping courses by the crowds of landing craft making for the beaches. The latter would not stop or change direction for any man! This phase of the minesweeping was well described in his report by Commander R. E. H. Nicholls, RN, commanding the 1st Minesweeping Flotilla, when he said: “The story of the subsequent sweeping was largely concerned with efforts to dodge the hazards of the course in the shape of other sweepers, convoys, etc.” It is noteworthy that interference by the enemy shore batteries was not mentioned as “one of the hazards of the course.”
There was also much minesweeping work to be done in the channels leading to the Normandy beaches from “Piccadilly Circus.” True, ten channels had been swept clear of mines for the initial assault, but these channels were narrow and, although so well marked, they were not sufficient to take the vast amount of shipping which would be plying to and fro across the English Channel during the immediate “follow up” and the early stages of the “build-up” period—during which the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief had stated his determination to land the very maximum of men and material in France irrespective of the strain thrown on ships and their crews. The ten channels had therefore to be widened, and widened to the extent that the spaces between adjacent swept channels were cleared of mines so that one broad channel would take the place of two of the original narrow channels. So successfully was this work tackled that before D-day drew to a close the spaces between Nos. 3 and 4 channels and between Nos. 5 and 6 channels had been swept clear of mines by the 4th, 14th, 6th and 1st Minesweeping Flotillas.
No description of the initial work of the minesweepers before H-hour would be complete without quoting a sentence from the report of Commander J. C. Richards, RN, who commanded the 6th Minesweeping Flotilla which had swept channel No. 5 from “Piccadilly Circus” to the assault area. Commander Richards said in his report: “In the increasing light it was most satisfying to see powerful ships southbound in channel No. 5, apparently undamaged and finding no difficulty in following the channel.”
It was the same in the other nine channels, but it was left to Commander Richards to find words to express the richly-earned satisfaction of the minesweepers in a most difficult and responsible job successfully
done.
US troops in an LCI(S). At the same time as the LCI(L) was handed over for US development and production, the British reworked their need for a raiding vessel into something that could be produced natively without making demands on limited resources. Fairmile Marine had already designed a number of small military vessels that were built in wood and they produced the Fairmile Type H which was another prefabricated wooden design. This was taken on as the Landing Craft Infantry (Small) or LCI(S). These were made on a cottage-industry scale throughout the country.
CHAPTER III
THE GUNS SPOKE THE PRELUDE
Preliminary bombardments—Neutralising the German batteries—Good shooting—The German torpedo boats attack—Supporting the Sixth Airborne Division—“Drenching” the beaches with high explosive—Giving supporting fire.
Coo! I’m sorry for those poor buggers on the other side!” The words were those of an able seaman in one of the little ships of the First Steam Gunboat Flotilla as he watched the initial bombardments on the morning of D-day.
The bombardments of the enemy’s coastal defences in the hours before H-hour on D-day were terrific. First the defences were subjected to a “softening up” heavy bombing from the air. In these bombing attacks Flying Fortresses, Lancasters, Liberators and Halifaxes of both the British and American Air Forces acted in magnificent co-operation. The scale of this bombing effort may be judged from the fact that between midnight and breakfast time there were no fewer than 31,000 Allied airmen in the air over the French coast and its immediate hinterland. That figure takes no account of the airborne troops and the aircraft carrying them or towing their gliders.
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